(Ga. L. 1945, p. 343, §§ 1, 10; Ga. L. 1969, p. 682, § 1; Ga. L. 1971, p. 264, § 1; Code 1981, §20-2-690; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 16; Code 1981, §20-2-690.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1984, p. 1266, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 618, § 62; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1159, § 2; Ga. L. 2004, p. 107, § 10; Ga. L. 2006, p. 851, § 1/SB 413; Ga. L. 2012, p. 358, § 31/HB 706; Ga. L. 2012, p. 648, §§ 2, 3/HB 39.)
Code Commission notes.- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2000, "Code Section 20-2-154.1" was substituted for "Code Section 20-2-769" in subsection (a) (now subsection (b)).
Law reviews.- For article recommending more consistency in age requirements of laws pertaining to the welfare of minors, see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 189 (1969). For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 129 (2006). For note discussing Georgia legislation governing the indenture of children and the practice of child indenture within the state, see 15 J. Pub. L. 349 (1966).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Former section was unconstitutionally vague, because the section was not sufficiently definite to provide a person of ordinary intelligence, who desires to avoid the section's penalties, fair notice of what constitutes a "private school." Furthermore, the section violated a second due process value in that the section impermissibly delegated to local law enforcement officials, judges, and juries the policy decision of what constitutes a "private school." Roemhild v. State, 251 Ga. 569, 308 S.E.2d 154 (1983) (decided prior to enactment of present Code Section20-2-690 by Ga. L. 1984, p. 1266, § 1; see the Editor's notes above).
Constitutionality.
- Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-690.1 failed because the statute clearly punished the unjustified failure to send a child to school for whom one was responsible, did not violate equal protection, and was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental interest of ensuring children were educated, and the delegation of power to the Board of Education was accompanied by sufficient guidelines directing the Board to consider sickness and other emergencies. Pitts v. State, 293 Ga. 511, 748 S.E.2d 426 (2013).
Parents obligated to send children to school under rules fixed by authorities.
- Ga. L. 1946, p. 206 imposes upon the parents of school age children the duty of sending their children to school and upon the school authorities the duty of fixing the rules and regulations under which the children shall attend. Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 259, 65 S.E.2d 848 (1951).
When parents refuse to have children immunized.
- If parents fail and refuse to have their children immunized against certain contagious diseases, which is required as a prerequisite to their attendance, and by reason of this refusal the children are sent home by their teachers, this would be a refusal by the parents to enroll and send their children to school and the parents would be guilty of violating the law. Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 259, 65 S.E.2d 848 (1951).
Children deprived based on truancy.
- Evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's findings that the parents' children were deprived due to educational neglect as evidenced by the children's truancy, the home was unsafe with pill bottles laying around and a nail gun under the sink, and the parents' drug abuse. In the Interest of J.C., 264 Ga. App. 598, 591 S.E.2d 475 (2003).
Foster children.
- O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-13,15-11-58,20-2-690.1 and49-5-12 set out in clear detail the rights and services to which foster children are entitled and, as a result, the federal statutory provisions (Title IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 670) in question are not too vague and amorphous to be enforced by the judiciary and each of the state statutes at issue impose specific duties on the state defendants; thus, the federal regulatory scheme embodied in the Child and Family Services Review process does not relieve the state defendants of the defendants' obligation to fulfill the defendants' statutory duties to plaintiff foster children, nor does the statute provide a legal excuse for the defendants failure to do so. Kenny A. v. Perdue, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004).
Permanent expulsion of a student for disciplinary reasons was not contrary to law since the constitutional right to free public education may be limited and the applicable statute, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-751, does not prohibit permanent expulsion; further, such expulsion does not conflict with or violate O.C.G.A. § 20-2-690.1. D.B. v. Clarke County Bd. of Educ., 220 Ga. App. 330, 469 S.E.2d 438 (1996).
Private cause of action.
- Following factors are relevant in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one: first, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one; third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for plaintiff? When foster children alleged that certain child services agencies and officials violated O.C.G.A. § 20-2-690.1 by failing to enroll and send the children to a school or provide home schooling that met statutory standards, § 20-2-690.1 conferred upon the children a private cause of action. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2003).
Cited in Hale v. Davies, 86 Ga. App. 130, 70 S.E.2d 926 (1952); Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ga. 1968); M.S.K. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d 59 (1974); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 233 Ga. 902, 214 S.E.2d 368 (1975); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975); McClain v. McClain, 235 Ga. 659, 221 S.E.2d 561 (1975); In re D.H., 178 Ga. App. 119, 342 S.E.2d 367 (1986); Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994); In the Interest of J.T., 297 Ga. App. 636, 678 S.E.2d 111 (2009).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Board not authorized to prescribe nonattendance standards for nonpublic schools.
- There is no specific grant of authority to the State Board of Education to prescribe any standards or require a license for nonpublic schools, other than those enumerated in Ga. L. 1945, p. 343, §§ 1, 9 and 10. Therefore, it is presumed that the General Assembly did not intend for the board to have such authority. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 119.
Provisions neither authorize nor prohibit parents from sending children to school during teacher's absence.- Law neither authorizes nor prohibits a school from directing the parents of children whose teacher is absent not to send the children to school during the teacher's absence. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 331.
Duty of Department of Human Resources.- While the Department of Human Resources is not bound by the compulsory school attendance law to provide education for youths in state institutions such as Youth Development Centers, the department nevertheless has the duty to provide education for youths committed to the department. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-47.
Work certificates not issued to child unless exempted or excused from school.- Work certificates should not be issued to any child within the school ages unless the child is exempted or excused from attending school. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 123.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
- Power of public school authorities to set minimum or maximum age requirements for pupils in absence of specific statutory authority, 78 A.L.R.2d 1021.
Conditions at school as excusing or justifying nonattendance, 9 A.L.R.4th 122.
Validity, construction, and application of statute, regulation, or policy governing home schooling or affecting rights of home-schooled students, 70 A.L.R.5th 169.