The General Assembly finds that identity fraud involves the use of identifying information which is uniquely personal to the consumer or business victim of that identity fraud and which information is considered to be in the lawful possession of the consumer or business victim wherever the consumer or business victim currently resides or is found. Accordingly, the fraudulent use of that information involves the fraudulent use of information that is, for the purposes of this article, found within the county where the consumer or business victim of the identity fraud resides or is found. Accordingly, in a proceeding under this article, the crime will be considered to have been committed in any county where the person whose means of identification or financial information was appropriated resides or is found, or in any county in which any other part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in such county.
(Code 1981, §16-9-124, enacted by Ga. L. 1998, p. 865, § 2; Code 1981, §16-9-125, as redesignated by Ga. L. 2002, p. 551, § 2.)
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 2002, p. 551, § 2, effective May 2, 2002, redesignated the former provisions of this Code section as Code Section 16-9-126.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
- Trial court erred in sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the identity fraud charges against the defendant as O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125 did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI, since identity fraud was a continuing offense, which extended into the county where the victim resided or was located. State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005).
Failure to prove venue.
- Defendant's conviction of identity fraud, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121, was reversed because the state failed to establish the victim's place of residence or the site where a credit card was stolen, and thus venue was not properly established as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125. Middlebrooks v. State, 277 Ga. App. 551, 627 S.E.2d 154 (2006).
Successive prosecution for financial identity fraud in two counties.
- Trial court correctly rejected the defendant's plea in bar and denied defendant's motion in autrefois convict because the defendant did not show that defendant's prosecution for two counts of financial identity fraud under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121 was barred as an impermissible successive prosecution for the same conduct in another county by defendant's earlier conviction in that county of 33 counts of financial identity fraud. Summers v. State, 263 Ga. App. 338, 587 S.E.2d 768 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125 complies with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; since the crime of identity fraud, as defined by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-9-121 and16-9-125 when read in para materia, takes place in the county where the victim and his or her personal information are located, there is no constitutional bar to trying the defendant in that county. State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005).
Venue proper where victim's office located.
- Evidence that a niece stole, forged, and cashed over 20 checks totaling $425,000 from the law firm where she worked with the assistance of her aunt and six other women was sufficient to find the niece and aunt guilty of 20 counts of identity fraud in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121. Under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125, venue was proper in the county where the law firm's office was located. McKenzie v. State, 300 Ga. App. 469, 685 S.E.2d 333 (2009).
Venue established.
- State established venue under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. §§ 16-9-125 and17-2-2(a) because a reasonable trier of fact was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims resided or were found in Forsyth County at the time the offense of financial identity fraud was committed as alleged in the indictment; the victim testified that the victim had been a resident of Forsyth County for twelve years and that the victim's company had been located there for seventeen years. Zachery v. State, 312 Ga. App. 418, 718 S.E.2d 332 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to support the codefendant's conviction on 12 counts of identity fraud, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121(a)(1), based on the state introducing evidence that the victims' identifying information was found in the Henry County, Georgia, residence of the defendant, and twelve of the victims testified at trial that the defendants did not authorize any such use of the defendant's identifying information, and the codefendant admitted in the codefendant's statement that the codefendant was a party to the crime in that the codefendant provided the victims' identifying information to an unauthorized third party, thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that at least part of the identity fraud took place in Henry County, regardless of whether the codefendant was ever actually in that county. Manhertz v. State, 317 Ga. App. 856, 734 S.E.2d 406 (2012).