(5.1) "Peace officer" shall have the same meaning as provided for in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (8) of Code Section 35-8-2.
(Code 1981, §16-5-46, enacted by Ga. L. 2006, p. 105, § 3/SB 529; Ga. L. 2011, p. 217, § 1/HB 200; Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 2-2/HB 233; Ga. L. 2016, p. 377, § 1/HB 770; Ga. L. 2017, p. 489, § 1/HB 341; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 16/HB 323; Ga. L. 2018, p. 628, § 1/HB 732; Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 1-5/SB 158; Ga. L. 2019, p. 81, § 2/HB 424; Ga. L. 2020, p. 29, § 1/SB 394; Ga. L. 2020, p. 240, § 1/HB 823.)
The 2017 amendments. The first 2017 amendment, effective July 1 2017, substituted the present provisions of subsection (c) for the former provisions, which read: "A person commits the offense of trafficking a person for sexual servitude when that person knowingly subjects another person to or maintains another person in sexual servitude or knowingly recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means another person for the purpose of sexual servitude."; deleted "or sexual" following "individual for labor" in the middle of paragraph (f)(1) and near the beginning of paragraph (f)(2); in paragraph (f)(2), deleted "under the age of 18 years shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years and a fine not to exceed $100,000.00; provided, however, that if the offense is committed against an individual" following "individual who is" near the middle, and deleted "or sexual servitude" following "trafficked for labor" in the middle; and added paragraphs (f)(3) through (f)(5). The second 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, redesignated former paragraph (a)(1) as present paragraph (a)(4), and redesignated former paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(4) as present paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3), respectively.
The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, inserted "or patronizes" near the beginning of paragraph (c)(3) and substituted "16 years of age or older" for "16 or 17 years of age" in the middle of the second sentence of paragraph (f)(5).
The 2019 amendments. The first 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in subsection (c), inserted "solicits, patronizes," in paragraph (c)(2), and rewrote paragraph (c)(3), which formerly read: "Solicits or patronizes by any means an individual to perform sexually explicit conduct on behalf of such person when such individual is the subject of sexual servitude."; and, in subsection (f), inserted "or sexual servitude" in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2), and deleted "and such individual under the age of 18 years was coerced or deceived into being trafficked for labor" following "18 years of age" in paragraph (f)(2). See Editor's note for applicability. The second 2019 amendment, effective April 18, 2019, inserted "or sexual servitude" in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2); deleted "and such individual under the age of 18 years was coerced or deceived into being trafficked for labor" following "18 years of age" in the middle of paragraph (f)(2); deleted former paragraph (f)(3), which read: "Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection, any person who violates paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c) of this Code section shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years."; deleted former paragraph (f)(4), which read: "Any person who violates paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c) of this Code section committed against an individual under 18 years of age and such individual under the age of 18 years was coerced or deceived into such violation or if such violation is committed against an individual who has a developmental disability, such person shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 25 nor more than 50 years or life imprisonment."; and deleted former paragraph (f)(5), which read: "Any person who violates paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of this Code section shall be guilty of a felony. When such offense is committed against an individual who is 16 years of age or older, upon conviction, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years. When such offense is committed against an individual who is younger than 16 years of age or an individual known to have a developmental disability, upon conviction, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years."
The 2020 amendments. The first 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, added paragraph (a)(5.1) and, in subsection (h), designated the existing provisions as paragraph (h)(1) and added paragraph (h)(2). The second 2020 amendment, effective July 21, 2020, added subsection (l). See the Editor's notes for applicability.
Code Commission notes.- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2011, a comma was inserted following "of this subsection" in paragraph (f)(1).
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 2006, p. 105, § 1/SB 529, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act.' All requirements of this Act concerning immigration or the classification of immigration status shall be construed in conformity with federal immigration law."
Ga. L. 2006, p. 105, § 10(b)/SB 529, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that this Code section shall not apply to any offense committed prior to July 1, 2007.
Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 4-1/HB 233, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2015, and shall apply to seizures of property for forfeiture that occur on or after that date. Any such seizure that occurs before July 1, 2015, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such seizure."
Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 1-1/SB 158, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Anti-Human Trafficking Protective Response Act.'"
Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 3-1/SB 158, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2019, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2019, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense, and any resulting conviction shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction."
Ga. L. 2020, p. 240, § 3/HB 823, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the addition of subsection (l) shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 21, 2020.
Law reviews.- For article on 2006 enactment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 247 (2006). For annual survey of labor and employment law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 211 (2006). For article, "The Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act: Comprehensive Immigration Reform in Georgia - 'Think Globally ... Act Locally'," see 13 Ga. St. B. J. 14 (2007). For article on the 2011 amendment of this Code section, see 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 131 (2011). For article, "Crimes and Offenses: Crimes Against the Person," see 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 131 (2011). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (2015). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For annual survey on criminal law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 63 (2018). For article on the 2019 amendment of this Code section, see 36 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 63 (2019).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Convictions did not merge.
- Trial court did not err in imposing separate sentences on Counts 1, 3, and 5, instead of merging the sentences and imposing a single life sentence, because Counts 1, 3, and 5 of the indictment each alleged that the defendant trafficked the victim for sexual servitude on different dates - between January 1 and April 1, 2012, between April 5 and 8, 2012, and on April 10, 2012; none of those dates or time periods overlapped; and each count was supported by specific, distinguishable, and independent evidence at trial; thus, the defendant was not convicted on more than one count for the same actions committed on a single day or during the same period of days as would be required for the convictions to merge as a matter of fact. Byrd v. State, 344 Ga. App. 780, 811 S.E.2d 85 (2018), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 352 Ga. App. 640, 835 S.E.2d 640 (2019).
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request that the counts for child cruelty and trafficking of person for sexual servitude merge because O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46(i) specifically stated that each such violation was a separate offense and would not merge with any other offense. Moore v. State, 354 Ga. App. 145, 840 S.E.2d 519 (2020).
Failure to request jury instruction on crime of pimping.
- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the crime of pimping as a lesser-included offense of trafficking a minor for sexual servitude without the use of coercion because the jury found the defendant guilty on the three trafficking without coercion counts and on three related counts charging the greater offense of trafficking the victim for sexual servitude through the use of coercion; thus, the defendant did not meet the defendant's burden of showing that there was a reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted the defendant on all of the indicted offenses and, instead, convicted the defendant only of pimping if counsel had requested a jury instruction on pimping as a lesser-included offense. Byrd v. State, 344 Ga. App. 780, 811 S.E.2d 85 (2018), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 352 Ga. App. 640, 835 S.E.2d 640 (2019).
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the crime of pimping as a lesser-included offense of trafficking a minor for sexual servitude without the use of coercion because counsel believed that requesting an instruction on pimping as a lesser-included offense would have eliminated any chance of obtaining a full acquittal on all charges; and requesting a pimping instruction would have given the jury the opportunity to acquit the defendant on the sexual trafficking charges, but still find the defendant guilty of pimping, and that potential outcome outweighed any benefit to the defendant as pimping carried a substantial sentence that was comparable to that of trafficking for sexual servitude without coercion. Byrd v. State, 344 Ga. App. 780, 811 S.E.2d 85 (2018), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 352 Ga. App. 640, 835 S.E.2d 640 (2019).
Sentence was proper.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to vacate, void, or correct an illegal sentence several years after the defendant's sentence was imposed because the alleged errors in the defendant's case clearly went to the validity of the judgment of conviction entered on the defendant's guilty plea, not the validity of the defendant's sentence; Georgia law authorized the concurrent sentences of 10 years in prison for false imprisonment, and 20 years, with 13 years to be served in prison and the remainder on probation, for trafficking of persons for sexual servitude. Jones v. State Two Cases, 354 Ga. App. 29, 840 S.E.2d 117 (2020).
Evidence sufficient for conviction.
- Based on evidence that the defendant kept the victim in a state of financial dependence, provided the victim with drugs and alcohol to keep the victim compliant, and the defendant told the victim the defendant needed money to keep the defendant out of jail, the jury could infer that the defendant used coercion and deception in an effort to overmaster the victim's will and compel the victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct. Lemery v. State, 330 Ga. App. 623, 768 S.E.2d 800 (2015).
Defendant's conviction for trafficking a person for sexual servitude was supported by evidence that the victim worked for the defendant as a prostitute, danced at adult entertainment clubs and stripper parties, and gave erotic massages, giving all the money earned to the defendant, promoted the defendant's escort service, and continued to act as a prostitute for the defendant regardless of whether the defendant was physically present on a given day. Ferguson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 862, 783 S.E.2d 380 (2016).
Convictions for attempting to commit trafficking a person for sexual servitude, conspiring to commit pimping, and enticing a child under 16 for indecent purposes were supported by evidence that two victims were taken home from a bar by the defendant and one was asked if she would be comfortable doing prostitution in the defendant's household, and the two victims gave out a business card for the escort service and posted ads for prostitution on Craigslist. Ferguson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 862, 783 S.E.2d 380 (2016).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of pimping a person under the age of 18, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and trafficking a person for sexual servitude because the copies of the birth certificate and social security card found in the victim's purse showed that the victim was under the age of 18; and an employee of the youth residence, from which the victim had recently run away, verified the victim's identity and that the victim was 16 years old. Mackey v. State, 342 Ga. App. 791, 805 S.E.2d 596 (2017).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking a person for sexual servitude because the evidence authorized the jury to find that, through an endeavor, planned action, or method, the defendant gained or exerted influence or control over the 15-year-old victim by giving the victim goods and money, then leaving the prospect of more money open until the victim performed a sexual act for cash. Grace v. State, 347 Ga. App. 396, 819 S.E.2d 674 (2018).
Defendant's conviction for trafficking was supported by evidence that the defendant used coercion to subject the victim to sexual servitude by engaging in sexual activity with people for money in order to live with the defendant. Moore v. State, 354 Ga. App. 145, 840 S.E.2d 519 (2020).
Counsel not ineffective in advising on sentence.
- Trial counsel's performance was not deficient for not informing the defendant that the defendant would not be eligible for parole for 30 years because the offenses of trafficking a person for sexual servitude that the defendant was convicted of did not constitute serious violent felonies; and no other authority or competent evidence supported the defendant's claim that the defendant would not be eligible for parole until the defendant served 30 years in prison; thus, trial counsel did not misinform the defendant as to the defendant's parole eligibility if the defendant rejected the plea deal, was convicted at trial, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Byrd v. State, 344 Ga. App. 780, 811 S.E.2d 85 (2018), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 352 Ga. App. 640, 835 S.E.2d 640 (2019).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
- Validity, construction, and application of state statutes proscribing human trafficking, 101 A.L.R.6th 417.
Litigation of Criminal Prosecutions for Human Trafficking, 165 Am. Jur. Trials 313.