(Code 1933, § 27-1802, enacted by Ga. L. 1971, p. 460, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 17.)
Law reviews.- For article discussing the effect of United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1982), on the directed verdict in criminal cases, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 1209 (1984).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Section is permissive, not mandatory.
- Ga. L. 1971, p. 460, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1), which provides that the trial judge "may" direct a verdict of acquittal, is simply permissive, not mandatory, and the act is cumulative of the existing law as such right already inhered in the trial judge. Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App. 745, 195 S.E.2d 184 (1972).
Construction of
§ 17-9-1 imposes duty, not merely authority, on trial judge. - While the wording of the statute appeared merely to authorize a verdict of acquittal under the circumstances mentioned therein, the entire language must be construed in light of the Appellate Practice Act authorizing an enumeration of error on the refusal of the trial court to direct a verdict of not guilty in a criminal case. When there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence clearly demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law, there is a duty upon the trial judge to grant a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The judge's failure to do so will constitute reversible error on appeal. Merino v. State, 230 Ga. 604, 198 S.E.2d 311 (1973); Rhodes v. State, 200 Ga. App. 193, 407 S.E.2d 442 (1991).
Constitutionality of statute on which indictment based.
- Even though a criminal defendant may challenge the constitutionality of the statute alleged in the indictment before trial by demurrer, motion to quash, or plea in bar, by properly raising the constitutional objection, it is not too late to challenge the statute on which an indictment is based on motion for directed verdict. Simmons v. State, 246 Ga. 390, 271 S.E.2d 468 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125, 101 S. Ct. 942, 67 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1981).
Motion for directed verdict cannot be made before trial. State v. Cooperman, 147 Ga. App. 556, 249 S.E.2d 358 (1978).
If the defendant moves for a directed verdict before any evidence is presented, the trial court does not err in denying the motion. Mann v. State, 167 Ga. App. 829, 308 S.E.2d 12 (1983).
No statutory authority existed for directed verdict.
- Since at the time a case was tried there was no statutory authority for the direction of a verdict in a criminal case, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to direct a verdict. Allen v. State, 228 Ga. 859, 188 S.E.2d 793 (1972).
Review of directed verdict was not provided for in former Code 1933, § 27-1802 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1). Stynchcombe v. Hardy, 228 Ga. 130, 184 S.E.2d 356 (1971).
No provision for motion for judgment of not guilty notwithstanding verdict of guilty.
- There is no provision of law for a court in the trial of a criminal case to entertain a motion for a judgment of not guilty notwithstanding a verdict of guilty. Austin v. State, 104 Ga. App. 795, 122 S.E.2d 926 (1961).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) after the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence to the extent that the defendant was a less-safe driver in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) because JNOV was not a remedy available in a criminal case. Masood v. State, 313 Ga. App. 549, 722 S.E.2d 149 (2012).
No provision for motion for directed verdict of acquittal notwithstanding mistrial.
- Georgia law provides for neither a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict nor a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding mistrial. Wilson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 327, 503 S.E.2d 924 (1998).
Opposition to directed verdict by codefendant.
- O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 sets out the circumstances in which a defendant may request and receive a directed verdict of acquittal, but is silent with regard to opposition by a codefendant. Broomfield v. State, 264 Ga. 145, 442 S.E.2d 242 (1994).
Motion addresses sufficiency of evidence.
- Motion for directed verdict of acquittal under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the underlying accusation. Echols v. State, 187 Ga. App. 870, 371 S.E.2d 682 (1988).
Since the state's evidence authorizes conviction, the evidence cannot be found to demand a verdict of acquittal. Milner v. State, 159 Ga. App. 887, 285 S.E.2d 602 (1981).
Directed verdict proper only if acquittal is only finding possible.
- Motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be made only after a proper and timely motion for a directed verdict has been made. However, the trial judge in a criminal case may direct a verdict only if, after all the state's evidence is in, a verdict of acquittal is the only legal finding possible. Summers v. State, 99 Ga. App. 183, 108 S.E.2d 140 (1959).
It is only when evidence demands verdict of not guilty that it is error for trial court to refuse motion for directed verdict of acquittal. Paxton v. State, 160 Ga. App. 19, 285 S.E.2d 741 (1981).
Motion for directed verdict should be granted only if there is no conflict in evidence and the evidence demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law. Zuber v. State, 248 Ga. 314, 282 S.E.2d 900 (1981); Martin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 483, 376 S.E.2d 888, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 911, 376 S.E.2d 888 (1988); Grier v. State, 198 Ga. App. 840, 403 S.E.2d 857 (1991); Storey v. State, 205 Ga. App. 610, 422 S.E.2d 879, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 422 S.E.2d 879 (1992).
If there is no conflict in the evidence and a verdict of acquittal is demanded as a matter of law, it is error for the trial court to refuse to direct a verdict of acquittal. Poole v. State, 159 Ga. App. 792, 285 S.E.2d 205 (1981).
Trial court is authorized to take the case from the jury and direct a verdict of acquittal if the state clearly fails to meet the state's burden. Muckle v. State, 165 Ga. App. 873, 303 S.E.2d 54 (1983).
Directed verdict of acquittal is authorized only if there is no evidence to support a verdict to the contrary. Lane v. State, 177 Ga. App. 553, 340 S.E.2d 228 (1986).
Directed verdict of acquittal is authorized only if there is no evidence. Bradley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 386, 349 S.E.2d 263 (1986).
Directed verdict of acquittal will lie only if there is no evidence to support a contrary verdict. Hamm v. State, 187 Ga. App. 318, 370 S.E.2d 158, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 370 S.E.2d 158 (1988).
Directed verdict of acquittal is authorized only if there is no evidence to support a verdict to the contrary. Mathis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 896, 420 S.E.2d 788, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 420 S.E.2d 788 (1992); Gude v. State, 213 Ga. App. 573, 445 S.E.2d 355 (1994).
Directed verdict was moot.
- Because the jury acquitted the defendant of murder but rendered convictions on the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault and kidnapping, a directed verdict on the murder counts was moot. Reagan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 708, 637 S.E.2d 113 (2006).
Any error in the trial court's failure to grant a defendant's motion for a directed verdict was harmless because an acquittal rendered the motion moot; pretermitting whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the jury found the defendant not guilty. Brown v. State, 299 Ga. App. 782, 683 S.E.2d 874 (2009).
Because the defendant was not convicted on the statutory-rape charge but was, instead, found guilty of attempted statutory rape as a lesser-included offense, the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as to the statutory-rape charge was moot. Judice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 229, 707 S.E.2d 114 (2011).
Defendant's complaint that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to the offense of forcible rape was rendered moot because the defendant was not found guilty of that offense. Beaudoin v. State, 311 Ga. App. 91, 714 S.E.2d 624 (2011).
Directed verdict unwarranted in bench trial.
- In a bench trial, a trial court cannot direct a verdict of acquittal because there is no verdict in a bench trial. Sistrunk v. State, 287 Ga. App. 39, 651 S.E.2d 350 (2007).
Contesting sufficiency of indictment.
- Motion for directed verdict of acquittal is not a proper way to contest the sufficiency of an indictment. Williams v. State, 162 Ga. App. 350, 291 S.E.2d 425 (1982); Tibbs v. State, 211 Ga. App. 250, 438 S.E.2d 706 (1993).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that the crimes for which the defendant was charged, aggravated assault, making terroristic threats, and cruelty to children in the third degree, were committed on the date alleged in the indictment because there was sufficient evidence to support the allegations of the indictment; the exact date of the crimes was not a material allegation of the indictment because the exact date was not an essential element with respect to any of the charged offenses, and the date of the crimes proved at trial was prior to the return of the indictment and within the limitation periods for the crimes. Coats v. State, 303 Ga. App. 818, 695 S.E.2d 285 (2010), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).
Variance in indictment insufficient.
- In a prosecution for burglary, because the variance between the indictment and the proof presented at trial did not misinform or mislead the defendant in any manner that resulted in surprise or impaired a defense, and the defendant could not be subjected to another prosecution for the same offense, the alleged variance was not fatal; as a result, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Chambers v. State, 284 Ga. App. 400, 643 S.E.2d 871 (2007).
Denial of directed verdict as to one charge after defendant convicted on another.
- After the defendant is convicted of theft by taking only, and the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, there is no harm in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for directed verdict on an armed robbery charge since a prosecution for theft by taking would still be permissible. Dickerson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 429, 260 S.E.2d 535 (1979).
Reasons for mistrial did not require acquittal on double jeopardy grounds.
- After a mistrial was declared due to the prosecutor's improper comments during closing, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for acquittal and discharge pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 as the prosecutor did not intend to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, at Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII and U.S. Const., amend. 5 by referring to the defendant's financial status due to discussions that occurred on that issue, although the prosecutor later realized that such discussions were held outside of the presence of the jury; the defendant failed to make the requisite showing of a purposeful subversion of double jeopardy, nor did the defendant show an improper motive, a benefit to the state to retry the case, or conduct that gave rise to a presumption of unlawful intent. Mathis v. State, 276 Ga. App. 587, 623 S.E.2d 674 (2005).
Non-prejudicial Brady violation did not require directed verdict.
- Trial court did not err in denying a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 when the state's failure to turn over an audiotape of a controlled undercover drug transaction that the defendant was involved in, due to the mistaken destruction of the tape, was not shown to have caused the defendant the kind of prejudice that undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial or that created a reasonable doubt of guilt which did not otherwise exist. Blackwood v. State, 277 Ga. App. 870, 627 S.E.2d 907 (2006).
Cited in Carter v. State, 227 Ga. 788, 183 S.E.2d 392 (1971); Morris v. State, 228 Ga. 39, 184 S.E.2d 82 (1971); McKenzey v. State, 125 Ga. App. 508, 188 S.E.2d 116 (1972); Chambers v. State, 127 Ga. App. 196, 192 S.E.2d 916 (1972); Slocum v. State, 230 Ga. 762, 199 S.E.2d 202 (1973); Geiger v. State, 129 Ga. App. 488, 199 S.E.2d 861 (1973); Butler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 469, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973); Willingham v. State, 131 Ga. App. 851, 207 S.E.2d 249 (1974); Carlile v. State, 132 Ga. App. 787, 209 S.E.2d 241 (1974); Phillips v. State, 133 Ga. App. 461, 211 S.E.2d 411 (1974); Murray v. State, 135 Ga. App. 264, 217 S.E.2d 293 (1975); Cunningham v. State, 235 Ga. 126, 218 S.E.2d 854 (1975); Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 219 S.E.2d 151 (1975); Johnson v. State, 235 Ga. 486, 220 S.E.2d 448 (1975); Kennedy v. State, 136 Ga. App. 305, 220 S.E.2d 788 (1975); Campbell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 338, 221 S.E.2d 212 (1975); Bennett v. State, 136 Ga. App. 806, 222 S.E.2d 207 (1975); Van Voltenburg v. State, 138 Ga. App. 628, 227 S.E.2d 451 (1976); Birks v. State, 237 Ga. 861, 230 S.E.2d 294 (1976); Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26, 234 S.E.2d 831 (1977); Phillips v. State, 238 Ga. 632, 235 S.E.2d 12 (1977); Glass v. State, 239 Ga. 78, 235 S.E.2d 513 (1977); Williamson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 177, 235 S.E.2d 643 (1977); Rutledge v. State, 142 Ga. App. 399, 236 S.E.2d 143 (1977); Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517, 238 S.E.2d 62 (1977); Hall v. State, 143 Ga. App. 706, 240 S.E.2d 125 (1977); Taylor v. State, 144 Ga. App. 534, 241 S.E.2d 590 (1978); Bowler v. State, 145 Ga. App. 633, 244 S.E.2d 142 (1978); Collins v. State, 146 Ga. App. 857, 247 S.E.2d 602 (1978); McCane v. State, 147 Ga. App. 730, 250 S.E.2d 181 (1978); Sleister v. State, 148 Ga. App. 296, 251 S.E.2d 152 (1978); Bryan v. State, 148 Ga. App. 428, 251 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Long v. State, 150 Ga. App. 796, 258 S.E.2d 603 (1979); Hood v. State, 157 Ga. App. 282, 277 S.E.2d 261 (1981); Heath v. State, 159 Ga. App. 17, 282 S.E.2d 673 (1981); Hartley v. State, 159 Ga. App. 157, 282 S.E.2d 684 (1981); Felchlin v. State, 159 Ga. App. 120, 282 S.E.2d 743 (1981); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981); Jones v. State, 159 Ga. App. 704, 285 S.E.2d 45 (1981); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981); Baxter v. State, 160 Ga. App. 181, 286 S.E.2d 460 (1981); Nelson v. State, 160 Ga. App. 168, 286 S.E.2d 504 (1981); Jones v. State, 160 Ga. App. 209, 286 S.E.2d 764 (1981); Whitehead v. State, 160 Ga. App. 644, 287 S.E.2d 648 (1981); Gaither v. State, 160 Ga. App. 705, 288 S.E.2d 18 (1981); Allums v. State, 161 Ga. App. 842, 288 S.E.2d 783 (1982); Ingram v. State, 161 Ga. App. 5, 288 S.E.2d 842 (1982); Brown v. State, 161 Ga. App. 55, 289 S.E.2d 9 (1982); Paulk v. State, 161 Ga. App. 89, 289 S.E.2d 257 (1982); Biggers v. State, 162 Ga. App. 163, 290 S.E.2d 159 (1982); Griner v. State, 162 Ga. App. 207, 291 S.E.2d 76 (1982); Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 320, 292 S.E.2d 77 (1982); James v. State, 162 Ga. App. 490, 292 S.E.2d 91 (1982); Lingold v. State, 162 Ga. App. 486, 292 S.E.2d 193 (1982); Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982); Storey v. State, 162 Ga. App. 763, 292 S.E.2d 483 (1982); Bradshaw v. State, 162 Ga. App. 750, 293 S.E.2d 360 (1982); Morris v. State, 163 Ga. App. 118, 293 S.E.2d 866 (1982); Sherrell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 345, 294 S.E.2d 559 (1982); Salter v. State, 163 Ga. App. 655, 294 S.E.2d 612 (1982); Bernard v. State, 163 Ga. App. 570, 295 S.E.2d 546 (1982); Slocumb v. State, 164 Ga. App. 114, 296 S.E.2d 409 (1982); Collins v. State, 164 Ga. App. 482, 297 S.E.2d 503 (1982); Williams v. State, 164 Ga. App. 562, 298 S.E.2d 282 (1982); Hill v. State, 164 Ga. App. 564, 298 S.E.2d 286 (1982); Graham v. State, 250 Ga. 473, 298 S.E.2d 499 (1983); Davenport v. State, 165 Ga. App. 299, 300 S.E.2d 549 (1983); Mease v. State, 165 Ga. App. 746, 302 S.E.2d 429 (1983); Wilbanks v. State, 165 Ga. App. 876, 303 S.E.2d 144 (1983); Pitts v. State, 166 Ga. App. 60, 303 S.E.2d 151 (1983); Estes v. State, 251 Ga. 347, 305 S.E.2d 778 (1983); Hubbard v. State, 167 Ga. App. 32, 305 S.E.2d 849 (1983); LaPan v. State, 167 Ga. App. 250, 305 S.E.2d 858 (1983); LaPann v. State, 167 Ga. App. 288, 306 S.E.2d 373 (1983); Keenan v. State, 168 Ga. App. 51, 308 S.E.2d 26 (1983); Lush v. State, 168 Ga. App. 740, 310 S.E.2d 287 (1983); Chester v. State, 169 Ga. App. 854, 315 S.E.2d 56 (1984); Padgett v. State, 170 Ga. App. 98, 316 S.E.2d 523 (1984); Moore v. State, 170 Ga. App. 698, 318 S.E.2d 172 (1984); H.R.G. v. State, 170 Ga. App. 776, 318 S.E.2d 210 (1984); Christmas v. State, 171 Ga. App. 4, 318 S.E.2d 682 (1984); Weems v. State, 172 Ga. App. 401, 323 S.E.2d 272 (1984); Mullinax v. State, 172 Ga. App. 601, 323 S.E.2d 897 (1984); State v. Williams, 172 Ga. App. 708, 324 S.E.2d 557 (1984); Houck v. State, 173 Ga. App. 388, 326 S.E.2d 567 (1985); Hamby v. State, 173 Ga. App. 750, 328 S.E.2d 224 (1985); Anderson v. State, 254 Ga. 470, 330 S.E.2d 592 (1985); Sprayberry v. State, 174 Ga. App. 574, 330 S.E.2d 731 (1985); Jones v. State, 174 Ga. App. 783, 331 S.E.2d 633 (1985); Green v. State, 175 Ga. App. 92, 332 S.E.2d 385 (1985); Thompson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 645, 334 S.E.2d 312 (1985); Collins v. State, 176 Ga. App. 634, 337 S.E.2d 415 (1985); Smith v. State, 178 Ga. App. 300, 342 S.E.2d 769 (1986); Battle v. State, 178 Ga. App. 655, 344 S.E.2d 477 (1986); Hamilton v. State, 179 Ga. App. 434, 346 S.E.2d 881 (1986); Williams v. State, 181 Ga. App. 49, 351 S.E.2d 207 (1986); Russell v. State, 181 Ga. App. 665, 353 S.E.2d 565 (1987); Noeske v. State, 181 Ga. App. 778, 353 S.E.2d 635 (1987); Payne v. State, 184 Ga. App. 366, 361 S.E.2d 666 (1987); Johnson v. State, 185 Ga. App. 167, 363 S.E.2d 773 (1987); Arnold v. State, 191 Ga. App. 436, 382 S.E.2d 174 (1989); Jenkins v. State, 191 Ga. App. 546, 382 S.E.2d 389 (1989); Oglesby v. State, 192 Ga. App. 165, 384 S.E.2d 192 (1989); Hood v. State, 193 Ga. App. 701, 389 S.E.2d 264 (1989); Ross v. State, 194 Ga. App. 285, 390 S.E.2d 429 (1990); Williams v. State, 195 Ga. App. 422, 394 S.E.2d 112 (1990); Anderson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 673, 394 S.E.2d 607 (1990); Kilgore v. State, 195 Ga. App. 884, 395 S.E.2d 337 (1990); Irby v. State, 260 Ga. 401, 396 S.E.2d 210 (1990); Clark v. State, 197 Ga. App. 318, 398 S.E.2d 377 (1990); Randolph v. State, 198 Ga. App. 291, 401 S.E.2d 310 (1991); Ranson v. State, 198 Ga. App. 659, 402 S.E.2d 740; Tyler v. State, 198 Ga. App. 685, 402 S.E.2d 780 (1991); Nelson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 487, 405 S.E.2d 310 (1991); Marshall v. State, 199 Ga. App. 678, 405 S.E.2d 893 (1991); Jones v. State, 201 Ga. App. 102, 410 S.E.2d 199 (1991); Wright v. State, 205 Ga. App. 149, 421 S.E.2d 331 (1992); White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 428 S.E.2d 789 (1993); Tucker v. State, 208 Ga. App. 224, 430 S.E.2d 84 (1993); White v. State, 208 Ga. App. 885, 432 S.E.2d 562 (1993); Moss v. State, 209 Ga. App. 59, 432 S.E.2d 825 (1993); Harden v. State, 210 Ga. App. 673, 436 S.E.2d 756 (1993); Riden v. State, 213 Ga. App. 17, 443 S.E.2d 865 (1994); Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 491 S.E.2d 791 (1997); Pittman v. State, 230 Ga. App. 799, 498 S.E.2d 309 (1998); Anderson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717 (1998); Oliver v. State, 232 Ga. App. 816, 503 S.E.2d 28 (1998); Johnson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 218, 507 S.E.2d 13 (1998); Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000); Watson v. State, 243 Ga. App. 636, 534 S.E.2d 93 (2000); King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (2000); Jackson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 273, 543 S.E.2d 770 (2000); Hayes v. State, 249 Ga. App. 857, 549 S.E.2d 813 (2001); Ginn v. State, 251 Ga. App. 159, 553 S.E.2d 839 (2001); Nel v. State, 252 Ga. App. 761, 557 S.E.2d 44 (2001); Weston v. State, 276 Ga. 680, 580 S.E.2d 204 (2003); Perkinson v. State, 279 Ga. 232, 610 S.E.2d 533; Lee v. State, 281 Ga. App. 479, 636 S.E.2d 547 (2006); Lyons v. State, 282 Ga. 588, 652 S.E.2d 525 (2007); Christian v. State, 297 Ga. App. 596, 677 S.E.2d 767 (2009)
Williamson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 473, 708 S.E.2d 57 (2011); Boyd v. State, 306 Ga. 204, 830 S.E.2d 160 (2019).
Evidence
Circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict.
- Since the evidence introduced during the trial was sufficient to convict the appellant on circumstantial evidence and did not demand a verdict of acquittal, the trial judge properly overruled the motion for directed verdict at the end of the state's case. Sutton v. State, 237 Ga. 418, 228 S.E.2d 815 (1976); Connell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 53, 293 S.E.2d 367 (1982).
In a trial for aggravated assault, although there were certain discrepancies in the evidence and a portion of the evidence was circumstantial rather than direct and there was direct evidence pointing to the same conclusion as the circumstantial evidence, the quantum of evidence in the defendant's favor fell far short of that necessary to "demand" a verdict of acquittal. Cobb v. State, 195 Ga. App. 429, 393 S.E.2d 723 (1990).
Trial court properly denied a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) since there was ample circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) for the jury to have found that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a); the defendant's claim that the defendant tripped and fell while carrying the infant son was contradicted by expert testimony that the injury to the infant's brain was caused by Shaken Baby Syndrome. Lindo v. State, 278 Ga. App. 228, 628 S.E.2d 665 (2006).
Given that the state's evidence showed that the defendant essentially admitted to being drunk to an investigating officer, as a result of an attempt to drive the car which was lodged on a curb, and the officer found an open beer container inside the car, although circumstantial, that evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was driving the car while intoxicated; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Moore v. State, 281 Ga. App. 141, 635 S.E.2d 408 (2006).
Jury decides if circumstantial evidence sufficient.
- Upon motion for directed verdicts of acquittal if there is any evidence of guilt, it is for the jury to decide whether that evidence, circumstantial though it may be, is sufficient to warrant a conviction. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817, 305 S.E.2d 629 (1983).
No conflict in evidence.
- Defendant is entitled to a directed verdict only if there is no conflict in the evidence, and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom, demands a verdict of not guilty. Benjein v. State, 158 Ga. App. 794, 282 S.E.2d 391 (1981); Howard v. State, 165 Ga. App. 555, 301 S.E.2d 910 (1983); Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987).
Only if there is no conflict in the evidence and a verdict of acquittal is demanded as a matter of law is it error for the trial court to refuse to direct a verdict of acquittal. Wisecup v. State, 157 Ga. App. 853, 278 S.E.2d 682 (1981).
Conflicts in evidence.
- If there are significant conflicts in the evidence regarding material issues, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the evidence, together with reasonable inferences and deductions therefrom, "demands" a verdict of acquittal. Elzey v. State, 168 Ga. App. 633, 309 S.E.2d 906 (1983).
Because a conflict existed in the evidence presented at the defendants' cruelty to children trial arising from the testimony of one pediatrician who testified that the defendants' child's nutritional deprivation could have resulted from a reflux condition, and another pediatrician testified that the child's reflux condition could not possibly have caused the victim's malnutrition, a directed verdict was inappropriate. Allen v. State, 278 Ga. App. 292, 628 S.E.2d 717 (2006).
Because sufficient evidence was presented that a juvenile was a party to the crime of entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft or felony, and the evidence was corroborated by a police officer who questioned the juvenile's cohort, an adjudication based on the juvenile's commission of the act was upheld on appeal; thus, given that the resolution of conflicts in the evidence and credibility of the witnesses fell within the province of the trial court, the juvenile's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. In the Interest of B.D., 287 Ga. App. 185, 651 S.E.2d 129 (2007).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that there was insufficient corroboration of an accomplice's testimony because there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8); the testimony of the victim's fiancee and the accomplice's friend was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony directly identifying the defendant as the shooter, the physical description of the shooter that the fiancee provided to the police fit the defendant, and the fiancee's description of the shooter's clothes was consistent with the accomplice's trial testimony about what the defendant was wearing on the day of the incident. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 803, 708 S.E.2d 331 (2011).
Directed verdict in juvenile delinquency hearing.
- Trial court erred in denying the defendant juvenile's motion for directed verdict as to aggravated assault and aggravated battery on the ground that the evidence established that the defendant was acting in self-defense because the evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court to find that the defendant exceeded any reasonable self-defense when the juvenile followed the victim out of a train and struck the victim. In the Interest of J. W., 306 Ga. App. 339, 702 S.E.2d 649 (2010).
Inconsistencies in evidence insufficient for direct verdict of acquittal.
- Because sufficient evidence was supplied via the testimony from the child victim, and the witnesses who corroborated the child's testimony, to support the defendant's aggravated sexual battery and child molestation convictions, despite any alleged inconsistencies, the convictions were upheld as was the denial of the defendant's motions for an acquittal and a new trial. Lilly v. State, 285 Ga. App. 427, 646 S.E.2d 512 (2007).
Issues which are jury questions.
- Whether a defendant impeded an officer in carrying out the officer's lawful duties is usually a jury question, except if there is no conflict in the evidence and all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom demand a verdict of acquittal. Wagner v. State, 206 Ga. App. 180, 424 S.E.2d 861 (1992).
In a joint prosecution, the trial court did not err in denying the first defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because of deficiencies in the victims' identifications and inconsistencies in the state's evidence, as it was within the jury's province to weigh the evidence and determine witness credibility; moreover, even if there were inconsistencies in the evidence, the jury as the trier of fact was authorized to find those identifications to be credible. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 121, 645 S.E.2d 608 (2007).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for an acquittal as the question of whether or not the defendant had the requisite intent to steal was for the jury to decide. Dudley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 794, 652 S.E.2d 840 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0319, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 168 (Ga. 2008).
Jury's role to assess conflicting evidence.
- Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in a trial for theft by taking a motor vehicle was properly denied because the jury properly assessed the evidence, although conflicting, and found each fact necessary to make out the state's case; trial counsel failed to preserve error regarding exclusion of a portion of the victim's videotaped interview; and a photographic lineup included people of the same general age and race as the defendant and was not impermissibly suggestive. Sherls v. State, 272 Ga. App. 152, 611 S.E.2d 780 (2005).
Because contradictions and uncertainties in the testimony did not render the evidence against the defendant insufficient but were ultimately for the jury to decide, and the victim's testimony that the gun used to commit the crime was not actually pointed at the victim did not mean that the intruders, including the defendant, did not commit an armed robbery since the evidence presented authorized the jury to find that the defendant participated in the committed crimes and was sufficient to support the defendant's armed robbery, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony convictions; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Sheely v. State, 287 Ga. App. 92, 650 S.E.2d 762 (2007).
Initial chain of custody discrepancy did not authorize directed verdict.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial after the trial court questioned the state's forensic scientist as to the scientist's findings and permitted the state to reopen the evidence to establish the chain of custody of the drugs to the crime laboratory; the trial court did not communicate an opinion as to the witness or the evidence, and defense counsel identified the failure to establish a chain of custody in the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, although the trial court identified what was missing from the chain of custody. Bramblett v. State, 259 Ga. App. 427, 577 S.E.2d 100 (2003).
Because the state met the state's burden in establishing a chain of custody by sufficiently demonstrating that the evidence seized was the same as that which was admitted at trial, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on this ground. Cook v. State, 287 Ga. App. 81, 650 S.E.2d 757 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1874, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 127 (Ga. 2008).
Directed verdict not warranted if evidence on mental ability in dispute.
- Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of the defendant's mental retardation since the evidence regarding the defendant's mental ability was disputed and conflicting. Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282, 498 S.E.2d 502, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 968, 119 S. Ct. 416, 142 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1998).
Distinction between evidence requiring charge as to entrapment and evidence requiring directed verdict.
- Distinction must be made between evidence which raises a defense of entrapment and which would require that the jury be charged as to the law of entrapment and the burden of proof thereon, and evidence which under the standards set out in O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 would demand a finding of entrapment and, therefore, a directed verdict of acquittal. Childs v. State, 158 Ga. App. 376, 280 S.E.2d 401 (1981); McNorton v. State, 159 Ga. App. 604, 284 S.E.2d 107 (1981); Parker v. State, 190 Ga. App. 35, 378 S.E.2d 157 (1989).
Conflict on noncontrolling point insufficient for denial of motion.
- Fact that there may be some conflict in evidence on a noncontrolling point is not a sufficient conflict to justify the denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in cases when the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to authorize a conviction. Boggus v. State, 136 Ga. App. 917, 222 S.E.2d 686 (1975).
Evidence insufficient to require directed verdict based on self-defense.
- Defendant claimed to have acted in self-defense after the victim fired at the defendant, but there was a conflict in the evidence as to the point in time in which the danger posed by the deceased passed; thus, the evidence did not demand a verdict of acquittal. Murff v. State, 165 Ga. App. 808, 302 S.E.2d 697, rev'd on other grounds, 251 Ga. 478, 306 S.E.2d 267 (1983).
When defendant's testimony as to entrapment will support directed verdict.
- Defendant's testimony as to entrapment, even if unrebutted by any other witness to the alleged misconduct, will not entitle the defendant to a directed verdict of acquittal unless that unrebutted testimony, together with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom, demands a finding that entrapment occurred. McNorton v. State, 159 Ga. App. 604, 284 S.E.2d 107 (1981); Caithaml v. State, 163 Ga. App. 429, 294 S.E.2d 674 (1982); Worley v. State, 185 Ga. App. 528, 364 S.E.2d 897 (1988); Newt v. State, 200 Ga. App. 262, 407 S.E.2d 487 (1991).
Rule that the state's failure to produce a confidential informant to rebut a defendant's entrapment testimony requires a directed verdict of acquittal did not apply after an undercover investigator testified that the informant had nothing to do with setting up the sale of the pound of cocaine, and in fact did not know the sale was going on. Armand v. State, 164 Ga. App. 350, 296 S.E.2d 734 (1982).
Since the evidence did not demand a finding of entrapment, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Rapier v. State, 245 Ga. App. 211, 535 S.E.2d 860 (2000).
Evidence insufficient to require directed verdict based on entrapment.
- Evidence did not authorize the granting of a directed verdict since, other than the defendant's own uncorroborated testimony, the defendant offered no evidence whatsoever in refutation of that presented by the prosecution and the entrapment defense which the defendant attempted to raise was likewise unsupported by any evidence other than the defendant's own testimony that the informant had a reputation for violence, that the informant had uttered a threat during appellant's negotiations with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent, and that the defendant had assumed that a bulge the defendant allegedly observed beneath the agent's clothing was a gun, and, the testimony of the agent, who was present during all stages of the transaction, was sufficient to rebut the defense of entrapment and to create an issue of fact for the jury. Meade v. State, 165 Ga. App. 556, 301 S.E.2d 912 (1983).
Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of the sale of cocaine and in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the jury was authorized to find that the state's evidence rebutted the defendant's case of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt since the uncontroverted testimony of the informant and the surveillance recording showed that the defendant had the previously established ability to purchase cocaine from the drug dealer and that the defendant willingly participated in the drug deal; there is no entrapment when the informant merely furnishes an opportunity to a defendant who is ready to commit the offense. Jackson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 591, 699 S.E.2d 884 (2010).
Defendant must show prejudice from trial delay to prevail on directed verdict motion.
- After weighing the factors considered in determining whether the defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated, the appeals court upheld the denial of the defendant's plea in bar and demand for an acquittal as the defendant failed to show that any prejudice resulted from the delay in bringing the case to trial. Lackey v. State, 283 Ga. App. 139, 640 S.E.2d 717 (2006).
Three year and two month delay was fatal.
- Trial court abused the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motions for discharge and acquittal because nothing in the trial court's order showed that the court considered whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long given the circumstances of the case, the pretrial delay of three years and two months greatly exceeded the amount of time necessary to establish a presumption of prejudice, the trial court erred in failing to assign blame for the delay, and the prejudice to the defendant was legally significant; the trial court's finding that the defendant's anxiety was the same as every other defendant awaiting trial was not supported by the evidence because the defendant's anxiety included losing custody of a small child and having the state threaten to take a different child away from the defendant at the time of that child's birth. Teasley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 153, 704 S.E.2d 248 (2010).
No fatal variance in evidence and accusations.
- Trial court correctly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal based on a variance between the allegations and proof as to the date of the offense. Frymyer v. State, 179 Ga. App. 391, 346 S.E.2d 573 (1986).
For construction purposes, the state's act of merely tracking the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), which used the masculine pronoun "his" to include the feminine gender, did not result in a fatal variance between the evidence at trial and the allegations of the accusation in a case involving a female officer, entitling both defendants to a directed verdict. Curtis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 298, 645 S.E.2d 705 (2007), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).
Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal, which alleged that the evidence fatally varied from the allegations in the accusation as: (1) the defendant failed to raise a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment through a special demurrer; and (2) the defendant admitted to possessing, endorsing, and uttering a check belonging to the victim. Tucker v. State, 283 Ga. App. 428, 641 S.E.2d 653 (2007).
Evidence did not demand verdict of acquittal. See Carpenter v. State, 167 Ga. App. 634, 307 S.E.2d 19 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 79, 310 S.E.2d 912 (1984); Spence v. State, 252 Ga. 338, 313 S.E.2d 475 (1984); Brooks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 543, 314 S.E.2d 115 (1984); Sharp v. State, 183 Ga. App. 641, 360 S.E.2d 50 (1987); Rose v. State, 195 Ga. App. 399, 393 S.E.2d 459 (1990); Funderburk v. State, 195 Ga. App. 441, 393 S.E.2d 727 (1990); Gray v. State, 207 Ga. App. 648, 428 S.E.2d 663 (1993); Felder v. State, 264 Ga. App. 583, 591 S.E.2d 471 (2003).
When a conviction is upheld on appeal because the evidence is such that a rational trier of fact could find appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it cannot possibly be said the evidence demanded a verdict of acquittal. Miller v. State, 201 Ga. App. 108, 410 S.E.2d 328 (1991).
Given evidence that the defendant (1) knowingly provided the officer with a false name and date of birth, (2) failed to provide written identification when asked to do so, and (3) refused to respond when the police repeatedly knocked and telephoned, all of elements of an obstruction charge were shown, thus supporting the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Williams v. State, 289 Ga. App. 402, 657 S.E.2d 556 (2008).
Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of attempted burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-7-1(a) because the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that the defendant took a substantial step toward entering an owner's apartment to commit a felony; the defendant's inculpatory statement that the defendant intended to enter the owner's apartment to get money was direct evidence of the defendant's guilt, and this statement, combined with a witness's testimony that the witness heard the defendant and the defendant's brother discuss entering the owner's apartment through the window, saw them on the owner's porch, and then heard the window breaking, provided ample evidence to support the defendant's conviction of attempted burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Durham v. State, 295 Ga. App. 734, 673 S.E.2d 80 (2009).
There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions on two counts of armed robbery, and the trial court did not err by failing to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, based on both victims' identification of the defendant; the defendant being found in a nearby location to the truck stop where the attacks occurred walking rapidly away; and the defendant being found with exactly the amount of cash taken from one victim. Burden v. State, 296 Ga. App. 441, 674 S.E.2d 668 (2009).
Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for a new trial or the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find the defendant guilty of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) beyond a reasonable doubt when the back window of a home was broken and police found the defendant hiding in a closet under a pile of clothing. Williams v. State, 297 Ga. App. 723, 678 S.E.2d 95 (2009).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions for attempted armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), given the victim's eyewitness testimony that the defendant approached the eyewitness with a handgun while attempting to obtain money from the cash register of a store. Nyane v. State, 306 Ga. App. 591, 703 S.E.2d 53 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0420, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. 2011).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate a coconspirator's testimony under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see O.C.G.A. § 24- 14-8) and for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes for which the defendant was convicted; the state presented the testimony of numerous witnesses and other evidence that sufficiently corroborated the coconspirator's testimony about the defendant's participation in the crimes. Walker v. State, 310 Ga. App. 223, 713 S.E.2d 413 (2011).
Because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty of criminal damage to property in the second degree, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal; the owner of the truck the defendant damaged testified that the owner paid to have the broken windows repaired and that the owner paid the amount shown on the repair bill, and the bill and photographs of the damages to the vehicle were introduced into evidence. Elsasser v. State, 313 Ga. App. 661, 722 S.E.2d 327 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0949, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 555 (Ga. 2012).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that there was no competent evidence to corroborate the codefendant's testimony because the codefendant's testimony was corroborated in the wealth of similar transaction evidence presented to the jury. Alatise v. State, 291 Ga. 428, 728 S.E.2d 592 (2012).
Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions and to establish venue, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict of acquittal on those issues. Bearden v. State, 316 Ga. App. 721, 728 S.E.2d 874 (2012).
While the co-murderer's statement to police did make up a significant portion of the testimony connecting the defendant to the murders, it was not the only evidence against the defendant as cell phone evidence indicated the defendant was near the victims' home near the time the crimes took place and direct testimony established that the defendant recruited at least one participant in the robbery scheme that resulted in the murders. Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017).
Cited in Klausen v. State, 294 Ga. App. 463, 669 S.E.2d 460 (2008).
Application
Mere presence where the crime is being committed is insufficient for conviction.
- Mere presence of one where a crime is being committed without any evidence to further show participation in the crime, directly or indirectly, is insufficient upon which to base a conviction. Therefore, in such case a defense motion for directed verdict should be granted. Simmons v. State, 149 Ga. App. 589, 254 S.E.2d 907 (1979).
Directed verdict not required if sufficient evidence of lesser included offense.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict since sufficient evidence was adduced to convict the defendant for the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Pierce v. State, 209 Ga. App. 366, 433 S.E.2d 641 (1993).
Distinction between legally insufficient evidence and verdict against weight of evidence.
- Trial court's review of the evidence under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-21 differs from the court's review of the evidence on a motion for a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1. In the latter case, the trial court has a duty to grant a directed verdict of acquittal when there is no conflict in the evidence and it clearly demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law. Lavertu v. State, 325 Ga. App. 709, 754 S.E.2d 663 (2014).
Directed verdict in assault cases.
- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for acquittal as a matter of law, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, as the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction on four counts of assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20 and16-5-21(a)(2), as the defendant and the codefendant committed two home invasions, whereupon the victims therein were fearful, some were harmed, and during the incidents, the defendant held a night stick and instructed the victims to cooperate with the codefendant, who brandished a handgun. Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 620 S.E.2d 837 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).
Directed verdict in aggravated assault cases.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as direct evidence that the defendant fired at the victim and the defendant's own admission that the defendant fired at the victim was sufficient to submit the question of whether the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault to the jury; no error occurred pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6), involving a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, as the state offered more than circumstantial evidence to support the state's case against the defendant. Cobb v. State, 268 Ga. App. 66, 601 S.E.2d 443 (2004).
Trial court did not err in denying a codefendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to two aggravated assault charges given that sufficient evidence was presented that: (1) both the defendant and the codefendant, while armed, attempted to rob the victims; (2) off-duty police officers working as security officers identified the defendants; (3) an assault rifle and a sawed-off shotgun were fired at the police as both the defendants were pursued; and (4) the weapons were recovered after both the defendants were apprehended. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. App. 163, 635 S.E.2d 422 (2006).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal because there was ample evidence of the defendant's guilt of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) based on the defendant's act of firing two shots in the victim's direction, wounding the victim in the chest and leg. Nyane v. State, 306 Ga. App. 591, 703 S.E.2d 53 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0420, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. 2011).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a bus driver, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the bus driver testified that the driver did not feel free to drive away since the driver felt the driver's life was in danger; the driver testified that the driver chose not to drive away for fear that the defendant would shoot. Cannon v. State, 310 Ga. App. 262, 712 S.E.2d 645 (2011).
Directed verdict in aggravated assault and reckless conduct case.
- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, because there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated assault and reckless conduct, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-5-60(b), respectively; the defendant and the codefendants were involved in a physical altercation with two restaurant patrons, and a codefendant's testimony that the defendant retrieved a gun and shot the victim was sufficiently repeated by the testimony of other witnesses, who also connected the defendant with the shooting pursuant to the corroboration requirement in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Baker v. State, 273 Ga. App. 297, 614 S.E.2d 904 (2005).
Directed verdicts in aggravated assault and armed robbery cases.
- Despite the defendant's claim of innocence, convictions for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence showing that the defendant waited at the scene of the robbery and then assisted the codefendants in an attempted escape; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Jordan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151 (2006).
Directed verdict in aggravated assault with intent to rape cases.
- Denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, was proper because the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault with intent to rape in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21; defendant came to the home of the victim, who was a former girlfriend, and the victim claimed that the defendant physically and sexually assaulted her, causing multiple serious injuries and bruises. Goodall v. State, 277 Ga. App. 600, 627 S.E.2d 183 (2006).
Directed verdict in aggravated battery cases.
- Because the defendant shot the victim in the buttocks, rendering the victim's rectum and a portion of the victim's colon useless for a period of time, the evidence sufficed to sustain an aggravated battery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a); consequently, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Parham v. State, 270 Ga. App. 54, 606 S.E.2d 79 (2004).
Directed verdicts in aggravated sexual battery cases.
- Aggravated sexual battery conviction was upheld on appeal as was the trial court's order denying the defendant a directed verdict of acquittal because: (1) the victim's testimony sufficiently demonstrated that the defendant put the defendant's hand inside her vaginal area; (2) the victim's testimony authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant penetrated the victim's sexual organ with a foreign object; (3) similar transaction evidence was properly admitted to prove the defendant's bent of mind and motive; (4) each similar transaction witness positively identified the defendant as the person who committed the independent act, and the proof of one of the incidents tended to prove the offense at trial, which also involved digital penetration in a hospital setting; and (5) three other similar transaction incidents, while not involving an actual touching, were properly admitted as evidence that the defendant offered a female money or clothing in exchange for a sexual favor of some sort; finally, because the defendant failed to object that testimony from these witnesses was cumulative, the defendant waived this claim of error for purposes of appeal. Enurah v. State, 279 Ga. App. 883, 633 S.E.2d 52 (2006).
Directed verdict on aggravated sodomy charge.
- Denial of a motion for directed verdict on a charge of aggravated sodomy was proper because the defendant and codefendant sexually assaulted three victims during an armed robbery, including one instance in which the defendant and the codefendant took turns raping one victim, and the aggravated sodomy was committed during the sexual assaults; the jury could reasonably find that the defendant and codefendant had a common criminal intent to commit the sexual assaults and the defendant could be found guilty of the act performed by the codefendant. Coley v. State, 272 Ga. App. 446, 612 S.E.2d 608 (2005).
Directed verdict in aggravated stalking cases.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to two aggravated stalking charges, despite claims that: (1) the state failed to prove the defendant acted for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the victim; and (2) the defendant lacked the requisite intent to commit the crimes; the former argument attacked the credibility of the witnesses, which the appeals court did not weigh, and, regarding the latter argument, the intention with which an act was committed was a jury question. Chatham v. State, 280 Ga. App. 695, 634 S.E.2d 856 (2006).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) because evidence of the defendant's continuing unauthorized contacts with the victim and repeated violations of restraining orders established a pattern of harassing behavior; a permanent restraining order had been entered that prohibited the defendant from having any contact with the victim, but the defendant violated that order by sending a letter to the victim that caused the victim to fear for the victim's own family and that of the victim's family. Additionally, a directed verdict was also inappropriate when the evidence authorized the jury to find that venue in Lowndes County was properly established; the victim and the victim's family resided in Lowndes County, and the victim's mother testified that the defendant had sent the letter to their residence and that the letter was retrieved from the mailbox at their residence. Bowen v. State, 304 Ga. App. 819, 697 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of aggravated stalking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a); the victim testified that the defendant had previously threatened the victim, the defendant had a history of violence against the victim, and the defendant made repeated phone calls and sent several text messages to the victim. Brooks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 789, 723 S.E.2d 29 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0974, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1035 (Ga. 2012).
Directed verdicts in armed robbery cases.
- Despite the defendant's assertion that the defendant only pretended to have a weapon while robbing a restaurant, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motions for a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as the victims testified that the defendant used something that felt and looked like a gun and one victim, the night manager, testified that the defendant threatened to "blow" that victim's head off if the victim did not open the safe; such testimony sufficiently showed that the defendant's actions created a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victims that an offensive weapon was being used. White v. State, 258 Ga. App. 546, 574 S.E.2d 629 (2002).
Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 because there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41; defendant and two others waited at a vacant house for a pizza delivery person, and upon arrival, the defendant held up a revolver and demanded the pizza. Oliver v. State, 270 Ga. App. 429, 606 S.E.2d 874 (2004).
Despite the defendant's contention on appeal that the state's evidence was insufficient, specifically, regarding the presence of a gun, given that the state presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim that an offensive weapon was being used in an armed robbery, when coupled with the defendant's admission to possessing a gun at the time of the robbery, the defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld; thus, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Fluellen v. State, 284 Ga. App. 584, 644 S.E.2d 486 (2007).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict after the defendant was convicted of armed robbery because there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) since there was evidence from which a jury could find sufficient corroboration of the accomplice's testimony to support the defendant's conviction; the testimony of the victims corroborated the accomplice's testimony because the victims physical description of the perpetrator was consistent with the accomplice's testimony about what the defendant was wearing on the day of the robbery. Harris v. State, 311 Ga. App. 336, 715 S.E.2d 757 (2011).
Directed verdict in armed robbery and aggravated assault cases.
- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on an armed robbery and aggravated assault charge as there was evidence that the defendant picked up a coin bag from a table in a laundry room, twice pointed a gun at the victim's neck, ordered the victim to kneel, demanded the victim's wallet and keys, and left the laundry room with the coin bag and the victim's keys. Kirk v. State, 271 Ga. App. 640, 610 S.E.2d 604 (2005).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the defendant's aggravated assault with intent to rob convictions because the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant fired a gun at the victims to further a robbery, and the indictment did not charge the defendant with a specific intent to rob the victims but only with a general intent to rob; the defendant approached the victims, pointed a gun toward the head of one of the victims, and demanded money, and after robbing that victim, the defendant fled and fired several shots at the porch where the victims had been standing and at the victims once the victims began chasing the defendant. Johnson v. State, 304 Ga. App. 371, 696 S.E.2d 396 (2010).
Directed verdict in armed robbery and theft of a motor vehicle.
- In a case wherein a defendant confessed that after killing the defendant's mother the defendant took cash and blank checks from the mother's purse and drove away in the mother's car, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery and theft by taking a motor vehicle, in addition to the defendant's conviction for malice murder; as a result, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the counts charging armed robbery and theft by taking a motor vehicle. Hester v. State, 282 Ga. 239, 647 S.E.2d 60 (2007).
Directed verdict in attempt to commit armed robbery cases.
- In a criminal trial on a charge of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, a trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for directed verdict; the criminal attempt under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 was committed when the defendant and the defendant's two coworkers obtained equipment, including guns and ammunition, in preparation for robbing a store, drove to the store, and were thereafter spotted by the police. Level v. State, 273 Ga. App. 601, 615 S.E.2d 640 (2005).
Directed verdict in attempted arson and aggravated assault case.
- Denial of the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict was proper as the evidence established the essential elements of attempted arson and aggravated assault; the evidence showed that the defendant poured gasoline near two ignition sources, a light bulb and hot water heater, in the crawlspace of his estranged girlfriend's house and then told the estranged girlfriend's adult children to light the water heater's pilot flame. McGraw v. State, 276 Ga. App. 607, 624 S.E.2d 232 (2005).
Directed verdict in burglary cases.
- As the defendant assisted her husband in committing burglaries by not only driving with him to the scene of the crimes, but by serving as the getaway driver, the evidence sufficed to show that she was a party to her husband's crimes, and the denial of the defendant's motion for directed verdict was proper. Head v. State, 261 Ga. App. 185, 582 S.E.2d 164 (2003).
Trial court correctly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on burglary charges since: (1) the evidence showed that property which was reported stolen from various residences was found at the house where the defendant was staying; (2) recent unexplained possession of that property was probative evidence of burglary; and (3) shoe prints made on the premises of two burglarized residences belonged to shoes owned by the defendant. Porter v. State, 264 Ga. App. 526, 591 S.E.2d 436 (2003).
Defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied because evidence from independent sources sufficiently corroborated the accomplice's statements implicating the defendant in the burglary. The accomplice's statements were corroborated by the victim's testimony that the defendant saw the victim bring the shotguns inside the apartment, by the victim's wife's testimony that the defendant had seen the victims leave the victims' apartment, and by the apartment manager's testimony that the defendant had been standing outside the victims' apartment, along with the accomplice, during the time period when the crimes were committed. Stocks v. State, 268 Ga. App. 351, 601 S.E.2d 729 (2004).
Because the evidence presented by the state was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for burglary, trial counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict did not constitute ineffective assistance. Brown v. State, 289 Ga. App. 297, 656 S.E.2d 582 (2008).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, which was based on the argument that the state's case relied too heavily on allegedly tainted evidence concerning the victims' pretrial identification of burglars, because at the time trial counsel moved for the directed verdict, the allegedly tainted identification evidence had been admitted without objection and, accordingly, the trial court properly considered that evidence in deciding the motion; even in the absence of testimony concerning the victims' pretrial identification of the defendant, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction because the defendant and the codefendant matched the general description of the burglars that the victims gave to police, the defendants were seen walking a short distance from the scene, not long after the burglary occurred, at the time police first saw them, the codefendant was carrying a backpack stolen during the break-in, when the codefendant saw police, the codefendant immediately discarded the backpack, and a number of items stolen during the burglary were recovered from the front porch of the defendant's residence. Bell v. State, 306 Ga. App. 853, 703 S.E.2d 680 (2010).
Directed verdict for violating age prohibition for body piercing.
- Denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was proper, in the defendant's conviction of piercing the body of a person under the age of 18, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-71.1(a), as the defendant did not verify that an individual was, in fact, 18 years old before the defendant pierced the individual's tongue. At the time, the individual was 17 years old. Sparks v. State, 292 Ga. App. 143, 664 S.E.2d 247 (2008).
Directed verdict in child molestation cases.
- Child's testimony that the child saw the defendant molest the child's sister was sufficient competent evidence to support a conviction for that crime, and the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict. Mantooth v. State, 197 Ga. App. 797, 399 S.E.2d 505 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Wilson v. State, 277 Ga. 195, 586 S.E.2d 669 (2003).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of aggravated child molestation because the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find that the defendant had the requisite intent for aggravated child molestation as the fact that the defendant expected a drug dealer to give the defendant and the defendant's daughter crack cocaine in exchange for their sexual favors did not exclude a finding that the defendant also intended the sexual acts to arouse or satisfy the defendant or the daughter's sexual desires. Odom v. State, 267 Ga. App. 701, 600 S.E.2d 759 (2004).
Trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, on two counts of child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4, was proper because the evidence of the defendant's inappropriate sexual abuse of the victim, defendant's son, sufficiently placed the dates of the charged offenses within the seven-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. §§ 17-3-1(c) and17-3-2.1(a)(5). Allen v. State, 275 Ga. App. 826, 622 S.E.2d 54 (2005).
Because the 13-year-old male victim testified that when the victim was sleeping the defendant pulled down the victim's pants and underwear and performed oral sex on him, and that testimony was corroborated by the defendant's girlfriend who observed the incident, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated child molestation, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c), as there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant committed "sodomy," as that term was defined under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a); accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1. Steverson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 876, 625 S.E.2d 476 (2005).
Trial court did not err by denying a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a child molestation charge, despite a claim that no physical evidence of other support for the victim's testimony was presented as: (1) Georgia law did not require corroboration of a child molestation victim's testimony; and (2) the victim's testimony was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. Keith v. State, 279 Ga. App. 819, 632 S.E.2d 669 (2006).
Directed verdict of acquittal unwarranted as: (1) the credibility of the child victim and any conflicts in the trial testimony were matters solely within the province of the jury to decide; (2) physical findings were not required to corroborate the charges of child molestation, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated child molestation; and (3) the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia. Hutchinson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 415, 651 S.E.2d 523 (2007).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the count of an indictment charging the defendant with attempted aggravated child molestation because the defendant was convicted only of the offense of criminal attempt, which was supported by the evidence, and the defendant could be convicted of the lesser-included offense of criminal attempt pursuant to a proper jury instruction. Arnold v. State, 305 Ga. App. 45, 699 S.E.2d 77 (2010).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as to the child-molestation count because the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that the defendant committed the offense of child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1); the jury was authorized to infer that the defendant was kissing the victim on the mouth because the victim testified that they were kissing, and the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant violated the statute prohibiting child molestation in at least two of the ways alleged in the indictment, which charged the defendant with kissing the victim on the mouth, exposing the defendant's privates to and having intercourse with the victim, who was under 16 years of age, with intent to arouse and satisfy their sexual desires. Judice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 229, 707 S.E.2d 114 (2011).
Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict based on the testimony of the victim that defendant repeatedly had sexual intercourse and engaged in other sexual acts with the victim, who was younger than 16, as well as the wife's testimony that defendant admitted to having sex with the victim. Jones v. State, 333 Ga. App. 796, 777 S.E.2d 480 (2015).
Motion for a judgment of acquittal on charges of aggravated sexual battery, aggravated child molestation, and child molestation was properly denied as the defendant's testimony that the defendant blacked out during the incident did not demand a finding that the defendant lacked the requisite criminal intent; the victim testified that the defendant began rubbing the victim's legs, touched the victim's "private part" through her clothing, pulled down the defendant's pants as well as the victim's pants, picked the victim up, and began rubbing the victim up and down against the defendant's "private part." Ward v. State, 274 Ga. App. 511, 618 S.E.2d 154 (2005).
Directed verdict in concealment of death and theft by taking case.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as the defendant did not show that the defendant's trial for charges of concealment of a death and theft by taking was conducted in an improper venue, that there was a fatal variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof offered at trial, that the case against the defendant was barred by the statute of limitations, or that the indictment was fatally defective. James v. State, 274 Ga. App. 498, 618 S.E.2d 133 (2005).
Directed verdict in trafficking in cocaine cases.
- In a trial when the defendant was subsequently convicted of trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that as a matter of law the state failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that the contraband was in the defendant's actual or constructive possession. Since the defendant presented no evidence to show that anyone else had equal access to the defendant's personal bag under the bed in the room the defendant rented, there was clearly sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Mathis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 896, 420 S.E.2d 788, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 420 S.E.2d 788 (1992).
Trafficking in cocaine and heroin possession upheld based on circumstantial evidence.
- Defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and16-13-31(a), were supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) since it was shown that a woman stated that the defendant was residing in an apartment and selling drugs, a search of the apartment revealed drugs, cash, and photographs and papers with the defendant's name on them, as well as a sweater which the defendant was seen wearing, and the defendant changed the locks on the apartment; accordingly, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motions for a directed verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 and for a new trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-23 were properly denied. Williams v. State, 262 Ga. App. 67, 584 S.E.2d 625 (2003).
Directed verdict in possession of cocaine with intent to distribute case.
- Despite the defendant's equal access claim, because: (1) the evidence sufficiently showed the defendant's ownership and possession of the vehicle where the contraband was found; (2) the similar transaction evidence showed that the defendant previously admitted possessing an almost identical array of drugs and drug processing paraphernalia; (3) the informant was a mere tipster and not a material or necessary witness; and (4) trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance, the defendant's possession of cocaine with intent to distribute conviction was upheld on appeal; thus, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Cauley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 701, 652 S.E.2d 586 (2007).
Codefendants' convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a housing project, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.5(b), were unsupportable as a matter of law, and the trial court erred by denying the codefendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom were insufficient to connect the codefendant to the cocaine, which was found in an upstairs bedroom occupied by the codefendants; no evidence was introduced to show that the codefendant resided in the apartment where the cocaine was found, which could authorize an inference that the codefendant possessed the property therein. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481 (2010).
Directed verdict in trafficking in cocaine cases.
- Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied and the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) as the defendant arranged the drug transaction with an undercover officer, accepted the container in which the officer directed the defendant to place the cocaine, and delivered to the officer 397 grams of cocaine with a purity of 44 percent. Salgado v. State, 268 Ga. App. 18, 601 S.E.2d 417 (2004).
Directed verdict in sale of cocaine cases.
- Because the evidence supporting the defendant's convictions revealed that the defendant was twice caught on tape selling crack cocaine to confidential informants, and a police officer testified that the location of one of the sales was within 200 to 300 feet of a public housing project, the defendant's convictions for selling cocaine and of distributing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a housing project and 1,000 feet of a school were upheld; thus, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Banks v. State, 270 Ga. App. 221, 606 S.E.2d 34 (2004).
Directed verdict in possession with intent to distribute cocaine case.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) in a case for possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30; defendant was seen fleeing into the woods wearing an unmarked black hat, a dog smelled the defendant on the same hat that was found near the defendant and that contained cocaine, and the defendant was not wearing a hat when the defendant was found. Riggins v. State, 281 Ga. App. 266, 635 S.E.2d 867 (2006).
Directed verdict on charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
- Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was properly denied; the evidence establishing the defendant's constructive possession of cocaine included the defendant's presence in the room where the cocaine was found, the defendant's actual possession of a key to the apartment where the cocaine was found and $346 in cash, testimony by another individual at the scene that the individual and the defendant were partners in the drug trade, and the defendant's giving a false name when police arrived. Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 694, 624 S.E.2d 270 (2005).
Directed verdict in trafficking in methamphetamine cases.
- After a search of the defendant's car produced, among other things, drugs, syringes, scales, and a slip of paper with amounts of money listed next to various names and initials, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in methamphetamine; the trial court therefore did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Yarbrough v. State, 264 Ga. App. 848, 592 S.E.2d 681 (2003).
Trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 was proper as the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e); there was clearly evidence that the sale of the drug involved more than 28 grams of methamphetamine, that the defendant either possessed or sold the methamphetamine through the defendant's presence when the drug was being cut, weighed, packaged, and sold, and that the defendant was liable as an aider and abettor under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21 even if there was no evidence that the defendant either arranged the sale or received any money in connection therewith. Blackwood v. State, 277 Ga. App. 870, 627 S.E.2d 907 (2006).
Trial court did not err in denying a codefendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in methamphetamine because based upon the circumstantial evidence presented, the jury was authorized to find that the codefendant was in joint constructive possession of the methamphetamine with the defendant, which was located at the kitchen table where the defendant had been sitting; the defendant lived at the residence with the codefendant, the defendant was present at the time of a controlled buy, and the defendant had access to the drugs that were seized from the kitchen table. Fyfe v. State, 305 Ga. App. 322, 699 S.E.2d 546 (2010).
Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal because the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) beyond a reasonable doubt since the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant knowingly had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the drugs, which were stashed inside a green vehicle; the defendant had moments earlier given an accomplice the keys to the vehicle, told the accomplice where to drive and park the vehicle, and led the accomplice to a motel. Flores v. State, 308 Ga. App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1072, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 527 (Ga. 2011).
Trial court erred in denying the codefendant's motion for a directed verdict after the codefendant was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) because the evidence against the codefendant was insufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the codefendant was in actual or constructive possession of the drugs found in a vehicle, and there was no presumption of drug possession since there was no evidence that the codefendant owned or controlled the vehicle in which the drugs were found; there was no evidence that the codefendant had even been in or had any connection to that vehicle, no testimony implicated the codefendant in the transaction, and the evidence showed nothing more than the codefendant's presence in the vehicle with the defendant, but there was no evidence that the codefendant had the power and intent to exercise control over the drugs. Flores v. State, 308 Ga. App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1072, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 527 (Ga. 2011).
Directed verdict in sale of methamphetamine case.
- Conviction for the sale of methamphetamine was upheld on appeal because the state presented sufficient evidence to support a charge of the sale of methamphetamine before the defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal, specifically, that the drugs allegedly sold to an informant were packaged in the same type of Ziploc bag as those found on the defendant's person, and the defendant was in possession of a large of amount of cash and paraphernalia. Ramey v. State, 288 Ga. App. 800, 655 S.E.2d 675 (2007).
Directed verdict in possession of methamphetamine cases.
- Although the defendant contended that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because presence in the vicinity of contraband did not establish possession, the defendant and the codefendant were indicted and tried together for possession of methamphetamine, the jury was entitled to conclude that the defendant was in possession of the methamphet- amine-coated pipe, which was found in the car the defendant drove, next to the driver's seat; moreover, the jury heard the officer's testimony that the defendant stated at arrest that the defendant was aware the item was used to smoke methamphetamine, and the trial court charged the jury on the doctrine of equal access. Thus, the jury was able to contemplate and reject the equal access defense, and sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to find that the defendant possessed the methamphetamine. Dover v. State, 307 Ga. App. 126, 704 S.E.2d 235 (2010).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to the charge of possession of methamphetamine because the trier of fact was presented with sufficient evidence to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of possessing methamphetamine since the court was authorized to conclude that the defendant either dropped or discarded the methamphetamine during the struggle with police when the defendant fled from a traffic stop; the evidence included the officer's testimony that the officer saw the defendant tuck something into a waistband while in a car, the defendant's flight from law enforcement after being stopped for a minor traffic offense, the proximity of the methamphetamine to the location where the defendant fell to the ground, and the defendant's statement to the officer that the defendant had exchanged drugs for use of the car. Bone v. State, 311 Ga. App. 390, 715 S.E.2d 789 (2011).
Directed verdict in driving without insurance cases.
- Defendant's conviction for driving without insurance in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-10(b) was based on sufficient evidence and, accordingly, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 was properly denied since the jury determined, based mainly on circumstantial evidence, that the elements of the crime were satisfied; the record revealed that the defendant was involved in a collision, slowed down briefly and then fled the scene, and then produced an insurance card which did not appear to be authentic and was not validated by the insurance company. Augustin v. State, 260 Ga. App. 631, 580 S.E.2d 640 (2003).
Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of driving with no proof of insurance was properly denied because the arresting officer confirmed several times that the defendant could not find the defendant's proof of insurance, which was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Broadnax-Woodland v. State, 265 Ga. App. 669, 595 S.E.2d 350 (2004).
Directed verdict in issues of delinquency.
- Evidence was sufficient to authorize a trial court to find the defendant delinquent for being a party to a homicide, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3), and, thus, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied; the defendant's intent could be inferred easily from the fact that the defendant stood and watched while a friend beat the victim and defecated on the victim, never leaving to call for help. In the Interest of K.B.T., 279 Ga. App. 350, 631 S.E.2d 412 (2006).
Trial court did not err in denying a defendant juvenile's motion for a directed verdict and in adjudicating the defendant delinquent on an obstruction charge because an officer working as a security guard at a restaurant was engaged in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties at the time of the officer's encounter with the defendant as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. In the Interest of D.S., 295 Ga. App. 847, 673 S.E.2d 321 (2009).
Directed verdict in disorderly conduct cases.
- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on a charge of disorderly conduct since the evidence did not demonstrate that the defendant's cursing and violent movement of the defendant's car door was directed solely at the passenger, as the defendant alleged, but was directed at the victim; furthermore, there was evidence that the defendant "violently" shook the defendant's keys at the victim, and the victim saw the defendant actually damaging the victim's vehicle by scratching the vehicle with a key. Crutcher v. State, 267 Ga. App. 410, 599 S.E.2d 353 (2004).
Directed verdicts in drug cases.
- Defendant's spontaneous oral identification of a substance as marijuana and possession of over 12 pounds of the substance authorized denial of a directed verdict of acquittal by the trial court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1. Turner v. State, 173 Ga. App. 782, 328 S.E.2d 368 (1985).
There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(5) and, accordingly, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 was proper; the record revealed that upon being stopped for a seatbelt violation, the defendant and the defendant's passenger were very anxious, their versions of where the defendants had been conflicted, and upon a consensual search of the car, a pistol and cocaine were found, which gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the defendant and the passenger were in joint constructive possession thereof. Taylor v. State, 263 Ga. App. 420, 587 S.E.2d 791 (2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 941, 124 S. Ct. 2916, 159 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004).
Defendant was not entitled to an acquittal on either a charge of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine or possession of methamphetamine as the evidence showed that methamphetamine was being manufactured inside the residence in which the defendant was found, and conviction of possession of methamphetamine did not rest solely upon evidence that the methamphetamine was found on the premises also occupied by others, nor did such conviction rest solely upon the defendant's spatial proximity to the contraband. McWhorter v. State, 275 Ga. App. 624, 621 S.E.2d 571 (2005).
Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, and properly entered judgments of conviction against the defendant for misdemeanor possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine as the evidence sufficiently showed that the defendant possessed marijuana which police found in a search of the defendant's home and that the defendant possessed cocaine found in a search of the home and car. Heller v. State, 275 Ga. App. 637, 621 S.E.2d 591 (2005).
Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on a charge of felony possession of marijuana. The amount of marijuana was established by a witness's testimony that the defendant returned to the witness's apartment with "about a pound" of marijuana in a grocery bag. Rosser v. State, 284 Ga. 335, 667 S.E.2d 62 (2008).
Denial of a motion for mistrial or directed verdict on a possession of marijuana charge based on the state's alleged failure to prove the evidence was marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt was proper. The defendant referred to the substance as marijuana during the defendant's testimony, and this, together with an officer's testimony, was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt. Dulcio v. State, 297 Ga. App. 600, 677 S.E.2d 758 (2009).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(A), and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j), because the verdict was not insupportable as a matter of law; in addition to evidence that the defendant rented a hotel room where illegal drugs were found, had a key to the suite, and was going to the suite at a time when a great quantity and variety of drugs were in open view, there was other evidence linking the defendant to the contraband found there, including the defendant's suspicious behavior upon seeing officers near the suite and the presence of the defendant's personal property inside the suite. Glass v. State, 304 Ga. App. 414, 696 S.E.2d 140 (2010).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal after a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine because the totality of the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to reject as speculative and unreasonable the hypothesis that someone else discarded the drugs in a patrol car; the defendant possessed a homemade smoking pipe containing methamphetamine residue, there was similar transaction evidence, and the patrol officer testified that the officer had exclusive control of the officer's patrol car, the officer stayed with the officer's car whenever the car was serviced by third parties, the officer searched the backseat immediately after the defendant exited from the car, and the officer discovered the drugs directly up under the seat where the defendant had been sitting. Taylor v. State, 305 Ga. App. 748, 700 S.E.2d 841 (2010).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of distribution of marijuana, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(4); the testimony of a party to the transaction was corroborated by the observations of the detectives, the marijuana taken into evidence, the written statements of the parties regarding the defendant's involvement, and the defendant's own statement to a detective. Arnett v. State, 311 Ga. App. 811, 717 S.E.2d 312 (2011).
Directed verdict in firearm possession cases.
- Trial court erred in denying the codefendant's motion for a directed verdict after the codefendant was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(5) because the evidence did not support the "during the commission of a felony" element of the firearm possession charge; the evidence against the codefendant was insufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the codefendant was in actual or constructive possession of drugs found in the vehicle in which the codefendant was riding. Flores v. State, 308 Ga. App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1072, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 527 (Ga. 2011).
Evidence sufficient to show drug transaction within 1,000 feet of public housing.
- Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) on a charge of distributing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public housing project in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.5(b); because another participant in the drug transaction testified that the transaction occurred at the "Atlanta Street Apartments," and an officer familiar with the area testified that the "Atlanta Street Apartments" were owned by a housing authority and people of lower income lived there, evidence was sufficient to show that the transaction occurred within 1,000 feet of a housing project. Barnett v. State, 276 Ga. App. 238, 623 S.E.2d 136 (2005).
Directed verdicts in DUI cases.
- Directed verdicts of acquittal were not required on charges because the evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving under the influence of alcohol in both manners charged and of carrying a concealed weapon. Anderson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 118, 416 S.E.2d 309, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 309 (1992).
Because the defendant made no objection to the admissibility of the defendant's breath test results or to any of the trooper's testimony concerning a roadblock or the defendant's condition in the defendant's criminal trial on driving under the influence charges, the evidence was properly before the trial court and the evidence supported the charges, such that denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) was proper. Overton v. State, 270 Ga. App. 285, 606 S.E.2d 306 (2004).
Because the state failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendant drove a vehicle within three hours prior to the Intoxilyzer 5000 test being administered, and no evidence was presented to support a per se violation of the offense, a driving under the influence of alcohol with an unlawful blood alcohol level conviction was reversed; but, given the defendant's admission to losing control of the vehicle and running into an embankment on the opposite side of the road, and evidence of a blood alcohol level well above the legal limit, which constituted circumstantial evidence of being a less-safe driver, a less-safe driving under the influence conviction was upheld, and no error resulted from the trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict as to this charge. Norton v. State, 280 Ga. App. 303, 640 S.E.2d 48 (2006).
Given that sufficient evidence was presented through the testimony of the arresting officer, the property damage victims, and the defendant's admissions, and a 16-year gap between the current DUI offense and a prior DUI arrest did not require exclusion of the prior DUI as a similar transaction, as it provided evidence of the defendant's bent of mind to get behind the wheel of a vehicle when it was less safe to do so, the defendant's conviction for the recent offense was upheld on appeal; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Evans v. State, 287 Ga. App. 74, 651 S.E.2d 363 (2007).
Because sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding that the defendant was intoxicated to the level that the intoxication caused both the defendant's loss of consciousness and an accident resulting in the defendant's truck straddling a ditch with the truck's nose down at close to a 90-degree angle, and the responding deputies testified that the defendant appeared to be under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive, the defendant's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) was supported by sufficient direct evidence of guilt; thus, a directed verdict of acquittal as to the DUI charge was properly denied. Stewart v. State, 288 Ga. App. 735, 655 S.E.2d 328 (2007).
Directed verdict in bus hijacking case.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of bus hijacking, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123(a)(1)(A), because the jury was authorized to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exercised control of the bus by force; the defendant brandished a handgun in the open door of the bus as the defendant ordered a passenger to get off, and the bus driver testified that the driver did not feel free to drive away because the driver felt the driver's life was in danger and the driver did not want to agitate the defendant. Cannon v. State, 310 Ga. App. 262, 712 S.E.2d 645 (2011).
Directed verdicts in kidnapping cases.
- Trial court did not err when the court denied a motion for a verdict of acquittal or "not guilty" in a prosecution for kidnapping since there was evidence that the defendant asserted control of the victim by ordering the victim to enter an apartment, and that the defendant participated in repeated assaults and the ultimate death of the victim after having forcibly kept the victim in the apartment. Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998).
There was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of kidnapping with bodily injury in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a) since the victim testified that the defendant held a knife to the victim's throat, made the victim get into the defendant's truck and drove for a while, and that the defendant told the victim that the defendant was going to kill the victim, at which point the victim escaped; accordingly, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 was proper. Mann v. State, 264 Ga. App. 631, 591 S.E.2d 495 (2003), overruled on other grounds, Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 646 S.E.2d 84 (2007).
Conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), was not supported by sufficient evidence of asportation as the defendant brandished a gun at the victim and attempted to have the victim get into the car but instead, the victim braced the victim's back against the car and refused to move, whereupon a struggle ensued between the victim and the defendant and the victim fell to the ground; such movement of the victim did not constitute asportation, and the trial court erred in denying a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1. Leppla v. State, 277 Ga. App. 804, 627 S.E.2d 794 (2006).
It was not error for the trial court to deny the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the kidnapping charge because during the incident, as the victim exited the defendant's truck, the defendant grabbed the victim by the neck and moved the victim away from the more public area near the truck into a backyard, and after beating the victim in that location, the defendant moved the victim deeper into the backyard toward the tree line; when the defendant finished beating the victim the defendant picked the victim up and carried the victim to a trailer. The defendant moved the victim away from the area before the defendant began the beating, which was not necessary to the battery and independently increased the victim's danger and prevented the victim from making an escape, calling for help, or being spotted by witnesses. Amaya v. State, 308 Ga. App. 460, 708 S.E.2d 28 (2011).
Trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider the lesser included offense of false imprisonment after granting a directed verdict on the kidnapping charges against the defendant because false imprisonment was a lesser included offense of kidnapping, and the indictment against the defendant contained all the essential elements related to false imprisonment. Martinez v. State, 318 Ga. App. 254, 735 S.E.2d 785 (2012).
Directed verdict in impersonating an officer, kidnapping, and other charges.
- Because sufficient evidence showed that the defendant, by posing as a police officer and driving the victims to remote locations, used fear and intimidation to ensure that the victims would cooperate and agree to have sex, the defendant was not entitled to an acquittal as to the charges of impersonating an officer, aggravated sodomy, attempted aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault and rape; furthermore, though both victims willingly got into the defendant's car, after the victims pleaded to be let go and the defendant refused to grant those pleas, that act amounted to a kidnapping. Dasher v. State, 281 Ga. App. 326, 636 S.E.2d 83 (2006).
Directed verdict in kidnapping, rape, and robbery trials.
- Trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, was proper as there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for kidnapping, rape, and robbery by intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-40,16-6-1, and16-8-41, respectively, because the victim positively identified the defendant upon the defendant's arrest and at trial, there was similar transaction evidence from another victim who was approached and threatened in the same manner, and there was also corroborative physical evidence; defendant threatened the victim, who was at a bus stop, with a gun, robbed her, forced her to a storage area in a garage, and raped her. Sims v. State, 275 Ga. App. 836, 621 S.E.2d 869 (2005).
Directed verdict in murder cases.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant killed the victim without justification or mitigation by strangling the victim and that the defendant, without the authority and with the intent to steal from the victim, entered the victim's apartment with keys defendant had access to as a maintenance worker in the victim's apartment complex. Oliver v. State, 276 Ga. 665, 581 S.E.2d 538 (2003).
Because the defendant admitted that, while the children were sleeping and to scare defendant's girlfriend, defendant used a cigarette lighter to set fire to the bedding on the corner of the son's bed, causing a fire in a trailer that killed the son and two daughters, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find that defendant was, beyond a reasonable doubt, guilty of three counts of malice murder, three counts of felony murder, and two counts of arson in the first degree; thus, the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a). Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488 (2004).
Trial court did not err in denying the codefendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the circumstantial evidence the state presented was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the codefendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of a girlfriend's child; both the girlfriend and the codefendant were with the child during the time period within which the fatal injuries were believed to have been inflicted upon the child. Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 721 S.E.2d 892 (2012).
Directed verdict in murder and aggravated assault case.
- Convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21, were supported by sufficient evidence including that the defendant and the codefendant were acting in concert, and the denial of the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 was proper; the defendant argued with the victim, a prostitute, and refused to pay for the victim's services, prompting the victim to get a gun and fire a shot into the air, whereupon the defendant and a codefendant fired their guns back at the victim in a car leaving the area, and a bullet from the codefendant's gun killed the victim. Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170, 626 S.E.2d 88 (2006).
Directed verdict in obstruction of officer cases.
- Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on obstruction of an officer charge since the defendant consented to the deputy's entry into the defendant's home and the defendant knowingly and wilfully grabbed the deputy's arm to stop the deputy from arresting a woman while in the lawful discharge of the deputy's duties. Schroeder v. State, 261 Ga. App. 879, 583 S.E.2d 922 (2003).
Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the count charging the defendant with obstructing a correctional officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties because the record did not support the defendant's argument that the state failed to prove that the person named in the indictment was a correctional officer even though the evidence showed that the dispatcher had not yet been trained five months after the dispatcher was employed. Grier v. State, 262 Ga. App. 777, 586 S.E.2d 448 (2003).
Because sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant physically assaulted an off-duty sheriff's officer prior to arrest and continued to resist and obstruct the officer's official duties thereafter, the defendant was properly denied an acquittal and a new trial. Helton v. State, 284 Ga. App. 777, 644 S.E.2d 896 (2007).
Authority of officer questioned in motion for directed verdict.
- University police officer had authority under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30 to issue citations for an accident that occurred at an intersection that bordered the campus, and the trial court, therefore, properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 relating to the charge of failing to obey a traffic control device in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20; the broad language of § 40-13-30 gave any officer of Georgia that had authority to arrest for a misdemeanor the authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial. Hawkins v. State, 281 Ga. App. 852, 637 S.E.2d 422 (2006).
Directed verdict in less safe driver cases.
- Because: (1) the appeals court did not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, despite the two conflicting views of the evidence; and (2) a jury charge related to HGN tests, where no HGN test was given, was proper, sufficient evidence supported the defendant's less-safe driver conviction under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1); thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Massa v. State, 287 Ga. App. 494, 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007).
Directed verdict in driving under a suspended license case.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 after a jury found the defendant guilty of driving on a suspended license in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121(a) because there was some evidence that the defendant was served with a notice of suspension pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-5-60; the state introduced the defendant's driver's license history report, which showed that the defendant had been served with the notice of the license suspension by a police officer, and the officer testified that the officer served the defendant with the notice. Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 717 S.E.2d 682 (2011).
Directed verdict in rape cases.
- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, and the defendant's rape conviction was upheld on appeal, given the victim's testimony at trial that the defendant's sexual organ penetrated hers after telling the defendant to stop was sufficient in and of itself, and no evidence was presented that directly contradicted this statement; hence, the jury had the right to accept the victim's testimony depicting non-consensual, forcible intercourse, as satisfying the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1. Scott v. State, 281 Ga. App. 106, 635 S.E.2d 582 (2006).
Directed verdict in statutory rape cases.
- Trial court did not err in denying a motion for a directed verdict on a charge of statutory rape as the victim's recantation did not render the evidence against the defendant insufficient because the victim's prior inconsistent statements concerning the sexual activity was substantive evidence of guilt; further, the prior inconsistent statements, corroborated by statements to others, as well as the defendant's own testimony that there was a sexual relationship, satisfied the sufficiency of the evidence standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1999). Lewis v. State, 278 Ga. App. 160, 628 S.E.2d 239 (2006).
Directed verdict in robbery by sudden snatching.
- Because the state's evidence failed to show that the robbery victim was aware that something was being taken before that taking was complete, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on a robbery by sudden snatching charge; however, given that: (1) the defendant gained entry to a back office by passing through a storage area, and the jury implicitly rejected an argument that the absence of an "Employees Only" sign meant, despite the victim's testimony to the contrary, that the defendant had permission to enter either the storage area or the office; and (2) the defendant admitted to entering the office without permission, took a cash bag, and reentered the store in a manner intending to hide from view, a burglary conviction was upheld. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. App. 91, 635 S.E.2d 385 (2006).
Directed verdict in shoplifting cases.
- In defendant's shoplifting conviction, the trial court did not err by failing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal because, as the defendant claimed, the state failed to exclude every reasonable conclusion from the circumstantial evidence presented; the evidence showed that the defendant was in the lobby of the store when the alarm was triggered, that the defendant ran, that the defendant was apprehended, that a bag from the store was recovered, and that the bag contained a number of items from the store but no receipt. Smith v. State, 275 Ga. App. 60, 619 S.E.2d 694 (2005).
Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal with regard to the defendant's trial for felony shoplifting because the testimony of the store's loss prevention officer established each element of the crime and provided sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Parham v. State, 320 Ga. App. 676, 739 S.E.2d 135 (2013).
Directed verdict in theft by receiving stolen property case.
- Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) and, thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, because the defendant's vehicle was stopped for violating traffic laws, the defendant could not produce a driver's license or proof of insurance, the personal information the defendant gave conflicted with the information on the identification card, the vehicle the defendant was driving had no vehicle tag, and the rental application found in the glove compartment along with a health insurance application showed that the car was rented to a person other than the defendant as the evidence showed that the defendant knew or should have known that the car the defendant possessed was stolen. Richardson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 320, 620 S.E.2d 522 (2005).
Directed verdict in theft by taking case.
- Because no evidence was presented that the defendant converted the victim's funds for the defendant's own use or cashed the victim's check and because the state did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of theft by taking, under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2; consequently, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Hydock v. State, 275 Ga. App. 122, 619 S.E.2d 807 (2005).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to infer that the defendant acted with criminal intent and to find the defendant guilty of theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, and whether the defendant intended to deprive the victims of the victims' property was a question for the trier of fact, who was not required to believe the defendant's testimony; the manner in which the property was appropriated was irrelevant, and even if the trial court had accepted the defendant's claim that the defendant lawfully appropriated the trailer, the evidence supported a finding that although the defendant could have had lawful possession of the truck initially, the defendant failed to return the truck, or even provide the victims with the location of the truck upon their demands. Rushing v. State, 305 Ga. App. 629, 700 S.E.2d 620 (2010).
Directed verdict on charge of theft by taking.
- Defendant's recent possession of stolen goods, coupled with other evidence linking the defendant with the theft, negated the propriety of a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of theft by taking. Rautenberg v. State, 178 Ga. App. 165, 342 S.E.2d 355 (1986).
Directed verdict in possession of tools for crime cases.
- In a prosecution for the possession of tools for the commission of a crime, which was a felony, while the evidence presented against the defendant was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, because the defendant's conduct could also have been charged as a misdemeanor offense of possession of a drug related object, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.2(a) and the rule of lenity, the felony conviction was reversed, and the matter was remanded for a resentencing on the misdemeanor offense; hence, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Washington v. State, 283 Ga. App. 570, 642 S.E.2d 199 (2007).
Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possession of tools for the commission of a crime for lack of evidence showing that body armor was a tool commonly used in the commission of attempted armed robbery pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-7-20(a). Nyane v. State, 306 Ga. App. 591, 703 S.E.2d 53 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0420, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. 2011).
Directed verdict on charge of terroristic threats.
- Trial judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of terroristic threats, as due to the implicit nature of the threats against an undercover officer, a reasonable inference of guilt could be found from the evidence; as corroborating evidence existed that proved the incident occurred as alleged, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing the jury to weigh the issue of corroboration and make a conclusion based on the evidence presented. Mendoza v. State, 274 Ga. App. 662, 618 S.E.2d 712 (2005).
Because evidence of the defendant's act of pointing the defendant's finger like a gun and threatening the victim, along with the use of racial slurs and profanity, was sufficient to support a charge of terroristic threats, the defendant's conviction was upheld on appeal, supporting the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to that charge; further, as to the state's evidence in support of the charge, given the equivalence between the words "ought" and "should," the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court overruled an objection to the state's assertion during closing argument that the defendant told the victim, "I ought to kill you." Self v. State, 288 Ga. App. 77, 653 S.E.2d 787 (2007).
Directed verdict in vehicular homicide and DUI cases.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motions for directed verdict and new trial because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for vehicular homicide and DUI since several witnesses on the scene testified that the defendant was in the driver's seat of the vehicle immediately after the accident. Hunt v. State, 261 Ga. App. 417, 582 S.E.2d 493 (2003).
Directed verdict in voluntary manslaughter cases.
- Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied as the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter because: (1) the victim assaulted the defendant, but turned away to leave the scene; (2) after the victim turned away, the defendant shot the victim in the back from two and one-half feet away; (3) the jury could reject the defendant's justification defense; (4) the defendant was identified as the assailant on the night of the shooting; and (5) the defendant admitted firing a gun at the victim. Nelloms v. State, 273 Ga. App. 448, 615 S.E.2d 153 (2005).
Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on a voluntary manslaughter count predicated on the defendant's claim of defense of habitation, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23, because the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) and to find that the defendant's stabbing of the victim was not justified in defense of the defendant's habitation; the jury was authorized to rely upon the defendant's prior inconsistent statement to the defendant's relative to conclude that the victim's entry into the defendant's apartment was not "violent and tumultuous," and based upon the eyewitness testimony of a neighbor, the jury also was authorized to find that the victim was unarmed and that deadly force was not necessary for the defendant's protection. Muckle v. State, 307 Ga. App. 634, 705 S.E.2d 721 (2011).
Directed verdict in racketeering crime offenses.
- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict with regard to the racketeering charges brought against the defendant for which the defendant was convicted of as the activities that the defendant engaged in involving various codefendants, the abduction of a store manager, and the victim's murder were sufficiently linked to form a racketeering pattern, but sufficiently distinguishable so that the crimes were not mere single transactions. Overton v. State, 295 Ga. App. 223, 671 S.E.2d 507 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0654, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 212 (Ga. 2009).
Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied because the defendant strangled the victim, robbed the victim, buried the victim, and then drove the victim's car for approximately two weeks after the crimes. Shelton v. State, 279 Ga. 161, 611 S.E.2d 11 (2005).
Trial court did not err in denying a motion for directed verdict. Loggins v. State, 169 Ga. App. 511, 313 S.E.2d 769 (1984).
Verdict of acquittal not demanded.
- Although there was no conflict in the evidence, the evidence does not demand a verdict of acquittal if there is evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant was attempting to take a shotgun without paying for the shotgun. Brown v. State, 160 Ga. App. 285, 287 S.E.2d 278 (1981).
Denial of a motion for directed verdict was upheld as there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict, including testimony by an officer identifying the defendant as a passenger in a stolen car and DNA evidence matching blood found on the defendant's shoes to a victim. Gonzalez v. State, 277 Ga. App. 362, 626 S.E.2d 569 (2006).
Trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based on a purported violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial because the circumstances of the case warranted a finding that the twelve-month, ten-day delay between the defendant's indictment and the filing of the defendant's motion to dismiss was not presumptively prejudicial. The defendant was serving a sentence on an unrelated charge in Mississippi when the indictment was returned, a requisition warrant had to be obtained from the Mississippi Governor, which process was initiated within a month of the defendant's indictment and took three months before the warrant was issued, and the defendant was brought to Georgia two months after the warrant issued and was arraigned approximately two months later. Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 387, 688 S.E.2d 344 (2010).
Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) for an acquittal in the defendant's trial for aiding and abetting a housemate in committing acts of aggravated child molestation against the defendant's children because there was ample evidence that the defendant acquiesced in and encouraged the acts of child molestation by forcing the children to sleep in the same room with the housemate, although the children objected. Valentine v. State, 301 Ga. App. 630, 689 S.E.2d 76 (2009).
Based on the evidence presented by the state from the eyewitnesses and the medical examiner, even if the defendant's act of beating the decedent victim was not the direct cause of death, given that it either materially contributed to the death or materially accelerated the death, the defendant was not entitled to an acquittal. Jones v. State, 281 Ga. 758, 642 S.E.2d 816 (2007).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal after a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of cruelty to children in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b) because the state did not fail to prove that the defendant used a bat and a belt as stated in the indictment; both victims, who were the defendant's adopted children, testified that the defendant beat the victims with a belt and a bat and that the beatings occurred when the victims did not complete the exercises that the defendant required the victims to do on a daily basis. Dinkler v. State, 305 Ga. App. 444, 699 S.E.2d 541 (2010), overruled on other grounds, Stuart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 839, 734 S.E.2d 814 (2012).
Superior court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal because the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated; the defendant did not assert the right until the defendant filed the motion, which was approximately 48 months from the time of the indictment, the defendant did not maintain that the defendant suffered any extraordinary anxiety or concern due to the delay in trial, and the defendant made no challenge to the finding of the defense's failure to show diligence in attempting to locate witnesses, i.e., that the witnesses were unavailable to the defendant. Williams v. State, 290 Ga. 24, 717 S.E.2d 640 (2011).
Defendant's claim that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict based on a fatal variance between the names of the victims in the indictment and the evidence failed because the state presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the names in the indictment referred to the victims present during the home invasion. Thompson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 150, 739 S.E.2d 434 (2013).
Because there was evidence, including blood that was a match for the defendant's DNA on the inside of the display case, showing that the defendant was connected to the crimes of robbery and theft by receiving, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Watson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 16, 785 S.E.2d 656 (2016).
Proof of conspiratorial acts on dates not alleged in indictment.
- Defendants were not entitled to directed verdicts of acquittal even though the state's evidence failed to prove that a conspiracy took place within the time frame alleged in the indictment since the indictment did not allege that the dates of the offense were material, and under these circumstances the state was entitled to offer any evidence proving commission of the conspiratorial acts on any date within the statute of limitations. Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 885, 311 S.E.2d 427, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241, 104 S. Ct. 3510, 82 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1984).
Directed verdict proper when inadequate link between arson conspiracy and murder.
- Conspiracy to commit arson, without more, does not naturally, necessarily, and probably result in the murder of one coconspirator by another; thus, the defendant was improperly convicted of murder and a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal should have been granted because although the defendant was guilty of conspiracy to commit arson, the subsequent murder of one coconspirator by another to keep the murdered coconspirator quiet was not reasonably foreseen as a necessary, probable consequence of the arson conspiracy. Everritt v. State, 277 Ga. 457, 588 S.E.2d 691 (2003).
Directed verdict in financial transaction card theft case.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of financial transaction card theft because the victim was in constructive possession of the victim's credit card, which was sufficient to establish the allegation set forth in the accusation; because the victim was the cardholder on the account, the victim had the authority to exercise dominion and control over the credit card that had been issued in the victim's name. Amaechi v. State, 306 Ga. App. 333, 702 S.E.2d 680 (2010).
Directed verdict in driving without a valid license case.
- Because the charge of being a habitual violator operating a vehicle without a valid driver's license, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c)(1), demanded a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law, the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict; the defendant was not driving without a valid driver's license because the arresting officer testified that the defendant had a probationary driver's license on the day of the arrest. Murray v. State, 315 Ga. App. 653, 727 S.E.2d 267 (2012).
Practice and Procedure
Ruling on motion after jury dispersed.
- Defendant failed to show any harm so as to justify reversal after the trial court reserved a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and ruled upon the motion after the jury had dispersed. Ballantine v. State, 194 Ga. App. 560, 390 S.E.2d 887, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 911, 390 S.E.2d 887 (1990).
There is no prohibition on the court's reservation of a final ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and the court rendering a decision after the jury returns a verdict and is dispersed. State v. Seignious, 197 Ga. App. 766, 399 S.E.2d 559 (1990).
Venue properly established.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal after a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of cruelty to children in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b) because venue was properly established by the state; one of the victims testified that the victim and the victim's sister lived about three blocks from the courthouse in which the trial was held, and the defendant testified that the defendant had been living in the same home for 14 years and that the defendant and the defendant's spouse had attempted to adopt in the county where the trial was held. Dinkler v. State, 305 Ga. App. 444, 699 S.E.2d 541 (2010), overruled on other grounds, Stuart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 839, 734 S.E.2d 814 (2012).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the testimony, taken as a whole, was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the child molestation was committed in Fayette County; during trial and the victim's forensic interview, the victim described that the molestation incident occurred during a visit to the victim's aunt's residence, which was located in Fayette County, Georgia, and two detectives testified that the referenced visit and molestation incident took place at a residence in Fayette County. Hargrave v. State, 311 Ga. App. 852, 717 S.E.2d 485 (2011).
Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for directed verdict after the judgment of conviction had been entered because the trial court's reservation of a ruling upon the motion was entered after the trial court imposed sentencing and entered the court's judgment of conviction; therefore, the decision on the motion came too late and was procedurally barred. State v. Canup, 300 Ga. App. 678, 686 S.E.2d 275 (2009).
Directed verdict granted as to some items in the accusation but not as to all.
- Defendant's substantial rights were not affected and the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict as to some items in the accusation of shoplifting, but not as to all, as the defendant was not surprised, and the defendant could not be prosecuted later for the same offense. Smith v. State, 275 Ga. App. 60, 619 S.E.2d 694 (2005).
Trial judge's interruption of defense counsel's argument of motion for directed verdict, in which the judge stated that the judge was aware of counsel's reasons for the motion, did not constitute harmful error; there was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of the offense charged. Morris v. State, 205 Ga. App. 650, 423 S.E.2d 54 (1992).
Review of directed verdict motion.
- Overruling of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal is reviewable on appeal. Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 219 S.E.2d 743 (1975).
Scope of appellate review of denial of directed verdict.
- Supreme Court will hold that the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal if the Supreme Court cannot say that there was no conflict in the evidence and the evidence demanded a verdict of acquittal. Conger v. State, 250 Ga. 867, 301 S.E.2d 878 (1983); Horton v. State, 194 Ga. App. 797, 392 S.E.2d 259, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 911, 392 S.E.2d 259 (1990).
Although the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is reviewable on appeal, it is the basis for reversal only when the evidence demands a verdict of not guilty. Meade v. State, 165 Ga. App. 556, 301 S.E.2d 912 (1983); Johnson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 773, 302 S.E.2d 626 (1983).
Test for determining sufficiency of the evidence.
- In light of the test established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), which holds that evidence to support a criminal conviction must be such that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, that test rather than the "any evidence" test of Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 219 S.E.2d 743 (1975) is the proper test for a reviewing court to use when the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, whether the challenge arises from the overruling of a motion for directed verdict or the overruling of a motion for a new trial based upon allegedly insufficient evidence. Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525, 314 S.E.2d 436 (1984).
Same test for directed verdict and sufficiency of evidence.
- Standard of review for the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is the same as that for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction; a motion for a directed verdict in a criminal case should only be granted when there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law. On appeal, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and an appellate court does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determines whether the evidence was sufficient for a conviction. Truitt v. State, 266 Ga. App. 56, 596 S.E.2d 219 (2004).
On appeal from overruled motion, all evidence in the case can be considered.
- On appeal of the overruling of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal made at the close of the state's case in chief, the reviewing court can consider all the evidence in the case in determining whether the trial court erred in overruling the motion. Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 219 S.E.2d 743 (1975); Causey v. State, 154 Ga. App. 76, 267 S.E.2d 475 (1980).
On appeal from an overruled motion, all evidence in a case can be considered whether overruled at the close of the state's case or at the conclusion of all evidence. Causey v. State, 154 Ga. App. 76, 267 S.E.2d 475 (1980).
Consideration of rebuttal evidence by appellate court.
- Defendant prosecuted for the sale of methamphetamine was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal due to the state's failure to prove venue because the state introduced testimony, on rebuttal, establishing that the crime occurred in the county in which the defendant was prosecuted, establishing venue beyond a reasonable doubt, and the appellate court was required to consider this rebuttal evidence when reviewing the denial of the defendant's motion. Reynolds v. State, 265 Ga. App. 776, 595 S.E.2d 606 (2004).
When failure to direct verdict of acquittal or not guilty constitutes error.
- It constitutes reversible error for the trial court to refuse to direct a verdict of acquittal if there is absolutely no conflict in the evidence and the verdict of acquittal is demanded as a matter of law. Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 219 S.E.2d 743 (1975); Sims v. State, 242 Ga. 256, 248 S.E.2d 651 (1978).
If the evidence demands a verdict of acquittal, the failure of a trial judge to so direct a verdict is reversible error. Cleveland v. State, 155 Ga. App. 267, 270 S.E.2d 687 (1980).
It is only if the evidence demands a verdict of not guilty that it is error for the trial court to refuse to grant a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Battle v. State, 155 Ga. App. 541, 271 S.E.2d 679 (1980).
Directed verdict motion on constitutional challenge held untimely.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to the aggravated sexual battery charge, which specifically alleged that O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b) violated the equal protection clause of both the Georgia and U.S. Constitutions, as the defendant did not move for a directed verdict until filing a second motion for a new trial, which was considered untimely. Phillips v. State, 284 Ga. App. 224, 644 S.E.2d 153 (2007).
Motion not moot by nolle prosequi of charges.
- After a trial court in the defendant's criminal matter entered an order of nolle prosequi regarding criminal charges against the defendant, the defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal, based on a claim that the trial court failed to comply with the demand for a speedy trial under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170, should have still been ruled on; accordingly, it was error to find that defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20, seeking to have the trial court judge rule on the motion for discharge and acquittal, was rendered moot. Davis v. Wilson, 280 Ga. 29, 622 S.E.2d 325 (2005).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
C.J.S.
- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law: Substantive Procedures, § 188 et seq. 22A C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 639 et seq. 23A C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, §§ 1387, 1980 et seq.
ALR.
- Power and duty of court to direct or advise acquittal in criminal case for insufficiency of evidence, 17 A.L.R. 910.
Power of court to enter nolle prosequi or dismiss prosecution, 69 A.L.R. 240.
Propriety of direction of verdict of guilty or of instruction or requested instruction requiring jury in criminal case to take the law from the court, or advising them as to their duty in that regard, 72 A.L.R. 899.
Power of trial court to dismiss defendant in criminal case for insufficiency of evidence after submitting case to jury or after verdict of guilty, 131 A.L.R. 187.
Propriety of direction of verdict in favor of fewer than all defendants at close of plaintiff's case, 82 A.L.R.3d 974.
Prejudicial effect of juror misconduct arising from internet usage, 48 A.L.R.6th 135.