(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, pp. 786, 787; Code 1863, § 4238; Code 1868, § 4273; Code 1873, § 4339; Code 1882, § 4339; Penal Code 1895, § 83; Penal Code 1910, § 83; Code 1933, § 26-1201; Code 1933, § 26-1305, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 543, § 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 16; Ga. L. 1984, p. 900, § 2; Ga. L. 1985, p. 628, § 2; Ga. L. 1991, p. 971, §§ 9, 10; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 9; Ga. L. 1996, p. 988, § 2; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1453, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 5; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1626, § 2; Ga. L. 2003, p. 140, § 16; Ga. L. 2014, p. 432, § 2-3/HB 826; Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 3-2/HB 60; Ga. L. 2016, p. 582, § 2/HB 979; Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 3-3/SB 160.)
The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted "subsections (c) through (g)" for "subsections (c) through (i)" in subsection (b); designated the existing provisions of subsection (c) as paragraph (c)(1); in paragraph (c)(1), substituted "public safety officer while the public safety officer" for "peace officer while the officer" near the middle, added the proviso at the end; added paragraph (c)(2); deleted former subsection (e), which read: "(1) As used in this subsection, the term 'correctional officer' shall include superintendents, wardens, deputy wardens, guards, and correctional officers of state, county, and municipal penal institutions who are certified by the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council pursuant to Chapter 8 of Title 35 and employees of the Department of Juvenile Justice who are known to be employees of the department or who have given reasonable identification of their employment. The term 'correctional officer' shall also include county jail officers who are certified or registered by the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council pursuant to Chapter 8 of Title 35."
"(2) A person who knowingly commits the offense of aggravated battery upon a correctional officer while the correctional officer is engaged in, or on account of the performance of, his or her official duties shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years."; redesignated former subsection (f) as present subsection (e); deleted the second sentence in present subsection (e), which read: "For purposes of this Code section, 'public transit vehicle' has the same meaning as in subsection (c) of Code Section 16-5-20."; redesignated former subsections (g) and (h) as present subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and deleted former subsection (i), which read: "A person who knowingly commits the offense of aggravated battery upon an emergency health worker while the worker is engaged in, or on account of the performance of, his or her official duties shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years. As used in this subsection, the term 'emergency health worker' means hospital emergency department personnel and emergency medical services personnel."
Cross references.- Indemnification program for law enforcement officers, firefighters, and prison guards killed or injured on duty, § 45-9-80 et seq.
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall be known and may be cited as the "School Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1994."
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, sets forth legislative findings and determinations for the "School Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1994."
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 29, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability.
Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Crimes Against Family Members Act of 1999'."
Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 7, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "Nothing herein shall be construed to validate a relationship between people of the same sex as a 'marriage' under the laws of this State."
Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-1/HB 60, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Safe Carry Protection Act.'"
Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 1-1/SB 160, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Back the Badge Act of 2017.'"
Law reviews.- For article surveying developments in Georgia constitutional law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 51 (1981). For article on the 2014 amendment of this Code section, see 31 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 47 (2014). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For review of 1996 children and youth services legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 314 (1996).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
Former offense of mayhem is replaced by aggravated battery under former Code 1933, § 26-1305. Wells v. State, 125 Ga. App. 579, 188 S.E.2d 407 (1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24).
Inasmuch as putting out an eye indisputably constituted an offense of mayhem, it follows that an established offense of mayhem likewise constitutes an aggravated battery, the present offense standing in place of mayhem. Watts v. State, 141 Ga. App. 127, 232 S.E.2d 590, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925, 98 S. Ct. 405, 54 L. Ed. 2d 283 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Graham v. State, 153 Ga. App. 658, 266 S.E.2d 316 (1980).
Aggravated battery is a felony. Ruff v. State, 150 Ga. App. 238, 257 S.E.2d 203 (1979).
Causation.
- Defendant's assertion that the victim had fallen against a grill after being hit did not demonstrate that defendant's admitted initial contact with the victim had not "caused" a subsequent cut to the victim's eye and the resulting loss of the victim's eyesight. If by maliciously striking the victim, defendant set in motion a force which ultimately resulted in the victim's loss of eyesight, it was not determinative that defendant's hand was not a more immediate factor in that result. McKissic v. State, 201 Ga. App. 525, 411 S.E.2d 516, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 411 S.E.2d 516 (1991).
In 1985, the Georgia legislature passed an Act "[t]o amend [the Code] relating to crimes of battery, so as to define the crime of ... aggravated battery upon a correctional officer [and] to define the term correctional officer." This language indicated that the Georgia General Assembly intended to create a "separate and distinct crime" from aggravated battery rather than a separate, enhanced penalty based on the victim's status at the time of the battery. Thus, because aggravated battery of a correctional officer is a distinct crime, the offense requires proof of the essential element of knowledge on the part of the defendant that the individual was a correctional officer at the time of the battery. Taylor v. State, 319 Ga. App. 850, 738 S.E.2d 679 (2013).
Cited in Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 177 S.E.2d 840 (1970); Lowe v. State, 133 Ga. App. 420, 210 S.E.2d 869 (1974); Jackson v. State, 234 Ga. 549, 216 S.E.2d 834 (1975); Braxton v. State, 240 Ga. 10, 239 S.E.2d 339 (1977); Tuggle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 603, 244 S.E.2d 131 (1978); Webster v. State, 147 Ga. App. 322, 248 S.E.2d 697 (1978); Jarrard v. State, 152 Ga. App. 553, 263 S.E.2d 444 (1979); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980); Dean v. State, 245 Ga. 503, 265 S.E.2d 805 (1980); Baker v. State, 245 Ga. 657, 266 S.E.2d 477 (1980); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 268 S.E.2d 316 (1980); Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 268 S.E.2d 339; Rollins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 585, 269 S.E.2d 81 (1980); Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981); Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558, 284 S.E.2d 390 (1981); Collins v. State, 164 Ga. App. 482, 297 S.E.2d 503 (1982); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549 (11th Cir. 1983); Ewing v. State, 169 Ga. App. 680, 314 S.E.2d 695 (1984); Morgan v. Zant, 582 F. Supp. 1026 (S.D. Ga. 1984); Howard v. State, 173 Ga. App. 585, 327 S.E.2d 554 (1985); Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 588, 340 S.E.2d 862 (1986); Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987); Cohn v. State, 186 Ga. App. 816, 368 S.E.2d 572 (1988); Williams v. State, 187 Ga. App. 355, 370 S.E.2d 210 (1988); Terry v. State, 188 Ga. App. 748, 374 S.E.2d 235 (1988); Harris v. State, 188 Ga. App. 795, 374 S.E.2d 565 (1988); Nichols v. State, 198 Ga. App. 323, 401 S.E.2d 338 (1991); Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 414 S.E.2d 5 (1992); Grace v. State, 262 Ga. 746, 425 S.E.2d 865 (1993); Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 477 S.E.2d 417 (1996); Grant v. State, 239 Ga. App. 608, 521 S.E.2d 654 (1999); Shepherd v. State, 245 Ga. App. 386, 537 S.E.2d 777 (2000); Henderson v. State, 252 Ga. App. 295, 556 S.E.2d 204 (2001); D.W. Adcock, M.D., P.C. v. Adcock, 257 Ga. App. 700, 572 S.E.2d 45 (2002); Grant v. State, 257 Ga. App. 678, 572 S.E.2d 38 (2002); Miller v. Martin, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2007); Glover v. State, 292 Ga. App. 22, 663 S.E.2d 772 (2008); Armstrong v. State, 292 Ga. App. 145, 664 S.E.2d 242 (2008); Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008); Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338, 680 S.E.2d 182 (2009); Hargrove v. State, 299 Ga. App. 27, 681 S.E.2d 707 (2009); Day v. State, 317 Ga. App. 243, 730 S.E.2d 734 (2012); Williams v. State, 330 Ga. App. 606, 768 S.E.2d 788 (2015); Thompson v. State, 348 Ga. App. 807, 824 S.E.2d 685 (2019); Cade v. State, 351 Ga. App. 637, 832 S.E.2d 453 (2019); Crawford v. State, 355 Ga. App. 401, 844 S.E.2d 294 (2020); Caldwell v. State, 355 Ga. App. 608, 845 S.E.2d 345 (2020).
"Serious Disfigurement"
"Serious disfigurement" supported by x-ray.
- Court of appeals has not precluded a holding that serious internal injuries, which can be visible through such means as x-ray, cannot support a conviction for aggravated battery. Weaver v. State, 351 Ga. App. 167, 830 S.E.2d 618 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1502, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 113 (Ga. 2020).
"Serious disfigurement".
- For purposes of aggravated battery, serious injuries and documented medical damage to internal organs can be sufficient to show serious disfigurement. There is no authority holding that, to constitute serious disfigurement for purposes of aggravated battery, a victim's injuries must be actually visible from the outside of a person's body. Weaver v. State, 351 Ga. App. 167, 830 S.E.2d 618 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1502, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 113 (Ga. 2020).
For purposes of aggravated battery, "serious disfigurement" may be proven when serious damage or injury occurred to a person's body or a part of a person's body, which affected the appearance of the body or body part. Weaver v. State, 351 Ga. App. 167, 830 S.E.2d 618 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1502, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 113 (Ga. 2020).
Knowledge that victim peace officer or other official.
- The O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8) statutory aggravating circumstance does not require knowledge on the part of the defendant that the victim was a peace officer or other designated official engaged in the performance of official duties. Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008).
Failure to show victim was a correctional officer.
- Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to aggravated battery of a correctional officer because the state failed to establish evidence that the victim was a correctional officer within the definition of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(e)(2); the victim was wearing civilian clothes at the time of the offense and had only been working at the facility for five months. Taylor v. State, 319 Ga. App. 850, 738 S.E.2d 679 (2013).
Victim who dies instantaneously from first blow cannot be subjected to aggravated battery. Patrick v. State, 247 Ga. 168, 274 S.E.2d 570 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089, 103 S. Ct. 575, 74 L. Ed. 2d 936 (1982).
Evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim suffered an aggravated battery before death when, according to the medical examiner's testimony, the victim sustained three blows to the scalp area of the head, any one of which would have been fatal, three other blows to the head would have rendered the victim unconscious and it was impossible to determine the sequence of the blows. Thus, the victim may have been dead or only unconscious after the first blow. Patrick v. State, 247 Ga. 168, 274 S.E.2d 570 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089, 103 S. Ct. 575, 74 L. Ed. 2d 936 (1982).
It is not incumbent upon the state to prove that defendant intended to maim. White v. State, 210 Ga. App. 563, 436 S.E.2d 584 (1993).
Indictment laid in exact terms of former Code 1933, § 26-1305 was sufficient. See Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 54, 270 S.E.2d 466 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24).
Use of the word "struggle" in an indictment charging aggravated battery merely adjusted the charge to the specific facts of the case, did not leave open the possibility that defendant acted in self-defense, and did not make the indictment deficient. Stokes v. State, 258 Ga. App. 840, 575 S.E.2d 651 (2002).
Evidence sufficient to establish venue.
- For purposes of the aggravated battery - family violence offense and other offenses occurring in the parties' home, venue was proper in Athens-Clarke County because one of the responding officers of the Athens-Clarke County Police Department directly testified that the house where the defendant and the victim lived was located in Athens-Clarke County. Jones v. State, 329 Ga. App. 439, 765 S.E.2d 639 (2014).
Indictment sufficient.
- Counts alleging aggravated battery sufficiently apprised the defendant of what the defendant had to defend against at trial, alleging that the defendant unlawfully and maliciously caused bodily harm to the victim. State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 759 S.E.2d 500 (2014).
Indictment not required to allege party status.
- Indictment's failure to allege that a defendant was a party to aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and first-degree child cruelty under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a),16-5-24(a), and16-5-70(b) did not require a showing that the defendant was the principal perpetrator under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21; the defendant's status as a party to the crimes was not an essential element used to increase the sentences for the crimes, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant could be convicted either as the principal perpetrator of the crimes or as a party thereto. Hill v. State, 282 Ga. App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (2006).
No fatal variance between indictment and proof.
- Fact that an indictment charged the defendant with aggravated assault and battery by slicing the victim's neck with a knife, but the evidence showed the defendant used a box cutter, did not constitute a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof, because the defendant was sufficiently informed of the charges and faced no danger of further prosecution arising out of the incident. Lawson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 852, 630 S.E.2d 131 (2006).
Aggravated battery charges did not merge.
- Because the first count of aggravated battery charged that the defendant rendered the victim's right thumb useless by shooting it, and the second count charged that the defendant seriously disfigured the victim's left hand by shooting it, each aggravated battery verdict was attributable to different conduct than the other aggravated battery verdict, and the trial court was not required to merge the two counts of aggravated battery. Thomas v. State, 325 Ga. App. 682, 754 S.E.2d 661 (2014).
When the defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated battery, the aggravated battery counts did not merge because the evidence was sufficient for a jury to determine that the batteries occurred on separate occasions rather than during a single transaction as the expert physician testified that after the blow to the infant's head that fractured the infant's skull and caused the infant's brain to swell, the infant would not have acted normally, and both parents testified that the infant was acting normally until the day they finally took the infant to the emergency room; and the defendant testified that the marks appeared on the infant before the defendant dropped the baby out the front door onto the ground. Busby v. State, 332 Ga. App. 646, 774 S.E.2d 717 (2015).
Aggravated battery conviction merged into the malice murder conviction where the medical examiner's testimony established that the same act caused the aggravated battery and the victim's death; thus, the same evidence was used to prove both crimes. Fulton v. State, 278 Ga. 58, 597 S.E.2d 396 (2004).
Aggravated battery merged with attempted murder.
- Trial court erred in failing to merge the offense of family violence aggravated battery with attempted murder, as both convictions were established by the same conduct. Hernandez v. State, 317 Ga. App. 845, 733 S.E.2d 30 (2012).
Most reasonable understanding of the conviction for lesser included offenses statute as applied to attempted murder and aggravated battery is that the aggravated battery merges into the greater offense of attempted murder when the crimes are predicated upon the same conduct. The Georgia Supreme Court overrules Hernandez v. State, 317 Ga. App. 845 (2012), Zamudio v. State, 332 Ga. App. 37 (2015), and Dobbs v. State, 2020 Ga. App. Lexis 279 (2020), to the extent that those cases hold otherwise. Priester v. State, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 683 (2020).
Offenses of aggravated battery and armed robbery merged as a matter of fact, where the aggravated battery indictment was drawn to charge the same serious bodily harm inflicted by a knife in the course of an armed robbery, and thus the same facts necessary to prove the aggravated battery charge were used up on proving the armed robbery charge. Whitner v. State, 198 Ga. App. 300, 401 S.E.2d 318 (1991).
Aggravated assault was not merged into aggravated battery.
- After the trial court merged the defendant's aggravated assault conviction into the defendant's armed robbery conviction, and then sentenced the defendant for armed robbery and aggravated battery, even if the trial court should have merged the defendant's aggravated battery and aggravated assault convictions, the end result would have been the same as the defendant would have been sentenced for aggravated battery rather than aggravated assault, given that the aggravated assault constituted the included offense; thus, any error by the trial court in failing to merge the defendant's aggravated battery and aggravated assault convictions was harmless and provided no basis for vacating the defendant's sentence. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016).
Family violence aggravated assault and the family violence aggravated battery convictions did not merge because the evidence showed that the defendant completed one crime before committing the other and that the crimes were based on different conduct as the aggravated battery charge was based on the defendant striking the victim with the defendant's fist and depriving the victim of two upper incisors, and the aggravated assault charge was based on the defendant striking the victim with a wire hanger and pouring lighter fluid on the victim's person and setting the victim on fire. Outz v. State, 344 Ga. App. 616, 810 S.E.2d 678 (2018).
Aggravated battery did not merge with offense of attempted armed robbery. Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 54, 270 S.E.2d 466 (1980).
Aggravated battery and robbery offenses did not merge.
- Trial court did not err in refusing to merge a defendant's robbery and aggravated battery offenses. The robbery offense required that the defendant, with intent to commit theft, took the property of the victim from the victim by use of force, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1), and the aggravated battery charge required proof that the defendant maliciously caused bodily harm to the victim by seriously disfiguring the victim's body or a member thereof, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Taking property of the victim was not a fact required to establish aggravated battery, and causing serious disfigurement was not a fact required to establish robbery. Blanch v. State, 306 Ga. App. 631, 703 S.E.2d 48 (2010).
Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's aggravated battery conviction into the defendant's armed robbery conviction because the taking of the victim's property was not a fact required to establish the aggravated battery offense, and depriving the victim of a member of the victim's body was not a fact required to establish the armed robbery offense; and, while the aggravated battery and armed robbery were based on the same criminal transaction, aggravated battery and armed robbery did not simply prohibit different degrees of injury or risk of injury; rather, the two crimes prohibited entirely different categories of injury - depriving the victim of a member of the victim's body versus depriving the victim of property. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016).
Merger with reckless conduct.
- Defendant's reckless conduct conviction merged as a matter of fact into the aggravated battery conviction as the state conceded at the beginning of sentencing, and the trial court erred in failing to so find. Collins v. State, 283 Ga. App. 188, 641 S.E.2d 208 (2007).
Because a charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) for aggravated battery required showings of malice and disfigurement, while the charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b) for reckless conduct did not require any more proof beyond showing the defendant shot the victim causing bodily harm, the reckless conduct charge should have merged into the aggravated battery charge as a matter of fact. DeLeon v. State, 289 Ga. 782, 716 S.E.2d 173 (2011).
No merger of nonhomicide counts.
- Defendant's convictions of involuntary manslaughter while in the commission of a simple battery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct were not mutually exclusive, and the trial court did not err in not merging the nonhomicide counts upon sentencing. Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).
Aggravated assault merged into aggravated battery.
- Because the indictment alleged only one act, the shooting of the victim, and because the evidence showed only that defendant's actions were the result of a single act of firing a series of shots in quick succession at the victim, the convictions for aggravated assault merged into the aggravated battery. Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 60, 539 S.E.2d 545 (2000).
Trial court erred in failing to merge a defendant's offenses of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), for sentencing purposes, because the assault was a lesser included offense of the battery offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1), given the defendant's single attack on the victim with a golf club. Allen v. State, 302 Ga. App. 190, 690 S.E.2d 492 (2010).
Defendant's aggravated battery and aggravated assault convictions merged because the counts of the indictment were based on the same conduct of hitting the victim with a hammer, resulting in serious bodily injury to the victim's hand and one of the victim's fingers being rendered useless when the victim placed the victim's hands up in an attempt to protect the victim's head; the aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery because the aggravated assault required proof of a less serious injury than the aggravated battery. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).
In an aggravated assault and aggravated battery case arising out of an incident in which the defendant twice, in quick succession, slashed the throat of the victim, the defendant's girlfriend, the trial court erred by failing to merge the defendant's convictions, and the court of appeals erroneously affirmed that decision because the record sufficiently established that the defendant's actions were part of a continuous criminal act, committed at the same time and place and inspired by the same criminal intent; and the offenses, which were based on the single criminal act of the defendant cutting the victim's throat with a knife, only differed with respect to the seriousness of the injury or risk of injury suffered by the victim. Regent v. State, 299 Ga. 172, 787 S.E.2d 217 (2016).
Trial court erred by failing to merge the defendant's aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions for the purposes of sentencing as the aggravated assault conviction was a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery conviction because, although the aggravated battery provision required proof that the victim had the victim's body seriously disfigured, which was not a required showing under the aggravated assault provision, the latter provision did not require proof of any fact that was not also required to prove the aggravated battery; thus, the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault had to be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing. Evans v. State, 344 Ga. App. 283, 810 S.E.2d 164 (2018).
Aggravated assault did not merge with aggravated battery.
- Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery against the same victim did not merge for sentencing purposes, as the two offenses were proven with different facts: the assault occurred when defendant threatened the victim with a gun, and the battery occurred when defendant later shot the victim in the arm. Pennymon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 450, 582 S.E.2d 582 (2003).
Trial court did not err in failing to merge an aggravated assault count into a kidnapping with bodily injury count, the aggravated assault count into an aggravated battery count, and the aggravated battery count into the kidnapping count, as each count referred to a separate cut of the victims with a decorative sword that defendant pulled off the wall during a domestic dispute with defendant's spouse and child. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).
Because a conviction on a charge of aggravated assault could be based on the defendant's act of cutting of the victim's throat, while a conviction on a charge of aggravated battery could be based on the serious disfigurement of the victim's arms, a conviction could be entered on each count. Hence, merger did not apply. Goss v. State, 289 Ga. App. 734, 658 S.E.2d 168 (2008).
Defendant's aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a) and16-5-24(a) did not merge under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), although both stemmed from the same act. The aggravated assault charge required proof that the defendant attempted to commit a violent injury with the intent to murder using a deadly weapon, while the aggravated battery charge required proof that the defendant maliciously caused bodily harm to the victim by rendering a member of the victim's body useless; thus, the offenses were distinct, with each requiring proof of a fact which the other did not. Robbins v. State, 293 Ga. App. 584, 667 S.E.2d 684 (2008).
Trial court did not err in refusing to merge the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-5-24, because the offenses were established by proving different facts; the defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault because there was evidence that the defendant assaulted the victim with a screwdriver, and the defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery because the victim's left lung was nonfunctional for a period of time due to the stab wound. Works v. State, 301 Ga. App. 108, 686 S.E.2d 863 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0458, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 251 (Ga. 2010).
Separate judgments of conviction and sentences for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), were authorized because the evidence authorized a finding that the defendant committed an initial aggravated assault and, after a deliberate interval, committed an aggravated battery in a different location and on a different part of the victim's body; because each offense required proof of a fact that the other offense did not, the crimes did not merge legally or factually. Brockington v. State, 316 Ga. App. 90, 728 S.E.2d 753 (2012).
Because the defendant's initial act of pointing the gun at the victim's head, an aggravated assault, was a separate act from the ensuing acts of aggravated battery in which the defendant shot and injured both of the victim's hands, the crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated battery did not merge. Thomas v. State, 325 Ga. App. 682, 754 S.E.2d 661 (2014).
Under the required evidence test, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery did not merge because the aggravated battery count required the state to prove that the defendant rendered a member of the victim's body useless, which the state did not have to prove for the conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and aggravated assault with an offensive weapon required the state to prove that the defendant used a hammer, an object likely to result in serious bodily injury, which the state did not have to prove for the aggravated battery conviction. Howard v. State, 334 Ga. App. 229, 779 S.E.2d 5 (2015).
Trial court did not err in failing to merge Count Three, charging the defendant with aggravated assault with intent to murder, into the aggravated battery convictions because the count of aggravated assault with intent to murder required proof of a fact - the intent to kill - that the aggravated battery counts did not, and the aggravated battery counts required proof of a fact - the infant's skull was rendered useless and the infant's face was disfigured - that the aggravated assault with intent to murder count did not; thus, the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant separately for aggravated assault with intent to murder, as well as two counts of aggravated battery. Busby v. State, 332 Ga. App. 646, 774 S.E.2d 717 (2015).
Merger of felony obstruction with aggravated battery.
- Because injuring another's ankle amounted to doing violence, the defendant's convictions for felony obstruction merged into aggravated battery; thus, the defendant was entitled to resentencing. Cooper v. State, 350 Ga. App. 365, 829 S.E.2d 433 (2019).
No merger of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping.
- Trial court did not err under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7 in failing to merge convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery with a conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury as each crime required proof of at least one different element, and the state presented independent evidence to prove each individual crime as set out in the indictment. Evidence that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and fired the gun at the floor near the victim, that the defendant used a wooden stick resembling a baseball bat to repeatedly hit the victim, and that the defendant hit and kicked the victim while the victim was tied up supported the three aggravated assault counts; aggravated battery was established by evidence that the defendant broke the victim's nose, wrist, and shoulder and knocked out two teeth and by evidence that the defendant burned the victim's hand and caused the victim to be bitten by fire ants; and kidnapping with bodily injury was proven by evidence of injuries to the victim due to being bound by rope. Rouse v. State, 295 Ga. App. 61, 670 S.E.2d 869 (2008).
Convictions for aggravated battery and cruelty to children did not merge since the evidence established that the victim was subjected to multiple injuries in addition to a broken arm, and that none of the injuries were relevant to defendant's aggravated battery conviction, which was predicated upon the victim's broken arm. Mashburn v. State, 244 Ga. App. 524, 536 S.E.2d 208 (2000).
Trial court did not err by refusing to give an instruction on battery since the state presented evidence that defendant maliciously struck the victim in the abdomen and caused severe and permanent damage to her liver and spleen, and defendant could not point to any evidence that would suggest the offense of battery. Allen v. State, 247 Ga. App. 10, 543 S.E.2d 45 (2000).
Aggravated battery and cruelty to children each requires proof of at least one additional element which the other does not, and the two crimes are not so closely related that multiple convictions are prohibited under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-6 and16-1-7; accordingly, even if the same conduct establishes the commission of both aggravated battery and cruelty to children, the two crimes do not merge, and thus a defendant was properly convicted of both crimes (overruling Jones v. State, 276 Ga. App. 762 (624 S.E.2d 291) (2005); Etchinson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 449 (538 S.E.2d 87) (2000); and Harmon v. State, 208 Ga. App. 271 (430 S.E.2d 399) (1993)). Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).
Aggravated battery did not merge with kidnapping with bodily injury because the battery was concluded when defendant delivered the initial blow to the victim's head before moving the victim to another place. Deal v. State, 233 Ga. App. 79, 503 S.E.2d 288 (1998).
Trial court did not err in failing to merge aggravated battery and kidnapping with bodily injury counts; the kidnapping with bodily injury count included an injury, a broken leg, that was not included in the aggravated battery count, and the evidence that authorized the defendant's conviction of aggravated battery was separate and distinct from the evidence that authorized the conviction of kidnapping with bodily injury. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. 871, 644 S.E.2d 113 (2007).
Because there was independent evidence to support each of the offenses as indicted, a defendant's aggravated assault conviction did not merge as a matter of fact with either the aggravated battery or kidnapping with bodily injury convictions. Pitts v. State, 287 Ga. App. 540, 652 S.E.2d 181 (2007).
Aggravated battery, family violence, merged with family violence battery if charges not based on different acts or injuries
- Convictions under both O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) and (h) (aggravated battery, family violence) and O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a), (b), and (f) (family violence battery, substantial physical and visible bodily harm), which were not based on actions at different times or places or different injuries, violated a defendant's double jeopardy rights under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7. Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 687 S.E.2d 185 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0549, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 244 (Ga. 2010).
Criminal attempt to commit aggravated battery.
- Attempted destruction of another's eyesight constitutes a criminal attempt to commit an aggravated battery. Greene v. State, 155 Ga. App. 222, 270 S.E.2d 386 (1980).
Mitigating factors.
- Focus of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) is upon whether the defendant has maliciously caused the victim to suffer an enumerated physical injury, and the means employed so as maliciously to cause such an injury is not a mitigating factor. McKissic v. State, 201 Ga. App. 525, 411 S.E.2d 516, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 411 S.E.2d 516 (1991).
Application
It is not necessary that the victim suffer the total loss of a member in order to be the victim of an aggravated battery. Taylor v. State, 178 Ga. App. 817, 344 S.E.2d 748 (1986).
Fractured arm rendering hand useless.
- Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's conviction for aggravated battery based on testimony that the defendant struck the victim with a stick, fracturing the victim's arm above the wrist and rendering the victim's left hand useless. Dean v. State, 313 Ga. App. 726, 722 S.E.2d 436 (2012).
Finger is a bodily part that accordingly qualifies as a "member" under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24. Ganas v. State, 245 Ga. App. 645, 537 S.E.2d 758 (2000).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of aggravated battery on defendant's former wife when the testimony was that defendant's former wife's index finger had been rendered useless as the result of defendant's beating. Ahmadi v. State, 251 Ga. App. 1895, 554 S.E.2d 215 (2001).
Injury to finger and eye.
- Defendant's aggravated battery convictions did not merge because the counts of the indictment were predicated on different conduct; in order to prove one count of the indictment, the state had to show that the victim threw bleach in the victim's eyes, and in order to prove another count of the indictment, the state had to prove that the victim's finger was rendered useless because the finger was repeatedly struck with a hammer. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).
Loss of tooth.
- Defendant deprived his ex-girlfriend of a member of her body or rendered such member of her body useless, when he repeatedly struck her in the face, dislodging a large portion of one of her teeth; thus, defendant's aggravated battery conviction was upheld. Rivers v. State, 255 Ga. App. 422, 565 S.E.2d 596 (2002).
Nose is a bodily member.
- A nose, which is a part of the body and was considered a bodily member under the law of mayhem, also qualifies as a bodily member for the purpose of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Jones v. State, 283 Ga. App. 631, 642 S.E.2d 331 (2007).
Ear rendered useless.
- When an ear is capable of hearing no more than a slight beep, the ear has been rendered useless for purposes of former Code 1933, § 26-1305. Jackson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 584, 266 S.E.2d 273 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24).
Because the evidence was sufficient for a trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's attack on the victim rendered the victim's ear useless, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as to an aggravated battery charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Biggins v. State, 299 Ga. App. 554, 683 S.E.2d 96 (2009).
Loss of use of eye is member rendered useless.
- Loss of use of an eye constitutes the rendering of "a member of his body useless" within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 26-1305. Mitchell v. State, 238 Ga. 167, 231 S.E.2d 773 (1977); Blackman v. State, 178 Ga. App. 88, 342 S.E.2d 24 (1986); Taylor v. State, 178 Ga. App. 817, 344 S.E.2d 748 (1986) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24).
Evidence that established that a victim's eye was removed immediately after defendant struck the victim and caused the eye to bleed was sufficient to show harm and to support a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) even though the eye was not functional before the battery because loss of the eye deprived the victim of a member of the victim's body. Williams v. State, 262 Ga. App. 698, 588 S.E.2d 755 (2003).
Expert testimony is not required in an aggravated battery case to prove the lose of use of an eye. The victim's testimony as to loss of eyesight will support the verdict. Mitchell v. State, 238 Ga. 167, 231 S.E.2d 773 (1977).
Blurred vision is evidence that an eye has been rendered useless. Taylor v. State, 178 Ga. App. 817, 344 S.E.2d 748 (1986).
Eye injury sufficient for conviction.
- Evidence that defendant put fist through a window causing broken glass to strike the victim's eye was sufficient for conviction. Blackwood v. State, 224 Ga. App. 486, 480 S.E.2d 914 (1997).
Victim's testimony that vision was improving was not sufficient to overcome the evidence that the victim's eye was rendered useless, especially in the absence of a prognosis of complete recovery. Taylor v. State, 178 Ga. App. 817, 344 S.E.2d 748 (1986).
Photographs depicting condition of victim's injured eye immediately following attack were admissible over defendant's objection that they were designed to inflame and prejudice the jury. Few v. State, 182 Ga. App. 667, 356 S.E.2d 729 (1987).
Admission of color photographs.
- Court did not err in admitting color photographs showing the victim's injuries. These photographs depicted the victim's injuries shortly after the injuries were inflicted and shortly before trial to show the permanence of the victim's injuries. Since the appellant was indicted for aggravated battery, the state was required to prove that the appellant severely disfigured the victim. Maxwell v. State, 250 Ga. App. 628, 552 S.E.2d 870 (2001).
Legs rendered useless.
- That the victim can walk for short distances with the aid of braces and a walker does not take away from the fact that for the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24 the victim's legs have been rendered useless. Magsby v. State, 169 Ga. App. 637, 314 S.E.2d 473 (1984).
Victim's testimony that defendant picked the victim up and threw the victim on the floor on the victim's neck, causing the victim to lose the use of both legs, was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated battery pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), despite defendant's contrary testimony that the victim simply tripped over a cord. King v. State, 255 Ga. App. 191, 564 S.E.2d 815 (2002).
When a defendant was charged with aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), for rendering a victim's legs useless by shooting the victim, the evidence supporting defendant's conviction was insufficient because no evidence showed that a gunshot wound caused the victim to lose the use of the victim's legs or any other part of the victim's body. Doomes v. State, 261 Ga. App. 442, 583 S.E.2d 151 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated battery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) because the medical evidence regarding the shooting victim's rehabilitation and the victim's ongoing gait impairment was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the victim's legs were rendered useless by the shooting. Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 711 S.E.2d 660 (2011).
Pouring boiling water over spouse's leg and foot.
- Sufficient evidence supported aggravated battery conviction, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), after testimony was received that defendant maliciously injured defendant's spouse and seriously disfigured that spouse by pouring boiling water on the spouse's leg and foot. Jones v. State, 259 Ga. App. 698, 577 S.E.2d 878 (2003).
Evidence sufficient for aggravated battery because hot bleach thrown on victim.
- Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated battery as defendant threw a cup of hot bleach on the victim and then repeatedly punched the victim in the face; the bleach burned and discolored the victim's face and severely damaged the victim's left eye. Payne v. State, 273 Ga. App. 483, 615 S.E.2d 564 (2005).
Evidence sufficient when hot water burned victim.
- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), first degree cruelty to children, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b), and second degree cruelty to children, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(c), because the victim stated in a forensic interview and testified at trial that the defendant had burned the victim with hot water on more than one occasion and that the defendant had slapped the victim's face and punched the victim in the stomach; the victim was admitted to the hospital with severe burns on the feet, buttocks, and scrotum, and the victim's mother testified that the victim had been under the defendant's care at the time the victim received the burns. Jackson v. State, 310 Ga. App. 476, 713 S.E.2d 679 (2011).
Harm to spouse's sexual organ.
- Defendant's actions in biting and severing part of the defendant's spouse's genitals while the defendant was performing oral sex on the spouse, done as revenge for the spouse's infidelity, constituted serious disfigurement sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault. Byrd v. State, 251 Ga. App. 83, 553 S.E.2d 380 (2001).
Brain injury to infant.
- Testimony that the defendant's baby spent 15 days in intensive care and, over a year later, was still being treated for head injuries was sufficient for the jury to find that the baby had suffered a loss of normal brain functioning (i.e., was deprived of a member of the body) to convict the defendant of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Nichols v. State, 278 Ga. App. 46, 628 S.E.2d 131 (2006).
Evidence that the baby had been in the defendant's care for more than two hours when the baby died; that in the medical examiner's opinion, the baby would have died within minutes or hours of suffering a brain injury; and that the autopsy uncovered extensive internal injuries to the baby was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for cruelty to children, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. Graham v. State, 320 Ga. App. 714, 740 S.E.2d 649 (2013).
Skull fracture and other head injuries on infant.
- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children with regard to the skull fracture and other head injuries incurred by the defendant's infant son because the expert testimony and medical evidence established that the child's injuries were not accidental but caused by a blow to the head and severe trauma. Oliver v. State, 324 Ga. App. 53, 748 S.E.2d 510 (2013).
Victim with cognitive and memory losses.
- Evidence was insufficient to sustain a juvenile court's finding that a child committed aggravated battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) because there was no showing that the victim's ongoing memory and cognitive problems were caused by the beating and not by a preexisting brain tumor and brain surgeries. In the Interest of Q. S., 310 Ga. App. 70, 712 S.E.2d 99 (2011).
Victim with impaired brain function.
- Evidence that the child suffered serious injuries from being shaken and that the child's brain function was impaired as a result was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of cruelty to children in the first degree and aggravated battery. Hillsman v. State, 341 Ga. App. 543, 802 S.E.2d 7 (2017).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of family violence aggravated assault and family violence aggravated battery because the victim's testimony that the victim and the defendant were romantically involved and had met 10 years before through mutual friends allowed the jury to conclude that they were not siblings; the defendant hit the victim with the defendant's fist and knocked out two of the victim's teeth; the defendant beat the victim with a wire clothes hanger; and the defendant squirted lighter fluid on the victim's head and chest, and used a lighter to set the victim on fire. Outz v. State, 344 Ga. App. 616, 810 S.E.2d 678 (2018).
Disfigurement need not be permanent.
- To constitute the crime of aggravated battery, there is no requirement that, in addition to being "serious," the disfigurement of a victim be permanent. In re H.S., 199 Ga. App. 481, 405 S.E.2d 323 (1991).
Factual issue of serious disfigurement for jury.
- Whether six scars from gunshot wounds, plus a large scar from operation to remove a bullet, constitute serious disfigurement is a factual issue for the jury. Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 54, 270 S.E.2d 466 (1980).
Whether a scar constituted serious disfigurement was a jury question and the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal on the charge of aggravated battery. Grace v. State, 210 Ga. App. 718, 437 S.E.2d 485 (1993).
Evidence authorized finding of serious disfigurement.
- Evidence authorized a finding that the victim had incurred a serious disfigurement to the victim's head as the result of being intentionally struck by defendant, where the victim suffered a broken nose and a laceration to the scalp requiring several stitches. In re H.S., 199 Ga. App. 481, 405 S.E.2d 323 (1991).
When the defendant broke the victim's nose with a metal pipe, and a surgeon testified as to how the victim's nose was rebroken and replaced in its proper position, the jury could find that the victim suffered serious disfigurement under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24. Underwood v. State, 283 Ga. App. 638, 642 S.E.2d 324 (2007), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018).
With regard to a defendant's conviction for aggravated battery, and other related crimes, sufficient evidence existed authorizing the jury to find that the victim's facial injuries were seriously disfiguring after the victim testified that the victim's eye socket was broken in three places, causing the eyeball to recede into the victim's head after the defendant beat the victim; the victim also testified that the victim's cheekbone and nose were broken, four ribs were broken, the victim's adenoids and eardrums burst, and the injuries required the victim to undergo multiple surgeries, including having wires placed in the victim's cheekbone and eye socket, one eye pulled back into place, and a plastic implant placed behind the eye. Ferrell v. State, 283 Ga. App. 471, 641 S.E.2d 658 (2007).
There was sufficient evidence of disfigurement to support a defendant's conviction for aggravated battery with regard to the abuse inflicted upon the defendant's two year old child based on the numerous visible injuries inflicted on the child, and a CT scan that showed a skull fracture, which required a long period of hospitalization. Yearwood v. State, 297 Ga. App. 633, 678 S.E.2d 114 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of aggravated battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury could reasonably find that the victim's broken nose constituted serious disfigurement. Seymore v. State, 300 Ga. App. 523, 685 S.E.2d 772 (2009).
Evidence that a belt used by a defendant to hit the victim created knots deep under the victim's skin and discoloration still visible during defendant's trial a year later, and that the severity and depth of those knots put the victim at risk for blood clots and deep vein thrombosis, was sufficient for the jury to determine that the victim was seriously disfigured and to sustain the defendant's conviction for aggravated battery. Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 687 S.E.2d 185 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0549, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 244 (Ga. 2010).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated battery conviction, which was based upon the serious disfigurement of the victim's eye. The jury was authorized to find that the victim's severely swollen, bruised eye and eye socket fracture constituted serious disfigurement. Feagin v. State, 317 Ga. App. 543, 731 S.E.2d 778 (2012).
Sufficient injury to warrant conviction for aggravated battery.
- Evidence that nine-week-old infant had numerous abrasions, lacerations, and bruises, as well as nine fractured ribs, showed sufficient injury to warrant conviction for aggravated battery. Thompson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 1, 273 S.E.2d 894 (1980).
Based on the victim's testimony that not only was the victim's arm broken, but that it jerked out of place, a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the arm was seriously disfigured and that defendant was guilty of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24. Hopkins v. State, 255 Ga. App. 202, 564 S.E.2d 805 (2002).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated battery as it showed that defendant was upset with the victim and wanted to confront the victim, defendant did in fact confront the victim while the victim was sitting in the victim's car, defendant had an angry and hostile demeanor during the confrontation, defendant started the verbal and physical confrontation, and defendant seriously disfigured the victim who sustained multiple cut wounds, including cuts to the head that took 30 staples to close. Campbell v. State, 258 Ga. App. 863, 575 S.E.2d 748 (2002).
Trial court properly rejected the defendant's contention that an aggravated battery conviction had to be reversed, as the stabbing left no part of the victim's body seriously disfigured, given the victim's testimony that: (1) the victim was hospitalized for three days; (2) the stabbing had violated the victim's skin and fatty tissue and exposed the sternum; (3) the tip of the knife used penetrated the sternum or had slipped to the side of the sternum and then punctured the tissues immediately underneath the sternum; and (4) for a month after the incident, the victim suffered intermittent shortness of breath and heavy chest pain; and that for about eight months, the victim was unable to work a job as a machine operator cutting metal. Parnell v. State, 280 Ga. App. 665, 634 S.E.2d 763 (2006).
Testimony indicating that the defendant struck the victim in the head and on the arm with a pry bar, breaking the victim's arm and pulling the flesh away from the victim's head, was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24 and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Mattis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 49, 637 S.E.2d 787 (2006).
Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated battery under OC.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) because the record showed that defendant cut a deep gash across the victim's abdomen using a knife with a 3.5 inch blade, stabbed the victim two more times, and then chased the victim as the victim fled. Brinkley v. State, 301 Ga. App. 827, 689 S.E.2d 116 (2009).
Burn injuries sufficient for aggravated battery conviction.
- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine that the defendant caused the victim to sustain visible, severe burns and large hypertrophic scars on the victim's skin, which required ongoing surgeries and corrective procedures; because the evidence established that the defendant caused the victim's skin to be seriously disfigured, burned, and scarred, the aggravated battery conviction was authorized. Wells v. State, 309 Ga. App. 661, 710 S.E.2d 860 (2011).
Injury to jaw sufficient for aggravated battery conviction.
- Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of aggravated battery because the evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's blows rendered the victim's mouth and jaw useless and that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt; the victim testified that the victim's jaw did not function normally after the victim was injured. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 468, 718 S.E.2d 808 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0473, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 277 (Ga. 2012).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary because the evidence showed that: (1) the defendant broke into his ex-girlfriend's home; (2) the defendant stabbed the ex-girlfriend's current boyfriend in the spine with a knife, paralyzing him; (3) the defendant cut his ex-girlfriend with a knife on the back of her head, on the side of her face, on her shoulder and back, and stabbed her in the stomach; and (4) the ex-girlfriend continued to bear scars from the knife attack. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012).
Victim's testimony that the victim and the defendant were fighting, the defendant left the room and later returned with gun that the defendant held to the victim's side, and the victim heard gunshot and turned to face the defendant, who told the victim that the defendant had been meaning to do that and ran, supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and possession of firearm during the commission of a felony. Jones v. State, 326 Ga. App. 151, 756 S.E.2d 267 (2014).
Evidence that, for several months after the shooting, the victim struggled to write and to care for the victim, had to rely on another person for help in tasks such as cooking and bathing, and had to undergo physical therapy, authorized the defendant's conviction for aggravated battery. Smith v. State, 328 Ga. App. 863, 763 S.E.2d 251 (2014).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery as the combined injuries to the victim's face, eyes, head, hands, and feet constituted serious disfigurement because the victim testified that the defendant repeatedly slapped and hit the victim, kicked the victim in the stomach, hit the victim in the back with a large bureau mirror, punched the victim in the nose, beat the victim with a gun, choked the victim, and dragged the victim around with an arm around the victim's throat; the victim's face was bruised and swollen, and one eye was swollen shut; the victim's hands were bruised and swollen from the beating; and the victim's feet were cut from walking on glass the defendant had broken. Levin v. State, 334 Ga. App. 71, 778 S.E.2d 238 (2015).
Evidence that the victim suffered a concussion and sustained a wound on the victim's face that took months to close up and left a dime-sized scar authorized the jury to conclude that the victim suffered more than a superficial wound and supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated battery. Shaw v. State, 340 Ga. App. 749, 798 S.E.2d 344 (2017).
Evidence that the defendant shot at a man who laughed when the defendant yelled anyone selling drugs in the neighborhood would have to give the defendant a commission, and then began shooting and hit two others was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated battery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Thompson v. State, 341 Ga. App. 883, 802 S.E.2d 713 (2017).
Introduction of civil lawsuit in criminal proceeding.
- Defendant's malice murder and aggravated battery convictions were upheld on appeal as the trial court did not err in introducing into evidence the pleadings filed in a civil lawsuit brought by defendant against the victim and others as the evidence was introduced to show the defendant's motive or state of mind. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 44, 644 S.E.2d 850, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 950, 128 S. Ct. 384, 169 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2007).
Statute sufficient to give due notice of prohibited acts causing serious disfigurement.
- When there was evidence that the defendant hit the defendant's mother-in-law, breaking her nose; that the defendant hit her repeatedly; that the results of the defendant's beating were severe, extensive bruises throughout the face and eyes, and forehead with deep lacerations at the bridge of her nose, her right brow, and her left temple, with arterial bleeding flowing from the final laceration; and, that the totality of the injuries required approximately 25 stitches, the prohibition in former Code 1933, § 26-1305 against maliciously causing bodily harm to another by seriously disfiguring the person's body gave the defendant due notice that the statute prohibited the acts for which defendant was convicted. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24).
Evidence sufficient for aggravated battery of officer.
- Because sufficient evidence was presented showing that the defendant cut a correctional officer's face with either a razor blade or other sharp object, requiring more than 150 stitches and cosmetic surgery to repair, the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery upon a correctional officer were upheld on appeal. White v. State, 289 Ga. App. 224, 656 S.E.2d 567 (2008).
Evidence that the defendant was angry, yelled at and argued with officers, jumped and thrashed about and threw the defendant backward against the officers, and then turned a shoulder into the chief and fell onto the chief's leg was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant committed aggravated battery. Lidy v. State, 335 Ga. App. 517, 782 S.E.2d 302 (2016).
Knowledge that victim was officer is essential element.
- Charge was inadequate, and the convictions of the indictment were vacated when the court defined the elements of the charges of aggravated assault and aggravated battery without any reference to the element of defendant's knowledge that the victim was a police officer. Chandler v. State, 204 Ga. App. 816, 421 S.E.2d 288 (1992).
Exclusion of evidence relevant to exculpatory theories as reversible error.
- When defendant was convicted of seriously disfiguring the body of the victim, evidence that the victim had previously attacked defendant's spouse during a custody hearing in court and evidence that a major part of the harm done to the victim was the result, not of defendant's fist, but of the foot of defendant's spouse, was relevant to the issues raised by exculpatory theories, and exclusion of such evidence constituted reversible error. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980).
Evidence of victim's alcoholism.
- Defendant's convictions of aggravated battery and simple battery were affirmed as the trial court properly refused to admit evidence of the victim's alcoholism prior to the victim's involvement with the defendant when the defendant failed to show any nexus between the victim's alcoholism and the conclusion that the victim had falsely accused the defendant of battery. Harris v. State, 263 Ga. App. 329, 587 S.E.2d 819 (2003).
Evidence of victim's conduct not admitted.
- In a defendant's trial for aggravated battery against a victim more than 65 years of age in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) and (d), evidence that the victim had fondled the defendant's genitals when the defendant was 15 was not admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404) to support the defendant's claim of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21. Strozier v. State, 300 Ga. App. 199, 685 S.E.2d 743 (2009).
Conduct outside scope of involuntary manslaughter.
- Whether the conduct of an accused is lawful at the outset, e.g., in self-defense or unlawful, where what takes place thereafter discloses felonious conduct in committing either an aggravated assault with an instrument likely to produce death or an aggravated battery which causes the death of another, such conduct is not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter. Trask v. State, 132 Ga. App. 645, 208 S.E.2d 591 (1974).
Aggravated assault occurring after aggravated battery.
- When defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and aggravated battery under an indictment as to aggravated assault alleging that defendant aided, abetted, advised, and encouraged defendant's son to shoot the victim, this occurred prior to the aggravated battery, and there is no evidence that after the victim was shot, defendant advised and encouraged the son to kill the victim, but in fact, prevented the son from doing so, it was error to sentence defendant for both offenses, and the sentence as to aggravated assault with intent to murder must be set aside. Overstreet v. State, 182 Ga. App. 809, 357 S.E.2d 103 (1987).
No merger of related offenses.
- Trial court did not err in failing to merge aggravated battery and armed robbery convictions. The evidence needed to prove each charge was entirely different, as one charge demanded evidence that the defendant shot and seriously disfigured the victim, while the other required proof that the defendant took money from the victim at gunpoint. Smashum v. State, 293 Ga. App. 41, 666 S.E.2d 549 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 952 (Ga. 2008).
Sufficient evidence of requisite criminal intent.
- Appellate court rejected the defendant's claim that insufficient evidence with respect to the requisite criminal intent failed to support an aggravated battery conviction, as the jury could infer intent by: (1) the defendant's act of twisting the victim's head all the way around to the left and slamming it towards the car floorboard; (2) the fact that the incident occurred during a heated argument that extended over several hours and had previously resulted in physical violence towards the victim; (3) the defendant's refusal to take the victim to a hospital or call the victim's mother after the incident; (4) the defendant's subsequent flight from law enforcement; and (5) evidence of two prior similar transactions admitted against the defendant involving assaults on a previous girlfriend. Collins v. State, 283 Ga. App. 188, 641 S.E.2d 208 (2007).
Evidence of previous crimes improperly admitted to show intent.
- Appellant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and knife-possession offenses were reversed because the Georgia Supreme Court could not say that the trial court's erroneous admission of the voluminous evidence that the appellant had previously committed multiple serious violent acts did not contribute to the guilty verdicts that the jury returned. Strong v. State, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 653 (2020).
Evidence sufficient to support conviction.
- Evidence sufficient to sustain convictions of arson in the first degree and two counts of aggravated battery. Rhodes v. State, 187 Ga. App. 218, 370 S.E.2d 219 (1988); Williams v. State, 187 Ga. App. 355, 370 S.E.2d 210 (1988).
Testimony by the victim, in which the victim positively identified defendant as the man who entered the victim's home, and committed the crimes of robbery by intimidation, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a knife, aggravated battery and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, charged in the indictment and eyewitness testimony that defendant entered the victim's premises minutes before the attack of the victim was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of committing the crimes charged in the indictment. Mobley v. State, 211 Ga. App. 709, 441 S.E.2d 73 (1994).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions for aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated battery. Autry v. State, 230 Ga. App. 773, 498 S.E.2d 304 (1998).
Proof that defendant's unjustified and malicious blows to the victim's head caused memory lapses and permanent nerve damage is sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict that defendant committed aggravated battery by depriving the victim of a member of the victim's body. Scott v. State, 243 Ga. App. 383, 532 S.E.2d 141 (2000).
Evidence showing that the victim, defendant's son, was subjected to unspeakable abuse at defendant's hands, and that the victim suffered a broken arm, amply supported defendant's aggravated battery conviction. Mashburn v. State, 244 Ga. App. 524, 536 S.E.2d 208 (2000).
Evidence that defendant struck the victim in the face with such force that defendant suffered a broken jaw was sufficient to support conviction. Ellis v. State, 245 Ga. App. 807, 539 S.E.2d 184 (2000).
Appellate court found that when a victim positively identified defendant as the person who came to the residence where the victim was visiting, assaulted and coerced the victim into showing defendant where certain drugs and money were stashed in the residence, and then dragged the victim to the backyard where defendant slit the victim's throat twice and left the victim for dead, the evidence sufficed to sustain an aggravated battery conviction. Kelly v. State, 255 Ga. App. 813, 567 S.E.2d 36 (2002).
Evidence that defendant intentionally stabbed a man with a knife, causing a wound that required 100 stitches and that left a scar on the victim's side, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Townsend v. State, 256 Ga. App. 837, 570 S.E.2d 47 (2002).
Since the state proved that defendant committed aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), by rendering the victim's brain useless and by depriving the victim of a brain through defendant's punches and kicks, the conviction was upheld. Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730, 571 S.E.2d 788 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1004, 123 S. Ct. 1911, 155 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated stalking and aggravated battery as the defendant's spouse had just parked at a supermarket when the defendant ran a vehicle into the spouse's vehicle, the defendant then approached the spouse, threatened to kill the spouse, opened the door, grabbed and twisted the spouse's wrist, and punched the spouse's nose, breaking the nose; on the date of the incident, a permanent protective order was in effect prohibiting the defendant from contacting the spouse or the spouse's family, or touching or damaging their property. Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (2003).
Evidence that the defendant, a convicted felon, accompanied the victim to a store with the codefendant; shot the victim in the head with a handgun that the defendant had in defendant's possession thereby, causing a wound in which the victim lost one eye; and along with the codefendant took all the victim's money was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated battery. Drummer v. State, 264 Ga. App. 617, 591 S.E.2d 481 (2003); Griggs v. State, 264 Ga. App. 636, 592 S.E.2d 168 (2003).
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts against defendant for false imprisonment, aggravated battery, and simple assault in regard to acts of domestic violence against the victim, defendant's spouse, as the evidence showed that defendant dragged the spouse down a hallway by the spouse's hair and held the spouse in a bedroom against the spouse's will, that defendant broke the spouse's nose and arm, and that defendant beat the spouse with a car-washing brush. Mize v. State, 262 Ga. App. 486, 585 S.E.2d 913 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support convictions against defendant for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and aggravated battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, when the victim identified defendant from a pre-trial photograph and from in-court identification, a codefendant and a witness testified against defendant, and the gun used to shoot the victim was found near the car with shell casings in the car. Dunn v. State, 262 Ga. App. 643, 586 S.E.2d 352 (2003).
Evidence that defendant, the estranged spouse of the victim, shot the victim twice and caused the spouse to be paralyzed from the neck down was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated battery. Colbert v. State, 263 Ga. App. 193, 587 S.E.2d 300 (2003).
Evidence in the form of testimony from defendant's accomplices that defendant repeatedly struck the victim in the face while asking the victim "where the money was" and choked the victim when the victim could not immediately find the money in the victim's truck after defendant took the victim to the truck because the victim told defendant that the money was there, coupled with defendant's possession of the victim's beeper, was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for robbery, kidnapping with bodily injury, and aggravated battery. Rutledge v. State, 263 Ga. App. 308, 587 S.E.2d 808 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of causing the victim's death while committing an aggravated battery against the victim, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1(c) and16-5-24, because defendant was seen walking toward the residence defendant shared with the victim, after a neighbor had called the police to report a disturbance there, carrying a gas can that appeared to be heavy, and, therefore, not empty, after which the victim was seen on the porch of the residence, in flames, and defendant, who was sitting on the porch, refused the requests of passersby attempting to give the victim assistance by providing a blanket to smother the flames, which caused the victim's death shortly thereafter. Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 579 S.E.2d 728 (2003).
Defendant's attempt to invoke the circumstantial evidence rule of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) was rejected, and the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated battery, as the evidence was not entirely circumstantial when there was direct evidence that: (1) the defendant said that the defendant was going to set the victim on fire; (2) defendant was present and poured the gasoline on the victim; (3) defendant reached in defendant's pocket for something just before the fire started; and (4) the victim questioned why defendant had done it. Miller v. State, 265 Ga. App. 402, 593 S.E.2d 943 (2004).
Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as the evidence showed that defendant shot the victim in the abdomen and the arm with a gun and that defendant intended to cause serious physical harm and disfigurement to the victim. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004).
Because defendant shot the victim in the buttocks, rendering the victim's rectum and a portion of the victim's colon useless for a period of time, the evidence sufficed to sustain an aggravated battery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a); consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Parham v. State, 270 Ga. App. 54, 606 S.E.2d 79 (2004).
Victim was shot while running away from the victim's home following an armed robbery, and although the codefendant testified that the codefendant accidentally shot the victim, the victim's testimony showed that both perpetrators fought with the victim inside the victim's home and that after the victim was shot, both perpetrators struggled over the gun, and one of the defendant's said, "Kill him"; sufficient evidence supported the defendant's aggravated battery conviction. Daniel v. State, 271 Ga. App. 539, 610 S.E.2d 90 (2005).
Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-5-24,16-5-40, and16-11-106, respectively, were supported by the evidence, as the defendant was engaged in a domestic dispute with the defendant's spouse and child, wherein the defendant argued, threatened to kill them, and locked them in a bathroom, punched and hit the spouse, and stabbed them each multiple times with a decorative sword that the defendant removed from the wall; there was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant did not stab them in the midst of a struggle over possession of the sword, but instead, that the defendant intended to stab or cut them. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).
Evidence supported defendant's conviction for armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated battery, and impersonating an officer because defendant kicked in the door of a home while shouting that defendant was a "federal agent," fired a shotgun through a door, shooting off a victim's thumb, inserted the barrel of the shotgun in the same person's mouth, and demanded money, which the victims turned over, two codefendants identified defendant as the user of the shotgun, and defendant's DNA was found on a ski mask recovered from the getaway car and defendant's fingerprints were found on the car. Garrison v. State, 276 Ga. App. 243, 622 S.E.2d 910 (2005).
Defendant's conviction as a party for aggravated assault and aggravated battery was affirmed as: (1) the defendant drove a car knowing a gun was inside; (2) the defendant extinguished the headlights and drove slowly past a crowded corner as a passenger opened fire; (3) the defendant stopped the car next to a prone victim while the passenger continued shooting; and (4) the defendant told the police that the defendant did not care who had been shot. Ford v. State, 280 Ga. App. 580, 634 S.E.2d 522 (2006).
Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by evidence that: (1) the victim and the defendant had an acrimonious relationship; (2) the defendant threatened to hit the victim with a jug; and (3) the defendant's statement that the victim was not "dead yet" after the victim was shot in the back; the jury could reject the defendant's claim that the defendant fired a warning shot away from the victim and could convict the defendant, even though the victim did not see the defendant point the gun at the victim. Rowe v. State, 280 Ga. App. 881, 635 S.E.2d 251 (2006).
Victim's prior statements to a responding police officer and to an investigator that the defendant beat the victim, photographs of the victim's injuries, and evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim constituted sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Meeks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 334, 636 S.E.2d 77 (2006).
Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for aggravated battery as there was evidence supporting an inference that the victim's first wound was non-fatal, as the victim managed to flee a short distance into a neighbor's yard before succumbing to the gunfire; the trial court was not required to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the aggravated battery charge, and the trial court did not err by allowing the jury to consider the crime of aggravated battery as an aggravating circumstance of the murder. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006).
Aggravated battery and obstruction or hindering an emergency telephone call convictions were upheld on appeal, despite a change in the victim's story, as the injuries sustained were consistent with the victim's original statements, foundational requirements supported the admission of hearsay statements regarding the injuries, the victim's actual written inconsistent statement was properly withheld from the jury, and a mistrial was unwarranted. Buchanan v. State, 282 Ga. App. 298, 638 S.E.2d 436 (2006).
Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and first-degree child cruelty pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a),16-5-24(a), and16-5-70(b) for participating in a drive-by shooting were supported by sufficient evidence because the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) and it was the function of the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses; based on the testimony of the witnesses to the shooting, a reasonable jury could have rejected the defendant's claims and determined that the defendant was a party to each of the crimes. Hill v. State, 282 Ga. App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (2006).
Defendant's aggravated battery conviction was upheld on appeal based on: (1) sufficient evidence showing that the victim lost the use of an elbow when the elbow was broken during the beating with the defendant; (2) the trial court's proper jury instructions as to the offense; and (3) counsel's representation at trial, which was not made ineffective due to a failure to object to certain testimony. Walls v. State, 283 Ga. App. 560, 642 S.E.2d 195 (2007).
There was sufficient evidence that a victim had been deprived of the use of the victim's extremities under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) when the victim's doctor testified that the victim would not regain full mobility of the victim's arm or hand and would likely suffer from arthritis for the rest of the victim's life, the bones in the victim's arm had been broken into several pieces, the victim had been immobilized by a fixation device, a cast, and a splint, and the victim had spent a month in the hospital with the victim's extremities in restrictive devices. McClain v. State, 284 Ga. App. 187, 643 S.E.2d 273 (2007).
Defendant's convictions for malice murder, aggravated battery, burglary, and violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully possessing cocaine and marijuana were supported by sufficient evidence; the defendant walked into a neighbor's house with a butcher knife in each hand and stabbed two people, knives found in the woods behind the defendant's apartment matched the descriptions of those used in the stabbings and had deoxyribonucleic acid matching the defendant's, two knives were missing from a knife block in the defendant's apartment, marijuana and cocaine were found in the apartment, the defendant told a friend that the defendant had "hurt some people really bad," and three eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the assailant. Swanson v. State, 282 Ga. 39, 644 S.E.2d 845 (2007).
Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, two counts of armed robbery, and aggravated battery as: the defendant had been seen fleeing the victim's home in a car registered to the defendant; the defendant told the defendant's spouse to discard the defendant's bloody clothing; the defendant sought treatment at a hospital after being shot during the crimes; and the defendant had initiated conversations in which the defendant described the actions of the defendant's companions in discarding guns used in the crimes and offered to reveal the names of the companions in exchange for not being charged with murder. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. 871, 644 S.E.2d 113 (2007).
Since the evidence presented at the defendant's trial showed, and the defendant admitted, that the defendant was holding a gun that shot the defendant's boyfriend in the neck and paralyzed him, and there was no evidence presented indicating that the act of shooting the boyfriend was in self-defense, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Worthy v. State, 286 Ga. App. 77, 648 S.E.2d 682 (2007).
Aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions were upheld on appeal as: (1) sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to reject the defendant's self-defense claim; (2) two photographs were properly admitted as innocuous demonstrative aids to show the scene of the crime and the defendant's location; and (3) the trial court did not improperly give the court's opinion about the evidence, but merely attempted to clarify the state's position. Whitaker v. State, 287 Ga. App. 465, 652 S.E.2d 568 (2007).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony; the defendant told the victim, who had walked into a common hallway in the defendant's apartment building, to leave, went inside, retrieved a gun, and shot the victim twice after the victim refused to leave, and then shot at the victim while the victim was fleeing. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 435, 657 S.E.2d 333 (2008).
Because sufficient evidence of the defendant's attack on the victim, repeatedly stabbing the victim and rendering the victim's wrist useless, supported an aggravated battery charge, and the defendant was adequately put on notice of the charge by the indictment, a conviction on that charge was supported by the evidence. Thus, a conviction based on this evidence did not violate due process. Goss v. State, 289 Ga. App. 734, 658 S.E.2d 168 (2008).
There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary when the victim unhesitatingly identified the defendant as one of the people who attacked the victim with a bat or a pipe; the victim's roommate was about "70 percent sure" that the defendant was one of the attackers; the defendant came to the victim's door earlier in the evening and told someone in the street, "Oh no, not now"; one of the attackers threatened the victim because the victim befriended the attacker's paramour; the paramour, who was a friend of the defendant and who had called the victim to the victim's door before the attack, knew that the victim had come into some cash; and the parent of the defendant's child testified that the defendant and others left the house saying that they were going to get into a fight. Furthermore, the victim sustained a stab wound in the liver, a shattered jaw, a broken foot, a stab to the elbow, damage to the facial nerves, and a double hernia and was in constant pain and could not work. Drew v. State, 291 Ga. App. 306, 661 S.E.2d 675 (2008).
Victim's testimony that after being shot by the defendant, the victim was left with nerve damage to the shoulder from which the victim had not fully recovered, was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008).
Victim testified that as the victim walked in front of the defendant's car, the defendant hit the gas pedal, throwing the victim onto the hood; accelerated when the victim asked the defendant to stop; and slammed on the brakes, causing the victim to slide down the hood, and the victim's legs and foot to be broken as they went underneath the car. As the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to establish these facts under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the defendant was properly convicted of aggravated battery. Cash v. State, 293 Ga. App. 702, 667 S.E.2d 691 (2008).
Jury was authorized to find that the defendant committed aggravated battery by seriously disfiguring the victim's face and rendering the victim's hand useless. The victim testified that the defendant beat the victim repeatedly, causing many injuries, including a scar above the victim's eye and trauma to the victim's hand that left the hand useless for several weeks; furthermore, there was photographic evidence of the injuries. Mack v. State, 294 Ga. App. 518, 669 S.E.2d 487 (2008).
Evidence that the defendant shot the victim at close range; that the victim, who knew the defendant well, identified the defendant from a photo line-up and at trial; and that a witness told police of driving the defendant to find the victim and of witnessing the shooting was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of those crimes. Spencer v. State, 296 Ga. App. 828, 676 S.E.2d 274 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery. The evidence showed that the defendant and other gang members opened fire on a crowd of rival gang members and that the bullets also wounded two people inside a duplex; the jury chose to disbelieve the defendant's alibi witnesses and to believe that of the eyewitnesses. Lopez v. State, 297 Ga. App. 618, 677 S.E.2d 776 (2009), overruled on other grounds, State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010).
Convictions of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, were not supported by sufficient evidence because, although the defendant's conduct before the crime was suspicious, the circumstantial evidence against the defendant was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6); the state did not show that the defendant was anywhere near the scene at the time of the shooting, did not present evidence connecting a weapon used in the shooting to the defendant, and, although a witness testified that three days before the shooting, the witness saw the defendant's brother hand the defendant a gun, the witness could not identify the type of gun involved, and this testimony did not connect the defendant with the shooting. The state also failed to adduce evidence that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Gresham v. State, 298 Ga. App. 136, 679 S.E.2d 344 (2009).
Defendant's aggravated battery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) was supported by evidence that the defendant and the codefendant burned the victim's hand and that the codefendant placed a red ant nest on the victim's body, resulting in numerous bites. Wilkinson v. State, 298 Ga. App. 190, 679 S.E.2d 766 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, armed robbery, and kidnapping. The victims' in-court identifications of the defendant and the codefendant were buttressed by the evidence that a cell phone in the defendants' possession matched that taken from the victims, that a car of the type used by the robbers contained guns similar to those used in the robbery, and the fact that the codefendant had a key to that car. Wright v. State, 300 Ga. App. 32, 684 S.E.2d 102 (2009).
Evidence supported the jury's determination that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-5-24, because although the victim was under the influence of alcohol and in severe pain when making statements to the police and the emergency room physician, it was within the jury's province to find the victim's statements more credible than the victim's trial testimony; the victim's statements in a request to dismiss the charges, which acknowledged that the defendant was the individual who attacked the victim, did not occur while the victim was under any physical impairment. Works v. State, 301 Ga. App. 108, 686 S.E.2d 863 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0458, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 251 (Ga. 2010).
Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of rape, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1), sexual battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.1(b), aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), because the victim's testimony that the defendant raped, sodomized, punched, burned, and threatened to kill the victim was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions. Harris v. State, 308 Ga. App. 523, 707 S.E.2d 908 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), and conspiracy to possess cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-30(a) as a conspirator because, while the uncorroborated testimony of one accomplice was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence sufficed to sustain the defendant's conviction when an additional accomplice provided testimony to corroborate that of the first accomplice. Both codefendants testified that the defendant was present from the robbery's inception through the robbery's execution, that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy to obtain the victim's money and cocaine by armed robbery, and that the defendant willingly participated in the crimes and shared the criminal intent of those who committed the crimes inside the victim's residence by supplying the defendant's car and acting as a get-away driver. Watson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 871, 708 S.E.2d 703 (2011).
Evidence including the geographic proximity of the defendant's home to the crime and pawn shop, the temporal proximity of the defendant's visit to the pawn shop after the intrusion, the victim's vehicle being found running across from the pawn shop, the defendant's initial denial of pawning the stolen television, and the lack of evidence about the identity of the person the defendant claimed to have gotten the television from supported robbery for force, burglary, aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and theft by taking convictions. Strickland v. State, 348 Ga. App. 892, 825 S.E.2d 379 (2019).
Jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of first degree cruelty to children and aggravated battery was not unsupportable because an expert testified that the injuries suffered by the defendant's baby were caused by some type of trauma to the body; at trial, the defendant offered no alternative hypothesis for the injuries; and, to the extent that the defendant offered on appeal the alternative hypothesis that the defendant's mother could have injured the baby, the jury was entitled to reject that hypothesis as unreasonable as the parties entered a stipulation that law enforcement had ruled out the defendant's mother as a suspect, and that stipulation was read to the jury. Weaver v. State, 351 Ga. App. 167, 830 S.E.2d 618 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1502, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 113 (Ga. 2020).
Jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of first degree cruelty to children and aggravated battery was not unsupportable because an expert testified that the injuries suffered by the defendant's baby were caused by some type of trauma to the body and that they were most consistent with at least two different instances of child physical abuse; at trial, the defendant offered no alternative hypothesis for the injuries; and the jury specifically considered whether the defendant's boyfriend could have injured the baby when the jury addressed the charges against the boyfriend, finding the boyfriend not guilty on all counts. Weaver v. State, 351 Ga. App. 167, 830 S.E.2d 618 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1502, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 113 (Ga. 2020).
In an action for aggravated battery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during a felony, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that the defendant was the shooter, including testimony from the victims identifying the defendant and any inconsistency between that testimony and the victims' pretrial identifications was for the jury. Smith v. State, 354 Ga. App. 782, 841 S.E.2d 444 (2020).
Convictions for burglary, rape, and aggravated battery were supported by sufficient evidence as the record showed that seminal fluid and the defendant's DNA were found in the victim's underwear, the defendant's alibi did not check out when police attempted to verify the alibi, and it was undisputed that the defendant had knowledge of how to enter the house through a broken door without a key, having previously been in a relationship with the victim's daughter. McEady v. State, Ga. App. , 846 S.E.2d 94 (2020).
Loss of sight sufficient for aggravated battery.
- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated battery, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), because the defendant knocked the victim face-down into a table, pointed a gun at the kneeling and bloodied victim, and threatened to kill the victim and the victim's children with the gun. The victim lost sight and required surgery to correct all the facial fractures which the victim suffered. Reynolds v. State, 311 Ga. App. 119, 714 S.E.2d 621 (2011).
Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and burglary after the state presented independent corroboration in support of an accomplice's testimony connecting the defendant to the crimes; the defendant's statements to police, the defendant's actions before and after the crimes, and the defendant's girlfriend's testimony stating that the defendant asked the girlfriend to lie about the defendant's whereabouts corroborated the defendant's guilt. Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 750, 733 S.E.2d 300 (2012).
Victim's testimony that defendant was one of the two men who came into the victim's house, beat the victim with fists and a flashlight, and demanded the victim's keys and money authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of burglary, aggravated battery, and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Garmon v. State, 317 Ga. App. 634, 732 S.E.2d 289 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault and aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court's final charge to the jury included instructions on the defense of justification; and the victim testified that, at the time in question, the victim did not have a gun, that the victim did not reach for any of the defendant's guns, and that the victim was not attacking the defendant and only charged the defendant after the defendant was aiming a gun at the victim. Price v. State, 325 Ga. App. 564, 754 S.E.2d 144 (2014).
Victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant attacked the victim and was guilty of aggravated battery. Patterson v. State, 327 Ga. App. 695, 761 S.E.2d 101 (2014).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two counts of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children in the first degree because, when the defendant and the defendant's girlfriend brought their 11-week-old daughter to the emergency room, the infant had extensive bruises all over the infant's body, the infant's skull was fractured on both sides, and the infant was having seizures; the skull fractures were caused by two separate impacts; and a physician who was qualified as an expert in assessing abuse and intentional injury to children testified that the physician could think of no accidental force that would account for all of the infant's injuries. Busby v. State, 332 Ga. App. 646, 774 S.E.2d 717 (2015).
Evidence that the defendant used the defendant's fists to beat the victim in the head and face, placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury supported a conviction for aggravated battery. Shaw v. State, 340 Ga. App. 749, 798 S.E.2d 344 (2017).
While the victim could not identify the gunman, the combined testimony of the other witnesses was sufficient to enable a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the charged crimes, including armed robbery and aggravated battery, and to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016).
Evidence including the geographic proximity of the defendant's home to the crime and pawn shop, the temporal proximity of the defendant's visit to the pawn shop after the intrusion, the victim's vehicle being found running across from the pawn shop, the defendant's initial denial of pawning the stolen television, and the lack of evidence about the identity of the person the defendant claimed to have gotten the television from supported robbery for force, burglary, aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and theft by taking convictions. Strickland v. State, 348 Ga. App. 892, 825 S.E.2d 379 (2019).
Evidence sufficient for family violence aggravated battery.
- Evidence that a collision reconstructionist determined that the defendant's truck struck the victim's car, causing the car to flip, while the defendant was driving more than 56 miles per hour and that there was no evidence that either driver tried to break before the impact, that the defendant was intoxicated, and that none of the defendant's explanations were consistent with the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for family-violence aggravated battery. Percell v. State, 346 Ga. App. 219, 816 S.E.2d 344 (2018).
Attack with a bottle sufficient for conviction.
- Evidence that the defendant attacked the victim with a bottle and bit off one of the victim's ears is sufficient to support a conviction. Drayton v. State, 167 Ga. App. 477, 306 S.E.2d 731 (1983).
Injury to nose sufficient for conviction.
- Evidence that defendant struck the victim in the face with such force that the blow fractured the victim's nose was sufficient to support conviction. Pollard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 159, 495 S.E.2d 629 (1998).
Evidence showing that the defendant shattered the victim's nasal bone and caused permanent injury to the victim's sinuses was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated battery. Silvers v. State, 245 Ga. App. 486, 538 S.E.2d 135 (2000).
When the indictment alleged that the defendant deprived the victim of a bodily member, the victim's nose, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, and there was not a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof; a nose is a bodily member under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and the victim's nasal drainage and blood leakage prior to surgery, as well as the victim's testimony that the victim's nose was still not "all the way" at the time of trial, could constitute evidence of loss of use. Jones v. State, 283 Ga. App. 631, 642 S.E.2d 331 (2007).
Evidence sufficient for aggravated battery against child.
- Evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions of cruelty to children and aggravated battery when the medical testimony concerning the extent and possible cause of the victim's injuries, evidence of defendants' complacent demeanor, and testimony concerning their access to the victim were but some of the factors from which the jury could find the defendants guilty. Thomas v. State, 262 Ga. App. 492, 589 S.E.2d 243 (2003).
Evidence supported defendant's conviction for cruelty to children and aggravated battery because there were a multitude of factors from which the jury could determine defendant's guilt. Hood v. State, 273 Ga. App. 430, 615 S.E.2d 244 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions on four counts of aggravated battery and one count of cruelty to children in the first degree after the 17-month-old child of a love interest was found with hot-water immersion burns incurred while the defendant was watching the child for the love interest; the jury was free to reject the explanation that defendant had no criminal intent at the time the burns were incurred and find that the only reasonable hypothesis was that defendant maliciously and intentionally immersed the baby in hot water after the baby soiled a diaper, especially since the explanations were not consistent with the evidence. Lee v. State, 275 Ga. App. 93, 619 S.E.2d 767 (2005).
Evidence that the defendant kicked and slammed the infant child of the defendant's love interest, breaking an arm and legs, and that, although the defendant knew the severity of the child's injuries, failed to procure medical treatment for the child on the day of the incident and for the following three days was sufficient to enable a jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense of aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). McKee v. State, 275 Ga. App. 646, 621 S.E.2d 611 (2005).
Evidence supported defendants' convictions for aggravated battery and cruelty to children because the jury was free not only to reject defendants' explanations of the child's injuries as unreasonable, but to find that the state's case, including testimony as to the extent and cause of the child's injuries and as to defendants' access to the child, excluded every reasonable possibility save defendants' guilt. Hunnicutt v. State, 276 Ga. App. 547, 623 S.E.2d 714 (2005).
Trial court properly denied a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) since there was ample circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) for the jury to have found that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a); the defendant's claim that the defendant tripped and fell while carrying the infant child was contradicted by expert testimony that the injury to the infant's brain was caused by shaken baby syndrome. Lindo v. State, 278 Ga. App. 228, 628 S.E.2d 665 (2006).
Evidence, including the defendant's admission to squeezing and shaking the child and the testimony of the forensic pediatrician that the child's injuries were consistent with being squeezed, was sufficient to convict the defendant of child cruelty in the first degree under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b) and aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Bass v. State, 282 Ga. App. 159, 637 S.E.2d 863 (2006).
Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct in connection with the death of the 16-month-old victim after: the defendant repeatedly fed the victim tomatoes despite the victim's allergic reactions to the tomatoes; two days before the victim's fatal injuries, the victim had numerous bruises, a black eye, and a split bottom lip; while the victim was in the hospital for the fatal injuries, the defendant repeatedly asked a babysitter to persuade the defendant's five-year-old child to say that the child had taken the victim out of the bathtub; the defendant asked medical personnel whether it could be proven that the victim was shaken; and medical evidence showed that the victim's death was consistent with violent shaking by a person of adult strength. Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).
There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for the felony murder and aggravated battery of the defendant's two-month-old child: (1) the child, who had been in good health at a pediatric checkup earlier in the day, was limp and cold when the defendant brought the child to an office where the child's other parent had an appointment; (2) the child was diagnosed as a "shaken baby"; and (3) the defendant was the only person with the child during and immediately prior to the onset of the child's symptoms. Smith v. State, 283 Ga. 237, 657 S.E.2d 523 (2008).
The following evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant acted with malice and thus supported the defendant's convictions of felony murder and the predicate felonies of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and first-degree child cruelty, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70: 1) the defendant claimed the victim, a 16-month-old child who had been left in the defendant's care, became unresponsive and that the defendant shook the child in an attempt to revive the child; 2) a medical examiner testified that the victim died from head trauma; 3) the victim's 10-year-old sibling testified that the defendant had struck the victim in the past and had been yelling at the victim before the victim lost consciousness. Sears v. State, 290 Ga. 1, 717 S.E.2d 453 (2011).
Jury resolves issue of self defense.
- Evidence was sufficient to affirm defendant's aggravated battery conviction; whether defendant engaged in unprovoked attacks or acted in self-defense or in defense of defendant's love interest was for the jury to resolve, and the jury obviously resolved the question in defendant's disfavor. Chalvatzis v. State, 265 Ga. App. 699, 595 S.E.2d 558 (2004).
Aggravated battery by juvenile against parent.
- Delinquency judgment upon a determination that a juvenile committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the felony of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), was proper. The juvenile's acts of grabbing, shoving, and pinning the juvenile's parent down and with such force so as to cause a knee injury exceeded the bounds of justification. In the Interest of A.D., 295 Ga. App. 750, 673 S.E.2d 116 (2009).
Compelled medical examination.
- Victim could not be compelled to undergo an independent medical examination of victim's eye based on defendant's claim that the injuries were preexisting or did not deprive the victim of eye nor render it useless. Park v. State, 230 Ga. App. 274, 495 S.E.2d 886 (1998).
Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated battery when defendant maliciously and seriously disfigured a detective's face, ear, and arm, where the defendant cut the detective several times with a boxcutter inflicting a wound requiring 65 stitches and reattachment of the detective's ear. Ramsey v. State, 233 Ga. App. 810, 505 S.E.2d 779 (1998).
There was sufficient evidence to conclude that defendant was the person who attacked the victim with a machete, and that by doing so the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily injury, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and aggravated battery by maliciously causing bodily harm and serious disfigurement, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a); the victim and two other people identified the defendant, and a witness testified that the defendant confided in the witness that the defendant had hit a person with a machete after someone threw an object at the defendant's car. Emberson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 773, 611 S.E.2d 83 (2005).
Factor for death sentence.
- Evidence supported the jury's finding of an aggravated battery for purposes of the death penalty under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(7), after finding petitioner inmate guilty of felony murder, because the evidence showed that the inmate severely beat the victim in the face with a heavy stick, and then finished the victim off by crushing the victim's skull with a log after the victim fell to the ground. Jefferson v. Terry, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ga. 2007), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 570 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. Ga. 2009).
Sentencing.
- Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant because the sentence it imposed on defendant was 10 years in prison and 10 years probation for aggravated assault, 10 years in prison to run concurrently for aggravated battery, and five years confinement to run consecutively for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as each part of defendant's sentence was well within the statutory limits for the respective crime involved; accordingly, defendant's sentence would not be modified on appeal. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004).
Trial court erred by failing to merge a defendant's two aggravated battery count convictions for sentencing purposes as the two counts were based on a disfigurement of the victim's back and buttocks and rendering of the victim's legs useless by the single act of the defendant pushing the victim out of a moving car; thus, that act did not violate two distinct statutory provisions. Rather, the state prosecuted the same act for two alleged violations of the same statutory provision, which was not appropriate; therefore, the defendant was entitled to have the two aggravated battery counts merged for sentencing purposes. Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821, 681 S.E.2d 248 (2009).
Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant on two counts of aggravated battery because the indictment alleged that the defendant committed two separate acts against the victim that caused the victim bodily harm; evidence was presented to show that the defendant's act of fracturing the victim's skull was separate from the defendant's act of violently shaking the victim. Eskew v. State, 309 Ga. App. 44, 709 S.E.2d 893 (2011).
It was not erroneous for the trial court to impose a sentence of 20 years for aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, because after the defendant's kidnapping conviction was voided, the trial court was authorized under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1 to sentence the defendant to a term of years on the aggravated battery count, which could consist of up to 20 years. Griggs v. State, 314 Ga. App. 158, 723 S.E.2d 480 (2012).
Trial court did not err by correcting the court's written sentence to conform with its oral pronouncement because the trial court was authorized to correct the clerical error appearing in the court's written sentence as compared to the court's original oral pronouncement; the trial court, after reviewing the original transcript, determined that the court's original pronouncement and intent was for the aggravated battery and burglary counts to be served consecutive to each other as well as to the other aggravated battery count. Griggs v. State, 314 Ga. App. 158, 723 S.E.2d 480 (2012).
Consecutive sentences.
- When the trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive 20-year sentences on two aggravated battery convictions, after the defendant was convicted of breaking the victim's ribs and both orbital bones of the victim's eyes, the sentences were not cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment; the sentences were within the statutory limits under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), (b), and (h) and did not shock the conscience. Ware v. State, 259 Ga. App. 267, 576 S.E.2d 649 (2003).
Supervised release properly revoked as aggravated battery was violation of condition of supervised release.- Inmate's supervised release was properly revoked and a sentence of imprisonment imposed because there was sufficient evidence to establish that the inmate committed a violation of a condition thereof by committing robbery and aggravated battery in Georgia. United States v. Hart, 552 Fed. Appx. 930, (11th Cir. 2014)(Unpublished).
Jury Instructions
Charging on lesser included offense.
- When the same facts were used to support aggravated assault and aggravated battery charges, the trial court erred in sentencing defendant on the aggravated assault count, the lesser included offense. Riden v. State, 226 Ga. App. 245, 486 S.E.2d 198 (1997).
Trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested charge on reckless conduct, where defendant's own testimony showed that defendant committed a culpable act with criminal intent when defendant threw gasoline on the victim and tossed a lighted match toward the victim. McClain v. State, 232 Ga. App. 282, 502 S.E.2d 266 (1998).
Trial court gave the jury the option to find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery or of felony aggravated battery as indicted, but since the jury rejected the misdemeanor battery charge and found the additional aggravating elements to warrant a felony conviction, the idea that the jury might have reached a different result had the jury also been charged on the even less culpable misdemeanor of simple battery is not reasonable. Christensen v. State, 245 Ga. App. 165, 537 S.E.2d 446 (2000).
Curative instructions prevented prejudice and obviated mistrial.
- In the prosecution of the defendant for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and resisting arrest, because the trial court's curative instructions to the jury obviated the need for a mistrial with respect to statements from a potential juror and cured any prejudice which might have resulted from the prosecutor's closing argument, convictions of those crimes were upheld on appeal. Mitchell v. State, 284 Ga. App. 209, 644 S.E.2d 147 (2007).
Charge on lesser included crimes not required.
- When there is uncontradicted evidence that the victim died, it is not necessary to charge on the lesser included crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated battery. Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983).
During the defendant's trial for aggravated battery, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct because the defendant did not submit a written request for a reckless conduct charge but orally requested such charge at the close of the evidence. Eskew v. State, 309 Ga. App. 44, 709 S.E.2d 893 (2011).
Trial court did not sua sponte err in failing to charge jury on identity as: (1) there was Georgia law requiring a trial judge to warn the jury against the possible dangers of mistaken identification of an accused as the person committing a crime; and (2) such was not required after the jury had already been charged as to the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, burden of proof, credibility of witnesses, and impeachment of witnesses. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. 776, 642 S.E.2d 835 (2007).
Omitting statutory definition of "visible bodily harm" from instruction error.
- By omitting the statutory definition of "visible bodily harm" contained in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(b), the trial court failed to give the jury the proper framework for evaluating whether a laceration to the victim's nose was severe enough to merit a finding of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24 or whether only a finding of battery was merited. Thus, the charge was fatally insufficient. Carroll v. State, 293 Ga. App. 721, 667 S.E.2d 708 (2008).
Instructions to jury.
- Trial court is not required to define the meaning of "seriously" with regard to the phrase "seriously disfiguring the person's body or a body part" and may properly instruct the jury that the "disfigurement may be temporary." Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 505 S.E.2d 16 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1118, 119 S. Ct. 1768, 143 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1999).
There was no conflict between the trial court's charge that the victim's loss of the use of an eye need not be permanent and the allegation in the indictment that defendant rendered the victim's eye "useless." Christensen v. State, 245 Ga. App. 165, 537 S.E.2d 446 (2000).
Trial court's jury instructions in defendant's criminal trial on multiple charges arising out of a domestic dispute were proper, as: (1) there was no requirement that the jury be instructed on the element of assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) in order to be properly instructed on the crime of aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21); (2) the methods of committing an aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), were properly defined based on the methods asserted in the indictment; (3) there was no support for a requested charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b); and (4) there was no possibility of a lesser included conviction for false imprisonment (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41), such that instruction only on the indicted offense of kidnapping (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40) was proper. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).
At a trial in which defendant was on trial for aggravated battery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, and an instruction was provided to the jury on the lesser included offenses of battery and simple battery as they related to the charged offense, the trial court judge did not commit reversible error in responding to the jury's questions, during deliberations, as to which offenses were felonies, as there was no discussion as to the possible sentences associated with each offense. Quintana-Camporredondo v. State, 275 Ga. App. 859, 622 S.E.2d 66 (2005).
In a prosecution for aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and kidnapping, a written Allen charge issued by the court was not coercive, despite the court's use of the phrase "must be decided", given that said language was only a small portion of an otherwise fair and balanced charge, the trial court urged the jury to take their time, and the defendant was acquitted of the kidnapping charge. Benson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 643, 634 S.E.2d 821 (2006).
Reversal of the defendant's aggravated battery conviction was not warranted based on a challenged jury instruction on that offense, as the charge as a whole limited the jury's consideration to the specific manner of committing the crime alleged in the indictment. Walls v. State, 283 Ga. App. 560, 642 S.E.2d 195 (2007).
On appeal from a conviction for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of malice murder, the appeals court found that no error or prejudice resulted from the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for an aggravated battery charge as a forcible felony in support of the defendant's justification claim, and affirmed the trial court's choice to charge on aggravated assault and rape, as the defendant failed to present evidence of any reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary to prevent the commission of an aggravated battery. Wicker v. State, 285 Ga. App. 294, 645 S.E.2d 712 (2007).
Because the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law regarding the use of prior consistent statements and on the defense of accident, the appeals court lacked any reason to reverse the defendant's aggravated battery and cruelty to children convictions. Watkins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 41, 658 S.E.2d 812 (2008).
With regard to a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and battery, since the trial court's jury charge tracked the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, the charge was a correct statement of law and the charge was properly tailored to the allegation in the indictment that the victim was deprived of the use of the victim's lower body. As a result, there was no impermissible amendment to the indictment with regard to that charge. Binns v. State, 296 Ga. App. 537, 675 S.E.2d 265 (2009).
Trial court correctly instructed the jury that, under Georgia law, a person committed the offense of aggravated battery when he or she maliciously caused bodily harm to another by seriously disfiguring the person's body or a member thereof because the instruction, which was taken from the pattern jury instructions, was adequately tailored to the indictment and adjusted to the evidence admitted in court; the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on the meaning of "serious disfigurement," and the jury's verdict was supported by ample evidence that the victim's injuries were "seriously disfiguring." Seymore v. State, 300 Ga. App. 523, 685 S.E.2d 772 (2009).
In an aggravated assault case in which the defense was justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a charge defining aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) as a forcible felony for which the use of force was justified. Also, there was no showing that the outcome of the trial would have been different if such a charge had been given. Lewis v. State, 302 Ga. App. 506, 691 S.E.2d 336 (2010).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel because there was no evidence to support an instruction on defense of habitation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23 and, thus, trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to request such an instruction; there was no evidence that the victim was attempting to unlawfully enter or attack the defendant's vehicle at the time the defendant stabbed the victim, and under the facts, there could be no reasonable belief that stabbing the victim was necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a motor vehicle. Philpot v. State, 311 Ga. App. 486, 716 S.E.2d 551 (2011).
Even though the trial court erred by mistakenly labeling the crime as aggravated assault before reading the charge for aggravated battery, the error was not reversible because the trial court went on to state that the crime at issue was aggravated battery and accurately read the substance of the count to the jury. In addition, a written copy of the indictment went out to the jury and the verdict form accurately listed the count as aggravated battery. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012).
Trial court's alleged overcharge on aggravated battery did not amount to harmful error because any overcharge was cured by the trial court's instruction to the jury that the burden of proof was with the state to prove every material allegation of the crimes charged in the indictment. Lenoir v. State, 322 Ga. App. 583, 745 S.E.2d 824 (2013).
Instruction on accident.
- In a prosecution for felony murder and the predicate felonies of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and first-degree child cruelty, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70, assuming arguendo that the evidence supported an instruction on accident, the trial court's failure to give that instruction was not reversible error as the jury's conclusion that the defendant acted with malice, which was supported by overwhelming evidence, necessarily meant that the jury would have rejected any accident defense. Sears v. State, 290 Ga. 1, 717 S.E.2d 453 (2011).
Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense because the defendant never admitted to the crimes alleged and, in fact, denied even being present during the assault of the victim; therefore, there was no evidence to support the giving of the requested charge. Ransom v. State, 318 Ga. App. 764, 734 S.E.2d 761 (2012).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery, §§ 2, 7, 30, 31, 32, 33, 144, 145. 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mayhem and Related Offenses, § 1 et seq.
C.J.S.- 56 C.J.S., Mayhem, § 1 et seq.
ALR.
- Mayhem as dependent on part of body injured and extent of injury, 58 A.L.R. 1320.
Mayhem by use of poison or acid, 58 A.L.R. 1328.
Use of set gun, trap, or similar device on defendant's own property, 47 A.L.R.3d 646.
Consent as defense to charge of criminal assault and battery, 58 A.L.R.3d 662.
Criminal responsibility for physical measures undertaken in connection with treatment of mentally disordered patient, 99 A.L.R.3d 854.
Criminal assault or battery statutes making attack on elderly person a special or aggravated offense, 73 A.L.R.4th 1123.
Admissibility of expert opinion stating whether a particular knife was, or could have been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th 660.
Stationary object or attached fixture as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 8 A.L.R.5th 775.
Construction and application of "crime of violence" provision of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 pertaining to unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States after commission of felony offense, 68 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 55.