As used in this chapter, the term:
(3.1) "Elective office" means an office filled by the exercise of the franchise of vote by electors in a general or special election as defined under the laws of this state.
Discretionary performance of a lawful act or a prescribed duty shall not constitute a ground for recall of an elected public official.
(7.1) "Legal sufficiency" means, solely as applied to the duties or functions of the election superintendent, a determination of the completeness of an application for a recall petition or a recall petition and a determination that an application for a recall petition or a recall petition contains a sufficient number of valid signatures. Such determinations shall not include any review of the sufficiency of the ground or grounds for the recall and the fact or facts upon which such ground or grounds are based.
(Code 1981, §21-4-3, enacted by Ga. L. 1989, p. 1721, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1939, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 133, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 21, § 1; Ga. L. 2014, p. 866, § 21/SB 340.)
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1990, p. 1939, § 8, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall only apply to recall proceedings under Chapter 4 of Title 21 which are instituted on or after July 1, 1990.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, cases decided prior to the 1989 revision of this chapter are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Constitutionality.
- The provision of O.C.G.A. § 21-4-3(7)(B)(i) that an official "has committed an act or acts of malfeasance while in office" is not unconstitutionally vague; the legislature enacted the section with knowledge of the definition of "malfeasance in office" as contained in case law. Davis v. Shavers, 263 Ga. 785, 439 S.E.2d 650 (1994).
Conduct of a public official who participates in a closed meeting that is required by law to be open can become a "ground for recall" under the Recall Act, O.C.G.A. § 21-4-1 et seq., if the circumstances of that participation come within the definition of "grounds for recall." Steele v. Honea, 261 Ga. 644, 409 S.E.2d 652 (1991).
Grounds alleged in recall petition.
- If one or more of the statutory grounds for recall set forth in O.C.G.A. § 21-4-3(7)(B) are alleged in the recall application, then the ground or grounds for recall are legally sufficient. Brooks v. Branch, 262 Ga. 658, 424 S.E.2d 277 (1993).
Since the factual allegations were either a mere conclusion, lacking reasonable particularity, or failed to allege conduct which would constitute one of the statutory grounds for recall, they were legally insufficient to support grounds for recall. Brooks v. Branch, 262 Ga. 658, 424 S.E.2d 277 (1993).
Sufficiency of recall applications.
- Applications seeking the recall of city officials were insufficient within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 21-4-3(7)(B) in that there was nothing in the applications from which the public could determine that the allegations, even if taken as true, amounted to acts of misconduct or malfeasance. Davis v. Shavers, 263 Ga. 785, 439 S.E.2d 650 (1994).
Cited in Cone v. Johnson, 251 Ga. 371, 306 S.E.2d 244 (1983).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
- Sufficiency of particular charges as affecting enforceability of recall petition, 114 A.L.R.5th 1.
Sufficiency of technical and procedural aspects of recall petitions, 116 A.L.R.5th 1.