The trial of inmates escaping from a state or county correctional institution shall take place in the superior court of the county in which the escape occurs, and inmates so escaping shall remain in the correctional institution after their apprehension and shall be treated as are other inmates until the trial takes place. At the trial, the copies of the records transmitted to the superintendent or warden of the state or county correctional institution, relative to the former trials of such inmates, shall be produced and filed of record in the superior court; and any other inmate not included in the same indictment shall be a competent witness.
(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 837; Code 1863, § 4545; Code 1868, § 4565; Code 1873, § 4659; Code 1882, § 4659; Penal Code 1895, § 318; Penal Code 1910, § 323; Code 1933, § 26-4511; Code 1933, § 26-9902, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)
Cross references.- Escape generally, § 16-10-52.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Procuring state's compliance with section when noncompliance alleged.
- If the defendant contends the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal based on the state's alleged violation of the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-50 because, prior to the trial on an escape charge, the defendant was sentenced to serve 14 days in confinement by the prison disciplinary committee and then transferred from the facility from which the defendant escaped to another correctional institution, and the state failed to produce the records of the defendant's former conviction at trial, the defendant should have filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a petition for a writ of mandamus in order to procure the state's compliance with § 17-8-50. Lofton v. State, 190 Ga. App. 408, 379 S.E.2d 13 (1989).
Administrative punishment.
- This section did not limit the imposition of administrative punishment for escape. Horne v. Hopper, 238 Ga. 140, 231 S.E.2d 735 (1977).
Right to return to same institution upon capture.
- Prior to November 1, 1982, a county correctional institute was not a "penitentiary" because it was not "exclusively" for the confinement of felony prisoners, as required by former Code 1933, § 102-103. As a result, former Code 1933, § 26-9902 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-8-50), which dealt with the trial of prisoners escaping from the "penitentiary," was inapplicable to a prisoner escaping from a county correctional institute. Accordingly, such a prisoner had no right, if one in fact existed under the inapplicable statute, to be returned to and to remain in the county correctional institute after the prisoner's apprehension. Mullins v. State, 167 Ga. App. 670, 307 S.E.2d 61 (1983).
Cited in McKenzey v. State, 140 Ga. App. 402, 231 S.E.2d 149 (1976).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escape, § 1 et seq.
C.J.S.- 30A C.J.S., Escape and Related Offenses; Rescue, § 1 et seq.
ALR.- What justifies escape or attempt to escape, or assistance in that regard, 70 A.L.R.2d 1430.
Duress, necessity, or conditions of confinement as justification for escape from prison, 69 A.L.R.3d 678.
Admissibility of evidence that defendant escaped or attempted to escape while being detained for offense in addition to that or those presently being prosecuted, 3 A.L.R.4th 1085.
Propriety of jury instruction regarding credibility of witness who has been convicted of a crime, 9 A.L.R.4th 897.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of witness testifying while in prison attire, 16 A.L.R.4th 1356.
Duress, necessity, or conditions of confinement as justification for escape from prison, 54 A.L.R.5th 141.