During a trial in a court of any case in which the evidence is vulgar and obscene or relates to the improper acts of the sexes, and tends to debauch the morals of the young, the presiding judge shall have the right in his discretion and on his own motion, or on motion of a party or his attorney, to hear and try the case after clearing the courtroom of all or any portion of the audience.
(Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 111, § 1; Ga. L. 1895, p. 49, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 5296; Civil Code 1910, § 5885; Code 1933, § 81-1006.)
Cross references.- Corresponding provision relating to civil procedure, § 9-10-3.
Exclusion of public from hearings involving determination of delinquency, deprivation, or unruliness of minors, § 15-11-700.
Law reviews.- For review of 1996 legislation relating to filming or videotaping in the courtroom, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 83 (1996).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Discretion of judge in allowing public in courtroom.
- Every person accused of a crime is entitled to a public trial. The presiding judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, may, without violating this right, exclude from the courtroom during the trial, for any sufficient special reason, such portion of the spectators as fall within the class to which this section applied. Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908).
Under neither the Constitution nor the laws of Georgia is it ever reversible error for a trial judge, in the judge's discretion, to allow the public to occupy seats in the courtroom as long as the public's conduct is orderly, peaceful, and does not tend to obstruct justice. Lancaster v. State, 168 Ga. 470, 148 S.E. 139 (1929), overruled on other grounds, Curtis v. State, 236 Ga. 362, 223 S.E.2d 721 (1976).
That matters are "ordinarily indecent to be mentioned" was not sufficient.
- When the judge, without further reason than that the testimony will relate to matters ordinarily indecent to be mentioned, orders, over the objection of the defendant, that the courtroom be cleared of everyone not connected with the case, the judge abused the judge's discretion and violated the defendant's right to a public trial as guaranteed by this section. Prejudice to the defendant is conclusively to be presumed from such an order, and a new trial necessarily results. Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908).
Partial closure of courtroom proper.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by partially closing the courtroom during the victims' testimonies because the trial court limited the closure by allowing the defendant, the attorneys for the defense and the state, immediate families or guardians of the victims, immediate families or guardians of the defendant, the attorneys' employees, officers of the court, sheriff's deputies, and any members of the press to remain in the courtroom, which was acceptable pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. Pate v. State, 315 Ga. App. 205, 726 S.E.2d 691 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1308, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1027 (Ga. 2012), appeal dismissed, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 3372 (11th Cir. Ga. 2020).
Aggravated sodomy and incest.
- In prosecution for aggravated sodomy and incest, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in excluding juvenile spectators from the courtroom and no violation of appellant's right to a public trial. Parker v. State, 162 Ga. App. 271, 290 S.E.2d 518 (1982).
Trial "public" when news media present.
- Georgia courts have given little credence to contentions that a hearing was not "public" when, in the interest of fair administration of justice, the trial court has cleared a part of the spectators from the courtroom but has allowed representatives of the news media to remain. R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 292 S.E.2d 815 (1982).
Right of access of news media representatives is no greater and no less than any other member of the general public. R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 292 S.E.2d 815 (1982).
Closure of courtroom must be supported by specific findings.
- Although the trial court cursorily mentioned protecting the minor victim's privacy, the trial court's findings must be specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered and the trial court's conclusory statement that the court had considered the alternatives to closure and found the alternatives to be insufficient under the circumstances of the case was not specific enough to enable the court to determine that the closure order was entered properly. Spikes v. State, 353 Ga. App. 454, 838 S.E.2d 121 (2020).
Cited in Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921); Henderson v. State, 207 Ga. 206, 60 S.E.2d 345 (1950); Babb v. State, 157 Ga. App. 757, 278 S.E.2d 495 (1981); Sears v. State, 182 Ga. App. 480, 356 S.E.2d 72 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
C.J.S.
- 88 C.J.S. (Rev), Trial, §§ 110, 113 et seq.
ALR.
- Exclusion of public during criminal trial, 156 A.L.R. 265; 48 A.L.R. 1436.
Validity and construction of constitution or statute authorizing exclusion of public in sex offense cases, 39 A.L.R.3d 852.
Restricting public access to judicial records of state courts, 84 A.L.R.3d 598.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial by conducting trial or part thereof at other than regular place or time, 70 A.L.R.4th 632.
Standing of media representatives or organizations to seek review of, or to intervene to oppose, order closing criminal proceedings to public, 74 A.L.R.4th 476.