(B) The form of notice shall be substantially as follows:
"You are hereby notified that the following instrument(s) Name of
Number Date
Amount
Bank(Ga. L. 1959, p. 252, §§ 1-3; Code 1933, § 26-1704, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Code 1933, § 41A-9909, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 705, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 482, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 1266, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2020, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1034, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1147, §§ 1-3; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1550, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 484, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 485, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1189, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 16; Ga. L. 1984, p. 1435, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 708, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 209, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 983, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 268, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 762, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1570, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 16; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1787, § 3; Ga. L. 1995, p. 910, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 748, § 10; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1014, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 720, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1352, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 4; Ga. L. 2003, p. 140, § 16; Ga. L. 2003, p. 478, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 3-6/HB 1176.)
Cross references.- Presentment, or notice of dishonor, § 11-3-501 et seq.
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 2000, p. 1352, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 2000 amendment to this section is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.
Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1(a)/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense, of whatever degree or level, pursuant to this Act."
Law reviews.- For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For annual survey on criminal law and procedure, 42 Mercer L. Rev. 141 (1990). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 290 (2012).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Ga. L. 1919, pp. 212, 220, former Ga. L. 1924, p. 194 and former Code 1933, § 13-9933, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Purpose of Code section.
- O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20 was enacted to punish the criminal behavior of knowingly passing bad checks, and to protect those legally authorized to negotiate checks given for value. Calhoon v. Mr. Locksmith Co., 200 Ga. App. 618, 409 S.E.2d 226 (1991).
Gravamen of offense of writing check knowing there are insufficient funds is intent to defraud. Berry v. State, 153 Ga. 169, 111 S.E. 669, 35 A.L.R. 370 (1922) (decided under former Ga. L. 1919, p. 212) Barnes v. Gossett Oil Co., 56 Ga. App. 220, 192 S.E. 254; 58 Ga. App. 102, 197 S.E. 902 (1937), later appeal, Crain v. State, 78 Ga. App. 806, 52 S.E.2d 577 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 13-9933);(decided under former Code 1933, § 13-9933).
Regular business transaction.
- Requirement of present consideration or a contemporaneous transaction is satisfied by a regular business practice of paying at the end of each week for gasoline purchased by retail customers during the preceding week. Porado v. State, 211 Ga. App. 728, 440 S.E.2d 690 (1994).
Immunity under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(h)(1) applies only to suits by those who "made, drew, uttered, executed, or delivered such instrument," and not to persons who were the victim of "financial identity fraud." Nicholl v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 238 Ga. App. 30, 517 S.E.2d 561 (1999).
Establishing requisite of present consideration.
- Requisite of present consideration may exist although goods or services are received before a check is delivered in payment when the interval is slight and the exchange can be characterized as a single contemporaneous transaction. Watson v. State, 235 Ga. App. 381, 509 S.E.2d 87 (1998); Holder v. State, 242 Ga. App. 479, 529 S.E.2d 907 (2000).
Elements of subsection (e)(2) are not requirements.
- In a bad check case, there was no merit to the defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient because the state failed to show pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(e)(2) that the representative receiving the check witnessed the defendant's signature on the check and then initialed the check. These provisions of § 16-9-20(e)(2) were not essential elements of the offense, but means to establish a statutory presumption with respect to the identity of the party who issued the check and the party's authority to draw on the named account; here, the state did not rely on the presumption because other evidence established that the defendant issued the check on the defendant's business account. Dougherty v. State, 292 Ga. App. 188, 664 S.E.2d 258 (2008).
Crime of moral turpitude.
- Heart of bad check crime, whether its commission is a felony or a misdemeanor, is dishonesty and thus involves moral turpitude, thus evidence of pleas of guilty to its commission as a misdemeanor may be considered by a jury for the purpose of impeachment of a witness. Carruth v. Brown, 202 Ga. App. 656, 415 S.E.2d 470 (1992).
Misdemeanor of issuing a bad check in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(a) was a crime of moral turpitude and the jury could consider evidence of a witness' guilty plea to such a crime as proof of general bad moral character which tended to impeach the credibility of that witness within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-608). Paradise v. State, 212 Ga. App. 166, 441 S.E.2d 497 (1994).
Burden of proof.
- State makes prima-facie case by proving making, drawing, etc., with knowledge at time that maker did not have sufficient funds. Burden is then cast upon defendant. Defendant is relieved of burden if it appears from state's evidence that defendant was not actuated by such intent. Berry v. State, 153 Ga. 169, 111 S.E. 669, 35 A.L.R. 370 (1922) (decided under former Ga. L. 1919, p. 212).
Sufficiency of indictment.
- Variance between indictment and proof was not fatal simply because the indictment alleged the check amount to be $1,730 and the amount proved at trial was $1,730.60. Holder v. State, 242 Ga. App. 479, 529 S.E.2d 907 (2000).
"Wages" connotes employer-employee relationship.
- Term "wages," as used in O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20, connotes an employer and employee relationship. Hutto v. State, 198 Ga. App. 325, 401 S.E.2d 339 (1991).
Offense occurs at time of issuance of check with knowledge that the check will not be honored. State v. Brannon, 154 Ga. App. 285, 267 S.E.2d 888 (1980); Russell v. State, 155 Ga. App. 555, 271 S.E.2d 689 (1980); Watson v. State, 235 Ga. App. 381, 509 S.E.2d 87 (1998).
Offense of uttering a bad check is completed when check is delivered, and it is the criminal intent present at that moment which the law proscribes. Russell v. State, 155 Ga. App. 555, 271 S.E.2d 689 (1980).
Purpose of defendant in giving the check.
- When the purpose of the defendant in giving the check was not to deprive the payee of anything, but was only to gain temporary respite from the defendant's creditor, there is no attempt to defraud such as remains an element of the crime of issuance of bad checks. McNeal v. State, 204 Ga. App. 791, 420 S.E.2d 653 (1992).
Drawer's knowledge of insufficient funds.
- In an action by the drawer of a check against a bank for damages arising from the drawer's arrest and prosecution for issuing a bad check based on the bank's negligent failure to stop payment and wrongful dishonor of the check, evidence that the drawer knew the check would not be honored was sufficient probable cause for the arrest and prosecution and, thus, the bank could not be held accountable for such damages. Karrer v. Georgia State Bank, 215 Ga. App. 654, 452 S.E.2d 120 (1994).
Payee's filling in amount at defendant's request makes no difference in crime.
- Defendant could be found guilty of the issuance of bad checks despite the defendant's contention that the checks were not "checks" because the checks did not contain a "sum certain" until the payee filled in the amount due at the defendant's request. Hutchens v. State, 174 Ga. App. 507, 330 S.E.2d 436 (1985).
Evidence of subsequent restitution irrelevant.
- As opposed to the subsequent failure to make restitution, evidence of subsequent restitution, standing alone, has no real relevancy to criminal liability under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20. Wilson v. Home Depot, Inc., 180 Ga. App. 218, 348 S.E.2d 588 (1986).
Date not element of offense.
- Date on which the checks were delivered is not an essential element of the offense of deposit account fraud; the state may prove the offense by the act and the intent. Holder v. State, 242 Ga. App. 479, 529 S.E.2d 907 (2000).
Prima-facie proof of intent to defraud.
- Knowledge that because of insufficient funds the check will not be honored is prima-facie proof of intent to defraud. Brooks v. State, 146 Ga. App. 626, 247 S.E.2d 209 (1978).
Drawer's contention that the drawer told the payee, at the time the drawer issued the payee a check, that the drawer's account did not have sufficient funds to cover the check did not rebut prima facie evidence of the drawer's knowing issuance of a bad check since there was no evidence of simultaneously written statements, representations, or collateral agreements and the record showed that the check was not even post-dated. Karrer v. Georgia State Bank, 215 Ga. App. 654, 452 S.E.2d 120 (1994).
Applicability to post dated checks.
- Ga. L. 1919, p. 220 was not applicable to a post dated check when the payee accepts the check before the date due with knowledge that there were no funds to cover the check. Strickland v. State, 27 Ga. App. 772, 110 S.E. 39 (1921) (decided under former Ga. L. 1919, p. 220); White v. State, 27 Ga. App. 774, 110 S.E. 40 (1921);(decided under former Ga. L. 1919, p. 220).
When drawer states that check is not covered, O.C.G.A.
§ 16-9-20 is not violated. - If check is postdated, or if giver of check states that giver has insufficient money in the bank to cover the check though the giver expects to have the money by time the check is presented for payment, there can be no implied representation that there is now enough on deposit to cover the check. Bivens v. State, 153 Ga. App. 631, 266 S.E.2d 304 (1980).
Payment of judgment for past due rents with check on closed account.
- Stipulations relating that a magistrate court had issued a judgment against defendant for past due rents, and that defendant paid the judgment to the creditor with a check on a closed account, knowing that the check would not be honored by the drawee, were sufficient to support a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20. Cooley v. State, 197 Ga. App. 340, 398 S.E.2d 414 (1990).
President of corporation, authorized to sign checks, liable for bad check.
- Defendant, who was the president of a corporation, ran the business and was the only person authorized to sign checks drawn on the corporation's account, could be held criminally liable for a bad check, even through the check was issued by a corporation on the corporate account, rather than by defendant as an individual. Parish v. State, 178 Ga. App. 177, 342 S.E.2d 360 (1986).
Civil immunity to which merchant is entitled to under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20 merely applies to activities mentioned in the notice required by subparagraph (a)(2)(B), i.e., giving the notice and turning over the check and information concerning it to the authorities. Stallings v. Coleman, 165 Ga. App. 667, 302 S.E.2d 412 (1983).
When civil immunity unavailable to merchant.
- Merchant could not claim civil immunity from action for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment based on plaintiff's allegation that the merchant failed to provide the prosecutor with evidence indicating plaintiff's innocence which the merchant obtained prior to plaintiff's preliminary hearing but after having sworn out a complaint which led to plaintiff's arrest. Stallings v. Coleman, 165 Ga. App. 667, 302 S.E.2d 412 (1983).
Defendant merchant is not immune under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(h) where evidence is conflicting as to whether plaintiff received notice of defendant's dishonored check notice and there is no evidence that plaintiff received notice in substantially similar form to that provided in subparagraph (a)(2)(B) of that Code section; the drawee bank's notation "unable to locate" is not conclusive evidence that plaintiff had no account with the drawee bank. Wilson v. Wheeler's, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 250, 378 S.E.2d 498, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 899, 378 S.E.2d 498 (1989).
Store owner and store manager were not entitled to civil immunity where the notice letter to the customer regarding a dishonored check did not provide the check number, check date, name of bank, name of payee, the warning "has been dishonored," and did not provide notice of the consequence of failing to make restitution within 10 days. Tallman v. Hinton, 220 Ga. App. 23, 467 S.E.2d 596 (1996).
Issuance of checks not part of same contemporaneous transaction.
- Issuance of the checks by the defendant cannot be reasonably viewed as having been a part of the same contemporaneous transaction as the delivery of the goods and services where there was never intended to be an exchange of goods and services at nearly the same point in time and such did not in fact occur due to the intervening inspection of the work and the passage of time. McNeal v. State, 204 Ga. App. 791, 420 S.E.2d 653 (1992).
Offense not lesser included offense of forgery.
- Offense of issuing bad checks is not a lesser included offense of forgery, and, in a prosecution for forgery, the trial court's failure to give a charge on issuing bad checks was not error. Adams v. State, 217 Ga. App. 759, 458 S.E.2d 918 (1995).
Postdating check cannot serve as basis for bad check charge.
- At best, there is implied in issuance of postdated checks a promise to cover drafts when the drafts are presented in the future. Such a promise of future performance cannot serve as a basis for a bad check charge. Bivens v. State, 153 Ga. App. 631, 266 S.E.2d 304 (1980).
County sheriff's deputy in Georgia was not qualifiedly immune from liability from a Florida businesswoman's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging that she was illegally incarcerated in Florida for six days until her family posted funds to cover postdated checks she had written to a Georgia food supplier; a prudent officer would not have found probable cause to arrest based on the facts known to the deputy, at least absent further investigation, because: (1) the supplier had a practice of accepting postdated checks from the arrestee; and (2) the offense of deposit account fraud, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(a), required a promise of present, rather than future, consideration. Brown v. Camden County, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Ga. 2008).
Proof of fraudulent intent in case of postdated check.
- State must prove a present fraudulent intent on the part of any maker of a postdated check in order to sustain a conviction for a bad check offense. Galbreath v. State, 193 Ga. App. 410, 387 S.E.2d 915 (1989).
Present fraudulent intent may be inferred when the maker knowingly and intentionally issues a postdated check in the regular course of business without having sufficient funds to cover the check when presented for payment, and when the maker does not call attention to the payee of the fact that the check is postdated or arrange for the payee to hold the check until some future time. Galbreath v. State, 193 Ga. App. 410, 387 S.E.2d 915 (1989).
Stopping payment on check, even if fraudulent.
- While it is true that one stopping payment on a check after obtaining a benefit thereunder and with intent to defraud might be guilty of cheating and swindling, that same conduct does not establish uttering of a bad check. Hardeman v. State, 154 Ga. App. 364, 268 S.E.2d 415 (1980); Fortier v. Jordan's Jewelers, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 527, 430 S.E.2d 829 (1993).
Former Code 1933, § 26-1704 did not allow a finding of guilt without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86, 259 S.E.2d 41 (1979).
Checks as collateral for loans.
- Owners of a small loan company committed perjury when the owners swore out warrants under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20 on customers who gave the owners checks as collateral for loans and then failed to repay the loans, since the checks were not intended to be deposited and honored by banks, rendering impossible the requisite knowledge/intent required under that section. Watson v. State, 235 Ga. App. 381, 509 S.E.2d 87 (1998).
Check given for equipment rental.
- Rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that a check the defendant gave a construction rental company in exchange for equipment was presented in exchange for a present consideration within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(a) because the rental of multiple pieces of construction equipment constituted a single transaction, which was not completed until the company picked up the equipment, calculated the amount due for necessary repairs, and presented the defendant with an invoice for which the defendant immediately wrote a check; neither § 16-9-20 nor the decisions of the courts in any way limit the definition of "rent". Gibson v. State, 315 Ga. App. 639, 727 S.E.2d 251 (2012).
Circumstantial evidence sufficient to support conviction.
- With regard to a defendant's convictions on three counts of deposit account fraud and two counts of theft by deception, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the convictions on two counts of deposit account fraud and both counts of theft by deception based on the defendant delivering two checks to two banks and receiving funds in exchange for the checks, which were subsequently dishonored; the defendant's failure to repay the funds as demanded; and the defendant's implausible story that the checks were from business partners whom the defendant had never met from another country. One count of deposit account fraud regarding a second check presented to one of the banks in the amount of $301,392 was not supported by the evidence as the prosecution failed to present any evidence that the defendant received anything of value in return for the check since the check was dishonored immediately and the defendant received no funds for that check. Vadde v. State, 296 Ga. App. 405, 674 S.E.2d 323 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1087, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 348 (Ga. 2009); cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1117, 130 S. Ct. 1051, 175 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2010); reh'g denied, 559 U.S. 998, 130 S. Ct. 1756, 176 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2010).
Cited in Marshall v. State, 128 Ga. App. 413, 197 S.E.2d 161 (1973); Wiggins v. State, 139 Ga. App. 98, 227 S.E.2d 895 (1976); Purvis v. State, 143 Ga. App. 447, 238 S.E.2d 575 (1977); Harrington v. State, 145 Ga. App. 609, 244 S.E.2d 130 (1978); Farmer v. State, 148 Ga. App. 6, 251 S.E.2d 6 (1978); United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1979); Pittman v. State, 154 Ga. App. 691, 269 S.E.2d 522 (1980); Bairentine v. State, 156 Ga. App. 341, 274 S.E.2d 736 (1980); Voliton v. Piggly Wiggly, 161 Ga. App. 813, 288 S.E.2d 924 (1982); Bowers v. State, 161 Ga. App. 239, 290 S.E.2d 362 (1982); Goodman v. State, 167 Ga. App. 378, 306 S.E.2d 417 (1983); Reynolds v. State, 172 Ga. App. 628, 323 S.E.2d 912 (1984); Marchman v. State, 173 Ga. App. 257, 325 S.E.2d 879 (1985); Hiers v. State, 182 Ga. App. 743, 356 S.E.2d 763 (1987); Blackford v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 17 F.3d 367 (11th Cir. 1994); Vadner v. Dickerson, 212 Ga. App. 255, 441 S.E.2d 527 (1994); Nicholl v. NationsBank, 227 Ga. App. 287, 488 S.E.2d 751 (1997).
Civil Liability
Evidence required to support malicious prosecution action.
- Malicious prosecution action by plaintiff who had issued a bad check was properly dismissed where plaintiff's allegation that plaintiff only wrote the check upon defendant's agreement that defendant would not cash it until plaintiff obtained funds to cover it was not supported by simultaneous written evidence as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(h)(2). Hartsfield v. Union City Chrysler-Plymouth, 218 Ga. App. 873, 463 S.E.2d 713 (1995).
Evidence of malice shown in malicious prosecution case.
- Trial court did not err in denying summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution because there was evidence from which a jury could determine that the defendant withheld information on the parties' course of dealings from the magistrate judge at the time the warrants were procured, which the defendant signed despite knowing that the checks had not been delivered for present consideration and that at least 16 of the checks were less than 30 days old. Sheffield v. Futch, 354 Ga. App. 661, 839 S.E.2d 294 (2020).
Evidence of oral statements inadmissible.
- Under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(h)(2), a civil rights litigant's oral representations regarding the litigant's business transaction with a payee of three checks that the litigant postdated were inadmissible to prove liability on the litigant's state law causes of actions, including false arrest and imprisonment, in the litigant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. Brown v. Camden County, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Ga. 2008).
Charge that defendant must negative state's evidence to reasonable satisfaction of jury.
- Charge pertaining to prima-facie evidence which states that jury can entertain reasonable doubt as to guilt only where defendant has proved to its reasonable satisfaction facts which negative state's evidence, is impermissible because it ignores state's burden of proof and defendant's presumption of innocence. Bess v. State, 138 Ga. App. 528, 226 S.E.2d 626 (1976).
Immunity on false arrest and malicious prosecutions claims found.
- Upon the grant of certiorari to consider the circumstances under which the deposit account fraud statute provided a defendant with immunity from civil liability in an action for false arrest and malicious prosecution, given the multiple references within O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(a) and (h) to the making, drawing, uttering, executing, or delivering of an instrument, it could not be said that the holder of a dishonored check was only entitled to immunity from civil liability when the action was brought by the person who signed that check; because the defendants complied with the notice requirements of § 16-9-20(a)(2), the defendants were entitled to immunity on a holder's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and the Court of Appeals erred by holding otherwise. Blue Moon Cycle, Inc. v. Jenkins, 281 Ga. 863, 642 S.E.2d 637 (2007).
Constitutional Issues
O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20 does not authorize imprisonment for debt as prohibited by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XX (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIII). Cobb v. State, 246 Ga. 567, 272 S.E.2d 299 (1980); Griffith v. State, 159 Ga. App. 252, 283 S.E.2d 40 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 249 Ga. 19, 287 S.E.2d 187 (1982).
O.C.G.A.
§ 16-9-20(c) is constitutional. - O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(c), which elevates criminal issuance of a bad check to a felony when drawn on an out-of-state bank, is constitutional. This statutory classification is not based upon residency; it applies to anyone's check drawn on an out-of-state bank. Nor is that subsection a burden on interstate commerce, as the state may qualify right of travel when criminal offense is committed. Finally, there is a rational relationship for differing penalties for bad checks on in-state and out-of-state banks because victim of this criminal act is exposed to possibility of greater harm, as a check on an out-of-state bank requires longer to clear, and thus that subsection constitutes a valid exercise of state's police power. Davis v. State, 248 Ga. 783, 286 S.E.2d 430 (1982).
Imprisonment for act of giving bad check for antecedent debt is not imprisonment for debt but, rather, for an independent act. Cobb v. State, 246 Ga. 567, 272 S.E.2d 299 (1980).
State interest justifying criminal liability for giving bad check in payment of rent or state taxes.
- State's interest in insuring orderly flow of commerce and in preventing disruption and mischief which worthless check passing promotes is a proper and appropriate basis for creation of criminal liability for act of giving bad check in payment of existing debt for rent or state taxes. Cobb v. State, 246 Ga. 567, 272 S.E.2d 299 (1980).
Effect of notice.
- Defendant merchant was immune from civil liability for giving notice of its holding worthless checks in a manner substantially in compliance with the form provided by O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20 since defendant pursued its collection action with probable cause and without malice. Grand Union Co. v. Edwards, 217 Ga. App. 154, 456 S.E.2d 736 (1995).
Present Consideration or Wages
State may sufficiently establish requisite intent without following procedure to establish prima-facie case.
- Court trying bad check case without jury may be convinced by other evidence in record that, notwithstanding fact that notice provisions were not followed so as to make out a prima-facie case, state sufficiently established mens rea of defendant. Russell v. State, 155 Ga. App. 555, 271 S.E.2d 689 (1980).
Notice of dishonor and subsequent failure to pay.
- Notice of drawee's refusal to pay, followed by ten days for defendant to pay the check (upon notice of its dishonor), is not an element of offense of issuing a bad check. State v. Brannon, 154 Ga. App. 285, 267 S.E.2d 888 (1980); Russell v. State, 155 Ga. App. 555, 271 S.E.2d 689 (1980).
Notice of dishonor and subsequent failure to pay are evidentiary matters.
- Provisions in former Code 1933, § 26-1704 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(a)(2)), relating to notice to defendant and defendant's subsequent failure to pay amount due were evidentiary matters and were not prerequisites to commission of or convictions of offense of issuing a bad check. State v. Brannon, 154 Ga. App. 285, 267 S.E.2d 888 (1980); Russell v. State, 155 Ga. App. 555, 271 S.E.2d 689 (1980).
Transaction amounting to mere promise by drawer to pay in future does not warrant conviction. Highsmith v. State, 33 Ga. App. 192, 143 S.E. 445 (1928) (decided under former Ga. L. 1919, p. 212).
Defrauded party must suffer loss resulting from reliance on defendant's wrongful act.
- Former Code 1933, § 13-9933 involved a special form of cheating and swindling, and it must be proved that party alleged to have been defrauded suffered loss resulting from its reliance on defendant's wrongful act as charged in indictment. Hamilton v. State, 118 Ga. App. 842, 165 S.E.2d 884 (1968) (decided under former Code 1933, § 13-9933).
Intent to defraud is not shown where credit is extended at time check is given. Barnes v. Gossett Oil Co., 56 Ga. App. 220, 192 S.E. 254, later appeal, 58 Ga. App. 102, 197 S.E. 902 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 13-9933).
Giving bad check to pay antecedent debt does not violate section.
- Giving check in payment of antecedent debt with false statement that maker has funds to cover it does not amount to intent to defraud, where maker does not deprive payee of any right or procure anything of value from payee by means of it. There is no evidence of intent to defraud. Berry v. State, 153 Ga. 169, 111 S.E. 669, 35 A.L.R. 370 (1922) (decided under former Ga. L. 1919, p. 220).
When a check was given for past-due indebtedness, and when there was nothing in evidence which either showed, or tended to show, that in giving the check the defendant either deprived, or intended to deprive, the prosecutor of any right, money, property, or other thing of value, intent to defraud was not shown, and the evidence did not support the verdict of guilty under Ga. L. 1924, p. 194 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20). Driskell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 741, 171 S.E. 389 (1933) (decided under former Ga. L. 1924, p. 194).
Giving of check to pay antecedent or preexisting debt, without funds in the bank, and without obtaining anything of benefit thereby does not constitute a crime. Vasser v. Berry, 85 Ga. App. 435, 69 S.E.2d 701 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 13-9933).
Drawer's conduct in chronically overdrawing the drawer's account and bouncing checks placed drawer on notice that writing a check to defendant store entailed a reckless risk sufficient to support a bad check charge which precluded the drawer's recovery for malicious prosecution. Blackford v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
It must be shown that in exchange for check the defendant received property of value, that is, present consideration. Brooks v. State, 146 Ga. App. 626, 247 S.E.2d 209 (1978).
Check must be in exchange for something of value.
- Wrongful act under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20 is issuance of worthless check for present consideration. Present consideration in this context means that check must be in exchange for something of value. Griffith v. State, 249 Ga. 19, 287 S.E.2d 187 (1982).
Evidence supported a conviction of deposit account fraud where it showed the defendant gave a dishonored check in exchange for a present consideration, albeit goods and services rather than wages. Maddox v. State, 236 Ga. App. 209, 511 S.E.2d 294 (1999).
Check given for same day delivery.
- Check given in payment for a delivery of the same date is probably present consideration. McNeal v. State, 204 Ga. App. 791, 420 S.E.2d 653 (1992).
Short interval before delivery of check does not preclude finding of present consideration.
- When there is a single contemporaneous transaction in which parties expect goods or services and payment to be exchanged as nearly as possible at the same time, a short interval of time preceding the delivery of a check would not preclude a jury from finding, as a matter of fact, that the check was given in exchange for present consideration. Bowers v. State, 248 Ga. 714, 285 S.E.2d 702 (1982); Gilley v. State, 182 Ga. App. 681, 356 S.E.2d 655 (1987).
Requisite of "present consideration" may exist although goods or services are received before a check is delivered in payment when the interval is slight and the exchange can be characterized as a single contemporaneous transaction. Singletary v. State, 192 Ga. App. 653, 385 S.E.2d 791 (1989).
Services rendered more than two months before delivery of check.
- Where check is delivered as payment for services rendered more than two months earlier, a rational trier of fact could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that check was in exchange for present consideration within meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20. Bowers v. State, 248 Ga. 714, 285 S.E.2d 702 (1982).
When the delivery of goods or services is followed more than two months later by delivery of a check as payment, the interval precludes, as a matter of law, any finding that the check was given in exchange for a present consideration. McNeal v. State, 204 Ga. App. 791, 420 S.E.2d 653 (1992).
Check issued by a partner's wife was not for a present consideration inasmuch as the check was not part of a single contemporaneous transaction since the partnership ordinarily issued a check to the payee in the middle of the month for services performed in the preceding month, and the check in question was issued on August 9 for work performed in June and July. Hutto v. State, 198 Ga. App. 325, 401 S.E.2d 339 (1991).
It must be proved that alleged defrauded party suffered loss resulting from reliance on defendant's wrongful act as charged in indictment. Bowers v. State, 248 Ga. 714, 285 S.E.2d 702 (1982).
Agreement to forgive portion of amount represented by check not shown.
- Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of deposit account fraud for delivering a bad check on a bank account containing insufficient funds. Although the defendant argued that the defendant had paid a supplier part of the amount due on the check and that the supplier had forgiven the remainder in exchange for the defendant's agreement to forgive damage caused by an employee of the supplier, a representative of the supplier denied that there were any such agreements. Dougherty v. State, 292 Ga. App. 188, 664 S.E.2d 258 (2008).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Commencement of prosecution.
- Prosecution for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20 is commenced within the meaning of the statute of limitations on misdemeanors, O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1-(d), when a citation meets the requirements contained in O.C.G.A. § 15-10-202(b) and (c), including the signature of the judge or clerk of the magistrate court and personal service of the citation by a law enforcement officer. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 98-1.
Service charge limitation on a returned check established by O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(a)(2) (now subsection (j)) is applicable only to the holder of the returned check. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-31.
Collection company may procure arrest warrant.- Magistrate judge may issue an arrest warrant for someone charged with the offense of deposit account fraud based on the affidavit of a person working for a company in the business of collecting worthless checks for merchants. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-20.
ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE STATE BAR
Actions by attorney demanding payment on check.
- Is it not ethically improper for a lawyer to send a statutory notice to the drawer of a bad check that states that unless the drawer pays the amount of the check in full within a specified period the drawer will be subject to criminal prosecution. Adv. Op. No. 80-26 (November 21, 1980).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 10 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks; Banks and Financial Institutions, §§ 429, 430, 432. 32 Am. Jur. 2d, False Pretenses, §§ 16, 67 et seq. 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, §§ 192, 465.
C.J.S.- 9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking, §§ 152, 213. 32A C.J.S., Evidence, § 1016. 35 C.J.S., False Pretenses, §§ 7, 8, 40 et seq., 74 et seq., 83.
ALR.
- False pretense or confidence game through means of worthless check or draft, 35 A.L.R. 344; 174 A.L.R. 173.
Construction, application, and effect of criminal statutes directed specifically against use of worthless, false, or bogus check or draft, 35 A.L.R. 375; 43 A.L.R. 49; 95 A.L.R. 486; 29 A.L.R.2d 1181; 59 A.L.R.2d 1159; 9 A.L.R.3d 719.
Statute of limitations applicable to action on check, 139 A.L.R. 1280.
Variance between charge that fraudulent check was given in payment of an obligation and evidence that it was delivered as a cash payment, or vice versa, 143 A.L.R. 1076.
Dishonor of check as proximate cause of arrest or criminal prosecution of depositor, 153 A.L.R. 1035.
Discharge of drawer by delay in presenting check as affected by insufficiency of funds during time within which check should have been presented, or subsequent insufficiency occasioned by their withdrawal, 160 A.L.R. 1069.
Construction and effect of "bad check" statute with respect to postdated checks, 29 A.L.R.2d 1181; 59 A.L.R.2d 1159; 9 A.L.R.3d 719.
Construction and effect of "bad check" statute with respect to check in payment of preexisting debt, 59 A.L.R.2d 1159.
Criminal liability of corporate officer who issues worthless checks in corporate name, 68 A.L.R.2d 1269.
Propriety of jury, or court sitting as trier of facts, making a comparison of a disputed writing with a standard produced in court, without the aid of an expert witness, 80 A.L.R.2d 272.
Right and remedy of drawer of check against collecting bank which receives it on forged indorsement and collects it from drawee bank, 99 A.L.R.2d 637.
Reasonable expectation of payment as affecting offense under "worthless check" statutes, 9 A.L.R.3d 719.
Application of "bad check" statute with respect to postdated checks, 52 A.L.R.3d 464.
Cashing check at bank at which account is maintained as violation of bad check statutes, 75 A.L.R.3d 1080.
When statute of limitations begins to run against criminal prosecution for embezzlement, fraud, false pretenses, or similar crimes, 77 A.L.R.3d 689.
Constitutionality of "bad check" statute, 16 A.L.R.4th 631.