The assessors, or a majority of them, shall assess the value of the property or interest taken or used, or the damage done, shall assess the consequential damages to the property or interests not taken, and shall deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the operation of the franchise by the condemnor or from the carrying on of the business of the condemnor, provided that the consequential benefits assessed shall in no case exceed the consequential damages assessed; provided, further, that nothing in this Code section shall be so construed as to deprive the owner of the actual value of his property or interest so taken or used.
(Ga. L. 1894, p. 95, § 19; Civil Code 1895, § 4675; Civil Code 1910, § 5225; Code 1933, § 36-504.)
Law reviews.- For comment on State Hwy. Dep't v. Lumpkin, 222 Ga. 727, 152 S.E.2d 557 (1966), see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 483 (1967).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Damage construed.
- The word "damaged," has a broader meaning than the word "taken," and is designed to impose liability on a condemnor for consequential injuries to property which would not otherwise exist. Macon-Bibb County Water & Sewerage Auth. v. Reynolds, 165 Ga. App. 348, 299 S.E.2d 594 (1983).
Condemnor liable for both direct and consequential damages.
- In condemnation proceedings, the condemnor is liable not only for direct damages for the actual land taken for the public use, but in addition thereto for all consequential damages which naturally and proximately flow from the taking of the land to the remainder of the parcel or tract of land not taken as tend to diminish its market value. Georgia Power Co. v. McCrea, 46 Ga. App. 279, 167 S.E. 542 (1933).
There are two elements to be considered in connection with the damages in condemnation cases, the actual value of the land taken and the consequential damage or consequential benefit to the remaining land. Fulton County v. Power, 109 Ga. App. 783, 137 S.E.2d 474 (1964).
Just and adequate compensation.
- In an eminent domain proceeding, the "just and adequate compensation" due a condemnee is "the value" of the land taken, plus any consequential damages to the remainder if there is a partial taking, which may not be less than "the actual value" of the property taken or damaged. Macon-Bibb County Water & Sewerage Auth. v. Reynolds, 165 Ga. App. 348, 299 S.E.2d 594 (1983).
Law allows damages to property not actually appropriated in an eminent domain proceeding as consequential damages if such damages are shown. Justice v. State Hwy. Dept., 100 Ga. App. 794, 112 S.E.2d 307 (1959).
Consequential damages must be recovered in condemnation proceeding.
- Consequential damages to property not taken in a condemnation proceeding resulting from the proper construction and maintenance of the object for which the property is taken must be recovered, if recovered at all, in the condemnation proceeding. State Hwy. Dep't v. Kaylor, 110 Ga. App. 46, 137 S.E.2d 664 (1964).
Direct and consequential damages to be figured separately.
- In any eminent domain case, the evidence and instructions to the jury should be such that the jurors are enabled to figure separately the value of the land or interest therein which is taken and the consequential damages to the land not taken, the latter of course balanced against any consequential benefits and by adding the two figures return a lump sum verdict which includes both items of depreciated value to the landowner. Georgia Power Co. v. Sinclair, 122 Ga. App. 305, 176 S.E.2d 639 (1970).
Remote and speculative or possible damages are not allowed. McCrea v. Georgia Power Co., 46 Ga. App. 276, 167 S.E. 540 (1933).
Remote or merely speculative or possible damages are not allowed in considering the value of the land taken nor consequential damage to the land not taken. Southern Ry. v. Miller, 94 Ga. App. 701, 96 S.E.2d 297 (1956).
Value of land taken and consequential damages are matters of opinion.
- The question of the value of the land taken and condemned and the amount of consequential damages to be assessed against the condemnor for the remaining land are matters of opinion. Derrick v. Rabun County, 107 Ga. App. 229, 129 S.E.2d 583 (1963).
Measure of damages for property taken is pecuniary loss sustained by owner, taking into consideration all relevant factors. Ordinarily this loss is represented by the fair market value of the property interest taken, but it may be the fair and reasonable value of the property taken if in fact the market value would not coincide with the actual value thereof. Housing Auth. v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 881, 87 S.E.2d 671 (1955).
Assessment of compensation covers all damages which result from proper construction, whether those damages are foreseen or not. Whipple v. County of Houston, 214 Ga. 532, 105 S.E.2d 898 (1958).
Only direct damages allowed when legal improvements properly erected and maintained.
- When the public authorities properly erected and properly maintain the improvements authorized by law, the only right of action which is maintainable is that conferred by state constitutional provision; it does not sound in tort, and the recovery permitted is strictly limited to the direct damage inflicted by diminishing the market value of the property damaged, as measured by the difference in its market value before and immediately after the construction of the public works, excluding all consequential damages subsequently accruing, such as might be recoverable in an action sounding in tort, based on the maintenance of a continuing, abatable nuisance. Felton v. State Hwy. Bd., 51 Ga. App. 930, 181 S.E. 506 (1935).
It cannot be assumed in condemnation proceedings that there will be negligent construction or operation of the project so as to cause damage in excess of that which would naturally and proximately result from the construction and operation thereof. McCrea v. Georgia Power Co., 46 Ga. App. 276, 167 S.E. 540 (1933).
Contiguity of parcels does not render the aggregate a tract.
- The mere contiguity of several parcels of land belonging to one owner does not in itself render the lots in the aggregate an entire tract. Gaines v. City of Calhoun, 42 Ga. App. 89, 155 S.E. 214 (1930).
Platting and subdivision does not necessarily destroy unity of tract.
- The mere platting of a tract of land and its subdivision into vacant building lots does not necessarily destroy the oneness or unity of the entire property. Gaines v. City of Calhoun, 42 Ga. App. 89, 115 S.E. 214 (1930).
Assessment by majority of assessors sufficient.
- It is not necessary to the validity of an assessment in a condemnation proceeding that all three of the assessors agree upon a valuation. A majority is sufficient. Cable v. State Hwy. Bd., 208 Ga. 593, 68 S.E.2d 564 (1952).
Assessment made by two assessors in absence of third cannot be collaterally attacked in a suit for injunction. If the assessment is irregular or erroneous, it must be vacated and set aside in a direct attack upon the award. Cable v. State Hwy. Bd., 208 Ga. 593, 68 S.E.2d 564 (1952).
In a proceeding to condemn only a portion of a tract of land the only question to be determined by the jury is the amount which the condemnor should pay as just and adequate compensation for the part taken and consequential damages, if any, to the remaining portion of the tract, as such damages may be offset, but not exceeded, by consequential benefits. Alabama Power Co. v. Chandler, 217 Ga. 550, 123 S.E.2d 767 (1962).
Damages allowed for loss of right of access.
- When a street upon which a lot abuts is closed by an obstruction at an intersecting street, which, as respects the lot, makes the street upon which it abuts a cul-de-sac, although the obstruction is neither immediately in front of the lot nor touches the lot, and the obstruction thereby materially diminishes and curtails the right of the owner to the free and uninterrupted use of the street in front of the lot, as a means of access to and from different parts of the city, it constitutes a special damage to the lot, different in kind from that inflicted upon the community in general, and the owner has a right of action in damages therefor. Felton v. State Hwy. Bd., 51 Ga. App. 930, 181 S.E. 506 (1935).
When a highway or roadway to which the condemnee has a right of access is condemned as part of a limited access highway the condemnor must necessarily pay for the taking of the right of access. State Hwy. Dep't v. Ford, 112 Ga. App. 270, 144 S.E.2d 924 (1965).
No damages for easement to and from limited access highway.
- When land is condemned for use as a new limited access highway the condemnee is not entitled to damages, actual or consequential, for lack of access to that new highway by reason of any rights of easement for ingress and egress to and from that highway. State Hwy. Dep't v. Ford, 112 Ga. App. 270, 144 S.E.2d 924 (1965).
Damages for inconvenient access not compensable.
- Damages for mere inconvenience and circuity of travel in the access to one's property are not compensable in an eminent domain proceeding. State Hwy. Dep't v. Cantrell, 119 Ga. 241, 166 S.E.2d 604 (1969).
Compensable elements of damage do not include prepayment interest penalties. DeKalb County v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 235 Ga. 417, 219 S.E.2d 707 (1975).
Examination of condemnee when perpetual easement for aviation purposes sought.
- When the condemnor seeks a perpetual easement for aviation purposes, in, to, upon and over, all of condemnee's property, the examination of the condemnee is not limited to planes using only one particular runway. Schoolcraft v. DeKalb County, 126 Ga. App. 101, 189 S.E.2d 915 (1972).
Charge substantially in the language of former Code 1933, §§ 36-503 through 36-506 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 22-2-62 and22-2-63) was not error. State Hwy. Bd. v. Coleman, 78 Ga. App. 54, 50 S.E.2d 262 (1948).
Failure to instruct on definition of "consequential damages".
- Since the court's jury charge never defined the term "consequential damages" and was vague in charging the method of determining consequential damages, the charge was too vague and that part of the judgment awarding consequential damages was overruled. DOT v. Clower, 170 Ga. App. 750, 318 S.E.2d 161 (1984).
Cited in Nalley Land & Inv. Co. v. State Hwy. Bd., 49 Ga. App. 258, 175 S.E. 269 (1934); Florida Blue Ridge Corp. v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 106 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1939); State Hwy. Dep't v. Peavy, 77 Ga. App. 308, 48 S.E.2d 478 (1948); Housing Auth. v. McDonald, 87 Ga. App. 392, 74 S.E.2d 113 (1953); Georgia Power Co. v. Pittman, 92 Ga. App. 673, 89 S.E.2d 577 (1955); O.K., Inc. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 213 Ga. 666, 100 S.E.2d 906 (1957); Kellett v. Fulton County, 215 Ga. 551, 111 S.E.2d 364 (1959); State Hwy. Dep't v. Robinson, 103 Ga. App. 12, 118 S.E.2d 289 (1961); Fulton County v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 512, 130 S.E.2d 800 (1963); State Hwy. Dep't v. Stevens, 128 Ga. App. 418, 196 S.E.2d 890 (1973); DOT v. Knight, 143 Ga. App. 748, 240 S.E.2d 90 (1977); Georgia Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977); Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980); DOT v. Willis, 165 Ga. App. 271, 299 S.E.2d 82 (1983); Smith v. DeKalb County, 184 Ga. App. 628, 362 S.E.2d 435 (1987).
Value of Property Taken
Owner entitled to fair market value for property taken.
- An owner of property taken for public purposes is entitled to receive as compensation therefor the fair market value. State Hwy. Bd. v. Warthen, 54 Ga. App. 759, 189 S.E. 76 (1936).
"Value," as used in reference to land taken under eminent domain, is a relative term depending on the circumstances. Thus, under some circumstances, "the value" might be the actual value, the market value, the salable value, the reasonable value, and the cash value. State Hwy. Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 3 S.E.2d 907 (1939).
It was not reversible error to charge the jury that "value," which is qualified in this section as "actual value," is the fair and reasonable value of a strip of land actually taken. Nor was it reversible error, after so charging, not to qualify and limit the word "value" by use of the words "market value." State Hwy. Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 3 S.E.2d 907 (1939).
Factors to be considered in estimating property value.
- All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, may be shown and considered in estimating its value. State Hwy. Bd. v. Warthen, 54 Ga. App. 759, 189 S.E. 76 (1936).
Reproduction cost may always be used as a factor involved in the valuation of property, together with other factors such as depreciation and the nature of the property interest seized, in determining market value. Housing Auth. v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 881, 87 S.E.2d 671 (1955).
In determining value of land actually taken, consequential damages or benefits should not be considered, these being separate elements which should be considered separately. State Hwy. Bd. v. Warthen, 54 Ga. App. 759, 189 S.E. 76 (1936).
Pro rata valuation in partial taking not authorized.
- Charge to jury which employed a pro rata method of assessing the value of a partial taking was erroneous; statutes which govern the manner of assessment and set out the factors considered in determining compensation do not express such a relational mode. Bland v. Bulloch County, 205 Ga. App. 317, 422 S.E.2d 223, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 899, 422 S.E.2d 223 (1992).
Prospective value of land for any purpose may be considered.
- In arriving at the value of the land taken under condemnation proceedings, the value of the land, including its prospective value for any purpose, may be considered. Georgia Power Co. v. Carson, 46 Ga. App. 612, 167 S.E. 902 (1933).
Prospective value for any purpose may be considered in determining the value of land taken under condemnation proceedings. State Hwy. Bd. v. Coleman, 78 Ga. App. 54, 50 S.E.2d 262 (1948).
All elements and uses of the land may be taken into consideration to determine the market value of the land taken and the consequential damages to the land not taken. However, under this sort of procedure, a witness may not be permitted to testify separately as to the value of each element. Southern Ry. v. Miller, 94 Ga. App. 701, 96 S.E.2d 297 (1956).
Evidence of voluntary sales of similar lands admissible.
- In a proceeding to condemn land, it is competent for the purpose of showing the value of the land being taken to introduce evidence of voluntary sales of other similar lands in the same vicinity made at or near the time of the taking and the price paid therefor. Alabama Power Co. v. Chandler, 217 Ga. 550, 123 S.E.2d 767 (1962).
Oral and not binding offers cast no light upon value.
- Oral and not binding offers are so easily made and refused in a mere passing conversation, and under circumstances involving no responsibility on either side, as to cast no light upon the question of value. Southern Ry. v. Miller, 94 Ga. App. 701, 96 S.E.2d 297 (1956).
Ascertaining value of land taken by subtracting value of land remaining from value of whole land before taking is error, since this permits the consideration of consequential damages or benefits in arriving at the value of the land remaining and may thus work harm to either the condemnor or the condemnee. Fulton County v. Power, 109 Ga. App. 783, 137 S.E.2d 474 (1964).
In eminent domain proceedings, evidence of the difference between the value of the whole property, that taken and that not taken, before the taking and after the taking is without probative value as to the actual value of the land taken and the consequential damage to that not taken. DOT v. Brand, 149 Ga. App. 547, 254 S.E.2d 873 (1979).
Recovery beyond fair market value for property of unique value.
- Although market value is ordinarily the measure of damages, if property has a unique or special use to the owner, just and adequate compensation should be determined without restriction to market value as such. DeKalb County v. Cowan, 151 Ga. App. 753, 261 S.E.2d 478 (1979).
Admission of evidence of income producing qualities from land.
- When evidence as to the income producing qualities and capabilities of the land condemned is objected to, and the trial court instructs the jury that the jurors are to consider this evidence only in arriving at a market value of the property taken and consequential damages to the remainder, there is no error in the admission of such evidence. State Hwy. Dep't v. Harrison, 115 Ga. App. 349, 154 S.E.2d 723, overruled on other grounds, Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848, 159 S.E.2d 145 (1967), rev'd, 224 Ga. 263, 161 S.E.2d 281 (1968).
Recovery of business losses.
- The damages sustained by a business are separate and apart from the damages sustained by the real estate on which the business is located. Old S. Bottle Shop, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 175 Ga. App. 295, 333 S.E.2d 127 (1985).
Prospective and Consequential Damages
Measure of consequential damages to adjoining property as a result of the condemnation of land for public purposes is the diminution of the value of the adjoining property measured by the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before the condemnation and immediately after the condemnation. State Hwy. Bd. v. Coleman, 78 Ga. App. 54, 50 S.E.2d 262 (1948).
The loss of value inherent in the land remaining after a strip of the land is taken is the difference between the greatest market value of land not taken before the strip is taken and improvements made less the market value of the remainder after the strip is taken off and improvements made. Swiney v. State Hwy. Dep't, 116 Ga. App. 667, 158 S.E.2d 321 (1967).
Damages still "consequential" as long as value inheres in remaining fee.
- The loss of value in land remaining after a strip is taken may approach the full value of the land, but it is still consequential damages so long as some value inheres in the fee remaining in the condemnee. Swiney v. State Hwy. Dep't, 116 Ga. App. 667, 158 S.E.2d 321 (1967).
Consequential benefits to remaining lands may be shown only as offset against consequential damages and may not be used as an offset against the value of the land actually taken. Merritt v. Department of Transp., 147 Ga. App. 316, 248 S.E.2d 689 (1978).
Consequential benefits refer to benefits accruing to property interests remaining in plaintiff at the site after the taking or damaging of a part thereof, and have no application when the entire interest of the plaintiff has been appropriated. Housing Auth. v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 881, 87 S.E.2d 671 (1955).
Reversion of title to old road to owner not consequential benefit.
- When land is condemned for the purpose of changing the location of a highway, the "consequential benefits to be derived by the owner" do not include the benefit which might be derived from the reversion to the owner of the title to the old road if and when abandoned. St. Clair v. State Hwy. Bd., 45 Ga. App. 488, 165 S.E. 297 (1932).
It is error to admit evidence of diminution in value of adjoining property without evidence of fair market value before the condemnation for such evidence is a mere conclusion of the witness without foundations of fact for the consideration of the jury. State Hwy. Bd. v. Coleman, 78 Ga. App. 54, 50 S.E.2d 262 (1948).
Damage to one contiguous parcel determinable without reference to others.
- When adjoining or contiguous parcels of land belonging to the same owner are put to separate and distinct uses, and do not together constitute one entire tract, damages to one of the parcels, as a result of the performance of public work in the neighborhood, is determinable without reference to the effect of the work upon the adjoining land. Gaines v. City of Calhoun, 42 Ga. App. 89, 155 S.E. 214 (1930).
Damage to portion of tract balanced against benefit to whole.
- When a tract of land having a value and a peculiar utility as an entirety is affected by public work, the owner of the land, for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from the performance of the work, cannot sever from the entire tract a portion of the land which has been peculiarly damaged and recover damages without reference to the benefits accruing to the entire tract by virtue of the performance of the work. Gaines v. City of Calhoun, 42 Ga. App. 89, 155 S.E. 214 (1930).
Destruction of unity of property as basis for consequential damages.
- In a condemnation action involving a farm, when there is evidence to show that the land taken will, by intrusion on the general layout of the property, tend to destroy the unity of the farm and thus depreciate the market value of the part not taken, this is a legitimate subject for consideration in determining the amount of consequential damages. DOT v. Brown, 155 Ga. App. 622, 271 S.E.2d 876 (1980).
Opinion of witness as to diminution in value of land.
- After a witness has given the witness's opinion of the value of land which it is claimed would be subject to consequential damages by reason of condemning another part of the tract, and has stated that the structure created by the condemnor caused injury to the balance of the land, there is no error in permitting the witness to give the witness's opinion as to the diminution in the value of the land. State Hwy. Bd. v. Coleman, 78 Ga. App. 54, 50 S.E.2d 262 (1948).
Testimony and photographs properly admitted in determining consequential damages or benefits.
- Testimony as to the replanting of trees and moving house back to the same relative location from the street as existed before the condemnation, and also certain photographs of the property in question, were properly admitted as evidence for consideration by the jury in determining consequential damages or benefits. State Hwy. Bd. v. Warthen, 54 Ga. App. 759, 189 S.E. 76 (1936).
Damages and judgment bar recovery of consequential damages except those resulting from negligent construction.
- Since former Code 1933, §§ 36-503 through 36-506 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 22-2-62 and22-2-63) plainly provide that the appraisers in proceedings to condemn private property for public purposes shall assess actual damages for the property taken and consequential damages to the property not taken, an award of damages and judgment of condemnation bar recovery of consequential damages except such as result from negligent and improper construction. Whipple v. County of Houston, 214 Ga. 532, 105 S.E.2d 898 (1958).
Proper construction not grounds for damages to remainder of property.
- Construction that is done with due care and is proper is not grounds for recovery for damages to the remainder of the property of the condemnee. Whipple v. County of Houston, 214 Ga. 532, 105 S.E.2d 898 (1958).
Consequential damages for improper construction subject of separate damage suit.
- Consequential damages to the remainder of the property caused by the negligent or improper construction of the improvement are not proper for consideration in a condemnation proceeding, but are the subject of a separate suit for damages. State Hwy. Dep't v. Kaylor, 110 Ga. App. 46, 137 S.E.2d 664 (1964).
Mistaken theory that construction would improve, not damage, remaining property.
- When, due to a mistake of fact unmixed with negligence, the condemnation proceeding for a public road was conducted throughout upon the theory that the road would be paved at approximately grade level, thus improving rather than damaging the remaining abutting property, and there was nothing to indicate that a fill of from 25 to 40 feet would be made in front of the remaining property which would damage it in the amount of approximately $20,000.00, a petition in equity, alleging these facts and alleging that the mistake prevented the owners from proving this consequential damage, alleged a cause of action to set aside the award and the judgment of condemnation and to recover the full damages. Whipple v. County of Houston, 214 Ga. 532, 105 S.E.2d 898 (1958).
Jury charge regarding consequential damages.
- The court did not err in charging the jury where in part of the charge the correct rules as contained in this section were given as to the assessment of consequential damages in case the consequential benefits equaled or exceeded the consequential damages. Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Norman, 140 Ga. 42, 78 S.E. 411 (1913).
Instruction held reversible error.
- Instructing the jury that the jury could reduce the amount of consequential damages to the remainder of the property by the amount of special consequential benefits was reversible error since there was no evidence from which the jury could have formed a reasonable estimate of the amount or value of such benefits. Perry v. Department of Transp., 193 Ga. App. 254, 387 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Assessment of consequential damages.
- In assessing consequential damages, the difference would lie in the valuation of the land which remains after condemnation, as compared with the value of that fragment of land before the condemnation was commenced; in considering this "damage," the assessors or jury would be bound to deduct from the whole damage, any increase which might result from the improvement respecting the sales value or market value of the tract not taken. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 273.
Payment of taxes on land taken by eminent domain.- The payment of city or county taxes is not a proper element of damages in a condemnation case; the payment of property taxes is a responsibility of the landowner only so long as the landowner, in fact, owns the property. The property owner or condemnee would be responsible for payment of taxes up to the date of taking; after that time, the responsibility for the payment of these taxes would lie upon the condemning body, if in fact that body is an entity which would have the responsibility for payment of these taxes. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-494.
Cost of transferring personal business articles to new location cannot be charged as such, but the reasonable cost of such moving may be evidence which is illustrative of the damage to the property, measured as of that particular owner; therefore, the cost of such moving should be ascertained and estimated, either when arriving at a value for negotiation, or when determining evidence of a value in condemnation case. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 276.
When area taken for right of way intersects building on tract involved, i.e., a portion of the building lies on land which is taken, and a portion of the building lies on land which is not taken, that portion of the building which extends upon the right of way may be severed if it is practicable to do so without destruction of the building; if severance would result in destruction, then the measure of damage to the building is the building's full value. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 273.
When a condemnation causes the intersection of a building by the line drawn between the land taken and the land not taken, when it is impossible to sever the building and the whole building would be destroyed, the value of the land without the building taken would be charged against the condemnor; the true market value of the remaining portion of the condemnee's land without the building, of course, it being destroyed, would be compared with the value of that tract before taking. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 273.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 1 et seq.
9A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Eminent Domain, §§ 122 et seq., 178 et seq.
C.J.S.- 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 1 et seq. 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 66 et seq., 250 et seq.
ALR.
- Profits derived from business conducted on property taken by eminent domain as evidence of market value, 7 A.L.R. 163.
Loss of right to contest assessment in proceeding for street or sewer improvement by waiver, estoppel, or the like, 9 A.L.R. 634.
Loss of right to contest assessment in drainage proceeding by waiver, estoppel, or the like, 9 A.L.R. 842.
Expense of building and maintaining fences as element in the determination of damages in eminent domain, 10 A.L.R. 451.
Right to interest in condemnation proceedings during owner's retention of possession, 32 A.L.R. 98.
Protection of rights of mortgagee in eminent domain proceedings, 58 A.L.R. 1534; 110 A.L.R. 542; 154 A.L.R. 1110.
Right of court to reduce or increase award in condemnation and confirm it as reduced or increased, 61 A.L.R. 194.
Failure to claim in special assessment proceedings compensation for taking or damaging property in construction of improvements as waiver or estoppel, 64 A.L.R. 764.
Measure of damages or compensation where property is taken to widen street, 64 A.L.R. 1513.
Compensation in eminent domain in respect of fixtures or chattels used in connection with real property taken or damaged, 90 A.L.R. 159.
Elements and measure of compensation for power lines or other wire lines over private property, 124 A.L.R. 407.
Special value or adaptability of property for purpose for which it is taken, as an element of, or matter for consideration in fixing, damages in condemnation proceedings, 124 A.L.R. 910.
Distinction between income or profits from business on land and income or profits from use of land, as affecting admissibility of evidence in that regard on question of damages in eminent domain, 134 A.L.R. 1125.
Increment to value, from project for which land is condemned, as a factor in fixing compensation, 147 A.L.R. 66.
Frustration of contractual rights as basis of claim for compensation where another's real property is taken in exercise of eminent domain, 152 A.L.R. 307.
Price at which one whose land is taken or damaged under power of eminent domain has sold, contracted to sell, or optioned land in question to third person as evidence of its market value in condemnation proceeding or related action for damages, 155 A.L.R. 262.
Are different estates or interests in real property taken under eminent domain to be valued separately, or entire property to be valued as a unit and the amount apportioned among separate interests, 166 A.L.R. 1211.
General governmental policy (distinguished from specific project) as affecting compensation allowable in eminent domain, 167 A.L.R. 502.
Eminent domain: valuation of land and improvements and fixtures thereon separately or as unit, 1 A.L.R.2d 878.
Elements and measure of lessee's compensation for taking or damaging leasehold in eminent domain, 3 A.L.R.2d 286.
Compensation for, or extent of rights acquired by, taking of land, as affected by condemner's promissory statements as to character of use or undertakings to be performed by it, 7 A.L.R.2d 364.
Attorney's fees as within statute imposing upon condemner liability for "expenses," "costs," and the like, 26 A.L.R.2d 1295.
Quotient condemnation report or award by commissioners or the like, 39 A.L.R.2d 1208.
Cost to property owner of moving personal property as element of damages or compensation in eminent domain proceedings, 69 A.L.R.2d 1453.
Counsel's use, in trial of condemnation proceeding, of chart, diagram or blackboard, not introduced in evidence, relating to damages or the value of the property condemned, 80 A.L.R.2d 1270.
Bad reputation of condemned property derived from its illegal use for gambling, prostitution, or the like, as factor decreasing compensation or damages, 87 A.L.R.2d 1156.
Changes in purchasing power of money as affecting compensation in eminent domain proceedings, 92 A.L.R.2d 772.
Valuation at time of original wrongful entry by condemnor or at time of subsequent initiation of condemnation proceedings, 2 A.L.R.3d 1038.
Depreciation in value, from project for which land is condemned, as a factor in fixing compensation, 5 A.L.R.3d 901.
Eminent domain: deduction of benefits in determining compensation or damages in proceedings involving opening, widening, or otherwise altering highway, 13 A.L.R.3d 1149.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of argument or evidence as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 17 A.L.R.3d 1449.
Existence of restrictive covenant as element in fixing value of property condemned, 22 A.L.R.3d 961.
Measure and elements of damage for limitation of access caused by conversion of conventional road into limited-access highway, 42 A.L.R.3d 148.
Measure of damages for condemnation of cemetery lands, 42 A.L.R.3d 1314.
Good will or "going concern" value as element of lessee's compensation for taking leasehold in eminent domain, 58 A.L.R.3d 566.
Loss of liquor license as compensable in condemnation proceeding, 58 A.L.R.3d 581.
Compensation for diminution in value of the remainder of property resulting from taking or use of adjoining land of others for the same undertaking, 59 A.L.R.3d 488.
Eminent domain: consideration of fact that landowner's remaining land will be subject to special assessment in fixing severance damages, 59 A.L.R.3d 534.
Eminent domain: right of owner of land not originally taken or purchased as part of adjacent project to recover, on enlargement of project to include adjacent land, enhanced value of property by reason of proximity to original land - state cases, 95 A.L.R.3d 752.
Eminent domain: recovery of value of improvements made with knowledge of impending condemnation, 98 A.L.R.3d 504.
Assemblage or plottage as factor affecting value in eminent domain proceedings, 8 A.L.R.4th 1202.
Eminent domain: measure and elements of lessee's compensation for condemnor's taking or damaging of leasehold, 17 A.L.R.4th 337.
Eminent domain: unity or contiguity of separate properties sufficient to allow damages for diminished value of parcel remaining after taking of other parcel, 59 A.L.R.4th 308.
Measure of damages or compensation in eminent domain as affected by premises being restricted to particular educational, religious, charitable, or noncommercial use, 29 A.L.R.5th 36.