(Code 1933, § 26-1501, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)
Law reviews.- For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For article, "Legal Remedies for Computer Abuse," see 21 Ga. St. B.J. 100 (1985).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
O.C.G.A. § 16-7-22 was inapplicable to persons seeking own destruction or engaging in self-mutilation in manner which interferes with private property. Loethen v. State, 158 Ga. App. 469, 280 S.E.2d 878 (1981).
Firing a weapon into a dwelling is an act which is inherently dangerous to the lives of others. Carthern v. State, 238 Ga. App. 670, 519 S.E.2d 490 (1999), aff'd, 272 Ga. 378, 529 S.E.2d 617 (2000).
Firing a weapon onto roadways.
- Person who fires gunshots into an inhabited dwelling where people are likely to be present endangers human life within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-22; the fact that the occupants of the house are not physically present does not lessen the risk of danger to others or the recklessness of the behavior. Carthern v. State, 272 Ga. 378, 529 S.E.2d 617 (2000).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of first degree criminal damage to property as the defendant shot a gun in the direction of a five-lane road that had a steady flow of traffic, and, thus, the defendant recklessly endangered the lives of people on the road. Wilson v. State, 344 Ga. App. 285, 810 S.E.2d 303 (2018).
Scope of "human life."
- Criminal damage to property in the first degree is a crime against the state involving the unauthorized interference with property in a manner that endangers human life. O.C.G.A. § 16-7-22(a) does not expressly or impliedly qualify or limit in any way the scope of the term "human life" as used therein; therefore, defendant's claim that the endangered life must be that of the owner of the property was clearly without support and utterly without merit. Carter v. State, 212 Ga. App. 139, 441 S.E.2d 100 (1994).
Felony murder conviction supported.
- Criminal damage to property in the first degree is a felonious act which is inherently dangerous or life-threatening and that felony can support a felony murder conviction. Waugh v. State, 263 Ga. 691, 437 S.E.2d 297 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1090, 114 S. Ct. 1850, 128 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994).
Application of transferred intent doctrine.
- First-degree criminal damage to property conviction was upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence based on the doctrine of transferred intent, given that the defendant could not take advantage of the wrong established by shooting at a police officer, and the intent to harm incident therein, transferred to an apartment building that was struck and damaged in the exchange of gunfire. Birt v. State, 285 Ga. App. 105, 645 S.E.2d 596 (2007).
Proper predicate for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
- Offense of criminal damage to property in the first degree, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-7-22(a)(1), involves a person, and thus may serve as a predicate for a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1). Craft v. State, 309 Ga. App. 698, 710 S.E.2d 891 (2011).
First and second degree criminal damage to property do not merge.
- Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's convictions for the criminal damage to property charges because criminal damage to property in the first degree required evidence that the defendant acted in a manner that endangered human life, whereas criminal damage to property in the second degree required evidence that the damage to property exceeded $500, neither of which was required in the other. Sullivan v. State, 331 Ga. App. 592, 771 S.E.2d 237 (2015).
Lesser included offenses.
- After the defendant was convicted of felony murder based on the underlying felony of criminal damage to property in the first degree, the trial court's refusal to charge on reckless conduct and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses was not error and there was no evidence to support a charge of criminal trespass as a lesser included offense. Waugh v. State, 263 Ga. 691, 437 S.E.2d 297 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1090, 114 S. Ct. 1850, 128 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994).
Because charges alleging aggravated assault did not amount to lesser-included offenses as a matter of fact of a charge of first-degree criminal damage to property, and the property offense was not a lesser-included offense of any aggravated assault offense, merger of the offenses was unwarranted. Louis v. State, 290 Ga. App. 106, 658 S.E.2d 897 (2008).
Kicking in front door sufficient.
- Evidence that the defendant kicked in the front door of the victim's apartment with a measure of force sufficient that the life of anyone struck by the door could have been jeopardized and that the victim was struck in the head causing swelling, supported the defendant's conviction for criminal damage to property in the first degree. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 122, 809 S.E.2d 76 (2017).
Evidence properly admitted.
- Trial court's admission of the victim's prior inconsistent statement to a police investigator regarding the events surrounding the first-degree criminal damage to property offense charged was proper as the prosecutor questioned the victim at considerable length regarding the statement, a tape recording of the victim's9-1-1 call was played, and then, the prosecutor questioned the victim in detail regarding the contents of the earlier statement which the victim denied making. Gooch v. State, 289 Ga. App. 74, 656 S.E.2d 214 (2007).
Evidence sufficient to support conviction.
- On appeal from the defendant's aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and first-degree criminal damage to property convictions, the court held that the testimony provided by two of the victims identifying the defendant as one of the perpetrators was sufficient to uphold the conviction as: (1) the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact; and (2) under under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620), the credibility of a witness was a matter to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. Reid v. State, 281 Ga. App. 640, 637 S.E.2d 62 (2006).
When the facts demonstrated that the defendant threatened to burn down a restaurant and then proceeded to pour gasoline onto the restaurant's tables and carpet in front of numerous eyewitnesses, such was sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to convict the defendant of attempt to commit arson and terroristic threats; moreover, the defendant's act of damaging the tables and carpet by pouring gasoline on them was sufficient to support a conviction of first-degree criminal damage to property. Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 219, 653 S.E.2d 810 (2007).
Because criminal damage to either marital or family property partially owned by another was sufficient to establish the commission of an offense under either O.C.G.A. § 16-7-22(a)(1) or O.C.G.A. § 16-7-23(a)(1), sufficient evidence was presented by the state to support the defendant's conviction under the former, as charged. Gooch v. State, 289 Ga. App. 74, 656 S.E.2d 214 (2007).
Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for criminal damage to property in the first degree, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-22(a), as the defendant intentionally fired several shots into the victim's residence at a time when the residence was obviously inhabited; although only one bullet entered the residence, the fact that nine empty shell casings were scattered in the street outside the victim's residence showed that the defendant specifically targeted the victim's residence such that the defendant's acts were reckless, rather than negligent. Wheeler v. State, 307 Ga. App. 585, 705 S.E.2d 686 (2011), overruled on other grounds, 322 Ga. App. 811 (2013).
Evidence was insufficient to show that the juvenile was a party to first degree criminal damage to property when shots were fired into the victim's car even though the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault for shooting into the house where the owner of the car was visiting; there was no evidence to suggest that the car was likely to be occupied at the time of the shooting or that the car was positioned relative to the gunmen in such a way that bullets fired into the car could be expected to enter the house, and the fact that the car was moved before police arrived and there was no testimony about where the car had been parked at the time of the shooting or how far the car was from the house or any other buildings would require pure speculation to say that the same shots that were fired at the car were the shots that struck the house. In the Interest of M.D.L., 271 Ga. App. 738, 610 S.E.2d 687 (2005).
Cited in Leggett v. State, 132 Ga. App. 815, 209 S.E.2d 257 (1974); Simmons v. State, 138 Ga. App. 554, 227 S.E.2d 70 (1976); McCarty v. State, 157 Ga. App. 336, 277 S.E.2d 259 (1981); Kitchens v. State, 159 Ga. App. 94, 282 S.E.2d 730 (1981); Staton v. State, 165 Ga. App. 572, 302 S.E.2d 126 (1983); Williams v. State, 263 Ga. 135, 429 S.E.2d 512 (1993); Robinson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 832, 459 S.E.2d 588 (1995); Louis v. State, 230 Ga. App. 897, 497 S.E.2d 824 (1998); Price v. State, 281 Ga. App. 844, 637 S.E.2d 468 (2006); Caldwell v. State, 355 Ga. App. 608, 845 S.E.2d 345 (2020).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Malicious Mischief, § 1 et seq.
C.J.S.- 54 C.J.S., Malicious or Criminal Mischief or Damage to Property, § 1 et seq. 86 C.J.S., Telecommunications, § 188.
ALR.
- Interference during labor dispute with performance by common carrier or other public utility of its duties to the public as ground for injunctive relief, 149 A.L.R. 1243.
Liability of one other than electric power or light company or its employee for interruption, failure, or inadequacy of electric power, 15 A.L.R.4th 1148.