(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, pp. 787-789; Laws 1840, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 788; Code 1863, §§ 4250, 4258, 4259, 4260; Ga. L. 1866, p. 151, § 1; Code 1868, §§ 4285, 4293, 4294, 4295; Code 1873, §§ 4351, 4359, 4360, 4361; Code 1882, §§ 4351, 4359, 4360, 4361; Penal Code 1895, §§ 97, 98, 99, 100; Penal Code 1910, §§ 97, 98, 99, 100; Code 1933, §§ 26-1403, 26-1404, 26-1405, 26-1406; Code 1933, § 26-1302, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 543, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 1242, § 2; Ga. L. 1984, p. 900, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 628, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 971, §§ 3, 4; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 8; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1920, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 988, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1453, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1626, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 140, § 16; Ga. L. 2004, p. 1072, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 4/HB 1059; Ga. L. 2010, p. 999, § 1/HB 1002; Ga. L. 2011, p. 752, § 16/HB 142; Ga. L. 2014, p. 432, § 2-2/HB 826; Ga. L. 2014, p. 441, § 1/HB 911; Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 3-1/HB 60; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-19/HB 310; Ga. L. 2016, p. 582, § 1/HB 979; Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 3-2/SB 160.)
The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, deleted subsection (a), which read: "As used in this Code section, the term 'strangulation' means impeding the normal breathing or circulation of blood of another person by applying pressure to the throat or neck of such person or by obstructing the nose and mouth of such person."; redesignated former subsections (b) and (c) as present subsections (a) and (b), respectively; substituted "subsections (c) through (k)" for "subsections (d) through (n)" in subsection (b); redesignated former subsections (d) and (e) as present subsections (c) and (d), respectively; rewrote present subsection (c); deleted former subsection (f), relating to defining the term "correctional officer"; redesignated former subsection (g) as present subsection (e); deleted the second sentence of subsection (e), which read: "For purposes of this Code section, 'public transit vehicle' has the same meaning as in subsection (c) of Code Section 16-5-20."; redesignated former subsections (h) and (i) as present subsections (f) and (g), respectively; in subsection (g), substituted "Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, a" for "A" at the beginning, and substituted "subsection (a)" for "subsection (b)" in the middle; redesignated former subsections (j) through (m) as present subsections (h) through (k), respectively; deleted the former second sentence in subsection (k), which read: "As used in this subsection, the term 'officer of the court' means a judge, attorney, clerk of court, deputy clerk of court, court reporter, court interpreter, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, or probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42."; and deleted former subsection (n), which read: "A person who knowingly commits the offense of aggravated assault upon an emergency health worker while the worker is engaged in, or on account of the performance of, his or her official duties shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years. As used in this subsection, the term 'emergency health worker" means hospital emergency department personnel and emergency medical services personnel.".
Cross references.- Indemnification program for law enforcement officers, firefighters, and prison guards killed or injured on duty, § 45-9-80 et seq.
Code Commission notes.- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1994, since both Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012 and p. 1920 enacted a new subsection (g), the amendment by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012 has been redesignated as subsection (h).
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall be known and may be cited as the "School Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1994."
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, sets forth legislative findings and determinations for the "School Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1994."
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 29, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability.
Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Crimes Against Family Members Act of 1999'."
Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 7, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "Nothing herein shall be construed to validate a relationship between people of the same sex as a 'marriage' under the laws of this State."
Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 1/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The General Assembly finds and declares that recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety. Many sexual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses; and some sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of their crimes. The General Assembly finds that this makes the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant. The General Assembly further finds that the high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses, provide the state with sufficient justification to implement a strategy that includes:
"(1) Incarcerating sexual offenders and maintaining adequate facilities to ensure that decisions to release sexual predators into the community are not made on the basis of inadequate space;
"(2) Requiring the registration of sexual offenders, with a requirement that complete and accurate information be maintained and accessible for use by law enforcement authorities, communities, and the public;
"(3) Providing for community and public notification concerning the presence of sexual offenders;
"(4) Collecting data relative to sexual offenses and sexual offenders;
"(5) Requiring sexual predators who are released into the community to wear an electronic monitoring system for the rest of their natural life and to pay for such system; and
"(6) Prohibiting sexual predators from working with children, either for compensation or as a volunteer.
"The General Assembly further finds that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders and in protecting children from predatory sexual activity, and there is sufficient justification for requiring sexual offenders to register and for requiring community and public notification of the presence of sexual offenders. The General Assembly declares that in order to protect the public, it is necessary that the sexual offenders be registered and that members of the community and the public be notified of a sexual offender's presence. The designation of a person as a sexual offender is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes. Likewise, the designation of a person as a sexual predator is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from findings by the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board and a court if requested by a sexual offender."
Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 30(c)/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment."
Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-1/HB 60, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Safe Carry Protection Act.'"
Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment by this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.
Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 1-1/SB 160, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Back the Badge Act of 2017.'"
Law reviews.- For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For article, "Criminal Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 209 (2001). For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 11 (2006). For survey article on evidence law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 135 (2008). For annual survey on death penalty law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 99 (2009). For article on the 2014 amendment of this Code section, see 31 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 47 (2014). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 231 (2015). For annual survey of criminal law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2015). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 89 (2017). For note contrasting assault with intent and attempt in food poisoning cases, see 25 Ga. St. B. J. 199 (1962). For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 110 (1994). For review of 1996 children and youth services legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 314 (1996).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Constitutionality.
- Legislature, in not providing for defense of opprobrious language, did not act unconstitutionally. Watkins v. State, 254 Ga. 267, 328 S.E.2d 537 (1985).
Prior violent felony conviction for purposes of Armed Career Criminal Act.- When the defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, defendant's application for leave to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the defendant's federal sentence was denied as the defendant had three prior violent felony convictions under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924, because the defendant had two separate Georgia convictions for felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer and a Georgia conviction for aggravated assault, which constituted violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. In re White, F.3d (11th Cir. June 15, 2016).
Qualifies as crime of violence under federal provisions.
- Because the elements of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) sufficiently match the elements of generic aggravated assault, it qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2. United States v. Huling, 741 Fed. Appx. 702 (11th Cir. 2018)(Unpublished).
Venue.
- Adjudication of delinquency was reversed as the state presented no evidence of venue and the juvenile court did not take judicial notice that the location of an aggravated assault described at a hearing was in Sumter County; the county in which the offense was committed was not established and the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, but retrial was not barred by the double jeopardy clause so long as venue was properly established at retrial. In the Interest of T.W., 280 Ga. App. 693, 634 S.E.2d 854 (2006).
Because the element of venue was sufficiently testified to by the victim's parent, the state adequately proved that element as part of its aggravated assault charges. Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2008).
Victim's testimony was sufficient evidence to prove venue in Henry County because the victim testified that the aggravated assault offense occurred at the house of the defendant's father, which was located in Henry County; the responding officer likewise testified that the house was located in Henry County. Ellis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (2012).
Elements of aggravated assault.
- Offense of aggravated assault has two essential elements: (1) that an assault, (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20), was committed on the victim; and (2) that it was aggravated by (a) an intention to murder, to rape, or to rob, or (b) use of a deadly weapon. Harper v. State, 127 Ga. App. 359, 193 S.E.2d 259 (1972); Hardin v. State, 137 Ga. App. 391, 224 S.E.2d 82 (1976); Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976); King v. State, 178 Ga. App. 343, 343 S.E.2d 401 (1986).
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 proscribes the commission of assault with the intent to accomplish the more serious crime of murder, robbery, or rape. No more need be alleged or proved. The statute deliberately sets out the offense of having intent, as disjunctive to an assault with a deadly weapon. Scroggins v. State, 198 Ga. App. 29, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1991).
Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the aggravated assault count of the indictment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) where it charged that defendant made an assault upon the person of the victim with a pistol, a deadly weapon, by shooting the victim with said pistol; the language was sufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault. Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 902, 124 S. Ct. 251, 157 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2003).
Person commits the offense of aggravated assault when the person assaults another with a deadly weapon which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. There is no requirement that the victim sustain an actual injury, and the crime is complete without proof thereof. Turbeville v. State, 268 Ga. App. 88, 601 S.E.2d 461 (2004).
Juvenile court's adjudication entered against a juvenile on charges of aggravated assault and terroristic threats was upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence that: (1) the state adequately showed venue; and (2) the victim's testimony described the juvenile's act of pointing a gun, threatening to use the gun, and that such caused fear that something could happen as a result of those acts. In the Interest of J.A.L., 284 Ga. App. 220, 644 S.E.2d 162 (2007).
Defendant's convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault on victims were supported by sufficient evidence despite the lack of evidence of the victims' mental state; assault included an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), so when two gang members attempted to commit violent injuries on their pursuers by intentionally firing guns at the pursuers, the defendant could be guilty as a party to these aggravated assaults and felony murder. Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339, 781 S.E.2d 777 (2016).
Identification of defendant.
- With regard to defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and false imprisonment, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress the out-of-court identifications of the defendant because the court found that the simultaneous lineup was not impermissibly suggestive as a matter of law based on the testimony of the officer who prepared and presented the lineup that the victims were admonished that the suspect may not be in the array. McCowan v. State, 325 Ga. App. 509, 753 S.E.2d 775 (2014).
Intent to injure is not an element of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Ganaway v. State, 282 Ga. 297, 647 S.E.2d 590 (2007).
Aiding and abetting.
- After defendant-A hijacked a victim's car at gunpoint, defendant-B's actions in punching the victim in the face while defendant-A waited in the car constituted aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), as defendant-B aided and abetted the commission of the carjacking pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) for purposes of the aggravated nature of the assault conviction. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 182, 630 S.E.2d 778 (2006).
Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant and the defendant's codefendant of aggravated assault because based on the circumstantial evidence, the jury was entitled to infer that the defendant and the codefendant accompanied their accomplice to a convenience store knowing that the accomplice intended to assault the victim because of their past differences, that the defendant had specifically served as the getaway driver, and that the codefendant had accompanied the accomplice inside the store as a lookout, making both individuals parties to the crime of aggravated assault. Romero v. State, 307 Ga. App. 348, 705 S.E.2d 195 (2010).
Failure to merge error.
- Trial court erred by failing to merge all of the aggravated assault convictions into the armed robbery conviction because all of the aggravated assault convictions were based on the defendant's commission of an assault with a deadly weapon. Irving v. State, 351 Ga. App. 779, 833 S.E.2d 162 (2019).
Conduct of third parties not admissible to support self-defense claim.
- During a defendant's trial for aggravated assault and other charges arising out of a road rage incident, the defendant was properly precluded from testifying about a prior attempted robbery in which the defendant was the victim and allegedly used a pistol in self-defense; because the defendant was asserting self-defense, other specific acts of violence committed by a victim would have been admissible if any such acts existed, but the defendant could not support the defense by the proffer of any evidence based upon the commission of extraneous acts of violence committed by others because it would have been difficult or impossible for the state to rebut, refute, or test the credibility of such evidence. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).
Intent element of aggravated assault was shown by evidence of the victim's fearful reactions to defendant's actions and words when defendant forced the victim to surrender the victim's purse by pointing a gun at the victim's chest. Cole v. State, 232 Ga. App. 795, 502 S.E.2d 742 (1998).
In a prosecution for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), evidence that the defendant stabbed another in an incident eight years previously was admissible to show whether the defendant intended to threaten or harm the victim when the defendant brandished a knife, and the evidence was not more prejudicial than probative, given the prior incident's relevance to a necessary element of the current crimes. Ledford v. State, 275 Ga. App. 107, 620 S.E.2d 187 (2005).
Defendant's convictions for felony murder and the underlying crime of aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence because no proof of the defendant's criminal intent to murder was required for the felony murder conviction, and the aggravated assault conviction did not require proof that the defendant intended to injure the victim, as only proof that the defendant intended to do the act which placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of harm was required. Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 490, 629 S.E.2d 816 (2006).
Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial on grounds that the state failed to prove that the defendant intentionally threatened two deputies the defendant forced off the road with a car, given evidence that prior to driving directly at the deputies, the car was being used offensively toward others by forcing those individuals off the road, and thereafter, in driving toward the two deputies at 90 miles per hour, a jury could infer that the defendant intended to threaten the deputies in hopes of forcing them from the road. Adams v. State, 280 Ga. App. 779, 634 S.E.2d 868 (2006).
Trial court did not err by denying a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of aggravated assault as the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction on that count in that the state proved that the defendant, while engaging the victim in an altercation, choked the victim so that the victim could not breath and, in fact, lost consciousness briefly. As such, the state proved that the defendant intended to injure the victim. Hall v. State, 292 Ga. App. 544, 664 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, No. S08C1841, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 926 (Ga. 2008).
Victim's apprehension of receiving a violent injury was not an essential element of aggravated assault in which the defendant intentionally fired a gun at the victim; sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, despite the failure of the victim to testify, because witnesses established that during a dispute with the victim over drugs, the defendant pointed a gun at the victim, struck the victim in the head, and shot the victim. Anthony v. State, 276 Ga. App. 107, 622 S.E.2d 450 (2005).
Simple assault becomes aggravated when it is perpetrated by use of a deadly weapon. Gentry v. State, 212 Ga. App. 79, 441 S.E.2d 249 (1994).
Defendant could not be convicted for "criminal attempt to commit aggravated assault" where the victim was asleep or passed out; there is no law authorizing conviction for an attempt to commit a crime which itself is a particular type of attempt to commit a crime. Patterson v. State, 192 Ga. App. 449, 385 S.E.2d 311, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 385 S.E.2d 311 (1989).
Neither simple nor aggravated assault requires physical contact with victim. Tuggle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 603, 244 S.E.2d 131 (1978).
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) does not make a battery an essential element of the offense of aggravated assault. Watkins v. State, 254 Ga. 267, 328 S.E.2d 537 (1985).
Physical contact is required for simple battery but not for aggravated assault, and hence the crime of simple battery is not necessarily included in the crime of aggravated assault. Tuggle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 603, 244 S.E.2d 131 (1978); Anderson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 634, 317 S.E.2d 877 (1984).
Indictment charging the defendant with making an assault "with [the defendant's] hands and fists, objects which when used offensively . . . were likely to result in serious bodily injury" contained all of the essential elements of the crime, even though it did not expressly allege that the defendant's hands were used as deadly weapons. Moore v. State, 246 Ga. App. 163, 539 S.E.2d 851 (2000).
Aggravated assault does not require that injury be in fact inflicted. Radford v. State, 140 Ga. App. 451, 231 S.E.2d 365 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 238 Ga. 532, 233 S.E.2d 785 (1977).
In every assault there must be intent to injure. The test is: was there a present purpose of doing bodily injury? Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 243 S.E.2d 607 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).
Assault against several persons.
- After the defendant fired a pistol into a group of nine people, the defendant's act of firing into the group made each individual in the group a separate victim and, thus, the seven aggravated assault convictions of which the defendant was found guilty did not merge. Pace v. State, 239 Ga. App. 506, 521 S.E.2d 444 (1999).
When a defendant intentionally shoots several times into a group of people intending to harm only one of them, a jury would be authorized to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault against each person in the group. Robertson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 649, 538 S.E.2d 755 (2000).
Assault with shotgun.
- Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated battery, and impersonating an officer because the defendant kicked in the door of a home while shouting that the defendant was a "federal agent," fired a shotgun through a door, shooting off a victim's thumb, inserted the barrel of the shotgun in the same person's mouth, and demanded money, which the victims turned over, two codefendants identified the defendant as the user of the shotgun, and the defendant's DNA was found on a ski mask recovered from the getaway car and the defendant's fingerprints were found on the car. Garrison v. State, 276 Ga. App. 243, 622 S.E.2d 910 (2005).
Elderly victims.
- Proof that the victim was at least 65 years old was not necessary to establish a prima facie case of aggravated assault, however, such evidence was required to enhance the penalty under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(d). Howard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 437, 496 S.E.2d 532 (1998).
Photographs depicting victim's injuries.
- Photographs depicting the victim's injuries were admissible because, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), proving serious bodily injury is a part of the state's burden of proof. Clay v. State, 214 Ga. App. 160, 447 S.E.2d 156 (1994).
Defendant's amended motion for a new trial was properly denied, and an aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal as the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting three photographs depicting the victim's knife wounds; the photographs were not inadmissible merely because the photographs also showed alterations to the victim's body made by medical personnel. McRae v. State, 282 Ga. App. 852, 640 S.E.2d 323 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 200 (Ga. 2007).
Injury requiring hospital stay and removal of part of brain deemed "serious."
- Defendant's challenge of aggravated assault provisions on grounds of vagueness, in that O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 requires a subjective evaluation by law enforcement personnel as to what constitutes "serious injury," was not viable where injury required removal of part of brain and a month-long hospital stay. Watkins v. State, 254 Ga. 267, 328 S.E.2d 537 (1985).
There are wanton or reckless states of mind sometimes equivalent to specific intention to kill, and which may and should be treated by the jury as amounting to such intention, when productive of violence likely to result in the destruction of life. Messer v. State, 120 Ga. App. 747, 172 S.E.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 866, 91 S. Ct. 107, 27 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1970).
Homicide occurring during aggravated assault not accident.
- Evidence that the defendant had cocked a gun and pointed the gun at her husband's head in order to scare him, and that the gun discharged when the victim struck the gun with his arm, was sufficient to authorize a conviction for felony-murder and the defense of "accident" was inapplicable. Stiles v. State, 264 Ga. App. 446, 448 S.E.2d 172 (1994).
Victim's awareness of danger is not essential element of crime of aggravated assault. Sutton v. State, 245 Ga. 192, 264 S.E.2d 184 (1980).
When the defendant was charged with the offense of aggravated assault by making an assault upon the victim's person with a gun, it was not incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the victim was aware the defendant was shooting at the victim. Brown v. State, 200 Ga. App. 537, 408 S.E.2d 836 (1991).
Appropriate test of mental capacity in trial for murder and aggravated assault is whether the accused is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time the offense was committed. Duck v. State, 250 Ga. 592, 300 S.E.2d 121 (1983).
Intent need not be directed toward person actually injured.
- Offenses of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault do not require that the necessary element of intent, to kill or injure as the case may be, must have been directed toward the person who actually was killed or injured. Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 340 S.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 241, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986).
Jury was authorized to find that the defendant intended to assault the first victim with a deadly weapon and that, in the course of that assault the second victim was injured. Similarly, the jury was also authorized to find the original intent was transferred in law to the second victim as well. Fussell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 134, 369 S.E.2d 511 (1988).
Trial court did not err in adjudicating a defendant juvenile delinquent based upon the defendant's commission of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because evidence that the defendant deliberately fired a BB gun in the direction of the victim and the victim's family established the offense, since, by intentionally firing the gun in the direction of the family, the defendant was likely to seriously injure any of the family members present, including the victim; the defendant's intent to assault any one of the family members was transferred to the victim, who suffered the harm, regardless of whether the defendant knew that the victim was in the line of fire or whether the victim was aware of the shooting as the shooting occurred. In the Interest of I.C., 300 Ga. App. 683, 686 S.E.2d 279 (2009).
Convictions as aider and abettor proper despite lack of personal involvement.
- Defendant's contention that the crimes against a stabbing victim were solely committed by a codefendant was rejected, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as ample evidence existed to conclude that defendant either committed the crimes or was a party to the crimes, including that both defendant and the codefendant drove to the stabbing victim's home, that victim was stabbed to death, and the victim's wallet and checkbook were stolen so that both defendants could have money to buy more drugs. Odom v. State, 279 Ga. 599, 619 S.E.2d 636 (2005).
"Intent" aspect of attempted vehicular suicide by colliding with another vehicle.
- Evidence supported conclusion that defendant, who crossed center line at 68 miles per hour without braking, intended to injure the occupants of an oncoming vehicle, despite defendant's contention that defendant was attempting suicide and therefore was intending only to inflict bodily injury on self. Anderson v. State, 254 Ga. 470, 330 S.E.2d 592 (1985).
Intent to perform illegal act.
- It was unnecessary to prove that the defendant intended to injure the victim to sustain an aggravated assault conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) as long as it was proved that the defendant intended to perform the illegal act which caused the intended victim to be apprehensive of receiving a violent injury. Gray v. State, 257 Ga. App. 393, 571 S.E.2d 435 (2002).
Evidence as to weapon's character.
- In an aggravated assault case, since no witness saw a weapon or "sharp instrument" as alleged in the indictment, evidence that as a result of the defendant's attack, the victim suffered a clean cut from the forehead to the lip was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the wound was caused by a sharp instrument. Evidence as to wounds inflicted was sufficient for a jury to infer a weapon's character. Miller v. State, 292 Ga. App. 641, 666 S.E.2d 35 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 903 (Ga. 2008).
No requirement that assault must be with deadly weapon in order to convict under Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1280 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21). Thadd v. State, 231 Ga. 623, 203 S.E.2d 230 (1974).
"Assault with a deadly weapon" and "assault with intent to murder" compared.
- While an assault with intent to commit murder is usually manifested by the use of some deadly weapon, yet the offense of an assault with intent to commit murder may be committed without a weapon likely to produce death. Wright v. State, 40 Ga. App. 118, 149 S.E. 153 (1929).
Aggravated assault was intended to include former offense of stabbing provided the weapon was in fact of the denominated character. A knife "designed for the purpose of offense and defense" is a deadly weapon almost by definition. Wells v. State, 125 Ga. App. 579, 188 S.E.2d 407 (1972); Johnson v. State, 185 Ga. App. 167, 363 S.E.2d 773 (1987).
Offense of shooting at another is form of aggravated assault. Bentley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 425, 205 S.E.2d 904 (1974).
Offense of shooting at another is replaced by aggravated assault under Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1280 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21). Wells v. State, 125 Ga. App. 579, 188 S.E.2d 407 (1972).
Deliberately firing gun in direction of another constitutes aggravated assault.
- When defendant admitted deliberately firing a gun in the direction of a victim to scare the victim, such action constitutes use of a deadly weapon to commit an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury and amounts to aggravated assault, absent justification. Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 6, 287 S.E.2d 31 (1982).
Intentionally firing a gun at another, absent justification, is sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction of aggravated assault. Steele v. State, 196 Ga. App. 330, 396 S.E.2d 4 (1990); Belins v. State, 210 Ga. App. 259, 435 S.E.2d 675 (1993); Lewis v. State, 215 Ga. App. 161, 450 S.E.2d 448 (1994); Creson v. State, 218 Ga. App. 184, 460 S.E.2d 83 (1995); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888, 485 S.E.2d 720 (1997); Goodman v. State, 237 Ga. App. 795, 516 S.E.2d 824 (1999).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal, as direct evidence that the defendant fired at the victim and the defendant's own admission that the defendant fired at the victim was sufficient to submit the question of whether the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault to the jury; no error occurred pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6), involving a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, as the state offered more than circumstantial evidence to support the state's case against the defendant. Cobb v. State, 268 Ga. App. 66, 601 S.E.2d 443 (2004).
Because former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) provided that a victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient, the victim's testimony that defendant twice shot at the victim was sufficient to find defendant guilty of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) despite testimony to the contrary. Hartley v. State, 299 Ga. App. 534, 683 S.E.2d 109 (2009).
That defendant did not initiate fight does not necessarily show that defendant was not guilty of aggravated assault. Russell v. State, 152 Ga. App. 693, 263 S.E.2d 689 (1979).
Admission of evidence of drug use was proper.
- Defendant was properly convicted for felony murder, malice murder, and aggravated assault where the defendant was seen twice beating someone with a pipe and yelling at the person regarding drugs, and where the person died as a result of injuries from that beating two days later. Admission at the defendant's trial of use of drugs was proper because it was not admitted purely to impugn the defendant's character, but was relevant as to motive. Dyers v. State, 277 Ga. 859, 596 S.E.2d 595 (2004).
Extrinsic evidence held harmless.
- Defendant's conviction for armed robbery and aggravated assault was affirmed because, given the overwhelming evidence, it was highly unlikely that the admission of the testimony concerning the subsequent burglary contributed to the verdict in this case, even if it was erroneous to allow such evidence. Hutchinson v. State, 318 Ga. App. 627, 733 S.E.2d 517 (2012).
Because evidence of the defendant's prior drug use, and history of crimes committed against family members fueled by that drug usage, were properly admitted as relevant to the crimes charged, despite incidentally placing the defendant's character in issue, convictions for both aggravated assault and simple assault were upheld on appeal. Jones v. State, 283 Ga. App. 812, 642 S.E.2d 887 (2007).
Pre- and post-Miranda statements properly admitted.
- In a prosecution for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, despite testimony from the arresting officer that the defendant was complaining of physical problems and under the influence of alcohol, both the pre- and post-Miranda statements made, as well as the numerous voluntary and unsolicited remarks which were not made in response to any form of interrogation, were properly admitted. Dorsey v. State, 285 Ga. App. 510, 646 S.E.2d 713 (2007).
Defendant's statements admissible.
- With regard to the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, the trial court did not err by admitting the defendant's statements because the defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made as the detective met with the defendant at the hospital, no arrest occurred, the defendant was not restrained in any way, and was free to go. Davis v. State, 320 Ga. App. 753, 740 S.E.2d 707 (2013).
Evidence of victim's character properly excluded.
- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, to the extent that the defendant sought to attack the victim's character through testimony about the victim's use of alcohol during pregnancy, whether the victim hid the defendant from the police, and the victim's alleged jealousy over the defendant's new relationship, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination to the issues directly related to the incidents. Massey v. State, 278 Ga. App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (2006).
Evidence was properly excluded under rape shield law.
- Trial court properly applied O.C.G.A. § 23-2-3 by refusing to allow testimony that a victim of domestic violence had been seen working as a prostitute because that information had no relevance to the aggravated assault and false imprisonment charges for which a defendant was convicted, and further, the defendant failed to produce any evidence that could have provided a nexus between the alleged prostitution and a conclusion that someone else might have inflicted the victim's injuries. Moorer v. State, 290 Ga. App. 216, 659 S.E.2d 422 (2008).
No speedy trial violation.
- Convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with the intent to rob, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were proper because the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the 20-month delay between the date the indictment was issued to the date of the defendant's actual trial as the delay was due to a higher priority of statutory speedy trial demands, so it was not a deliberate delay on the part of the state, and as the defendant failed to show any prejudice from the delay. Herndon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 374, 626 S.E.2d 579 (2006).
Denial of motion to sever.
- In a prosecution on two counts of attempting to hijack a motor vehicle, four counts of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and criminal trespass, because the offenses committed by a defendant and a codefendant amounted to a series of continuous acts connected together both in time and the area in which committed, and there was no likelihood of confusion, the trial court did not abuse of discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever the trial from that of the codefendant; furthermore, the mere fact that the codefendants' defenses were antagonistic was insufficient in itself to warrant separate trials. Diaz v. State, 280 Ga. App. 413, 634 S.E.2d 160 (2006).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to sever the charges of rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and aggravated sodomy arising out of three sexual assaults against three different women because the charges against the defendant clearly showed a recurring pattern of conduct suggesting a common scheme or modus operandi as the victims of the three sexual assaults were adult women who did not know the defendant, all three incidents occurred in DeKalb County within six months of each other, each victim was taken by vehicle to a secluded location before the victims were raped, all three incidents involved a handgun, and semen matching the defendant's DNA profile was found on each victim. Ray v. State, 329 Ga. App. 5, 763 S.E.2d 361 (2014).
State's peremptory strikes were valid.
- While defendant made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination regarding the state's use of three peremptory strikes, sufficient race-neutral reasons existed for those strikes; thus, given the court's jury charges and recharge to the jury, the court's responses to questions from the jury, and waiver of improper bolstering objection on appeal, defendant's aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions were upheld on appeal, as was the court's denial of a motion for a new trial. LeMon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 527, 660 S.E.2d 11 (2008).
Jury determinations.
- Whether the defendant's means of attack was deadly and whether the defendant's acts were punishable as an aggravated assault or as simple battery were matters properly left to the jury. Guevara v. State, 151 Ga. App. 444, 260 S.E.2d 491 (1979).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the defendant's aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal as conflicts in the evidence between the defendant's version of the facts and that version offered by the other witnesses were for the jury, not the appeals court, to resolve. Hicks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 461, 636 S.E.2d 183 (2006).
Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, criminal attempt to commit aggravated sodomy, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime because the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support the convictions; regardless of any inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, it was for the jury to assess witness credibility, and the jury chose to believe the victim's identification of the defendant as the individual who committed the crimes. Williams v. State, 300 Ga. App. 839, 686 S.E.2d 446 (2009).
Testimony of the victim and other state witnesses was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault, criminal damage to property in the second degree, and battery because it was the role of the jury, not the court of appeals, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, assess witness credibility, and decide whether to believe the victim's or the defendant's version of events; the defendant punched the victim, drew a handgun from the defendant's pants, and fired at the victim, and at trial, the victim, the responding officers, and the state's ballistic expert testified to the events. Bryant v. State, 309 Ga. App. 649, 710 S.E.2d 854 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because, although the defendant argued that there was insufficient credible and admissible evidence to show that the defendant was the victim's attacker, determinations of witness credibility and the weight to give the evidence presented was solely within the province of the jury; defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the victim, the responding officers, and the investigator regarding the victim's demeanor after the attack, the victim's description of the attack and the attacker, and the inconsistencies between what the victim told each of them. Pennington v. State, 313 Ga. App. 764, 723 S.E.2d 13 (2012).
Jury charge on justification not plain error.
- Defendant failed to show plain error in the jury charge on justification because the defendant could not demonstrate that the alleged error in the jury charge likely affected the outcome of the proceedings as the evidence was overwhelming that the defendant was the initial aggressor who attacked the unarmed victim with the metal bar and, thus, that the defendant did not act in self-defense and was guilty of aggravated assault. Tremblay v. State, 329 Ga. App. 139, 764 S.E.2d 163 (2014).
Guilty plea free and voluntary.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to two counts of kidnapping and two counts of aggravated assault as the trial court was well aware of the medications the defendant was taking when the plea was entered, the medications did not affect the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings, and an expert opined that the defendant was feigning hallucinations and was competent to stand trial; hence, at that point, the trial court had no duty to make any further inquiries into the defendant's ability to competently tender a plea. McDowell v. State, 282 Ga. App. 754, 639 S.E.2d 644 (2006).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to aggravated assault because the defendant was thoroughly questioned about the plea, fully informed and cognizant of the rights the defendant was waiving, and fully aware of the consequences of the plea; the purported recantation evidence proffered at the hearing was very weak, and at the plea hearing, the defendant admitted under oath that the defendant committed two acts of aggravated assault. Williams v. State, 315 Ga. App. 704, 727 S.E.2d 532 (2012).
Double jeopardy since aggravated assault was underlying offense in felony murder.
- Second prosecution on an aggravated assault charge was barred by double jeopardy because the assault charge served as the underlying offense to the felony murder charge and was a lesser included offense of felony murder; the court of appeals erred by failing to consider the implications of the modified merger rule when reviewing the defendant's double jeopardy claim because the aggravated assault charge was perpetrated against the victim and was an integral part of the homicide, and the evidence authorized a charge on voluntary manslaughter on which the defendant was convicted. Williams v. State, 288 Ga. 7, 700 S.E.2d 564 (2010).
Double jeopardy did not bar retrial.
- Defendant's acquittal on felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 did not bar retrial on a voluntary manslaughter charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) as the collateral estoppel doctrine under the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const., amend. 5, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, did not apply because voluntary manslaughter required proof of an element not found in felony murder or aggravated assault, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and voluntary manslaughter were mutually exclusive. Roesser v. State, 316 Ga. App. 850, 730 S.E.2d 641 (2012).
Aggravated assault is not a capital felony. Jones v. State, 246 Ga. 109, 269 S.E.2d 6 (1980).
State was not required to prove victim's certification as a police officer under the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 et seq., in order to make a prima facie showing that the victim was acting as a peace officer within the contemplation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c). Cornwell v. State, 193 Ga. App. 561, 388 S.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 909, 388 S.E.2d 353 (1989).
Victim's apprehension of violent injuries.
- In a prosecution for felony murder, where defendant was charged with the underlying felony of aggravated assault by stabbing the victim with a knife, a deadly weapon, it was unnecessary for the state to show the victim's apprehension of the violent injuries inflicted. Brinson v. State, 272 Ga. 345, 529 S.E.2d 129 (2000).
Evidence was sufficient to allow the court to adjudicate the defendant a delinquent for committing an act which would have been an aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), if committed by an adult, because a police officer testified that the juvenile pointed a gun at the officer. In the Interest of M.F., 276 Ga. App. 402, 623 S.E.2d 234 (2005).
Because sufficient evidence was presented supporting the jury's determination that the defendant's act of shooting the victim was not an accident and was not justified, the victim testified to knowing defendant had a gun, and the presence of a gun normally placed a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by the record. Dukes v. State, 285 Ga. App. 172, 645 S.E.2d 664 (2007).
Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of juvenile delinquency based on aggravated assault. The defendant committed an act with a deadly weapon, advancing on a deputy with a baton in the defendant's hand, putting the deputy in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. In the Interest of J.A.C., 291 Ga. App. 728, 662 S.E.2d 811 (2008).
Evidence was sufficient to uphold the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because all of the victims were together in a group, and one of the victim's testified that guns were pointed at everybody; the defendant's act of firing the weapon into the group made each individual a separate victim, and testimony that the victims were crying and screaming when the defendant fired was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the group too had a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53, 717 S.E.2d 654 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0337, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2012).
Violence against a parent.
- When the defendant, while cursing and screaming at the defendant's parent, stood near the parent, holding a pot of boiling water and staring at the parent, the defendant's acts constituted aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). The acts constituted both a substantial step toward committing a battery and a demonstration of violence against the parent, and showed a present ability to inflict injury that placed the parent in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury under § 16-5-21(a)(2). In the Interest of T.Y.B., 288 Ga. App. 610, 654 S.E.2d 688 (2007).
Prior transaction evidence properly admitted.
- Trial court did not err in admitting prior transaction evidence sufficiently similar to the charged aggravated assault offense in order to disprove the defendant's claim of accident and to show intent and course of conduct as proof of the prior offense helped prove an element of the aggravated assault. Mack v. State, 283 Ga. App. 172, 641 S.E.2d 194 (2007).
Similar transaction evidence of an eight-year-old incident in which the defendant robbed two victims at gunpoint was not too remote in time or dissimilar to the armed robbery and aggravated assault charges the defendant was being tried for, and was thus properly admitted to show course of conduct, bent of mind, motive, and identity. Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452, 671 S.E.2d 911 (2009).
Evidence of an earlier altercation between the defendant and a former girlfriend was admissible in the aggravated assault of the victim, the former girlfriend's brother, because the state of mind required for the charged offense of aggravated assault against the victim was the same as the state of mind required for the uncharged act against the former girlfriend, which could have constituted an aggravated assault; the other act was probative of the issue of the defendant's intent, which defense counsel argued to the jury was the biggest issue in the case; and the evidence was sufficient to show that the prior bad act occurred and that the defendant was the person who accosted and threatened the former girlfriend with the knife. Wilson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 60, 783 S.E.2d 662 (2016).
Error in admitting similar transaction evidence required reversal.
- While state presented sufficient evidence of the victim's age to support assault charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), because the trial court clearly erred in admitting evidence of two burglaries defendant committed in 1998 as similar transactions to help prove the issue of identity, defendant's aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, theft, and battery convictions were reversed. Usher v. State, 290 Ga. App. 710, 659 S.E.2d 920 (2008).
Evidence of previous crimes improperly admitted to show intent.
- Appellant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and knife-possession offenses were reversed because the Georgia Supreme Court could not say that the trial court's erroneous admission of the voluminous evidence that the appellant had previously committed multiple serious violent acts did not contribute to the guilty verdicts that the jury returned. Strong v. State, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 653 (2020).
Prior convictions properly admitted for both impeachment and sentencing purposes.
- Trial court properly admitted certified copies of the defendant's two prior convictions of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the court carefully balanced the competing interests; (2) the prior offenses had a substantial probative value which outweighed their prejudicial effect; and (3) nothing prevented the use of a defendant's convictions for both impeachment and sentencing purposes. Moreover, the court rejected the defendant's claim that by adding the word "substantially" to the balancing test, the Georgia legislature meant to incorporate the standard for admissibility embodied in Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). Newsome v. State, 289 Ga. App. 590, 657 S.E.2d 540 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1042, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 494 (Ga. 2008).
Comment in closing did not warrant new trial.
- Aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal, and the defendant was not entitled to a new trial, as the prosecution's closing argument, utilizing an analogy between the defendant's case and a similar separate case involving other parties, was within the parameters of an appropriate closing argument. Moss v. State, 278 Ga. App. 221, 628 S.E.2d 648 (2006).
Guilty verdicts were of aggravated assaults of peace officers.
- Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault of a peace officer where: (1) the evidence showed that the defendant attempted to run law enforcement officers off the road; (2) the indictment was sufficient to charge aggravated assault of a peace officer; (3) the jury was instructed to determine whether any guilty verdict was aggravated assault or aggravated assault of a peace officer; (4) the jury did not specify whether the guilty verdicts were of assaults against peace officers; and (5) the defendant did not object to the jury's failure to specify whether the convictions were for assaults against peace officers at the time the verdicts were announced. Dupree v. State, 267 Ga. App. 561, 600 S.E.2d 654 (2004).
Aggravated assault on security guard.
- When, in an obvious attempt to incapacitate an armed security guard, the defendant pulled the trigger of the defendant's own weapon in that direction, an aggravated assault was committed. Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).
Lawful discharge of official duties.
- Officers who were summoned to the scene of a domestic disturbance and saw defendant forcibly march defendant's family into their dwelling, quite possibly at gunpoint, had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest for a battery constituting a family violence and, thus, were engaged in the performance of official duties for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Duitsman v. State, 212 Ga. App. 348, 441 S.E.2d 888 (1994).
Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault on a police officer, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c), when, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the defendant of criminal activity. Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 619 S.E.2d 668 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1217, 126 S. Ct. 1435, 164 L. Ed. 2d 138 (2006).
Police officer moonlighting as security guard performing "official duties."
- State proved every element of crime charged although indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault on a police officer engaged in the performance of the officer's official duties where the officer was moonlighting as a security guard at the time of the assault, as the officer had an "official duty" to take action when defendant breached the peace. Loumakis v. State, 179 Ga. App. 294, 346 S.E.2d 373 (1986).
Merger required with aggravated assault on peace officer.
- Record clearly showed that the crime of obstruction was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the crime of aggravated assault on a peace officer; thus, the convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer and felony obstruction of a peace officer should have merged. Reid v. State, 339 Ga. App. 772, 792 S.E.2d 732 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).
Conviction for assault authorized though intended criminal act is completed.
- It is the intent of the Legislature that, although an assault may be a criminal attempt, and even though the intended criminal act be completed, a conviction for an assault is authorized. Williams v. State, 141 Ga. App. 201, 233 S.E.2d 48 (1977).
Aggravated assault conviction approved although battery completed. Williams v. State, 141 Ga. App. 201, 233 S.E.2d 48 (1977).
Assault with pistol not completed.
- When defendant was arrested, indicted, and tried on three counts of aggravated assault: (1) shooting at another with a pistol; (2) attempting to shoot another with a pistol; and (3) attempting to run over another with an automobile, the assault with the automobile was clearly completed (the car had been stopped and placed in "park") before the assault with the pistol began. However, the evidence did not authorize the jury to conclude that the assault with the pistol was "completed" between the time that defendant fired shots while on the run and the time when defendant caught up with defendant's quarry and attempted to fire additional shots from a stationary position, so that the two charges involving the use of a pistol referred to acts that were parts of a single transaction and defendant therefore could not properly be convicted on both charges. Davis v. State, 186 Ga. App. 491, 367 S.E.2d 884 (1988).
Aggravated assault and hit-and-run are not mutually exclusive crimes.
- Aggravated assault with a motor vehicle and hit-and-run with that same vehicle are not mutually exclusive crimes, since an aggravated assault includes a finding of intent which is not an element of hit-and-run. Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 878, 510 S.E.2d 570 (1998).
Conduct outside scope of involuntary manslaughter.
- Whether the conduct of an accused is lawful at the outset, e.g., in self-defense or unlawful, when what takes place thereafter discloses felonious conduct in committing either an aggravated assault with an instrument likely to produce death or an aggravated battery which causes the death of another, such conduct is not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter. Trask v. State, 132 Ga. App. 645, 208 S.E.2d 591 (1974).
Defendant was not entitled to a sentence reduction because the aggravated assault and aggravated stalking statutes did not define the same offense and did not address the same criminal conduct, the former offense addressing assault with the object likely to result in serious bodily injury and the latter offense addressing harassment and intimidation of a victim. Myrick v. State, 325 Ga. App. 607, 754 S.E.2d 395 (2014).
Cruelty to children conviction did not merge with aggravated assault or false imprisonment.
- Defendant's cruelty to children in the first degree charge did not merge with the aggravated assault or false imprisonment charge because neither aggravated assault nor false imprisonment required proof that the victim suffered cruel or excessive physical or mental pain. Kirt v. State, 309 Ga. App. 227, 709 S.E.2d 840 (2011).
No merger with family violence battery.
- Family violence aggravated assault and the family violence aggravated battery convictions did not merge because the evidence showed that the defendant completed one crime before committing the other and that the crimes were based on different conduct as the aggravated battery charge was based on the defendant striking the victim with the defendant's fist and depriving the victim of two upper incisors, and the aggravated assault charge was based on the defendant striking the victim with a wire hanger and pouring lighter fluid on the victim's person and setting the victim on fire. Outz v. State, 344 Ga. App. 616, 810 S.E.2d 678 (2018).
Merger not appropriate.
- Trial court did not err in failing to merge an aggravated assault count into a kidnapping with bodily injury count, the aggravated assault count into an aggravated battery count, and the aggravated battery count into the kidnapping count, as each count referred to a separate cut of the victims with a decorative sword that the defendant had pulled off the wall during a domestic dispute with the defendant's spouse and child. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).
Due to the entry of a guilty plea over 20 years before the filing of a motion to correct alleged illegal sentences, the defendant's merger claim was waived, and since the sentences imposed were not void, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the motion for correction. Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 640 S.E.2d 353 (2006).
Because the jury could reasonably have concluded that the victim's first two injuries from two non-fatal shots resulted from a separate offense than the third, the earlier shots were sufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction, separate from the third and fatal shot, and there was no merger of the aggravated assault offense with a separate charge of malice murder. Parker v. State, 281 Ga. 490, 640 S.E.2d 44 (2007).
Because separate cruelty to children and aggravated assault counts were based upon acts committed by the defendant on the day preceding the death of the victim, neither of those convictions merged into the felony murder count also filed against the defendant and, accordingly, separate sentences for those crimes were authorized. Christian v. State, 281 Ga. 474, 640 S.E.2d 21 (2007).
Defendant's aggravated assault conviction did not merge into a felony murder conviction because neither the murder nor the underlying felony of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery required the state to prove the element of reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, which was a required element of the aggravated assault count as indicted. Willingham v. State, 281 Ga. 577, 642 S.E.2d 43 (2007).
Defendant's convictions of involuntary manslaughter while in the commission of a simple battery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct were not mutually exclusive, and the trial court did not err in not merging the nonhomicide counts upon sentencing. Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).
Aggravated assault with a rope and kidnapping with bodily injury offenses did not merge for sentencing purposes as one crime was completed before the other took place, and the crimes were established by separate and distinct facts. McCaskell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 592, 646 S.E.2d 761 (2007).
An aggravated assault conviction did not merge as a matter of fact with a murder conviction because the evidence presented at trial showed that the defendant inflicted a severe, but non-fatal, beating upon the victim that was separate and distinct from the choking and strangling which resulted in the victim's death. Starks v. State, 283 Ga. 164, 656 S.E.2d 518 (2008).
Because the evidence presented against the defendant showed two distinct acts of aggravated assault, separated by time and motive, the two offenses did not merge. Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2008).
Because charges alleging aggravated assault did not amount to lesser-included offenses as a matter of fact of a charge of first-degree criminal damage to property, and the property offense was not a lesser-included offense of any aggravated assault offense, merger of the offenses was unwarranted. Louis v. State, 290 Ga. App. 106, 658 S.E.2d 897 (2008).
When a defendant pulled out a gun and demanded money from a cab driver, the offense of criminal attempt armed robbery was complete, and the defendant's subsequent acts, including striking the driver on the head, were not necessary to prove that offense; thus, the attempt offense did not merge with aggravated assault offenses for sentencing purposes. Duncan v. State, 290 Ga. App. 32, 658 S.E.2d 780 (2008).
Because: (1) different facts were used to prove an aggravated assault and an armed robbery, specifically, that the armed robbery was complete after the defendant laid a handgun on the counter in the convenience store, demanded that the victim open the register, and a codefendant took money from the a register; and (2) the separate offense of aggravated assault occurred when the defendant struck the victim in the head with the gun, the offenses did not merge as a matter of fact. Thus, the separate sentences imposed for each offense were upheld, and no double jeopardy violation occurred. Garibay v. State, 290 Ga. App. 385, 659 S.E.2d 775 (2008).
As the offense of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), required proof of at least one additional fact which the offense of robbery by intimidation, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), did not, under the "required evidence" test of O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7, a defendant's aggravated assault conviction did not merge into the defendant's robbery by intimidation conviction. Elamin v. State, 293 Ga. App. 591, 667 S.E.2d 439 (2008).
Defendant's aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a) and16-5-24(a) did not merge under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), although both stemmed from the same act. The aggravated assault charge required proof that the defendant attempted to commit a violent injury with the intent to murder using a deadly weapon, while the aggravated battery charge required proof that the defendant maliciously caused bodily harm to the victim by rendering a member of the victim's body useless; thus, the offenses were distinct, with each requiring proof of a fact which the other did not. Robbins v. State, 293 Ga. App. 584, 667 S.E.2d 684 (2008).
Defendant's aggravated assault convictions under both O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and (a)(2) did not merge because the state presented evidence that two separate assaults on the victim occurred at separate times and in different ways; from the evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant used the defendant's hands to choke the victim and that at a separate time and a different location, the defendant also jammed a curling iron down the victim's throat. Lord v. State, 297 Ga. App. 88, 676 S.E.2d 404 (2009).
Trial court did not err in refusing to merge six aggravated assault counts into one count or in charging the jury that it could find the defendant guilty on the six separate counts because the act of firing a weapon into a group made each individual in the group a separate victim and justified a separate count of aggravated assault for each victim. Scott v. State, 302 Ga. App. 111, 690 S.E.2d 242 (2010).
Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and feticide in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-80(a) did not merge for sentencing purposes because the victim of the aggravated assault was the defendant's girlfriend, while the victim of the feticide was the girlfriend's unborn child; the merger doctrine does not apply if each of the charged crimes was committed against a different victim. Carmichael v. State, 305 Ga. App. 651, 700 S.E.2d 650 (2010).
Defendant's guilty pleas for aggravated assault with intent to rape in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and kidnapping in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a) were not accepted in violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because the offenses did not merge as a matter of law since each of the offenses were separate and required proof of different facts; the state asserted that the defendant had dragged the victim from the front of a laundromat facility into a bathroom in the back of the facility, which formed a basis for the kidnapping charge, and that the defendant had sexually assaulted the victim while holding the victim in the bathroom, which formed a basis for the aggravated assault with the intent to rape charge. Shelton v. State, 307 Ga. App. 599, 705 S.E.2d 699 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).
Defendant's aggravated assault convictions did not merge because the counts of the indictment requiring the state to prove that the defendant slashed the victim's neck with a sharp-edged instrument, hit the victim with a hammer and wrapped a cord around the victim's neck with the intent to murder were based on different conduct and merger of those convictions was not required. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).
Trial court was correct not to merge the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault because although the defendant's conviction for the armed robbery of the victim resulted from a holdup, the conviction for aggravated assault was based on the defendant's forcing the shotgun down the victim's throat later in a bathroom. Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. 877, 717 S.E.2d 187 (2011).
Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's aggravated assault convictions because, although the convictions arose from the same acts, the convictions did not merge as a matter of fact or law since each count was based upon harm to a different victim. Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53, 717 S.E.2d 654 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0337, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2012).
Aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions did not merge for sentencing purposes because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the assault with a gun was a separate act from the armed robbery, which occurred after the victim had been pistol-whipped. McGlasker v. State, 321 Ga. App. 614, 741 S.E.2d 303 (2013).
Trial court erred by merging all four of the family violence aggravated assault verdicts into the malice murder verdict as the family violence aggravated assault verdict will not merge into a verdict for murder. Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713, 770 S.E.2d 585 (2015).
Trial court did not err in declining to merge the defendant's aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions for sentencing as the aggravated assault was a separate act from the ensuing act of aggravated battery because the aggravated assault occurred when the defendant pointed the gun at the victim's head, while the aggravated battery did not occur until after the aggravated assault caused the victim to move defensively, and the defendant then took a separate action of moving toward the victim, which led to the struggle that resulted in the victim getting shot in the spine. Williams v. State, 332 Ga. App. 805, 775 S.E.2d 178 (2015).
Trial court did not err by failing to merge the rape count with a count of aggravated assault as the defendant's choking of the victim, which supported the assault, occurred prior to the rape and was a separate and distinct act of force and intimidation outside of that necessary to accomplish the rape. Bolden v. State, 335 Ga. App. 653, 782 S.E.2d 708 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391 (2016).
Trial court did not err by failing to merge the convictions for aggravated assault and felony obstruction because each offense required proof of an additional element that the other did not. Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. 64, 785 S.E.2d 900 (2016).
Merger appropriate.
- Two counts of aggravated assault merge since both convictions were based on the same act. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. App. 211, 630 S.E.2d 833 (2006).
Upon the concession by the state on appeal, the two aggravated-assault counts the defendant was convicted of should have merged because there was no ensuing interval between the defendant's first act of pointing the gun at the victim's head and the later act of lowering the gun's aim and shooting that victim in the leg. Mack v. State, 283 Ga. App. 172, 641 S.E.2d 194 (2007).
Although an armed robbery served as the predicate felony for one count of felony murder, there was a separate felony murder count predicated on aggravated assault; hence, when the jury found the defendant guilty of both counts, it was within the trial court's discretion to choose to merge the aggravated assault rather than the armed robbery into the felony murder count for which appellant was sentenced. Hill v. State, 281 Ga. 795, 642 S.E.2d 64 (2007).
One of defendant's aggravated assault convictions merged as a matter of fact with armed robbery. Fagan v. State, 283 Ga. App. 784, 643 S.E.2d 268 (2007).
When the defendant pulled out a gun and demanded money from a cab driver, put the vehicle in park, hit the driver on the head with the gun and shot the gun into the floor, then ordered the driver out of the cab, the offenses of aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merged as a matter of fact for sentencing purposes, as the evidence did not support a separate conviction for assault with intent to rob; since any reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent or bodily injury related to the threat posed by the gun, not to the actions of putting the vehicle into park and directing the driver out of the cab, no separate aggravated assault occurred. Duncan v. State, 290 Ga. App. 32, 658 S.E.2d 780 (2008).
Defendant's aggravated assault convictions were to be merged with armed robbery and kidnapping convictions as the same set of facts were used to prove the offenses. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).
Because a defendant's convictions for armed robbery (O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a)) and aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)) were based on the same conduct - the defendant's pointing a gun at the victim with the intent to rob the victim - merger was required. Therefore, the sentence for the aggravated assault was vacated. Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1 (2008).
Trial court erred in failing to merge a defendant's offenses of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), for sentencing purposes, because the assault was a lesser included offense of the battery offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1), given the defendant's single attack on the victim with a golf club. Allen v. State, 302 Ga. App. 190, 690 S.E.2d 492 (2010).
Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault with intent to murder merged for sentencing because both counts of the indictment alleged that the defendant committed aggravated assault by slashing the victim's neck; although one count alleged that the assault was done with a deadly weapon and the other alleged that it was done with the intent to commit murder, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and (a)(2), the counts were clearly based on a single act since the razor or knife used in that assault broke while it was pressed against the victim's neck, and thus, the counts merely charged the same act of aggravated assault being committed in two of the multiple ways set out in O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).
Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault should have been merged into a malice murder conviction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(1), based on the "required evidence" test, as the aggravated assault, as pled, did not require proof of a fact not required to have been proved in the malice murder. Culpepper v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 715 S.E.2d 155 (2011).
Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault should have been merged for sentencing, as a co-defendant's actions, which occurred either concurrently or in rapid succession, were committed as part of one uninterrupted criminal transaction and in pursuit of a specific, predetermined goal: the armed robbery of a single victim. Crowley v. State, 315 Ga. App. 755, 728 S.E.2d 282 (2012).
Trial court erred in failing to merge defendant's conviction for aggravated assault into defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).
Trial court erred by not merging the aggravated assault offense into the armed robbery offense for sentencing purposes, as the evidence showed one transaction, where the defendant pointed the revolver at the victim and took the victim's money and cell phone, and there was not break between that time and when the defendant asked if the defendant should also take the keys to the vehicle. Dean v. State, 327 Ga. App. 9, 755 S.E.2d 245 (2014).
Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault should have merged with the conviction for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because those acts were predicated upon the same act, the defendant's use of a handgun to overpower and intimidate the victim for the purpose of attempting to rob the victim of the victim's belongings. Morris v. State, 340 Ga. App. 295, 797 S.E.2d 207 (2017).
Merger with malice murder conviction.
- Trial court did not err in failing to merge the aggravated assault for which the defendant was sentenced into defendant's malice murder conviction because the two crimes were not established by the same conduct; the defendant's conduct did not establish the commission of both the aggravated assault and the murder because the aggravated assault was established by evidence that the defendant and the codefendant beat and strangled the victim, whereas the murder was established by evidence that they killed the victim by stabbing the victim's body. Hall v. State, 286 Ga. 358, 687 S.E.2d 819 (2010).
Separate judgments of conviction and sentences for aggravated assault were vacated because the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for both the malice murders of the two victims and the aggravated assaults of those victims, and although there was no merger of those crimes as a matter of law, the record established that the aggravated assault convictions merged into the malice murder convictions as a matter of fact. Vergara v. State, 287 Ga. 194, 695 S.E.2d 215 (2010).
Defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravated assault was vacated and the case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing because the aggravated assault conviction merged into the defendant's malice murder conviction as a matter of fact even though there was no merger of those crimes as a matter of law. Sharpe v. State, 288 Ga. 565, 707 S.E.2d 338 (2011).
Defendant's conviction on a second aggravated assault should have merged into the malice murder conviction because the victim sustained two shots to the arm and one fatal shot to the back of the head, and the evidence did not authorize the finding of an additional "deliberate interval" between the second shot to the arm and the shot to the head; both were inflicted in close succession as the defendant confronted the victim. Ortiz v. State, 291 Ga. 3, 727 S.E.2d 103 (2012).
Merger with felony murder.
- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was not authorized because the count of the indictment that alleged aggravated assault had to be merged into the felony murder count; although the felony murder and the underlying felony were committed on different victims, the count of the indictment alleging felony murder set forth the aggravated assault against a victim as the underlying felony supporting the charge of felony murder. Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 542, 712 S.E.2d 851 (2011).
Aggravated assault did not merge with armed robbery.
- As the armed robberies and aggravated assaults the defendant was charged with were committed against different victims, the crimes did not merge as a matter of law or fact. Verdree v. State, 299 Ga. App. 673, 683 S.E.2d 632 (2009).
Trial court did not err when the court refused to merge the defendant's aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions because the armed robbery and aggravated assault were separate and distinct acts; the victim's testimony showed that the armed robbery was complete before the commission of the aggravated assault. Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 198, 723 S.E.2d 520 (2012).
Because an attempted armed robbery began when the defendant kicked down the victim's door, entered the victim's home with a firearm, and demanded that the victim give it up, and continued as the victim and a co-defendant struggled outside; after the victim was able to run away, the co-defendant shot the victim twice; the robbery and aggravated assault were separate offenses and did not merge. Cuyler v. State, 344 Ga. App. 532, 811 S.E.2d 42 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0874, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 482 (Ga. 2018).
Aggravated assault and armed robbery should merge.
- Trial court erred in failing to merge aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, counts because the state relied on the same act of assault to establish defendant's guilt of aggravated assault and armed robbery, and although the state would have been able to indict the defendant for aggravated assault based on conduct separate and distinct from the defendant's act of hitting the victim in the head with a baseball bat, the indictment specifically charged the defendant with the offense of aggravated assault; while armed robbery requires proof of additional facts, like aggravated assault with intent to rob, aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require proof of a fact not required to establish armed robbery. Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 395, 696 S.E.2d 686 (2010).
Because the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault arose from the same act or transaction, the defendant's taking money from the victim at gunpoint, the defendant's aggravated assault conviction against that victim merged with the armed robbery conviction. Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. 877, 717 S.E.2d 187 (2011).
Conviction for aggravated assault should have been merged with the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the convictions both required proof of the same elements. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. 607, 740 S.E.2d 100 (2013).
Aggravated assault offense did not merge with kidnapping charge.
- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, which was based on the defendant's striking the victim with a pistol, did not merge with the defendant's kidnapping conviction, which was based on the defendant's forcing the victim upstairs, because the assault occurred prior to the kidnapping and was not necessary to accomplish the kidnapping. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008).
Trial court did not err under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7 in failing to merge convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery with a conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury, as each crime required proof of at least one different element, and the state presented independent evidence to prove each individual crime as set out in the indictment. Evidence that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and fired the gun at the floor near the victim, that the defendant used a wooden stick resembling a baseball bat to repeatedly hit the victim, and that the defendant hit and kicked the victim while the victim was tied up supported the three aggravated assault counts; aggravated battery was established by evidence that the defendant broke the victim's nose, wrist, and shoulder and knocked out two teeth and by evidence that the defendant burned the victim's hand and caused the victim to be bitten by fire ants; and kidnapping with bodily injury was proven by evidence of injuries to the victim due to being bound by rope. Rouse v. State, 295 Ga. App. 61, 670 S.E.2d 869 (2008).
Trial court correctly sentenced the defendant for both aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and kidnapping with bodily injury, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, because the crimes did not merge since each of the two crimes required proof of at least one fact that the other did not, and the state provided such proof. Kidnapping required proof of asportation, holding the victim against the victim's will, and bodily injury, which was not required to prove aggravated assault; and aggravated assault required proof that the defendant used the defendant's hands, with either the intent to cause a violent injury or which placed the victim in reasonable fear of receiving a violent injury, but the kidnapping charge did not require such proof. Mayberry v. State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 687 S.E.2d 893 (2009).
Convictions for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and kidnapping, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, did not merge because the aggravated assault was completed when the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and grabbed the victim around the neck, while the asportation for the kidnapping occurred when the defendant then dragged the victim into another room. The movement of the victim from one room to another within the hotel room, even though of minimal duration, created an additional danger to the victim by enhancing the defendant's control over the victim, and it was not an inherent part of the aggravated assault. Williams v. State, 307 Ga. App. 675, 705 S.E.2d 906 (2011).
Merger with involuntary manslaughter.
- Defendant's sufficiency challenge became moot on appeal as the trial court merged the involuntary manslaughter count into the aggravated assault count for sentencing purposes. Ramirez v. State, 288 Ga. App. 249, 653 S.E.2d 837 (2007).
Merger with voluntary manslaughter.
- Trial court erred in entering a judgment of conviction against the defendant for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because that conviction should have been merged into the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a); the defendant was charged in the indictment with voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault for the stabbing of the victim, and the undisputed evidence at trial showed that the victim was stabbed one time in the chest, causing the victim's death. Muckle v. State, 307 Ga. App. 634, 705 S.E.2d 721 (2011).
Trial court erred in failing to merge both defendants' convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because the indictments charged the defendants with felony murder by alleging that the defendants committed aggravated assault, but the court then charged the defendants with aggravated assault based on the exact same conduct; and, although the jury convicted the defendants of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of felony murder, it, nevertheless, followed that the defendants' convictions for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact into the defendants convictions for voluntary manslaughter. Hamlette v. State (two cases), 353 Ga. App. 640, 839 S.E.2d 161 (2020).
Rule of lenity not applicable.
- Because the defendant could commit felony obstruction only if the defendant offered violence against an officer while the officer was in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties and felony obstruction could occur regardless of whether it involved the use of an offensive weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury, unlike aggravated assault, the two offenses were not proved by the same evidence and the rule of lenity did not apply. Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. 64, 785 S.E.2d 900 (2016).
Trial court did not err by not applying the rule of lenity in sentencing the defendant on criminal attempt to commit a felony, rather than on aggravated assault, because the statutory language and indictment showed that the two counts did not address the same criminal conduct as the criminal attempt (of murder) included the substantial step of pulling the trigger of the handgun aimed at the victim's head, which additional step was not required for the commission of aggravated assault. Gonzalez v. State, 352 Ga. App. 83, 833 S.E.2d 727 (2019).
Corroborating accomplice testimony sufficient to support conviction.
- Because defendant's four accomplices in commission of multiple armed robberies and aggravated assaults corroborated each other as to defendant's participation in the crimes, convictions on those offenses were upheld on appeal. Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 686, 660 S.E.2d 474 (2008).
Because of the corroborating testimony from the defendant's two accomplices, the accomplice testimony was admissible to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(3), and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Scott v. State, 302 Ga. App. 111, 690 S.E.2d 242 (2010).
There was sufficient corroboration of the defendant as a perpetrator of the principal crime, and, ultimately, sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary because there was circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant committed a similar transaction after the first incident, that the same gun an accomplice bought and used in the first crime was used in the second crime and ended up in a car at the house of the defendant's mother afterwards, and that the defendant was nervous and felt guilty about events that the defendant participated in with the accomplice, whom the defendant had only known a short time; that corroborative evidence connected the accomplice to the crimes. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit burglary, and sexual battery because two codefendant's testified that the defendant participated in the home invasion, and that testimony was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for the crimes committed at the home. Martinez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (2010).
Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and aggravated assault because the independent corroborating evidence in the case was substantial; an accomplice's testimony implicating the defendants was corroborated by the aggravated assault victim, who positively identified one of the defendants, that defendant's own admission to a woman in the defendant's apartment, evidence that the second defendant had sustained shotgun wounds on the evening of the crimes, ballistics evidence tying that defendant to the crime scene, and the presence of that defendant's blood on the first defendant's clothing and in the getaway vehicle. Ward v. State, 288 Ga. 641, 706 S.E.2d 430 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motions for directed verdict and new trial because the jury could have determined that a witness's testimony provided corroboration for the codefendant's identification of the defendant; further, corroboration for the testimony of the witness and the codefendant was provided by a neighbors' description of the robbery and shooting, by the description of the codefendant's wife of the codefendant's demeanor and behavior that day, and by physical evidence found at the scene. Williamson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 473, 708 S.E.2d 57 (2011).
Parties to crime.
- Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants were parties to the aggravated assault because the defendants supplied the shooter with the weapons and the bullets knowing that the shooter intended to use those items for a personal avengance against the intended victim and the shooter also attempted to fire at the occupants of the van. Cammon v. State, 269 Ga. 470, 500 S.E.2d 329 (1998).
Evidence that the defendant was seen making notes at the crime scene the day of the shooting, that the defendant accompanied the coconspirator knowing that the coconspirator intended to rob a cab driver, and that the defendant drove the coconspirator away after the shooting of the cab driver authorized the jury to find the defendant was a party to the crime of aggravated assault committed with a deadly weapon, and hence to felony murder. Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (2004).
Evidence was sufficient to show that a juvenile was a party to aggravated assault on the victim when the defendant and three other men approached the victim with guns, placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate injury, and the victim identified the juvenile to police as one of the men. In the Interest of M.D.L., 271 Ga. App. 738, 610 S.E.2d 687 (2005).
Despite the defendant's claim of innocence, convictions for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence showing that the defendant waited at the scene of the robbery and then assisted the codefendants in an attempted escape; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Jordan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151 (2006).
Defendant's aggravated assault and robbery convictions were upheld on appeal, as evidence including the defendant's admission and flight from the scene authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant went to an apartment complex intending to participate in the robbery, and in fact participated in the robbery by acting as a lookout and an additional show of force; hence, the jury was authorized to infer criminal intent from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Millender v. State, 286 Ga. App. 331, 648 S.E.2d 777 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1717, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 80 (Ga. 2008).
Evidence supported a conviction of aggravated assault with a knife when two codefendants repeatedly struck the victim, the defendant struck the victim and threatened the victim's life, the defendant and the first codefendant entered a pharmacy to buy duct tape, and while alone with the victim, the second codefendant held a knife on the victim where the second codefendant could reach the knife and where the victim could see the knife; this authorized the conclusion that the second codefendant committed aggravated assault and that the defendant was a party. Rhines v. State, 288 Ga. App. 128, 653 S.E.2d 500 (2007).
Evidence established more than the mere presence of the defendant during the commission of the offense of aggravated assault and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault: (1) the defendant assaulted the victim during the drive to the murder scene; (2) the defendant participated in a plot to burn the victim's body and stood lookout while the body was buried; (3) the defendant did not attempt to report the crime; and (4) the defendant watched as another person stabbed the victim before attempting to intervene. Navarrete v. State, 283 Ga. 156, 656 S.E.2d 814 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 104, 172 L. Ed. 2d 33 (2008).
Evidence that the defendant drove a codefendant away from the crime scene in a subdivision after the codefendant shot the victim and that a box of bullets was found in the defendant's car when the defendant was later arrested did not support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defendant's possession of a box of bullets of the same caliber as those used in the murder weapon in no way proved the defendant's possession of the weapon during the commission of the assault; driving the codefendant away with knowledge that the codefendant had committed the crime did not, in and of itself, render the defendant guilty as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20; and to the extent that the evidence that the defendant's car had been parked at some point with the car's front end facing in the direction going out of the subdivision constituted circumstantial evidence of guilt, the evidence did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Ratana v. State, 297 Ga. App. 747, 678 S.E.2d 193 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty as a party to malice murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and tampering with evidence because the evidence showed that before, during, and after the commission of the crimes, the defendant was present and shared companionship with the defendant's brothers; the state's evidence authorized the inferences that the defendant, who had assisted the defendant's brothers in attacking the cousin of one of the victims, was not an innocent bystander, that the defendant drove the defendant's brothers to the crime scene knowing that one of the brothers was armed, that the defendant willingly stayed with the defendant's brothers while the brothers tried to start a fight and threatened to kill someone, and that the defendant ran to the defendant's car and drove the brothers away immediately after the brothers had shot one of the victims. Teasley v. State, 288 Ga. 468, 704 S.E.2d 800 (2010).
State proved that the defendant possessed the intent required to commit the predicate aggravated assault and conspiracy felonies for the felony murder conviction because evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to conclude that the defendant, with a coparty and coconspirator, intended to rob the victim using a deadly weapon, that the victim was reasonably apprehensive of receiving a violent injury as a result of their intentional acts, and that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crimes for which the defendant was convicted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 498, 713 S.E.2d 376 (2011).
State did not have to prove the defendant had knowledge of the weapon to be convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during a felony, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit hijacking a motor vehicle. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find that the defendant conspired to rob the victims and murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. Hicks v. State, 295 Ga. 268, 759 S.E.2d 509 (2014).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crime of the aggravated assaults of the two victims because the jury could have concluded that the defendant accompanied the others to a house with the intent to invade a rival gang's neighborhood and that the defendant brought a gun in a black bag for that purpose; the co-defendants and other witnesses testified that the defendant had a gun at the time of the shooting, supporting an inference that the defendant displayed the gun, even if the defendant did not shoot the gun; and, after the shooting, the defendant came into the house, wiping off a gun. Taylor v. State, 331 Ga. App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (2015).
Coercion defense rejected.
- In a bench trial for armed robbery and aggravated assault, the evidence authorized the trial court to conclude that the state had sufficiently disproved the defendant's defense that the defendant had been coerced by one of the defendant's companions into committing the crimes; the defendant had not mentioned coercion in either of the defendant's two statements to police, one in which the defendant had admitted to committing the crimes, and it was not until trial that the defendant claimed coercion. Edwards v. State, 285 Ga. App. 227, 645 S.E.2d 699 (2007).
Identification of defendant.
- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, as defendant's challenge to that conviction was meritless; defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient had to be rejected because it was premised on the argument that the victims' identification of defendant as a perpetrator was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup and the photographic lineup procedure was not impermissibly suggestive. Evans v. State, 261 Ga. App. 22, 581 S.E.2d 676 (2003).
Because a burglary victim recognized the defendant before a photographic lineup was introduced, the defendant did not show deficient performance or prejudice based on trial counsel's failure to object to the lineup; in any event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, making terroristic threats, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1), (a)(2),16-7-1(a),16-8-41(a),16-11-37(a), and16-11-106(b)(1). Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 845, 608 S.E.2d 310 (2004).
Sufficient evidence supported convictions for aggravated assault, kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, even though none of the victims could identify the defendant as the gunman in the robbery due to the fact that the defendant wore a mask, because defendant was found shortly after the robbery with cash, weapons, a ski mask, a car and clothing matching the victims' description; surveillance videotape of the robbery was shown to the jury to determine whether defendant was the person on the videotape. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 625 S.E.2d 411 (2005).
Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal, as the victim's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the aggravated assault, both during and after the altercation, was sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction, and evidence of a subsequent altercation between the two, like evidence of a prior difficulty, was probative evidence that the victim immediately identified the defendant to police on the day of the incident. Bond v. State, 283 Ga. App. 620, 642 S.E.2d 223 (2007).
Because the evidence showed that the victim sufficiently identified the defendant as the perpetrator of an aggravated assault and armed robbery (1) to officers at the scene; (2) by means of a photographic lineup; and (3) at trial, the appeals court rejected the defendant's sufficiency challenge as to that element. Wallace v. State, 289 Ga. App. 497, 657 S.E.2d 874 (2008).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), rape, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), aggravated sexual battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b), kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), and aggravated sodomy, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a)(2), involving four different victims on three separate dates; both the husband and the wife, the victims in the first criminal incident, identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator of the crimes. Two separate DNA analyses testified to by two forensic biologists showed that the defendant's sperm was present in the vaginas of the other two female victims. Robins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 70, 679 S.E.2d 92 (2009).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-21 after a jury convicted the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment because the evidence was legally sufficient to support the crimes of which the defendant was convicted; the victim was shown a photo array containing six photographs and immediately picked the defendant's photo as the person who held a gun to the victim's head during the incident, and the victim also identified the defendant in court. Delgiudice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 397, 707 S.E.2d 603 (2011).
Trial court authorized to find defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
- See McKinney v. State, 166 Ga. App. 718, 305 S.E.2d 446 (1983).
Defendant's admission sufficient.
- Defendant's recorded admission to a co-worker that the defendant killed the victim with the assistance of a codefendant was sufficient to support a convictions for murder and aggravated assault. Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 539, 630 S.E.2d 410 (2006).
Evidence sufficient for conviction.
- See Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177, 308 S.E.2d 438 (1983); Davis v. State, 168 Ga. App. 272, 308 S.E.2d 602 (1983); Hall v. State, 172 Ga. App. 371, 323 S.E.2d 261 (1984); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 330 S.E.2d 383 (1985); Lucas v. State, 174 Ga. App. 580, 330 S.E.2d 792 (1985); Rucker v. State, 177 Ga. App. 779, 341 S.E.2d 228 (1986); Maxwell v. State, 178 Ga. App. 20, 342 S.E.2d 8 (1986); Gilstrap v. State, 256 Ga. 20, 342 S.E.2d 667 (1986); Laidler v. State, 180 Ga. App. 213, 348 S.E.2d 739 (1986); Roberson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 406, 349 S.E.2d 39 (1986); Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 366, 349 S.E.2d 255 (1986); Nelson v. State, 181 Ga. App. 455, 352 S.E.2d 636 (1987); Hanvey v. State, 186 Ga. App. 690, 368 S.E.2d 357 (1988); Conley v. State, 258 Ga. 339, 368 S.E.2d 502 (1988); Mapp v. State, 258 Ga. 273, 368 S.E.2d 511 (1988); Beal v. State, 186 Ga. App. 806, 368 S.E.2d 567 (1988); Roberson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 808, 368 S.E.2d 568 (1988); Jackson v. State, 258 Ga. 322, 368 S.E.2d 771 (1988); Walker v. State, 258 Ga. 443, 370 S.E.2d 149 (1988); Adams v. State, 187 Ga. App. 340, 370 S.E.2d 197 (1988); McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga. App. 840, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988); Young v. State, 188 Ga. App. 601, 373 S.E.2d 837 (1988); Fowler v. State, 188 Ga. App. 873, 374 S.E.2d 805 (1988); Benford v. State, 189 Ga. App. 761, 377 S.E.2d 530 (1989); Seagraves v. State, 191 Ga. App. 207, 381 S.E.2d 523 (1989); Davis v. State, 192 Ga. App. 47, 383 S.E.2d 615 (1989); Arnold v. State, 193 Ga. App. 206, 387 S.E.2d 417 (1989); Henderson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 200, 407 S.E.2d 448 (1991); Brown v. State, 200 Ga. App. 537, 408 S.E.2d 836 (1991); Turner v. State, 205 Ga. App. 745, 423 S.E.2d 439 (1992); In re J.K.D., 211 Ga. App. 776, 440 S.E.2d 524 (1994); Brown v. State, 215 Ga. App. 544, 451 S.E.2d 787 (1994); Adside v. State, 216 Ga. App. 129, 453 S.E.2d 139 (1995); Humphrey v. State, 218 Ga. App. 574, 462 S.E.2d 641 (1995); Durden v. State, 219 Ga. App. 732, 466 S.E.2d 641 (1995); Matthews v. State, 224 Ga. App. 407, 481 S.E.2d 235 (1997); Dukes v. State, 224 Ga. App. 305, 480 S.E.2d 340 (1997); Livingston v. State, 225 Ga. App. 512, 484 S.E.2d 311 (1997); Johnson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 863, 485 S.E.2d 551 (1997); McSears v. State, 226 Ga. App. 90, 485 S.E.2d 589 (1997); Taylor v. State, 226 Ga. App. 254, 485 S.E.2d 830 (1997); Miller v. State, 228 Ga. App. 754, 492 S.E.2d 734 (1997); Osborne v. State, 228 Ga. App. 758, 492 S.E.2d 732 (1997), overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998); Rivers v. State, 229 Ga. App. 12, 493 S.E.2d 2 (1997); Hawkins v. State, 230 Ga. App. 627, 497 S.E.2d 386 (1998); Louis v. State, 230 Ga. App. 897, 497 S.E.2d 824 (1998); In re J.J.K., 232 Ga. App. 470, 502 S.E.2d 313 (1998); Cheney v. State, 233 Ga. App. 66, 503 S.E.2d 327 (1998); Vick v. State, 237 Ga. App. 762, 516 S.E.2d 815 (1999); Butura v. State, 239 Ga. App. 132, 519 S.E.2d 18 (1999); Favors v. State, 238 Ga. App. 234, 518 S.E.2d 444 (1999); Anderson v. State, 238 Ga. App. 866, 519 S.E.2d 463 (1999); Young v. State, 238 Ga. App. 555, 519 S.E.2d 481 (1999); Grant v. State, 239 Ga. App. 608, 521 S.E.2d 654 (1999); Wright v. State, 240 Ga. App. 763, 525 S.E.2d 143 (1999); Lowery v. State, 242 Ga. App. 375, 530 S.E.2d 22 (2000); Carr v. State, 243 Ga. App. 557, 533 S.E.2d 756 (2000); Allen v. State, 243 Ga. App. 730, 534 S.E.2d 190 (2000); White v. State, 244 Ga. App. 54, 537 S.E.2d 364 (2000), aff'd, 273 Ga. 787, 546 S.E.2d 514 (2001); Green v. State, 244 Ga. App. 697, 536 S.E.2d 565 (2000); Strange v. State, 244 Ga. App. 635, 535 S.E.2d 315 (2000); Self v. State, 245 Ga. App. 270, 537 S.E.2d 723 (2000); Shepherd v. State, 245 Ga. App. 386, 537 S.E.2d 777 (2000); McLeod v. State, 245 Ga. App. 668, 538 S.E.2d 759 (2000); Hodges v. State, 248 Ga. App. 23, 545 S.E.2d 157 (2000); Johnson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 157, 543 S.E.2d 439 (2000); Young v. State, 245 Ga. App. 684, 538 S.E.2d 760 (2000); Free v. State, 245 Ga. App. 886, 539 S.E.2d 213 (2000); Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 549 S.E.2d 406 (2001); In the Interest of C.A., 249 Ga. App. 280, 548 S.E.2d 37 (2001); Etheridge v. State, 249 Ga. App. 111, 547 S.E.2d 744 (2001); Thurman v. State, 249 Ga. App. 390, 547 S.E.2d 715 (2001); Davis v. State, 249 Ga. App. 579, 548 S.E.2d 678 (2001); Allsup v. State, 250 Ga. App. 53, 550 S.E.2d 465 (2001); Hill v. State, 276 Ga. 220, 576 S.E.2d 886 (2003); Jackson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 727, 578 S.E.2d 298 (2003); Duckett v. State, 259 Ga. App. 814, 578 S.E.2d 524 (2003); Rust v. State, 264 Ga. App. 893, 592 S.E.2d 525 (2003); Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 608 S.E.2d 634 (2005); Miller v. State, 271 Ga. App. 524, 610 S.E.2d 156 (2005); Tiggs v. State, 287 Ga. App. 291, 651 S.E.2d 209 (2007); John v. State, 282 Ga. 792, 653 S.E.2d 435 (2007); Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No. S10P1859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 267 (Ga. 2011); Bradley v. State, 283 Ga. 45, 656 S.E.2d 842 (2008); McGordon v. State, 298 Ga. App. 161, 679 S.E.2d 743 (2009); Hargrove v. State, 299 Ga. App. 27, 681 S.E.2d 707 (2009); Clark v. State, 299 Ga. App. 558, 683 S.E.2d 93 (2009); In the Interest of J. W., 306 Ga. App. 339, 702 S.E.2d 649 (2010).
Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault when the defendant, a passenger in a taxicab, put a knife to the throat of the driver and forced the driver to a different destination, and a struggle ensued resulting in the driver restraining the defendant. Fair v. State, 172 Ga. App. 49, 321 S.E.2d 790 (1984); Black v. State, 261 Ga. 791, 410 S.E.2d 740 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 839, 113 S. Ct. 118, 121 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1992).
When the defendant was found inside his former girlfriend's broken-into apartment, hid in a bathroom enclosure, with a removed kitchen knife and a letter recognizing defendant's own propensity for violence, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary since there was sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to commit an aggravated assault. Johnson v. State, 207 Ga. App. 34, 427 S.E.2d 29 (1993).
Rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Walden v. State, 264 Ga. 92, 441 S.E.2d 247 (1994).
In light of the overwhelming evidence produced at trial, even though one victim expressed some uncertainty regarding defendant's identity, a rational trier of fact could determine defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 441 S.E.2d 262 (1994).
Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, evidence that the defendant identified the defendant as the person who shot the victim was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault. Cyrus v. State, 231 Ga. App. 71, 498 S.E.2d 554 (1998).
Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Lattimer v. State, 231 Ga. App. 594, 499 S.E.2d 671 (1998).
Voice identification testimony, along with circumstantial evidence showing invaders were familiar with the internal operations and layout of the store, allowed the jury to reach the conclusion that defendant was guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga. App. 140, 499 S.E.2d 922 (1998).
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of robbery, aggravated assault, felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, attempting to elude a law enforcement officer and driving under the influence of drugs. Chisholm v. State, 231 Ga. App. 835, 500 S.E.2d 14 (1998).
Evidence, which included a positive identification by two eyewitnesses who testified that the defendants kicked the victim repeatedly, was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts. Cox v. State, 242 Ga. App. 334, 528 S.E.2d 871 (2000).
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime against a person because: (1) the codefendant jumped out of the car defendant was driving and told the victim and two other men to empty their pockets as the codefendant was robbing the victims and then the codefendant began shooting; and (2) the victim was shot in the head and later died. Thomas v. State, 275 Ga. 882, 572 S.E.2d 537 (2002).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 where four victims testified that they either saw or heard shots fired from defendant's truck and were frightened as a result. Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 94, 576 S.E.2d 71 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime where the record revealed that the defendant was riding in a car, made a gang sign to some people on the street, and in response to their obscene gesture, the defendant took out a gun and fired at them, killing two people and wounding one; the defendant's contention that the defendant was acting to protect the defendant and others in the car, that the defendant fired into the air, and that the defendant did not mean to hurt anyone was found to lack merit. Ingram v. State, 276 Ga. 223, 576 S.E.2d 855 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant reached around the victim and cut the victim's throat, and then stabbed the victim twice in the back. Bell v. State, 276 Ga. 206, 576 S.E.2d 876 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault where defendant repeatedly hit the victim with a skillet, and knocked the victim unconscious. Lord v. State, 259 Ga. App. 449, 577 S.E.2d 103 (2003).
Evidence, including the victim's unequivocal identification of defendant from a book of 150 pictures and the victim's identification of defendant at trial, was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Baker v. State, 259 Ga. App. 433, 577 S.E.2d 282 (2003), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of malice murder, felony murder, burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony where the defendant: (1) planned the crimes, and was armed with a gun and handcuffs; (2) broke into the defendant's in-laws' house after severing their phone line; (3) shot and killed the defendant's father-in-law and wounded the defendant's mother-in-law while they lay in bed; (4) handcuffed the defendant's bleeding mother-in-law to the mother-in-law's nine-year-old child and left them tethered to a bed rail in a room with the mother-in-law's dead spouse and the defendant's two-year-old child; and (5) abducted the defendant's estranged spouse and the spouse's 17 year-old sibling to a mobile home where the defendant made them take showers while the defendant watched, and then raped them both. Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 902, 124 S. Ct. 251, 157 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of aggravated assault with a knife, aggravated assault with defendant's fists and feet, and false imprisonment, where the police found defendant's love interest laying on the floor of a hotel room, bruised, with knives in the hotel room, and the love interest testified that defendant had kicked and hit the love interest. Banks v. State, 260 Ga. App. 515, 580 S.E.2d 308 (2003).
Circumstantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, armed robbery, cruelty to children, theft by receiving stolen property, and possession of a firearm as: (1) defendant was driving a stolen car that defendant knew was not defendant's own; (2) defendant returned to the victims' house, which defendant had left only a short time before, slowly circling the victims' residence, pointing at the house; (3) defendant appeared to let codefendants out of the car for a specific purpose, since defendant saw them enter the victims' home and waited for them, demonstrating that defendant knew they would return shortly; (4) when codefendants ran back to the car and jumped in, defendant drove off in response to their rapid return; and (5) shortly thereafter, defendant abandoned the stolen car. Parnell v. State, 260 Ga. App. 213, 581 S.E.2d 263 (2003).
Evidence that defendant unlawfully entered the victim's residence with intent to commit assault therein and was in possession of a gun was sufficient for conviction. Simmons v. State, 262 Ga. App. 164, 585 S.E.2d 93 (2003).
Defendant was properly found guilty of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, aggravated assault with intent to rob under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 where the footprints observed along the path between the crime scene and the area where defendant was apprehended matched the size and soles of defendant's shoes and defendant was identified as the robber based on defendant's clothing, shoes and "build." Mack v. State, 263 Ga. App. 186, 587 S.E.2d 132 (2003).
Even though the store clerk did not testify, the evidence of the store surveillance videotape of defendant waiving a gun at the store clerk was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, despite the defendant's contentions that the videotape was ambiguous as the weight and credibility to be assigned to the videotape was solely within the purview of the jury. Cecil v. State, 263 Ga. App. 48, 587 S.E.2d 197 (2003).
Evidence that defendant, who was seated in the passenger seat of an automobile, and the victim, who was standing outside the automobile, argued, that the victim hit defendant, and that defendant then shot the victim, paralyzing the victim, was sufficient to sustain defendant's aggravated assault conviction. Bailey v. State, 263 Ga. App. 614, 588 S.E.2d 807 (2003).
Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault for participating in breaking down the door of an apartment belonging to the victim and the victim's spouse because the spouse was dizzy and crying during the incident in which shots were fired. Meadows v. State, 264 Ga. App. 160, 590 S.E.2d 173 (2003).
Rational trier of fact was authorized to find that both defendants burglarized the victims' residence; that, once inside, they took money, clothing, and other personal property by use of a gun; that the first defendant also committed an aggravated assault on the victim by striking the victim in the head with a handgun and was, therefore, in possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; and that both defendants, along with their cohorts, had been in possession of the cocaine which was tossed out the vehicle they were riding in and found along the roadway. Davis v. State, 264 Ga. App. 221, 590 S.E.2d 192 (2003).
When defendant robbed victims at gunpoint with two accomplices, the testimony of one accomplice that defendant was involved in the robbery was sufficient to corroborate testimony to the same effect from defendant's other accomplice and sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-5-21(a)(1), (2). Gallimore v. State, 264 Ga. App. 629, 591 S.E.2d 485 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for arson, felony murder, and aggravated assault, resulting from a fire set at a residence occupied by defendant's sister-in-law, her four children, and her 12-year-old brother where: (1) defendant confronted defendant's sister-in-law at her home, alleging that she had stolen items from defendant's mobile home; (2) a physical altercation ensued between defendant and the sister-in-law; (3) defendant retrieved a gasoline can from defendant's car, poured gasoline onto the back door of the sister-in-law's home, and ignited it; and (4) the sister-in-law's three-year-old child died from the injuries sustained in the fire. Tarvin v. State, 277 Ga. 509, 591 S.E.2d 777 (2004).
Evidence was sufficient to affirm defendant's aggravated assault conviction; whether defendant engaged in unprovoked attacks, acted in self-defense, or acted in defense of the defendant's love interest was for the jury to resolve, and it obviously resolved the question in defendant's disfavor. Chalvatzis v. State, 265 Ga. App. 699, 595 S.E.2d 558 (2004).
Since the jury was to weigh the credibility of the witnesses testimony and was instructed on self defense, accident, and criminal intent, its decision to believe the victim's and the victim's love interest's story regarding how a stabbing occurred instead of defendant's version of the events and its subsequent decision related to defendant's intent in the stabbing, were controlling on appeal and was sufficient for defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Hazelwood v. State, 265 Ga. App. 709, 595 S.E.2d 564 (2004).
Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant committed an aggravated assault against the victims where it showed that after one victim separated defendant and defendant's sibling, who were involved in a minor altercation, defendant left and came back with a gun, which defendant fired into the truck in which the victims were sitting; accordingly, the evidence showed defendant intended to commit violence to the person of another. Bishop v. State, 266 Ga. App. 129, 596 S.E.2d 674 (2004).
Evidence of defendant's voluntary and willing participation in the crimes, through providing the use of defendant's car to transport the other three named in the indictment to and from the scene and waiting in the vehicle while two of them committed aggravated assault, burglary, murder, and aggravated robbery, supported defendant's convictions for the same as a co-conspirator. Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (2004).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions as a party to the offenses of armed robbery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, burglary, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-5-41,16-7-1, and16-8-41, because: (1) defendant received information from the defendant's love interest, about the victims' house, the location of safes, where money was located, and about the alarm system; (2) the day after the home invasion the love interest saw defendant and defendant showed the love interest a stack of cash, and defendant told the love interest it might be the victim's money; and (3) an FBI informant met with defendant and defendant told the informant that defendant had been shorted money from the robbery, and that defendant got the layout of the house from the former daughter-in-law. Pope v. State, 266 Ga. App. 658, 598 S.E.2d 48 (2004).
Victim's testimony that the victim saw defendant remove what the victim thought was a gun from defendant's waistband, heard a clicking noise, and was so afraid that defendant would shoot victim that the victim jumped from a moving car, after which the victim heard what sounded like a shot being fired as the victim jumped, was sufficient to allow a rational jury to convict defendant of aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Jefferies v. State, 267 Ga. App. 694, 600 S.E.2d 753 (2004).
Defendant's statements to police and the victim's prior inconsistent statements were sufficient to support conviction for aggravated assault, despite the fact that the victim recanted at trial. Wyche-Hinkle v. State, 268 Ga. App. 898, 602 S.E.2d 902 (2004).
There was sufficient credible evidence to support a jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of committing voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-2 and16-5-21, respectively, because there was testimony from three surviving witnesses that the defendant shot at their car as they drove by, killing one of the occupants; there was further testimony that the parties had a history of disputes between themselves, that the victim's brother had fired a shot at the defendant earlier in the day, and the defendant's claim that the defendant thought that as the car drove by, the victim was reaching for a gun, was not found credible. Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. App. 271, 605 S.E.2d 913 (2004).
There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and of malice murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, because the defendant saw the victim trying to break up a fight between the victim's sibling and another person, the defendant became angry and followed the victim and the victim's sibling after the fight broke up, the defendant then swore at them and shot at them, and the defendant's claim of self-defense was not found to be credible. Harris v. State, 278 Ga. 596, 604 S.E.2d 788 (2004).
Evidence was sufficient to support felony murder and aggravated assault convictions because: (1) defendant, after exchanging blows with the defendant's spouse while in a car, left the area but returned shortly thereafter in the car; (2) one eyewitness saw defendant strike the defendant's spouse with the front of the car, back up striking the defendant's spouse again with the rear of the car, and drive off; (3) other witnesses saw two people brought to the scene by defendant beating and stomping the victim; and (4) the medical examiner testified that the victim died from blunt force head trauma consistent with being struck by a vehicle and that the force of the fatal blow would most likely have left the victim unconscious or unable to walk around. Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 606 S.E.2d 269 (2004).
Sufficient evidence, including testimony from the child victim identifying defendant's vehicle, evidence of defendant's DNA matching that of the victim and expert testimony that the frequency of such occurrence was approximately one in two billion in the Caucasian population, and similar transaction evidence, supported defendant's kidnapping with bodily injury, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, aggravated assault, and first-degree cruelty to children convictions. Morita v. State, 270 Ga. App. 372, 606 S.E.2d 595 (2004).
In addition to the second codefendant's testimony, the state showed that, shortly after the murder, defendant was in possession of the victim's cab, that the victim's blood was found in the vehicle and on defendant, and that defendant made incriminating admissions to others; thus, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt of malice murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Wicks v. State, 278 Ga. 550, 604 S.E.2d 768 (2004).
Evidence that the defendant's vehicle was seen at the victim's residence around the time the victim was murdered, the defendant's subsequent arrest in a hotel room paid for with the victim's credit card, and the presence of the victim's blood on the defendant's boots when arrested was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Moore v. State, 279 Ga. 45, 609 S.E.2d 340 (2005).
Defendant's multiple convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, burglary, and kidnapping with bodily injury, were supported by sufficient evidence because defendant and another robbed a store while holding the two owners at gunpoint, the defendant led police on a high-speed car chase, and the defendant broke into and robbed two homes, one of which had an occupant that the defendant beat; only one store owner's testimony was needed to establish the facts to support the aggravated assault conviction. Owens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and giving a false statement when the defendant and the codefendant were arrested when the codefendant sought medical treatment for a gunshot wound sustained in the incident, the codefendant gave police a false name and said the codefendant was shot when someone tried to rob the codefendant, the codefendant told a neighbor who saw the wound that someone else was worse off than the codefendant was, the defendant asked the neighbor's niece to tell police the codefendant was at the niece's house on the night of the crime and was robbed when the codefendant left, and, while in jail, the defendant told one inmate the defendant shot someone in the incident and told another inmate the defendant was involved in a robbery of this victim that went bad, and that the defendant and the codefendant had been looking for a safe with money and marijuana. Styles v. State, 279 Ga. 134, 610 S.E.2d 23 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and burglary, after the defendant threatened and broke a window in the victim's home, reached in and tried to grab the victim, and the victim positively identified the defendant in a show-up identification that was found to be fair under the totality of the circumstances. Taylor v. State, 271 Ga. App. 701, 610 S.E.2d 668 (2005).
Sufficient evidence supported aggravated assault conviction because both the victim and another witness testified that defendant stabbed the victim, and a nurse testified that the victim's injury was serious. Hampton v. State, 272 Ga. App. 273, 612 S.E.2d 96 (2005).
Defendant's rape conviction was proper, even though defendant was acquitted of kidnapping with bodily injury, false imprisonment, and aggravated assault, as Georgia did not recognize the inconsistent verdict rule; further, the convictions were not necessarily inconsistent as the jury could have found that defendant raped the victim, but did not commit the other crimes. Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521 (2005).
Because the victim's statement of sexual abuse was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to convict defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated child molestation, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, the victim's testimony did not have to be corroborated by physical evidence. Gartrell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 726, 613 S.E.2d 226 (2005).
Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter because: (1) defendant and the victim had threatened to kill each other; (2) the victim died from a gunshot wound inflicted when the victim "stepped in" to a fight between defendant and another; (3) the victim did not have a gun or own a gun; and (4) the fatal head wound was inflicted from at least two-and-a-half to three feet away and rendered the victim unconscious. Hall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (2005).
Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, because there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated assault and reckless conduct, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-5-60(b), respectively; the defendant and the codefendants were involved in a physical altercation with two restaurant patrons, and a codefendant's testimony that the defendant retrieved a gun and shot the victim was sufficiently repeated by the testimony of other witnesses, who also connected the defendant with the shooting pursuant to the corroboration requirement in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Baker v. State, 273 Ga. App. 297, 614 S.E.2d 904 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault, as an eyewitness testified that the defendant was the only person to pull out a weapon in a confrontation at a nightclub, that the defendant fired a weapon at the victim, who had previously struck the defendant's love interest, and at two other victims who were attempting to leave. Rodriguez v. State, 274 Ga. App. 549, 618 S.E.2d 177 (2005).
Because defendant fatally stabbed the estranged spouse's love interest, stabbed the spouse in the head, and then bragged about the actions, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of malice murder and aggravated assault. Henry v. State, 279 Ga. 615, 619 S.E.2d 609 (2005).
Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-5-24,16-5-40, and16-11-106, respectively, were supported by the evidence, as defendant was engaged in a domestic dispute with defendant's spouse and child, wherein defendant argued, threatened to kill them, and locked them in a bathroom, punched and hit the spouse, and stabbed them each multiple times with a decorative sword that defendant had removed from the wall; there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant did not stab them in the midst of a struggle over possession of the sword, but instead, that defendant intended to stab or cut them. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).
Defendant's convictions of aggravated stalking, burglary, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-91,16-7-1,16-5-21, and16-5-41, were supported by sufficient evidence because, despite the victim's recantation at trial, the victim stated to police earlier that defendant broke into the victim's apartment, scratched and damaged furniture and other property, tied the victim up, locked the victim in the bedroom for several hours, harmed the victim, threatened that defendant and defendant's friends were going to lock the victim in a basement for a few months, and defendant had been waiting for the victim to arrive home. Andrews v. State, 275 Ga. App. 426, 620 S.E.2d 629 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for felony and malice murder, and aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21, as well as a possession of a firearm conviction, because defendant helped a sibling retaliate against the victim, who had previously sold the sibling fake drugs, by going to the victim's place of work, fatally shooting the victim multiple times, and planting fake drugs on the body; defendant's claim that defendant was in another state at the time of the incident was refuted by a copy of the criminal history which showed that defendant was out on bail just days before the incident, as well as testimony from the victim's roommate. Copprue v. State, 279 Ga. 771, 621 S.E.2d 457 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for malice murder and aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21, respectively, as well as for possession of a firearm during a felony, because defendant was identified by multiple witnesses as having fatally shot the victim; defendant and the friends joined the victim's basketball game and when their team lost, defendant took the bet money, pulled out a gun, and started firing at the victim and the teammates. Agee v. State, 279 Ga. 774, 621 S.E.2d 434 (2005).
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find defendant committed felony murder and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt when there was testimony that defendant was seen wearing a trench coat, waved down the victim's vehicle, leaned in through an open window in the vehicle, fled after firing two shots, saying, "I believe I shot him," forensic evidence was consistent with this testimony, defendant and a codefendant were earlier seen trying to sell a gun, a trench coat with missing buttons was found in the codefendant's house, and its buttons matched a button found in the victim's car. Burns v. State, 280 Ga. 24, 622 S.E.2d 352 (2005).
Evidence regarding defendant's holding a knife to a love interest's throat and demanding money sustained defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Smith v. State, 276 Ga. App. 41, 622 S.E.2d 413 (2005).
After defendant and the victim were engaged in a heated verbal exchange, defendant went to a room and obtained a serrated knife, returned to where the victim was and stabbed the victim in the chest, which resulted in the victim's heart being punctured, and defendant later admitted to the stabbing, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of finding defendant guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21, as well as possession of a knife during the commission of a felony; the jury was authorized to find defendant's claim of self-defense lacking in credibility. Delanoval v. State, 280 Ga. 36, 622 S.E.2d 811 (2005).
Defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony were supported by sufficient evidence; while defendant argued that defendant acted in self-defense in stabbing the victim in the chest during a confrontation, the jury was authorized to disbelieve defendant's testimony in favor of the testimony of the state's witnesses. Delanoval v. State, 280 Ga. 36, 622 S.E.2d 811 (2005).
Defendant's convictions for malice murder, burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another were supported by sufficient evidence because: (1) defendant broke into the office where the victim was living; (2) defendant hit the victim several times on the head and body with a pair of pliers; (3) defendant choked the victim with the defendant's hands and arms, and with the pliers, until the victim was dead; (4) defendant took the victim's credit card and driver's license; and (5) defendant disposed of the victim's body. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005).
Denial of defendant's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict was proper as the evidence established the essential elements of attempted arson and aggravated assault; the evidence showed that defendant poured gasoline near two ignition sources (a light bulb and hot water heater) in the crawlspace of the estranged love interest's house and then told the estranged love interest's adult children to light the water heater's pilot flame. McGraw v. State, 276 Ga. App. 607, 624 S.E.2d 232 (2005).
Convictions of murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were supported by sufficient evidence showing that while the victim was in the process of buying drugs from a third party, the defendant approached the driver's side of the victim's car, demanded the victim's money, and shot the victim several times, killing the victim and injuring a passenger in the car; the seller of the drugs testified that the seller had observed the defendant carrying a gun, and both the codefendant and another witness identified the defendant as the shooter. Major v. State, 280 Ga. 746, 632 S.E.2d 661 (2006).
Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for malice murder and aggravated assault as: (1) when a cab driver arrived to pick up a passenger at the defendant's apartment, the defendant was waiting outside and told the cab driver to wait while the defendant returned to the apartment; (2) the cab driver heard several gunshots immediately before the defendant ran to the cab and told the cab driver to "go"; (3) during the ride, the cab driver observed drops of blood on the defendant's clothing and overheard the defendant state in a cell phone call that the defendant "got the guy who owed (the defendant) money"; (4) the police traced the phone call to the defendant's uncle; and (5) the defendant later confided to a friend that the defendant shot and killed someone, that the defendant left in a cab, and that the defendant made a phone call with the cab driver's phone. Puga-Cerantes v. State, 281 Ga. 78, 635 S.E.2d 118 (2006).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of two counts of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; two witnesses testified that the defendant had told them that the defendant shot the victim, and one of the witnesses testified that the defendant stated that the shooting occurred during a robbery, the defendant discarded a gun that was later found to be the murder weapon while fleeing police on another crime, and the defendant admitted to police that the murder weapon was the defendant's, that the defendant stole $100 from the victims, and that the defendant shot the murder victim. Chenoweth v. State, 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (2006).
Evidence that there was an 80 to 90 percent chance that injuries that caused the death of a defendant's 10-month-old child were inflicted within an hour of the child's death, that the defendant left the apartment at 4:10 P.M., that an attending physician was called to the emergency room at 5:46 P.M., and that the child was dead on arrival at the emergency room was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder while in commission of cruelty to a child in the second degree, aggravated assault, and cruelty to a child in the first degree; the evidence permitted the jury to conclude that the time frame in which the child's injuries were inflicted included the time before the defendant left for work, there was evidence concerning the defendant's actions before and after the child's death that indicated the defendant's guilt, and the jury was not required to accept the defendant's version of events. White v. State, 281 Ga. 276, 637 S.E.2d 645 (2006).
Aggravated assault conviction was upheld, as supported by sufficient evidence, including: (1) properly admitted similar transaction evidence; (2) the indictment charging the defendant was not defective; (3) the court's slip of the tongue did not mislead or confuse the jury; (4) a justification instruction was not warranted; and (5) the defendant failed to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Scott v. State, 281 Ga. App. 813, 637 S.E.2d 751 (2006).
Because the state showed that the victim had an apprehension, reasonable under the circumstances, of immediately receiving a violent injury, this testimony, if believed, together with a finding that the defendant intended to drive rapidly out of the car wash while dragging the victim, was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault; further, an assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) did not require that a defendant act with criminal intent in regard to the victim, but did require that an intentional act be shown. Kirkland v. State, 282 Ga. App. 331, 638 S.E.2d 784 (2006).
Because conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses, including the state's witness, were a matter of credibility for the jury to decide, and because the defendant cited no authority suggesting that the instructions in question were incorrect statements of the law, and did not explain an assertion that they were confusing, convictions armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence. Lattimore v. State, 282 Ga. App. 435, 638 S.E.2d 848 (2006).
Because the victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, when said evidence showed: (1) two separate aggravated assaults, one with a knife and one with a hammer; (2) two separate instances of simple battery; and (3) a hours-long detention of the victim by the defendant, said evidence amply supported the jury's conviction on the charges of false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and simple battery. Brigman v. State, 282 Ga. App. 481, 639 S.E.2d 359 (2006).
Even though the victim was the only witness who could testify that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crimes of robbery by force and aggravated assault, said testimony was enough to establish the defendant's identity as one of the assailants; moreover, the lack of corroboration went only to the weight of the evidence and the victim's credibility, matters which were solely within the purview of the jury. Thomas v. State, 282 Ga. App. 522, 639 S.E.2d 531 (2006).
Pictures of a defendant withdrawing money from a victim's ATM account and evidence that the defendant repeatedly asked the victim for the PIN number for the victim's ATM card, held a knife to the victim's neck, cut the cord used to tie the victim, and had cash, an ATM receipt, and the victim's car keys when the defendant was arrested were sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and two counts of possessing a knife during the commission of a crime. Wright v. State, 282 Ga. App. 649, 639 S.E.2d 581 (2006).
Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and first-degree child cruelty pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a),16-5-24(a), and16-5-70(b) for participating in a drive-by shooting were supported by sufficient evidence because the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) and it was the function of the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses; based on the testimony of the witnesses to the shooting, a reasonable jury could have rejected the defendant's claims and determined that the defendant was a party to each of the crimes. Hill v. State, 282 Ga. App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (2006).
There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder and aggravated assault resulting from an incident when shots were fired from a van at the victims, who were riding in a car that had formerly belonged to a drug dealer; the defendant had argued with the drug dealer the day of the shooting, the defendant's wrecked car was found in the same place as the van, the surviving victim identified the defendant as the driver of the van, the van had been traded to the defendant's brother, and even if the defendant did not actually fire the shots, being the driver would authorize the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a). Yancey v. State, 281 Ga. 664, 641 S.E.2d 524 (2007).
There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder and aggravated assault; after an argument at the victims' house over money, the defendant returned to the house with a concealed pistol, demanded money from the first victim, pulled out the pistol after the first victim said that the first victim was not afraid of the defendant, and shot the two victims. Shelton v. State, 281 Ga. 660, 641 S.E.2d 536 (2007).
Given that sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant planned and attempted an armed robbery, and the victim was killed during that attempted robbery with the defendant's gun, when such was coupled with evidence that the defendant threatened the victim with a reasonable apprehension of a violent attack, both an aggravated assault and felony murder conviction were upheld on appeal. Willingham v. State, 281 Ga. 577, 642 S.E.2d 43 (2007).
As the evidence provided by the state at defendants' criminal trial demonstrated that based on information from defendant-B regarding a large quantity of marijuana possessed by a victim, defendant-A and another man forcibly entered the victim's residence while defendant-A was armed, pushed the victim to the ground, demanded to know where the marijuana was, and a physical struggle resulted, the evidence supported defendants' convictions for burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault; defendant-B was convicted as a party to the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(4). Garland v. State, 283 Ga. App. 622, 642 S.E.2d 320 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 282 Ga. 201, 657 S.E.2d 842 (2008).
When the victim was killed during the theft of the victim's vehicle, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict the defendant of felony murder, aggravated assault, and armed robbery; the defendant told others where the vehicle was, then stripped the vehicle; a call was placed from the victim's cell phone to the house of one of the defendant's grandparents; police found some of the victim's belongings at the home of the defendant's cousin; and a witness and two cousins of the defendant stated that the defendant admitted shooting the victim. Paige v. State, 281 Ga. 504, 639 S.E.2d 478 (2007).
Defendant's felony murder and aggravated assault convictions were both upheld on appeal as evidence of the victim's prior violent acts was properly excluded given that at the time of the confrontation with the defendant, the victim was no longer the aggressor, and the defendant failed to show prejudice resulting from the admission of a knife that was not used in the altercation, into evidence, and in fact, the knife had been removed from the scene by police before the incident involving the defendant and the victim occurred. Milner v. State, 281 Ga. 612, 641 S.E.2d 517 (2007).
Evidence of a prior aggravated assault conviction was sufficiently similar to be admissible to show a defendant's bent of mind in initiating the stabbing of a victim and to rebut the defendant's assertion of self-defense. Cockrell v. State, 281 Ga. 536, 640 S.E.2d 262 (2007).
When the unarmed victim advanced on the defendant, who had a baseball bat, and the defendant swung twice at the victim, then hit the victim on the head with the bat after the victim lost the victim's balance, the jury at the defendant's aggravated assault trial was entitled to conclude that the defendant was not justified in using force greater than that necessary for self-defense; the evidence, including the defendant's bragging at a party that night about the incident and telling an acquaintance a few days later that the acquaintance was "riding with a murderer," supported the conviction. Fields v. State, 285 Ga. App. 345, 646 S.E.2d 326 (2007).
Upon the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt provided by the victim supporting a charge of aggravated assault, despite the trial court's erroneous act requiring the defendant to introduce a certified copy of the victim's prior conviction to impeach, the defendant's aggravated assault conviction was upheld; moreover, the evidence in the record revealed that the jury chose to believe the victim, despite the issues involving the victim's prior record. Johnson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 724, 644 S.E.2d 544, cert. denied, No. S07C1179, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. 2007).
Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct in connection with the death of the 16-month-old victim since: the defendant repeatedly fed the victim tomatoes despite the victim's allergic reactions to the tomatoes; two days before the victim's fatal injuries, the victim had numerous bruises, a black eye, and a split bottom lip; while the victim was in the hospital for the fatal injuries, the defendant repeatedly asked a babysitter to persuade the defendant's five-year-old child to say that the child had taken the victim out of the bathtub; the defendant asked medical personnel whether it could be proven that the victim was shaken; and medical evidence showed that the victim's death was consistent with violent shaking by a person of adult strength. Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).
Defendant's claim on appeal that convictions for aggravated assault and kidnapping had to be reversed because the victim's testimony was unworthy of belief lacked merit as it was the role of the fact finder, not the appellate court, to determine whether a witness was credible; moreover, the testimony of the victim alone was sufficient to support a finding of guilt. Bragg v. State, 285 Ga. App. 408, 646 S.E.2d 508 (2007).
There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of child molestation, kidnapping with bodily injury, kidnapping, and aggravated assault when the defendant, who lived with an ex-girlfriend and her teenage daughter, called them into a bedroom and bound the ex-girlfriend's arms, legs, and mouth with duct tape, threatened the women with a hatchet, and led the daughter to another bedroom where the defendant duct-taped her hands and feet and forced her to have intercourse with him. Phillips v. State, 284 Ga. App. 683, 644 S.E.2d 535 (2007).
Evidence was sufficient to support the three defendants' convictions of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after: the victims were shot from a gold SUV and the first defendant owned a gold SUV; the first defendant, who had been robbed the day before, stated that the first defendant "wanted to straighten about the money"; the third defendant met the first two defendants at a hotel and transferred weapons into the gold SUV; the first defendant pointed to a person outside the hotel and said "Let him have it"; and the third defendant later wondered if one of the victims was dead. Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 875, 644 S.E.2d 116 (2007).
Because the testimony from the aggravated assault victim's girlfriend about observing the defendant stab the victim was sufficient, standing alone, to support an aggravated assault conviction, the conviction was upheld on appeal. Diop v. State, 285 Ga. App. 312, 645 S.E.2d 756 (2007).
In a case when a defendant was adjudicated delinquent based on aggravated assault, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the defendant was the one who shot the victim because the victim was unable to identify the defendant after the incident and because the defendant's gunshot residue test came back negative; an officer testified that the victim's failure to identify the defendant after the shooting was likely due to the victim's medical condition at the time, and the victim identified the defendant as the shooter at the hearing. In the Interest of B.S., 284 Ga. App. 680, 644 S.E.2d 527 (2007).
Given that the circumstantial evidence presented against the defendant sufficiently showed that: (1) the victim shot one of the intruders who committed the burglary; (2) shortly after the burglary, the defendant was treated for a gunshot wound and arrived at the hospital in a vehicle matching the description of the automobile seen leaving the crime scene; (3) the DNA evidence on ski masks found at the scene matched that of the owner of the car and the other passenger, who was also the defendant's brother; and (4) according to the defendant's brother, the driver of the car admitted to shooting the victim, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were affirmed on appeal. Sherman v. State, 284 Ga. App. 809, 644 S.E.2d 901 (2007).
Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after the defendant went to the victim's laundromat and waited until the victim opened a change machine, pointed a gun at the victim's head and ordered the victim to put the money in a bag, told the victim, "Hell, yeah, I'll kill you," and shot the victim multiple times; eyewitnesses, including two who knew the defendant, identified the defendant as the perpetrator. Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. 760, 642 S.E.2d 817 (2007).
Evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault even though the defendant claimed that the defendant merely accidentally fired a gun at the victim, the evidence indicated that the defendant intentionally fired at and struck the victim.
Because sufficient evidence was presented consisting of the victim's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of a burglary, who threatened the victim with a sharp, knife-like letter opener, forcing the victim into a closet, and stealing the victim's camera upon fleeing, sufficient evidence supported the defendant's burglary, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping convictions. Bryant v. State, 286 Ga. App. 493, 649 S.E.2d 597 (2007).
There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of aggravated assault when after the victim flicked a cigarette that landed on the defendant's car seat, the defendant said "I'll shoot you," and pointed a gun at the victim; although the defendant claimed that the defendant and the victim were just joking around, the evidence presented was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant's act placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (2007).
There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault when about 15 minutes after arguing with the victim, the defendant returned and shot the victim after the defendant's companion tried to hit the victim with a car; the victim, who had previously known the defendant, picked the defendant's picture from a photographic lineup, and the defendant admitted shooting at the victim.
There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and the jury was entitled to disbelieve family members who testified that the defendant was out of state when the crimes occurred; the defendant pointed a handgun at the two victims and told the victims to give the defendant the keys to the van in which the victims were loading scooters, shot one victim in the chest, and ran away, after which the defendant's companions drove the van after the defendant. Edwards v. State, 282 Ga. 259, 646 S.E.2d 663 (2007).
There was sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of juvenile delinquency based on convictions of aggravated assault and of felony and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer; after threatening to slash the victim's throat, the defendant produced a knife and opened the blade, and when officers arrived at the defendant's residence to arrest the defendant, the defendant screamed obscenities and fled to another home before assuming a "fighting stance," placing the defendant's fists in front of the defendant's face, and yelling obscenities at officers while refusing to obey the officers' commands. In the Interest of D.D., 287 Ga. App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007).
Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault based on the defendant's attack on a fellow prison inmate when, although an officer who allegedly witnessed the attack was not called as a witness, both the victim and another eyewitness testified that the defendant attacked the victim; even without the actual weapon being introduced into evidence, the testimony that the defendant used a metal knife or shank to stab the victim was sufficient to support the conviction and the jury was authorized to conclude that defendant's alibi witnesses, who gave inconsistent alibis for the defendant and who all had felony convictions, were not credible. Cail v. State, 287 Ga. App. 547, 652 S.E.2d 190 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).
Evidence from eyewitnesses that the defendant had been in a heated argument with the victim, the defendant left the scene and returned with a gun, the defendant again argued with the victim, pulling out the gun and shooting the victim three times, and that the bullets recovered from the victim confirmed that the bullets were fired from the defendant's weapon, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to reject the defendant's self-defense claim and to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Bolston v. State, 282 Ga. 400, 651 S.E.2d 19 (2007).
Evidence supported the defendant's aggravated assault conviction when the defendant came to a married couple's home, grabbed the wife and threatened to cut her throat, then struggled with the husband over a gun and tried to shoot the husband and both the husband and the wife identified the defendant as the perpetrator in separate photo lineups and at trial; discrepancies regarding the clothes that the perpetrator was wearing and what the defendant was wearing when the defendant was apprehended were for the jury to resolve, and inconsistencies in a witness's statement regarding time were for the jury to resolve and did not make it impossible that the defendant could have been at the crime scene. Brown v. State, 287 Ga. App. 115, 650 S.E.2d 780 (2007).
Victim's testimony that the defendant forcibly entered the victim's house and accused the victim of sexually assaulting a sibling of the defendant, then beat the victim with a bat and kicked the victim, established the essential elements of aggravated assault and burglary; a single witness's testimony was generally sufficient to establish a fact. Gonzales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 821, 650 S.E.2d 401 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1765, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2008).
Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the two surviving victims testified that the defendant began shooting at the victims after arriving at an apartment, and the testimony of the victims, the location of shell casings, and the evidence showing that the deceased victim was shot from a distance of over three feet, significantly refuted the defendant's claim of self-defense. Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 494, 651 S.E.2d 702 (2007).
In a case involving a defendant's cohort shooting a man at a gas station, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, since the evidence showed that the defendant willingly drove the cohort to the gas station, waited in a stolen truck while armed with an assault rifle as the cohort pulled the victim out of the victim's car and then shot the victim, and then rescued the injured cohort and fled the police; the defendant's criminal intent was properly inferred from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime. McClendon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 238, 651 S.E.2d 165 (2007).
Defendant retrieved a loaded pistol from defendant's apartment and returned to the parking lot where defendant pointed the pistol at the boyfriend's head. A bystander then told the defendant to put the gun down, at which point the defendant pointed the gun at the bystander, and the boyfriend snatched the gun from the defendant. These two acts were sufficient to allow a jury to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated assault. Gaines v. State, 289 Ga. App. 339, 656 S.E.2d 871 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 379 (Ga. 2008); overruled in part by Worthen v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019).
Because sufficient evidence was presented showing that the defendant cut a correctional officer's face with either a razor blade or other sharp object, requiring more than 150 stitches and cosmetic surgery to repair, the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery upon a correctional officer were upheld on appeal. White v. State, 289 Ga. App. 224, 656 S.E.2d 567 (2008).
Testimony of both an aggravated assault victim and another witness, which demonstrated that the defendant shot the victim in the leg, coupled with the defendant's flight after the incident, was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated assault conviction and, furthermore, defendant was subject to an enhanced sentence under the family violence provision of the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(j), since the crime was committed between persons "living or formerly living in the same household." Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 219, 656 S.E.2d 556 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 381 (Ga. 2008).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony; the defendant told the victim, who had walked into a common hallway in the defendant's apartment building, to leave, went inside, retrieved a gun, and shot the victim twice after the victim refused to leave, and then shot at the victim while the victim was fleeing. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 435, 657 S.E.2d 333 (2008).
Evidence supported defendant's convictions of malice murder and two counts of aggravated assault; witnesses testified that a person wearing a red bandana went into a bar, pointed a pistol at one victim, left, and later returned and began shooting, and other witnesses testified that defendant was the shooter and that defendant was wearing a red bandana. Felton v. State, 283 Ga. 242, 657 S.E.2d 850 (2008).
Evidence supported defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Witnesses saw the defendant walk with the victim from a store to the victim's car and later run from the scene following the sounds of a gunshot and a car crash, and the defendant admitted pulling a gun on the victim and said that the gun had gone off during a struggle, after which the victim tried to drive away. Petty v. State, 283 Ga. 268, 658 S.E.2d 599 (2008).
Evidence supported convictions of malice murder, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The victim was struck twice in the head with a pistol, strangled, and shot twice in the head; the victim's wallet and keys were missing; and the defendant, who told police where the wallet could be found, admitted shooting the victim and claimed that the defendant had done so after the victim tried to hug and kiss the defendant and things got "ugly." Brown v. State, 283 Ga. 327, 658 S.E.2d 740 (2008).
Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The four victims were found dead in two hotel rooms from gunshot wounds to the back of their heads; identification documents belonging to the four victims were found in the defendant's car; there was expert testimony that the defendant's gun had been used to kill the victims; the defendant's baseball cap contained one victim's deoxyribonucleic acid; there was evidence that the defendant and two friends used three victims' tickets to attend a football game after the victims were murdered; the defendant was identified as being in an elevator with one victim; the defendant was seen leaving the hotel with one victim's cooler; and a duffle bag belonging to one victim was in the defendant's car when the defendant was arrested on weapons charges. Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 169, 172 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2008).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and kidnapping under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-8-41, and16-11-106 as: (1) a robber ordered two store employees at gunpoint to give the robber money, then ordered the employees to go into a back room; (2) the employees described the robber and the robber's vehicle in detail; (3) the employees positively identified the defendant as the robber 15 to 20 minutes after the crime following a pursuit during which the defendant fled from police first in the defendant's vehicle, then on foot; and (4) the defendant had $281 in a pocket at the time of arrest. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).
Evidence supported defendant's convictions of felony murder during commission of aggravated assault and of possessing a firearm while committing the murder; after defendant argued with the victim and hit the victim while they were riding in a car, defendant and the victim got out of the car where defendant shot at the victim multiple times, defendant fled the scene but later surrendered to authorities and stated that defendant had murdered the victim, and at trial defendant claimed that the gun accidentally discharged when defendant was trying to return the gun to the victim. Lashley v. State, 283 Ga. 465, 660 S.E.2d 370 (2008).
Evidence supported convictions on three counts of aggravated assault when the first victim testified that after the first victim and the second victim chased defendant, defendant began firing at them, eyewitness testified that defendant was shooting at the two victims' vehicle, and there was testimony that a bystander was hit at the scene where defendant was the shooter. Burden v. State, 290 Ga. App. 734, 660 S.E.2d 481 (2008).
Although victim gave statements that conflicted with victim's own statements and those of others involving a shooting in a parking lot, gunshot residue tests were inconclusive, bystanders each testified that defendant was standing at a different location, and no specific weapon was traced to any participant, evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault when the victim testified that defendant shot the victim in the foot, two bystanders testified that defendant shot at the victim, and a third bystander testified that defendant admitted to having a gun at the time of the incident. Banks v. State, 290 Ga. App. 887, 660 S.E.2d 873 (2008).
Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated assault on a peace officer, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, interference with government property, and criminal trespass when defendant admitted obstructing officers and damaging a patrol car and the victim's vehicle; although the defendant denied assaulting the victim and responding officer, the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's testimony in favor of theirs. Gartrell v. State, 291 Ga. App. 21, 660 S.E.2d 886 (2008).
Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the victim's testimony that the defendant pulled a knife out of the defendant's pocket with the defendant's right hand and lunged at the victim was sufficient in itself to support convictions for aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-126. Testimony that the defendant had arthritis in the right hand at most created a conflict in the evidence, as there was also testimony that the defendant, a carpenter, used both hands in the defendant's trade. Carder v. State, 291 Ga. App. 265, 661 S.E.2d 632 (2008).
There was sufficient evidence to support armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions. Two masked persons entered a restaurant, pointed a gun at the employees, forced the manager to give the persons money, including rolls of change, ordered everyone to get on the floor, and then fled; an officer saw two people running, including the defendant, who were wearing the type of boots worn by the robbers; the defendant had a BB gun and $201 in cash, including several rolls of quarters; two restaurant employees identified the gun as the weapon used in the robbery; and a detective testified that when the defendant was arrested, the defendant was wearing the jacket and boots depicted on the surveillance videotape played for the jury. Williams v. State, 291 Ga. App. 279, 661 S.E.2d 658 (2008).
There was sufficient evidence to support an aggravated assault conviction when after the defendant and the victim got into an argument that escalated into a fistfight, paramedics found that the victim had five elongated, open wounds that appeared to be stab wounds, bruises, and a bite mark on the shoulder and that one of the victim's lungs had been punctured. Jackson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 287, 661 S.E.2d 665 (2008).
There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary when the victim unhesitatingly identified the defendant as one of the people who attacked the victim with a bat or a pipe; the victim's roommate was about "70 percent sure" that the defendant was one of the attackers; the defendant came to the victim's door earlier in the evening and told someone in the street, "Oh no, not now"; one of the attackers threatened the victim because the victim befriended the attacker's paramour; the paramour, who was a friend of the defendant and who had called the victim to the victim's door before the attack, knew that the victim had come into some cash; and the parent of the defendant's child testified that the defendant and others left the house saying that they were going to get into a fight. Furthermore, the victim sustained a stab wound in the liver, a shattered jaw, a broken foot, a stab to the elbow, damage to the facial nerves, and a double hernia and was in constant pain and could not work. Drew v. State, 291 Ga. App. 306, 661 S.E.2d 675 (2008).
There was sufficient evidence to support convictions of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and of third-degree cruelty to children under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70. The victim, who had formerly been romantically involved with the defendant, was leaving a motel with the victim's two children, three other children, and two friends when the defendant approached the victim from behind, put a gun to the victim's head, and told the victim that when the defendant did not care about the children anymore, the defendant was going to kill the victim, and the state introduced prior difficulties evidence about an earlier incident where the victim was asleep at a parent's house when the victim woke up to a punch in the face and saw the defendant running out the front door. McCullors v. State, 291 Ga. App. 393, 662 S.E.2d 197 (2008).
Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of burglary, kidnapping with bodily injury, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and theft by taking when a treating physician stated that the 86-year-old victim's injuries, including blood inside her vagina and bruises and contusions on her vagina, were consistent with forcible penetration; when the defendant admitted entering the victim's home, removing her clothing, restraining her with electrical cords, hitting her, putting a plastic bag over her head, forcing her from one room to another, and taking her money and her car; and when DNA from the defendant matched the DNA of two hair roots found on the victim's living room floor. Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 545, 662 S.E.2d 323 (2008).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-106 because the defendant's admission that defendant was holding a rifle throughout the crimes' commission, along with evidence of the defendant's flight, authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant participated in the crimes by acting as a lookout. Gant v. State, 291 Ga. App. 823, 662 S.E.2d 895 (2008).
Defendant's convictions on charges of malice murder, aggravated assault, and obstruction were supported by evidence that showed, inter alia, that the defendant was upset because the victim owed the defendant money, that the defendant got into an argument with the victim that culminated in the defendant shooting the victim, that a shell casing from the gun used to shoot the victim was found in the defendant's room, and that when the defendant was arrested, the defendant lied about the defendant's identity. Williams v. State, 284 Ga. 94, 663 S.E.2d 179 (2008).
Evidence was legally sufficient to convict a defendant on charges of armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; the testimony of one of the defendant's accomplices, which implicated the defendant in the crimes, was corroborated by evidence that the defendant was captured with the two accomplices shortly after the robbery, that defendant had a large amount of cash, a gun, and a roll of duct tape, and that the victim was able to identify all three men as the ones who robbed and assaulted the victim. Spragg v. State, 292 Ga. App. 37, 663 S.E.2d 389 (2008).
Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant on a charge of aggravated assault since the defendant failed to carry the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated at the time of the aggravated assault, and there was at least some evidence before the jury of each element of aggravated assault that the state was required to prove. Stewart v. State, 291 Ga. App. 846, 663 S.E.2d 278 (2008).
Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-106 when competent evidence showed that the defendant put a gun to the victim's chest and pulled the trigger. Furthermore, a jury could conclude that this was not the result of an accident. Jones v. State, 293 Ga. App. 218, 666 S.E.2d 738 (2008).
Testimony from two eyewitnesses that the defendant fatally shot the victim with an assault rifle and aimed the rifle at one of the witnesses, and evidence that the defendant then fled and tried to elude authorities, was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342, 667 S.E.2d 43 (2008).
Evidence showed the defendant broke into a victim's home while the victim was asleep and then pulled a knife on the victim in the kitchen and began waving the knife at the victim, who testified that the victim was afraid because the defendant "was looking wild and acting a little wild and I didn't know what he might would do" and that the victim was concerned the victim might get injured. Under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the victim had a reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate, violent injury, to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Atwell v. State, 293 Ga. App. 586, 667 S.E.2d 442 (2008).
Since the evidence established the defendant shot three people and took money from one of them, and two of the people survived and identified the defendant as the shooter, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault. Abdullah v. State, 284 Ga. 399, 667 S.E.2d 584 (2008).
Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), defendant juvenile's statements to the police corroborated an accomplice's testimony that the juvenile struck a woman unconscious, caused her serious bodily injury, used force to steal her pocketbook, and dragged her down onto her front yard; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to adjudicate the juvenile delinquent under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-5-40(a), and16-8-40(a)(1). In re D. T., 294 Ga. App. 486, 669 S.E.2d 471 (2008).
Although the defendant argued that the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, was not supported by sufficient evidence, the facts asserted by the defendant in support of this claim were of no consequence on appeal because the appellate court did not speculate as to which evidence the jury chose to believe; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 564, 669 S.E.2d 505 (2008).
Evidence supported convictions for aggravated assault, theft by taking, and felony murder when the evidence showed that the defendant pulled the victim out of the victim's car, beat the victim with a pistol, stole the car, and deliberately backed over the victim; before the crime, the defendant told an eyewitness to those acts that the defendant planned to rob the victim; and the defendant used the victim's phone after the victim's death. Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga. 576, 669 S.E.2d 133 (2008).
Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was proper as several eyewitnesses, including the defendant's sister, testified that the defendant kicked the victim while the victim was lying on the ground. At best, the defendant's arguments were based on disagreement with the credibility determinations made by the trial judge. McDowell v. State, 284 Ga. 666, 670 S.E.2d 438 (2008).
There was sufficient evidence to support two juveniles' adjudications of delinquency for the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime based on the victim identifying the juveniles and the evidence that one of the juveniles used a gun to intimidate the victim into handing over the cash from the register of a gas station, shot the victim in the face causing severe injuries, and possessed a firearm during the commission of the crimes. In the Interest of R. S., 295 Ga. App. 772, 673 S.E.2d 280 (2009).
Evidence that showed that during an argument with the victim, the defendant dragged the victim off a couch by the victim's hair and threw a table at the victim, that the victim fled on foot and attempted to make a9-1-1 call, that the defendant pursued the victim in the defendant's truck, reached the victim, and held a knife to the victim, retreating only after another vehicle drove up, was sufficient to convict the defendant of family violence aggravated assault. Stone v. State, 296 Ga. App. 305, 674 S.E.2d 31 (2009).
Contrary to a defendant's contention that the state presented only circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) that did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses except that of the defendant's guilt, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for felony murder and aggravated assault; the defendant's infant child died of a massive closed head trauma complicated by blunt force chest trauma, and the defendant had the sole care of the child just before the child suffered rib injuries allegedly due to the defendant pushing on the child's chest while the child was choking and just before the child suffered seizure-like symptoms. Berryhill v. State, 285 Ga. 198, 674 S.E.2d 920 (2009).
As the defendant drove a car slowly by a house where rival gang members were while a car passenger repeatedly fired an assault rifle at the house, resulting in the death of two victims and injuries to two others, the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by the evidence. Deleon v. State, 285 Ga. 306, 676 S.E.2d 184 (2009).
Convictions of two defendants of, inter alia, malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence because eyewitnesses saw the defendants point guns at the victim, shoot, and flee. Daniel v. State, 285 Ga. 406, 677 S.E.2d 120 (2009).
Sufficient evidence was presented to support a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault based on the victim's testimony that the defendant struck the victim in the head, a neighbor's testimony that the defendant stated that the defendant struck the victim in the head for failing to pay the defendant and that the neighbor found the victim lying on the ground, and the fact that, while the defendant claimed self defense, the blow was to the back of the victim's head. Howard v. State, 297 Ga. App. 316, 677 S.E.2d 375 (2009).
As the victim testified that "he pointed it at me," and that "he never pointed the gun at my head, but he did point the gun at me," the jury was authorized to find from the evidence that the victim was placed in reasonable apprehension of violent injury and that the defendant was therefore guilty of aggravated assault. Lewis v. State, 297 Ga. App. 517, 677 S.E.2d 723 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery. It showed that the defendant and other gang members opened fire on a crowd of rival gang members and that the bullets also wounded two people inside a duplex; the jury chose to disbelieve the defendant's alibi witnesses and to believe that of the eyewitnesses. Lopez v. State, 297 Ga. App. 618, 677 S.E.2d 776 (2009), overruled on other grounds, State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010).
Evidence supported the defendant's aggravated assault conviction when the defendant confronted the victim while holding a claw hammer and the victim defended the victim's self with a baseball bat based on the victim's fear that the defendant was going to strike the victim. Although the defendant argued that the defendant had no intent of hitting the victim with the hammer and that the victim attacked the defendant, the jury opted to believe the victim; furthermore, it was the victim's reasonable apprehension of injury from an assault by a deadly weapon that established the crime of aggravated assault, not the assailant's intent to injure. Crane v. State, 297 Ga. App. 880, 678 S.E.2d 542 (2009).
Defendant's aggravated assault conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) was supported by evidence that the codefendant took a running kick at the victim's face while the defendant was present and that the defendant kicked the back of the victim's legs. Wilkinson v. State, 298 Ga. App. 190, 679 S.E.2d 766 (2009).
Conviction of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), was supported by sufficient evidence and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on this basis under circumstances in which the defendant became angry over some statements the defendant heard about the victim, punched the victim in the face, causing the victim to bleed, and knocked the victim to the ground; as the victim attempted to run, the defendant caught the victim and punched the victim in the side of the face, pulled the victim's hair, drove the victim's face into the defendant's knee, and repeatedly hit the victim in the face with the defendant's fist. The evidence of the extent of the damage inflicted on the victim by the defendant's repeated punches was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict. Walker v. State, 298 Ga. App. 265, 679 S.E.2d 814 (2009).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions because the victim recognized the defendant as one of the people who, while armed with a gun, pushed their way into the victim's home, pushed the victim down, and demanded money when a mask the defendant was wearing fell down; the victim also identified the defendant from earlier occasions when the defendant was visiting the victim's neighborhood. Dubose v. State, 298 Ga. App. 335, 680 S.E.2d 193 (2009).
Because the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal. Artis v. State, 299 Ga. App. 287, 682 S.E.2d 375 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, armed robbery, and kidnapping. The victims' in-court identifications of the defendant and the codefendant were buttressed by the evidence that a cell phone in the defendants' possession matched that taken from the victims, that a car of the type used by the robbers contained guns similar to those used in the robbery, and the fact that the codefendant had a key to that car. Wright v. State, 300 Ga. App. 32, 684 S.E.2d 102 (2009).
Evidence supported the jury's determination that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-5-24, because although the victim was under the influence of alcohol and in severe pain when making statements to the police and the emergency room physician, it was within the jury's province to find the victim's statements more credible than the victim's trial testimony; the victim's statements in a request to dismiss the charges, which acknowledged that the defendant was the individual who attacked the victim, did not occur while the victim was under any physical impairment. Works v. State, 301 Ga. App. 108, 686 S.E.2d 863 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0458, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 251 (Ga. 2010).
Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because a witness identified the defendant as the person the witness saw shooting and running, and witnesses testified that the day of the shooting the defendant told the witnesses that the victim had robbed the defendant; the mother of the defendant's children testified that, on the night of the shooting, the defendant came to her apartment in the same complex where the shooting took place, breathing heavily, and wearing a shirt with bullet holes in the shirt. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 687 S.E.2d 799 (2010).
Evidence that defendant and another person burst into a home after they had lured the victim brandishing an automatic gun and wearing black t-shirts that said "Sheriff," handcuffed the victim, took the victim's money, and forced the victim to write a bill of sale for the victim's motorcycle was sufficient to support convictions for robbery by intimidation, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and impersonating a peace officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-23.23. Powers v. State, 303 Ga. App. 326, 693 S.E.2d 592 (2010).
Evidence adduced was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of felony murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault for attacking six people in a home because one of the victims stated that the victim saw defendant in the doorway after shots had been fired; whether the deal a codefendant made with the state rendered the codefendant's testimony biased to a degree that left the codefendant less creditworthy was a determination to be made by the jury. Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 434, 689 S.E.2d 286, overruled on other grounds, Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 698 S.E.2d 301 (2010).
Because testimony about the circumstances of the victim's visit to a home where defendant was shot was relevant and admissible to explain defendant's motive in shooting the victim, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of malice murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Taylor v. State, 287 Ga. 440, 696 S.E.2d 652 (2010).
Defendant's convictions for aggravated child molestation, aggravated assault, enticing a child for an indecent purpose, kidnapping, false imprisonment, cruelty to children, burglary, theft by taking, and striking an unattended vehicle were authorized because at trial, the defendant was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crimes; a nurse and doctor testified that the victim had an injury that was consistent with the molestation allegation, and a videotape depicted the defendant driving a maintenance truck that the defendant did not have authority to take. Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37, 699 S.E.2d 363 (2010).
Since the victim was cut and hit by a shotgun during a struggle with defendant in defendant's attempt to obtain money for drugs, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-8-41(a), and16-11-106(b)(1). Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 838, 700 S.E.2d 726 (2010).
Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder and aggravated assault because the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crimes supported the finding that the defendant was a party thereto, notwithstanding the jury's acquittal of the defendant on three weapons charges. Allen v. State, 288 Ga. 263, 702 S.E.2d 869 (2010).
Trial court did not err in determining that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because overwhelming evidence adduced at trial showed that the defendant was at the scene, that the defendant had a handgun in the defendant's possession, and that the defendant drew the defendant's handgun and pointed the gun at the victim and the victim's companions as they were sitting in the victim's car, thereby placing them in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. White v. State, 308 Ga. App. 38, 706 S.E.2d 570 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of malice murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt because although the defendant denied to police that the defendant had any contact with the silver car that was connected to the robbery, the defendant's fingerprints were found on the outside of the car, and an eyewitness's physical description of the second gunman from the robbery matched the defendant. Carter v. State, 289 Ga. 51, 709 S.E.2d 223 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) to support the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, financial transaction card fraud, and recidivism because there was evidence placing the defendant at the victim's home during the time of the murder and evidence of the victim's blood on the defendant's shoes, which the defendant intentionally chose not to wear when being questioned by police; the evidence, together with the defendant's own statements regarding the defendant's use of the victim's debit card, was sufficient to authorize the jury to determine that the state excluded all reasonable hypotheses save that of the defendant's guilt and to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 771, 707 S.E.2d 92 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), and conspiracy to possess cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-30(a) as a conspirator because, while the uncorroborated testimony of one accomplice was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence sufficed to sustain defendant's conviction when an additional accomplice provided testimony to corroborate that of the first accomplice. Both codefendants testified that the defendant was present from the robbery's inception through the robbery's execution, that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy to obtain the victim's money and cocaine by armed robbery, and that the defendant willingly participated in the crimes and shared the criminal intent of those who committed the crimes inside the victim's residence by supplying the defendant's car and acting as a get-away driver. Watson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 871, 708 S.E.2d 703 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault since, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, the defendant intentionally committed an act that placed an apartment resident in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Craft v. State, 309 Ga. App. 698, 710 S.E.2d 891 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because evidence was presented that the defendant and a codefendant entered a restaurant to rob the restaurant and shot two employees of the restaurant. In a statement to the police, the defendant admitted that the defendant entered the restaurant with a handgun to rob the restaurant, but the defendant claimed that the defendant heard gunshots and left the restaurant, while the codefendant gave a similar statement to the police. Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 711 S.E.2d 655 (2011).
Rational jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the state disproved the defendant's self-defense claim; the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's version of events, and even if the jury found that the victim threw a bottle at the defendant's car, the jury could have concluded that the defendant struck the victim after any danger had passed and that the defendant's response was excessive. Hill v. State, 310 Ga. App. 695, 713 S.E.2d 891 (2011).
Evidence of the circumstances was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator and the defendant's guilt of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because the defendant matched the description of the perpetrator given by both a convenience store clerk and another store employee; when the defendant was apprehended, an officer recovered next to the defendant's person the contraband and instrumentalities used in the commission of the robbery. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).
Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and malice murder were based on sufficient evidence where a victim in an apartment next to the defendant's apartment was fatally stabbed multiple times, there was physical evidence that tied the defendant to the criminal incident, and the defendant confessed to committing the crimes. Culpepper v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 715 S.E.2d 155 (2011).
Because the defendant pointed a gun at the victim while defendant's accomplices robbed the victim, and thereafter shot at the victim's trailer, hitting a child and killing the victim's sister-in-law, the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, cruelty to children, possession of a gun during the commission of a crime, and possession of a revolver by a person under the age of 18. Lytle v. State, 290 Ga. 177, 718 S.E.2d 296 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b), armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), based on the defendant's involvement as a party to the crimes, or as a coconspirator under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b). The evidence presented was that: (1) when two people walked past the victim's parked vehicle, one of the people held a knife to the victim's stomach and ordered the victim to give the person the victim's wallet and keys; (2) the victim complied; (3) the person with the knife got into the driver's seat and the defendant, who had stood nearby during the incident, got into the passenger seat; (3) the victim identified the defendant as the person who got into the passenger seat; (4) the people drove away, but were apprehended; (5) the victim's wallet was recovered, on the ground to the rear of the vehicle, on the passenger side; and (6) the defendant wanted to leave the area because there was a warrant for the defendant's arrest. Harrelson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 710, 719 S.E.2d 569 (2011).
Sufficient evidence showed the defendant committed aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, in the process of hijacking a victim's vehicle because: (1) the defendant showed a gun when the victim resisted the defendant's attempt to take the victim's car; (2) the victim grabbed the gun and tussled with the defendant showed a reasonable apprehension of harm; and (3) the victim was seriously injured. Campbell v. State, 314 Ga. App. 299, 724 S.E.2d 24 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), because the victim testified about the assault and identified the defendant as the person who committed the assault; the competent testimony of even a single witness can be enough to sustain a conviction. Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 198, 723 S.E.2d 520 (2012).
Evidence that the defendant was in the victim's home after a neighbor heard glass breaking and called9-1-1, that a ribbon from the defendant's home was used to strangle the victim, that both the victim's and the defendant's DNA were on the ribbon, and that the victim's wedding ring was found in the defendant's pocket supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault. Muhammad v. State, 290 Ga. 880, 725 S.E.2d 302 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and participation in criminal street gang activity. The defendant and fellow gang members walked toward a group of teenagers in a front yard while yelling and making gang signals; the defendant fired once into the crowd, killing the victim, who was unarmed; and the defendant, who fled the scene, was the only person who fired a weapon and was identified to police as the shooter by witnesses who knew the defendant by name. Jackson v. State, 291 Ga. 25, 727 S.E.2d 120 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime against another person, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because a witness and a friend testified that they had seen the defendant shoot the victim. Redinburg v. State, 315 Ga. App. 413, 727 S.E.2d 201 (2012).
Testimony that the defendant forced the defendant's way into a victim's house, kissed the victim against the victim's will, and attempted to pull the victim's pants down, stopping only when a car drove up, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Murrell v. State, 317 Ga. App. 310, 730 S.E.2d 675 (2012).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's aggravated assault conviction, despite the defendant's claim that the defendant took nothing from the victim and did not point a weapon at the victim because: (1) it was undisputed that the crime occurred; and, (2) whether the defendant or the defendant's accomplice pointed the gun and took the property, the defendant could be convicted through the defendant's role as a party, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21. Bush v. State, 317 Ga. App. 439, 731 S.E.2d 121 (2012).
Witness's testimony that the witness and the defendant had been smoking crack cocaine down the street from the victim's apartment, the defendant left the house to get more drugs, and the defendant returned agitated and told the witness an old man stole the defendant's crack but the defendant "took care of him," and testimony the victim went head first through a window after being burned supported convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. Haymer v. State, 323 Ga. App. 874, 747 S.E.2d 512 (2013).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because, although the two passengers of the car committed the actual armed robbery, there was evidence that the defendant, the driver of the car, knew that the two passengers were armed and that the defendant "kind of sort of" knew what they were going to do, which supported a finding that the defendant participated in the robbery as the getaway driver. Smith v. State, 325 Ga. App. 745, 754 S.E.2d 788 (2014).
Evidence, including the defendant's statement to police that the defendant had shot the victim, had meant to shoot the victim, and would have shot the victim again, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Taylor v. State, 327 Ga. App. 288, 758 S.E.2d 629 (2014).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two counts of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children in the first degree because, when the defendant and the defendant's girlfriend brought their 11-week-old daughter to the emergency room, the infant had extensive bruises all over the infant's body, the infant's skull was fractured on both sides, and the infant was having seizures; the skull fractures were caused by two separate impacts; and a physician who was qualified as an expert in assessing abuse and intentional injury to children testified that the physician could think of no accidental force that would account for all of the infant's injuries. Busby v. State, 332 Ga. App. 646, 774 S.E.2d 717 (2015).
Since the admission of the victim's identification of the defendant was not improper, the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on that identification failed and the jury was authorized, based on the identification and the existence of the defendant's fingerprints on the victim's van, to find that the defendant committed both armed robbery and aggravated assault. Jackson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 500, 782 S.E.2d 287 (2016).
Testimony that the victim demanded the return of the victim's motorcycle, while the victim's hands were on the motorcycle, the defendant started the motorcycle, and the victim had to move to avoid being hit when the defendant took off on the motorcycle was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Newby v. State, 338 Ga. App. 588, 791 S.E.2d 92 (2016).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a party to the crimes because a codefendant pointed a gun at the victim's side and demanded money; the codefendant told the defendant that they were going to kill the victim; the codefendant took the victim's cell phone, ordered the victim to disrobe, and raped the victim in the front seat of the car; during the rape, the victim could not escape from the car as the defendant was standing in front of the driver's door; and, after the victim transferred the victim's number to a new cell phone, the victim received calls for the defendant. Carter v. State, 339 Ga. App. 140, 793 S.E.2d 459 (2016).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, false imprisonment, kidnapping, and aggravated assault based on the state showing that the defendant held the four boys at gunpoint, forced the boys into the pool to restrict their ability to flee, and stole two cell phones and money from the boys before fleeing. Smith v. State, 342 Ga. App. 656, 805 S.E.2d 251 (2017).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of family violence aggravated assault and family violence aggravated battery because the victim's testimony that the victim and the defendant were romantically involved and had met 10 years before through mutual friends allowed the jury to conclude that they were not siblings; the defendant hit the victim with the defendant's fist and knocked out two of the victim's teeth; the defendant beat the victim with a wire clothes hanger; and the defendant squirted lighter fluid on the victim's head and chest, and used a lighter to set the victim on fire. Outz v. State, 344 Ga. App. 616, 810 S.E.2d 678 (2018).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, felony murder, and family violence aggravated assault because the defendant, who had a turbulent and troubled history with the victim, the defendant's father, got into an argument with the victim; the defendant then shot the victim six times with a semi-automatic handgun, killing the victim; the defendant's son heard the argument and witnessed the shooting; the defendant told one of the defendant's sisters that the defendant did not mean to kill the victim and only wanted to hurt the victim; and the defendant's son testified at the trial about witnessing the defendant shoot the victim, the son's grandfather. Puckett v. State, 303 Ga. 719, 814 S.E.2d 726 (2018).
Trial court did not err in determining that the state carried the state's burden of introducing evidence that disproved the defendant's alleged justification for the defendant's use of deadly force because the defendant intentionally fired a gun at the defendant's fiancee and the fiancee's three children while they were sitting in the fiancee's car and it was within the jury's province to reject the defendant's contention that the defendant was afraid the fiancee was trying to run the defendant over. Williams v. State, 347 Ga. App. 171, 818 S.E.2d 88 (2018).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder of the first victim, aggravated assault of the second victim, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the defendant pulled alongside the second victim's car at an intersection and shot into the passenger side of the car several times, killing the first victim; the second victim identified the defendant as the shooter; and the video recordings from the gas station's surveillance system and the city's street surveillance system that showed the incident that took place at the gas station before the shooting and showed the shooting were played for the jury. Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. 475, 826 S.E.2d 89 (2019).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault of the victim with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime because the victim testified that a passenger in a vehicle shot the victim; and the victim positively identified the defendant as the driver of the vehicle. Perdomo v. State, 307 Ga. 670, 837 S.E.2d 762 (2020).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because the second defendant, the first defendant, and some of their friends engaged in a heated argument with the victim that escalated into a physical altercation, in which the defendants knocked the victim to the ground; the victim escaped from the fight by pulling a knife and cutting the second defendant; and the second defendant and the first defendant pulled handguns and fired at the victim as the victim tried to walk away with three bullets striking and ultimately killing the victim. Hamlette v. State (two cases), 353 Ga. App. 640, 839 S.E.2d 161 (2020).
Slapping is sufficient for aggravated assault.
- Allegation alleged that the defendant committed aggravated assault with intent to rape in that the defendant assaulted the girlfriend's daughter with the intent to rape her when the defendant slapped the daughter across the face with the defendant's hands. The evidence supported this accusation, showing that shortly after 6:30 A.M., the defendant threatened and slapped the daughter on the face as the defendant repeatedly attempted to penetrate the daughter. The defendant's argument on appeal that the slapping of the daughter's face did not constitute an assault is simply wrong. Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2008).
Evidence sufficient for conviction of aggravated assault with gun.
- Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because: (1) defendant thrust a handgun in the door of an ex-love interest's apartment, pointed it at the ex-love interest, and asked the ex-love interest if the ex-love interest was going to call the defendant anymore; (2) the ex-love interest said no and shut the door; (3) defendant then shot two rounds through the door; (4) two shell casings were found on the apartment floor; and (5) a matching shell casing and a photograph of defendant with a handgun were found at another love interest's house. Johnson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 641, 618 S.E.2d 716 (2005).
Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for acquittal as a matter of law, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, as the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction on four counts of assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20 and16-5-21(a)(2), as defendant and the codefendant committed two home invasions, whereupon the victims therein were fearful, some were harmed, and during the incidents, defendant held a night stick and instructed the victims to cooperate with the codefendant, who brandished a handgun. Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 620 S.E.2d 837 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).
Because sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant was provoked by an attack on a sibling, and that the defendant had a history of abusive relationships with several men, the voluntary manslaughter of the male victim was supported by the evidence; moreover, evidence of the victim's stabbing and death also supported the jury's verdict with respect to the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, felony murder, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony charges. Breland v. State, 285 Ga. App. 251, 648 S.E.2d 389 (2007).
Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, and an aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal, as the state was not required to show that the defendant expressed an intent to rob or declared a purpose to carry that intent into effect, for the jury to arrive at the conclusion that such was the defendant's intent; moreover, the defendant's intention could be gathered from the circumstances of the case as proved, and in seeking the motives of human conduct, inferences and deductions could properly be considered when the inferences and deductions flowed naturally from the facts proved. Squires v. State, 286 Ga. App. 141, 648 S.E.2d 696 (2007).
The O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8) statutory aggravating circumstance does not require knowledge on the part of the defendant that the victim was a peace officer or other designated official engaged in the performance of official duties. Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008).
Evidence that: (1) a sister of one of two shooting victims described the defendant to police; (2) the defendant admitted having held a gun near the crime scene at the time of the shooting; and (3) a victim, who knew the defendant and had seen the defendant from a distance of three to four feet, identified the defendant as the shooter, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Carlos v. State, 292 Ga. App. 419, 664 S.E.2d 808 (2008).
Testimony by a victim that the defendant and an accomplice, armed with handguns, forcibly entered the victim's apartment, raped and sodomized the victim, struck the victim with a gun, stole jewelry, bound the victim, and escaped in a car owned by the victim's prospective spouse, and evidence that 24 fingerprints lifted from the apartment and car matched the defendant's was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault. Crawford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 463, 664 S.E.2d 820 (2008).
Brandishing a gun, a masked individual moved a wheelchair-bound restaurant manager to a hidden safe and ordered the manager to open the safe. The manager's identification of the perpetrator as the defendant, a former employee, from the defendant's distinctive voice, and the perpetrator's knowledge of the safe's location, authorized the jury to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault by placing a gun to the victim's head. Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 728, 667 S.E.2d 637 (2008).
With regard to a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the victim's testimony that the defendant was the individual who approached the victim's car with a gun and ordered the victim out, causing the victim to be in fear. Kashamba v. State, 295 Ga. App. 540, 672 S.E.2d 512 (2009).
Evidence that the defendant shot the victim at close range; that the victim, who knew the defendant well, identified the defendant from a photo line-up and at trial; and that a witness told police of driving the defendant to find the victim and of witnessing the shooting, was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of those crimes. Spencer v. State, 296 Ga. App. 828, 676 S.E.2d 274 (2009).
Evidence authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault because defendant and defendant's codefendants entered an apartment masked and armed with an assault rifle, and the defendant fired the rifle at the victim and fatally wounded the victim. Zackery v. State, 286 Ga. 399, 688 S.E.2d 354 (2010).
Evidence that a defendant threatened to and then intentionally returned with armed associates to the scene of an unsatisfactory marijuana purchase and participated in a shootout, causing a chest wound to a 16-year-old boy in a nearby house, supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Dennis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 510, 696 S.E.2d 333 (2010).
Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) beyond a reasonable doubt because a witness to the incident testified that the defendant intentionally fired the defendant's gun in a guest's direction after the defendant became upset with the guest's jokes; a bullet hole was also found inside the refrigerator where the guest had been sitting. Williams v. State, 307 Ga. App. 577, 705 S.E.2d 332 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession in connection with the shooting death of the victim because the evidence showed that: (1) the defendant's teenage children made a cell phone call to the children's parents' home to tell them that the children were being followed by a motorcycle rider; (2) as the children arrived home, the defendant exited from the house with a handgun; (3) the defendant fired two warning shots at the rider when the rider rode past; (4) the rider turned the motorcycle around and when the rider rode past the house again, the defendant fired again as the defendant claimed that the rider swerved toward the defendant; and (5) this shot struck the victim, resulting in the victim's death. Gear v. State, 288 Ga. 500, 705 S.E.2d 632 (2011), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).
In an action for aggravated assault, testimony from a victim that the defendant shot a handgun toward the victim and others and testimony that the defendant had been texting a victim and caused the victim to be afraid that the defendant was coming to the victim's apartment and there would be a problem was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty as indicted. Sullins v. State, 350 Ga. App. 83, 828 S.E.2d 142 (2019).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because, after verbal and physical altercations with the defendant's live-in girlfriend and the girlfriend's brother, the defendant fired several shots from a gun toward a departing car carrying the three aggravated assault victims named in the indictment - the defendant's girlfriend, the girlfriend's brother, and the girlfriend's mother; a bullet struck the car near where one of the victims was sitting; and a jury could find that the defendant intentionally fired the gun in the three victims' direction. Bashir v. State, 350 Ga. App. 852, 830 S.E.2d 353 (2019).
Evidence that the defendant fired several shots at the victim outside of the pool hall and that one of those shots struck the victim in the back was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Sherrod v. State, 355 Ga. App. 441, 844 S.E.2d 508 (2020).
Evidence sufficient when air pistol pointed at victim.
- Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the defendant pointed an air pistol at the victim and threatened to kill the victim. Leeks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 724, 710 S.E.2d 908 (2011).
Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), carrying a concealed weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(b), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b), because during an argument with the victims, the defendant shot the victims and threatened to kill the victims. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and aggravated battery because the victim turned to see the defendant pointing a gun to the victim's head; the victim pushed the defendant's hand away; the defendant came back swinging and hit the victim with the pistol; the victim grabbed the defendant and they tussled; the defendant then shot the victim, severing the victim's spine; and the victim was now confined to a wheelchair. Williams v. State, 332 Ga. App. 805, 775 S.E.2d 178 (2015).
Aggravated assault against grandparents.
- As a victim's grandparent was present in the victim's home when the defendant shot the victim three times, the jury could have inferred that the grandparent reasonably feared suffering a violent injury during the shooting. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 as to the grandparent. Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487 (2009).
Evidence sufficient for conviction of aggravated assault upon peace officer.
- See Brown v. State, 180 Ga. App. 361, 349 S.E.2d 250 (1986); Reddin v. State, 223 Ga. App. 148, 476 S.E.2d 882 (1996).
Defendant committed aggravated assault on a police officer in an offensive manner, resulting in injuries to the officer; it was a jury question as to whether defendant's testimony that defendant intended no harm was believed or not. Dyer v. State, 261 Ga. App. 289, 585 S.E.2d 81 (2003).
There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 where deputies testified that defendant was pointing defendant's pistol at all of them as defendant made defendant's way towards a trailer in defendant's backyard and then ran off into the woods; one deputies conflicting testimony as to whether the officer feared for the officer's life was a matter of credibility that was determined by the jury, and there was evidence that the deputies had identified themselves as peace officers to defendant. Logan v. State, 265 Ga. App. 134, 593 S.E.2d 14 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to show that a juvenile was a party to aggravated assault on a victim when one or more of four gunmen including the juvenile shot into another person's residence because the victim's car was parked; the presence of the victim's car at the house was circumstantial evidence from which the court could find the shooters believed someone was in the house and that they intended to commit a violent injury to the victim by firing their weapons. In the Interest of M.D.L., 271 Ga. App. 738, 610 S.E.2d 687 (2005).
Evidence that defendant, who was driving a vehicle being pursued by law enforcement officers' vehicles, after an officer unsuccessfully attempted to arrest defendant for domestic violence, called the spouse and told the spouse to call off the officers or defendant would try to kill them by colliding the defendant's vehicle with theirs and then tried to run an officer off the road was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault upon a police officer, and any conflict in the testimony was for the jury to resolve. Razinha v. State, 273 Ga. App. 583, 615 S.E.2d 649 (2005).
Evidence that a defendant, after bringing the defendant's vehicle to a complete stop and making eye contact with a police officer, accelerated and struck a patrol car, causing damage to the vehicle, supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and (c). Branton v. State, 292 Ga. App. 104, 663 S.E.2d 414 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1771, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 873 (Ga. 2008).
On a charge for aggravated assault of a peace officer, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the officer was never in immediate apprehension of harm. The officer testified that the officer was in fear of receiving a violent injury when the defendant suddenly pulled away from a traffic stop, which was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant committed aggravated assault. Little v. State, 298 Ga. App. 298, 680 S.E.2d 154 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an assault upon a corporal with the county sheriff's department with a knife while the corporal was engaged in official duties because, while the defendant cited to testimony implying that a deputy had secured the knife by the time the corporal joined the struggle, other testimony indicated that the corporal was lying on top of the defendant and attempting to restrain the defendant while the defendant continued to wield the knife against police officers; even if the Court of Appeals considered the testimony the police officers provided to be inconsistent, conflict in the testimony of witnesses was for resolution by the jury and not the Court of Appeals. Dobbs v. State, 302 Ga. App. 628, 691 S.E.2d 387 (2010).
Knowledge that victim was peace officer as part of jury instruction.
- In a prosecution for aggravated assault upon a police officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c), the trial court's instructions regarding the defense of misapprehension of fact, and that intent was an essential element of any crime, were insufficient to convey to the jury the requirement that the defendant had to have known that the victim was a peace officer. The error was not harmless as the entire defense was based on the defendant's alleged lack of knowledge that the defendant's assault victim was a peace officer. Fedd v. State, 298 Ga. App. 508, 680 S.E.2d 453 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1776, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 793 (Ga. 2009).
Aggravated assault with intent to rob supported by evidence.
- Identification testimony was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the perpetrator of the offenses of theft by sudden snatching and aggravated assault with intent to rob. Tolbert v. State, 180 Ga. App. 703, 350 S.E.2d 51 (1986).
Aggravated assault, possession of firearm, and discharge of firearm sufficient to support felony murder conviction.
- Because defendant and an accomplice ordered the victim and another individual against a wall, took the victim's money at gunpoint, and defendant began to point and wave the gun when it fired, resulting in the victim being shot and subsequently dying, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of felony murder while committing aggravated assault and of possession of a firearm. Taylor v. State, 279 Ga. 706, 620 S.E.2d 363 (2005).
Aggravated assault and felony murder.
- Evidence in support of the state's theory that the defendant killed the victim in an unprovoked aggravated assault, based on expert testimony that the victim died from a deliberate and forceful strike with a knife, and evidence that discounted any possible accident or lack of intent, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for felony murder during the commission of an aggravated assault Nichols v. State, 281 Ga. 483, 640 S.E.2d 40 (2007).
Jury was authorized to find that the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder during the commission of aggravated assault in the manner alleged in the indictment because at trial the medical examiner testified that the cause of the victim's death was suffocation; although the defendant told an ex-spouse over the phone that the defendant choked the victim, there was no other evidence to corroborate that statement while there was much physical and scientific evidence that pointed to the cause of death as suffocation. Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 421, 721 S.E.2d 886 (2012).
Rule against mutually exclusive verdicts did not apply.
- Rule against mutually exclusive verdicts did not apply to the verdicts returned by the jury of guilty on a charge of malice murder, but not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of aggravated assault. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 502, 651 S.E.2d 715 (2007).
Conviction for multiple felonies appropriate.
- Evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault with intent to rob. Conway v. State, 183 Ga. App. 573, 359 S.E.2d 438 (1987).
Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Baty v. State, 257 Ga. 371, 359 S.E.2d 655 (1987).
Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the shooting deaths of two victims. Burtts v. State, 269 Ga. 402, 499 S.E.2d 326 (1998).
Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find each defendant guilty of malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and aggravated assault. Whitaker v. State, 269 Ga. 462, 499 S.E.2d 888 (1998).
Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-6 and16-1-7, as defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and kidnapping, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-5-40(a), respectively, did not merge as a matter of law, as only aggravated assault and kidnapping with bodily injury merged as a matter of law; further, the crimes did not merge as a matter of fact, as they were based on separate and distinct facts, and due to the timing of defendant's actions during the incident, the separate convictions were proper. Walker v. State, 275 Ga. App. 862, 622 S.E.2d 64 (2005).
Testimony of a single witness sufficient.
- Testimony of a single witness was sufficient to authorize a jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and that the defendant committed simple battery by intentionally kicking the victim on the ankle, causing a bruise. Ringo v. State, 236 Ga. App. 38, 510 S.E.2d 893 (1999).
Witness's testimony was sufficient to authorize a factfinder to determine that the witness was not an accomplice, obviating the need for the testimony to be corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) , and based on that testimony, a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile had committed the act of aggravated assault. In re A.Z., 301 Ga. App. 524, 687 S.E.2d 887 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0492, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 335 (Ga. 2010).
Prospective juror properly excluded on basis of bias.
- When the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, the trial court did not err in excusing for cause a prospective juror who was acquainted with defense counsel as the juror's statement that the juror worked with a criminal defense firm, and could not give the state a fair hearing clearly established a leaning or bias on the part of the juror, which made the juror subject to being excused for cause. Bell v. State, 276 Ga. 206, 576 S.E.2d 876 (2003).
Verdict of guilty but mentally ill supported by evidence.
- When the defendant was indicted for assault with intent to rape and the evidence showed that the defendant was a paranoid schizophrenic with borderline mental retardation at the time of the crime but that the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong at that time, the evidence supported a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. Jackson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 477, 304 S.E.2d 560 (1983).
Inconsistent verdicts.
- Fact that jury acquitted defendant of charges of kidnapping and armed robbery arising out of the same incident in which defendant committed aggravated assault did not mean that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of the aggravated assault where the other two alleged offenses occurred before the aggravated assault such that the verdicts were not necessarily inconsistent; in any event, the inconsistent verdict rule does not apply in criminal cases. Thomas v. State, 257 Ga. App. 350, 571 S.E.2d 178 (2002).
Jury's verdict finding defendants guilty of reckless conduct against a victim after one of the defendants fired a shot at a car was factually inconsistent with the jury's verdict finding defendants guilty of aggravated assault against the same victim; because the appellate court could not determine if the jury reached inconsistent verdicts, it reversed defendants' convictions for both offenses and remanded the case for a new trial on those charges. Reddick v. State, 264 Ga. App. 487, 591 S.E.2d 392 (2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 774 S.E.2d 106 (2015).
Evidence that the defendant fired a gun in the victim's direction from within a vehicle, thereby frightening the victim, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault as defined by O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(3); the result was not changed by the fact that the defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2). Hardeman v. State, 277 Ga. App. 180, 626 S.E.2d 138 (2006).
There was no merit to a defendant's argument that a guilty verdict on an aggravated assault charge as to one of the victims was inconsistent with a not guilty verdict on an armed robbery charge as to that victim. The inconsistent verdict rule was abolished; moreover, since the crimes had different elements, the jury could have found that the defendant was guilty of assaulting both victims but robbing only one of the victims. Bethune v. State, 291 Ga. App. 674, 662 S.E.2d 774 (2008).
Evidence insufficient for conviction.
- See Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 564 S.E.2d 216 (2002).
Insufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a); in superficially wounding the victim after the fatal stabbing had occurred and after the victim was either dead or unconscious, there was no evidence that the defendant intended to violently injure the victim or that the victim was placed in reasonable apprehension of being violently injured. Perez v. State, 281 Ga. 175, 637 S.E.2d 30 (2006).
Convictions of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, were not supported by sufficient evidence because, although the defendant's conduct before the crime was suspicious, the circumstantial evidence against the defendant was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6); the state did not show that the defendant was anywhere near the scene at the time of the shooting, did not present evidence connecting a weapon used in the shooting to the defendant, and, although a witness testified that three days before the shooting, the witness saw the defendant's brother hand the defendant a gun, the witness could not identify the type of gun involved, and this testimony did not connect the defendant with the shooting. The state also failed to adduce evidence that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Gresham v. State, 298 Ga. App. 136, 679 S.E.2d 344 (2009).
Evidence insufficient to convict juvenile defendant.
- Evidence was insufficient to support a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for aggravated assault with the intent to rob under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 when the juvenile placed the juvenile's hands in the victim's pockets to see what the victim was carrying. In the Interest of D.M., 308 Ga. App. 589, 708 S.E.2d 550 (2011).
Evidence did not support self-defense claim.
- Evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject the defendant's claim of self-defense and to support the defendant's aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime conviction because, inter alia, two witnesses yelled at the defendant to put the gun away, but the defendant shot the victim a second time, the defendant testified that the defendant believed that the victim was holding a weapon behind the victim's leg when the victim got out of the car and that the defendant heard someone yell "bust," which the defendant understood to mean "shoot," and another witness heard no such statement and did not see anything in the victim's hands when the victim exited the car. Hill v. State, 276 Ga. App. 874, 625 S.E.2d 108 (2005).
Felony murder and aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal as the defendant's defense of self-defense lacked merit given evidence that any imminent threat posed against the defendant had passed, the victim was shot in the head after the confrontation ended, and the victim retreated to the victim's car and was being driven away at the time the fatal shot was dealt. Woolfolk v. State, 282 Ga. 139, 644 S.E.2d 828 (2007).
Despite the defendant's claim that the state failed to disprove a claim of self-defense, the appeals court upheld the defendant's aggravated assault conviction, because sufficient evidence was presented to allow the jury to decide that the defendant's act of stabbing the weaponless victim amounted to excessive force. Thus, the defendant's motion for a new trial on the issue was properly denied. Richards v. State, 288 Ga. App. 814, 655 S.E.2d 690 (2007).
Justification defense.
- In defendant's trial on a charge of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), the trial court did not err under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-64 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611) in precluding the defendant from cross-examining the victim about what the victim meant when the victim said that there was tension in the victim's relationship with the defendant and that the victim was going through a transitional period in the victim's life; while the defendant contended that the defendant wanted to examine the victim about the victim's failure to comply with a drug rehabilitation program in which the victim was enrolled and that the defendant was upset about the possibility that the victim would leave Georgia if the victim failed to complete the program, thereby ending the relationship, such evidence was irrelevant to the defendant's justification defense because it was not evidence either of the victim's general reputation for violence or of specific acts of violence perpetrated by the victim. Evidence about the status of the couple's relationship and the nature of the couple's arguments in the week leading up to their fight would not have shed any light on whether the defendant was in reasonable fear of suffering immediate serious harm personally when the defendant choked the victim and threatened to kill the victim. As such, the trial court did not err in ruling that the evidence was irrelevant. Chambers v. State, 308 Ga. App. 748, 708 S.E.2d 651 (2011).
Improper comment on evidence by court was reversible error.
- On appeal from an aggravated assault conviction, because the trial judge improperly commented on the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by telling the jury that the parties agreed that there was no gun involved in the incident, the comment amounted to reversible error entitling the defendant to a new trial. Brimidge v. State, 287 Ga. App. 23, 651 S.E.2d 344 (2007).
Claim of error waived on appeal when exclusion of evidence not raised at trial.
- On appeal from convictions for murder and aggravated assault, the defendant waived any error regarding the exclusion of a videotaped statement on appeal, which the defendant claimed would have supported a voluntary manslaughter theory, by failing to raise the claim specifically at trial. Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. 96, 646 S.E.2d 216 (2007).
Withdrawal of guilty pleas properly denied.
- Because: (1) the facts of the case as narrated by the prosecutor presented a sufficient factual basis for the defendant's pleas to both aggravated assault and two battery counts; (2) the trial court informed the defendant of the consequences of the guilty pleas, waiver of certain constitutional and statutory rights, and the minimum and maximum possible sentences for the crimes charged; and (3) the defendant admitted guilt and to entering the guilty plea freely and voluntarily, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying withdrawal of the pleas. Foster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 584, 636 S.E.2d 759 (2006).
Defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea was properly denied as withdrawal of the plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice since: (1) the defense counsel was not ineffective; (2) the state showed that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (3) the trial court was entitled to discredit contradictory testimony given by the defendant at the motion to withdraw the plea hearing; and (4) the defendant's claim that the defendant had nothing to gain by entering a "blind" plea failed as even assuming, that an aggravated assault conviction would have merged with an armed robbery conviction and that five convictions of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime would have merged with each other for sentencing purposes, the defendant still would have faced an additional five years' to serve if the defendant had not pled guilty. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. 767, 634 S.E.2d 875 (2006).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), cruelty to children in the first degree, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because the state met the state's burden of showing that the defendant understood the constitutional rights the defendant was giving up by pleading guilty, that the defendant understood that since the plea was non-negotiated, the trial court would sentence the defendant to at least ten years imprisonment and could sentence the defendant to a maximum sentence of life in prison, and that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea in order to avoid a trial on the indicted charges. Carson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 225, 723 S.E.2d 516 (2012), overruled on other grounds, Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to aggravated assault because the victim suffered a burning sensation in the victim's eyes and face, was in a great deal of pain, and was temporarily blinded after the defendant sprayed the victim with mace. Weaver v. State, 325 Ga. App. 51, 752 S.E.2d 128 (2013).
Sentencing.
- When defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, defendant's prior convictions for aggravated assault and criminal damage to property, which had been used during the guilt-innocence phase of defendant's trial for impeachment purposes, could be used at sentencing because a repeat offender convicted of aggravated assault could be sentenced as a recidivist, under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a), and there was no restriction in the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, that limited the use of prior convictions to the guilt-innocence phase of trial such that they could not be used again at the sentencing phase of trial. Carswell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 833, 589 S.E.2d 605 (2003).
Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant because the sentence it imposed on defendant was 10 years in prison and 10 years probation for aggravated assault, 10 years in prison to run concurrently for aggravated battery, and five years confinement to run consecutively for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as each part of defendant's sentence was well within the statutory limits for the respective crime involved; accordingly, defendant's sentences would not be modified on appeal. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004).
Because the trial court set aside the defendant's aggravated assault conviction, a claim that the trial court erred in failing to merge the aggravated assault with an armed robbery conviction for sentencing purposes, lacked merit. Lawrence v. State, 289 Ga. App. 163, 657 S.E.2d 250 (2008).
Because the Supreme Court of Georgia had already affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault by striking the victim with a gun with the intent to rob and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault by striking the victim with a gun, an instrument when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury, the trial court properly denied a subsequent pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. Brady v. State, 283 Ga. 359, 659 S.E.2d 368 (2008).
As the defendant was not sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) or to the maximum term pursuant to § 17-10-7(a) for a conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b), the defendant's claim that the sentencing imposed was improper lacked merit. Tatum v. State, 297 Ga. App. 550, 677 S.E.2d 740 (2009).
Trial court did not impose an unjustifiably lengthy sentence merely because a defendant chose to require the prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt at trial rather than to enter a plea of guilty because the trial court sentenced defendant to the maximum term of 20 years in prison for kidnapping and on each of the aggravated assault counts, the trial court also exercised the court's discretion to run all of the counts concurrently instead of consecutively; the defendant's claim that the trial court punished the defendant for exercising the defendant's right to a jury trial was not supported by the transcript, which revealed that the sentence imposed by the trial court was based on the defendant's lack of remorse. Brown v. State, 299 Ga. App. 782, 683 S.E.2d 874 (2009).
Defendant's sentence of 20 years to serve for armed robbery, 20 years probation for aggravated assault, and 5 years probation for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, each to run consecutively, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the trial court's sentence fell within the statutory range of punishment, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b),16-8-41(b), and16-11-106(b); under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-10(a), it was within the trial court's discretion to order that the defendant's sentences on armed robbery and aggravated assault run consecutively. McKenzie v. State, 302 Ga. App. 538, 691 S.E.2d 352 (2010).
Defendant's life sentence for armed robbery was within the statutory limits, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b), and the 20-year sentences imposed for the defendant's aggravated assaults were within the statutory range of punishment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b). Therefore, the sentences were not void, and the court had no basis for disturbing the sentences. Gillespie v. State, 311 Ga. App. 442, 715 S.E.2d 832 (2011).
Defendant's sentence, as a recidivist, of concurrent 20 year terms on each of three counts of aggravated assault, concurrent five year terms on each of three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, to run consecutive to the aggravated assault sentence, and concurrent 15 year terms on each of two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to run consecutive to the aggravated assault sentence, was not cruel, inhumane, and unusual punishment because each sentence was within the statutory limits of the crimes charged, and the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the underlying crimes. Willis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 258, 728 S.E.2d 857 (2012).
State did not have the right to appeal sentences imposed by the trial court contrary to a plea agreement under O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(6) because the 15-year sentences, with five years to serve and the remainder on probation, were not void; they were within the 20-year range of punishments for robbery and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b) &16-8-40(b). State v. Harper, 279 Ga. App. 620, 631 S.E.2d 820 (2006) was overruled. State v. King, 325 Ga. App. 445, 750 S.E.2d 756 (2013).
In an aggravated assault case, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the trial court did not indicate that the court could not sentence the defendant to 20 years in prison as a recidivist, but, rather, the trial court clearly indicated that the court could sentence the defendant to 20 years in prison; and the colloquy clearly alerted the defendant that the consequences of refusing the state's plea offer could be harsher than the consequences of accepting the plea. Crews v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 10, 2020).
Sentence improper.
- Trial court erred in sentencing the defendant on the count of the indictment charging the defendant with making an assault upon the victim with intent to murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) after sentencing the defendant to life in prison for malice murder because the aggravated assault upon the victim and the murder of the victim occurred simultaneously; thus, the evidence used to prove the aggravated assault offense was established by the same, but not all, of the facts required to prove malice murder. Gresham v. State, 289 Ga. 103, 709 S.E.2d 780 (2011).
Defendant was incorrectly sentenced on the aggravated assault charge which was the underlying offense for one of the felony murder charges. Kipp v. State, 294 Ga. 55, 751 S.E.2d 83 (2013).
Four consecutive 20-year sentences not excessive.
- Trial court's imposition of four separate 20-year sentences upon the defendant for each of the four aggravated-assault convictions and ordering those sentences to be served consecutively was not excessive punishment because the 20-year sentence for each separate aggravated assault fell within the statutory range and the defendant failed to demonstrate that the punishment was so excessive in proportion to the offenses as to shock the conscience. Miller v. State, 351 Ga. App. 757, 833 S.E.2d 142 (2019).
Sentence not void.
- Defendant's 10-year sentence for violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., and aggravated assault was not void as the sentence fell within the range of permitted sentences and, thus, did not amount to a punishment that the law did not allow. Garza v. State, 325 Ga. App. 505, 753 S.E.2d 651 (2014).
Conduct sufficient for sentence enhancement.
- Four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6) was proper because the district court found that the defendant shot at people allegedly intending to rob the defendant's store, the act constituted the felony offense of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and the discharge of the gun was relevant conduct under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(1) because the discharge occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922. United States v. Sako, F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 2, 2008)(Unpublished).
Sufficient findings warranting restrictive custody for juvenile.
- Juvenile court did not err in determining that a defendant juvenile was in need of restrictive custody with thirty months of confinement in a youth detention center because: (1) the court complied with O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(c) by making specific written findings of fact as to each of the statutory elements; (2) the court's findings analyzed the defendant's needs and best interest; and (3) the court properly considered the report of a psychological evaluation performed on the defendant, along with the defendant's background and prior juvenile history, in making the court's determination that the defendant's needs would be better served with restrictive custody; the juvenile court's findings accurately reflected the nature and circumstances of the aggravated assault the defendant committed, including the facts that the victim did receive a serious injury when the defendant shot her in the head and that she had to receive medical treatment for her head injury, and the juvenile court's findings as to those basic facts were supported by the trial evidence and showed circumstances that authorized the order for restrictive custody. In the Interest of I.C., 300 Ga. App. 683, 686 S.E.2d 279 (2009).
Ineffective counsel not established.
- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, despite the fact that defendant failed to satisfy defendant's responsibility under the Rules of the Georgia Court of Appeals, after a review of the record in the appellate court's discretion, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed, as defendant's trial counsel's stipulation to a witness' prior testimony, made under oath, before the judge, and subject to trial counsel's searching cross-examination on defendant's behalf regarding this same case, did not constitute an unreasonable or incompetent strategy. Stuart v. State, 274 Ga. App. 120, 616 S.E.2d 855 (2005).
Given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt with respect to an aggravated assault charge, and because no reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial with respect to that charge would have been different had the jury not been presented evidence of the temporary protective order, and the result would not have changed even if trial counsel had stipulated to the existence of the temporary protective order to avoid its presentment to the jury, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in defending the charge. Ford v. State, 283 Ga. App. 460, 641 S.E.2d 671 (2007).
Because defense counsel was not ineffective in: (1) failing to investigate the victim's reputation for violence and introduce evidence of that victim's prior violent acts; (2) failing to investigate the defendant's medical records; (3) failing to investigate a state witness's convictions for crimes of moral turpitude and request an impeachment charge concerning that witness; (4) advising defendant not to testify; and (5) failing to present evidence or argument at sentencing, the defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied and the aggravated assault conviction was upheld. Cross v. State, 285 Ga. App. 518, 646 S.E.2d 723 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1479, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 680 (Ga. 2007).
Ineffective counsel established as to aggravated assault but not as to other charge.
- Because the defendant presented sufficient evidence to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to stipulate to the defendant's felon status or to obtain a jury charge limiting the jury's consideration of the defendant's criminal history, such failures prejudiced the defendant's defense sufficiently to require a new trial on a charge of aggravated assault; however, given the defendant's admission to possessing a gun at the time of the altercation, no prejudice resulted to warrant reversal and a new trial on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. Starling v. State, 285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007).
Prior conviction properly admitted.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing the state to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior aggravated assault conviction under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 because the trial court specifically addressed the relevant factors including the kind of felony involved, the date of the conviction, and the importance of the witness's credibility and properly considered the specific facts and circumstances of the defendant's prior aggravated assault conviction, as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b), before concluding that the probative value of evidence of the conviction substantially outweighed the evidence's prejudicial effect; the statute itself contains no distinction between defendants and witnesses when more than ten years has passed since the applicable conviction or release. Dozier v. State, 311 Ga. App. 713, 716 S.E.2d 802 (2011), overruled on other grounds, Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (2012).
Cited in Middlebrooks v. State, 107 Ga. App. 587, 130 S.E.2d 798 (1963); Vanleeward v. Rutledge, 369 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1966); Lingo v. State, 226 Ga. 496, 175 S.E.2d 657 (1970); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 177 S.E.2d 840 (1970); Barrett v. State, 123 Ga. App. 210, 180 S.E.2d 271 (1971); Summerour v. State, 124 Ga. App. 484, 184 S.E.2d 365 (1971); Hobbs v. State, 229 Ga. 556, 192 S.E.2d 903 (1972); Hewitt v. State, 127 Ga. App. 180, 193 S.E.2d 47 (1972); Smith v. State, 127 Ga. App. 468, 193 S.E.2d 921 (1972); Collins v. State, 129 Ga. App. 87, 198 S.E.2d 707 (1973); Ward v. State, 231 Ga. 484, 202 S.E.2d 421 (1973); Cain v. State, 232 Ga. 804, 209 S.E.2d 158 (1974); Harvey v. State, 233 Ga. 41, 209 S.E.2d 587 (1974); Lowe v. State, 133 Ga. App. 420, 210 S.E.2d 869 (1974); Barker v. State, 233 Ga. 781, 213 S.E.2d 624 (1975); Long v. State, 233 Ga. 926, 213 S.E.2d 853 (1975); Chappell v. State, 134 Ga. App. 375, 214 S.E.2d 392 (1975); Jackson v. State, 234 Ga. 549, 216 S.E.2d 834 (1975); Jones v. State, 234 Ga. 648, 217 S.E.2d 597 (1975); Hale v. State, 135 Ga. App. 625, 218 S.E.2d 643 (1975); Davis v. State, 136 Ga. App. 749, 222 S.E.2d 188 (1975); Baker v. State, 236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269 (1976); Spriggs v. State, 139 Ga. App. 586, 228 S.E.2d 727 (1976); Ledford v. State, 237 Ga. 628, 229 S.E.2d 403 (1976); Fountain v. York, 237 Ga. 784, 229 S.E.2d 629 (1976); Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976); Gillespie v. State, 140 Ga. App. 408, 231 S.E.2d 154 (1976); Robertson v. State, 140 Ga. App. 506, 231 S.E.2d 367 (1976); Bruce v. State, 142 Ga. App. 211, 235 S.E.2d 606 (1977); Carroll v. State, 143 Ga. App. 230, 237 S.E.2d 703 (1977); Leach v. State, 143 Ga. App. 598, 239 S.E.2d 177 (1977); Braxton v. State, 240 Ga. 10, 239 S.E.2d 339 (1977); Tucker v. State, 144 Ga. App. 30, 240 S.E.2d 304 (1977); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977); Smith v. State, 144 Ga. App. 785, 242 S.E.2d 376 (1978); Rush v. State, 145 Ga. App. 745, 245 S.E.2d 34 (1978); Murphy v. State, 146 Ga. App. 721, 247 S.E.2d 186 (1978); White v. State, 147 Ga. App. 260, 248 S.E.2d 540 (1978); Webster v. State, 147 Ga. App. 322, 248 S.E.2d 697 (1978); Peterkin v. State, 147 Ga. App. 437, 249 S.E.2d 152 (1978); Garrett v. State, 147 Ga. App. 500, 249 S.E.2d 315 (1978); Sprouse v. State, 242 Ga. 831, 252 S.E.2d 173 (1979); Ballard v. State, 150 Ga. App. 704, 258 S.E.2d 331 (1979); Martin v. State, 151 Ga. App. 9, 258 S.E.2d 711 (1979); Savage v. State, 152 Ga. App. 392, 263 S.E.2d 218 (1979); Bill v. State, 153 Ga. App. 131, 264 S.E.2d 582 (1980); Dean v. State, 245 Ga. 503, 265 S.E.2d 805 (1980); Henderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 801, 266 S.E.2d 522 (1980); Marable v. State, 154 Ga. App. 115, 267 S.E.2d 837 (1980); Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga. App. 835, 270 S.E.2d 61 (1980); Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 411, 274 S.E.2d 778 (1980); State v. Williams, 247 Ga. 200, 275 S.E.2d 62 (1981); McMillan v. State, 157 Ga. App. 694, 278 S.E.2d 478 (1981); Delano v. State, 158 Ga. App. 296, 279 S.E.2d 743 (1981); Craft v. State, 158 Ga. App. 745, 282 S.E.2d 203 (1981); Garard v. State, 159 Ga. App. 248, 283 S.E.2d 27 (1981); Jackson v. State, 248 Ga. 480, 284 S.E.2d 267 (1981); Fletcher v. State, 159 Ga. App. 789, 285 S.E.2d 762 (1981); Bundren v. State, 160 Ga. App. 367, 287 S.E.2d 248 (1981); Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 287 S.E.2d 26 (1982); Shelton v. State, 161 Ga. App. 524, 289 S.E.2d 768 (1982); Carter v. State, 162 Ga. App. 44, 290 S.E.2d 143 (1982); Miller v. State, 162 Ga. App. 759, 292 S.E.2d 481 (1982); Dunbar v. State, 163 Ga. App. 243, 292 S.E.2d 897 (1982); Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 293 S.E.2d 474 (1982); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 801, 294 S.E.2d 525 (1982); Chastain v. State, 163 Ga. App. 678, 296 S.E.2d 69 (1982); Talley v. State, 164 Ga. App. 150, 296 S.E.2d 173 (1982); Jester v. State, 250 Ga. 119, 296 S.E.2d 555 (1982); Simmons v. State, 164 Ga. App. 643, 298 S.E.2d 313 (1982); Richardson v. State, 250 Ga. 506, 299 S.E.2d 715 (1983); Rozier v. State, 165 Ga. App. 178, 300 S.E.2d 194 (1983); Brown v. State, 165 Ga. App. 799, 302 S.E.2d 630 (1983); Bert v. State, 169 Ga. App. 628, 314 S.E.2d 466 (1984); Hartman v. State, 170 Ga. App. 195, 316 S.E.2d 820 (1984); Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 319 S.E.2d 484 (1984); Fobbs v. State, 171 Ga. App. 352, 319 S.E.2d 522 (1984); McWilliams v. State, 172 Ga. App. 55, 322 S.E.2d 87 (1984); Lester v. State, 173 Ga. App. 300, 325 S.E.2d 912 (1985); Shepherd v. State, 173 Ga. App. 499, 326 S.E.2d 596 (1985); Howard v. State, 173 Ga. App. 585, 327 S.E.2d 554 (1985); Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 703, 331 S.E.2d 616 (1985); Green v. State, 175 Ga. App. 92, 332 S.E.2d 385 (1985); Stevens v. State, 176 Ga. App. 583, 336 S.E.2d 846 (1985); McCrary v. State, 176 Ga. App. 683, 337 S.E.2d 442 (1985); Gabler v. State, 177 Ga. App. 3, 338 S.E.2d 469 (1985); Turner v. State, 178 Ga. App. 274, 342 S.E.2d 759 (1986); Hiers v. State, 179 Ga. App. 181, 345 S.E.2d 900 (1986); Allen v. State, 180 Ga. App. 701, 350 S.E.2d 478 (1986); Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987); Johnson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 822, 357 S.E.2d 161 (1987); Jackson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 885, 357 S.E.2d 321 (1987); Allison v. State, 184 Ga. App. 294, 361 S.E.2d 271 (1987); Williams v. State, 185 Ga. App. 633, 365 S.E.2d 491 (1988); Curtis v. State, 190 Ga. App. 173, 378 S.E.2d 516 (1989); Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 65, 383 S.E.2d 627 (1989); Lubiano v. State, 192 Ga. App. 272, 384 S.E.2d 410 (1989); Blackmon v. State, 197 Ga. App. 133, 397 S.E.2d 728 (1990); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 401 S.E.2d 484 (1991); Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 401 S.E.2d 549 (1991); Jones v. State, 198 Ga. App. 377, 401 S.E.2d 584 (1991); Strickland v. State, 198 Ga. App. 570, 402 S.E.2d 532 (1991); Brooks v. State, 199 Ga. App. 525, 405 S.E.2d 343 (1991); Moore v. State, 207 Ga. App. 892, 429 S.E.2d 335 (1993); Davis v. State, 209 Ga. App. 187, 433 S.E.2d 366 (1993); Smiley v. State, 263 Ga. 716, 438 S.E.2d 75 (1994); Williams v. State, 214 Ga. App. 834, 449 S.E.2d 532 (1994); Shorter v. State, 270 Ga. 280, 507 S.E.2d 757 (1998); Mangham v. State, 234 Ga. App. 567, 507 S.E.2d 806 (1998); Busch v. State, 234 Ga. App. 766, 507 S.E.2d 868 (1998); Cockrell v. State, 248 Ga. App. 359, 545 S.E.2d 600 (2001); Reyes v. State, 250 Ga. App. 769, 552 S.E.2d 918 (2001); Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 552 S.E.2d 922 (2001), overruled in part by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018); In the Interest of A.A., 253 Ga. App. 858, 560 S.E.2d 763 (2002); Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 564 S.E.2d 216 (2002); Webb v. State, 256 Ga. App. 653, 569 S.E.2d 596 (2002); Anderson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 602, 571 S.E.2d 815 (2002); Adams v. State, 275 Ga. 867, 572 S.E.2d 545 (2002); Shields v. State, 259 Ga. App. 906, 578 S.E.2d 566 (2003); Jackson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (2003); Eidson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 664, 586 S.E.2d 362 (2003); Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327, 588 S.E.2d 722 (2003); Hill v. State, 268 Ga. App. 642, 602 S.E.2d 348 (2004); Blake v. State, 272 Ga. App. 181, 612 S.E.2d 33 (2005); Price v. State, 281 Ga. App. 844, 637 S.E.2d 468 (2006); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007); Dalton v. State, 282 Ga. 300, 647 S.E.2d 580 (2007); Spiller v. State, 282 Ga. 351, 647 S.E.2d 64 (2007); Whitaker v. State, 287 Ga. App. 465, 652 S.E.2d 568 (2007); Miller v. Martin, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2007); Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 219, 653 S.E.2d 810 (2007); Beals v. State, 288 Ga. App. 815, 655 S.E.2d 687 (2007); Grant v. State, 289 Ga. App. 230, 656 S.E.2d 873 (2008); Smith v. State, 289 Ga. App. 742, 658 S.E.2d 156 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 462 (Ga. 2008); Mitchell v. State, 283 Ga. 341, 659 S.E.2d 356 (2008); Louis v. State, 290 Ga. App. 106, 658 S.E.2d 897 (2008); Hyde v. State, 291 Ga. App. 662, 662 S.E.2d 764 (2008); Sillah v. State, 291 Ga. App. 848, 663 S.E.2d 274 (2008); Lemming v. State, 292 Ga. App. 138, 663 S.E.2d 375 (2008)
Jennings v. State, 292 Ga. App. 149, 664 S.E.2d 248 (2008); Moran v. State, 293 Ga. App. 279, 666 S.E.2d 726 (2008); Greene v. State, 295 Ga. App. 803, 673 S.E.2d 292 (2009); Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338, 680 S.E.2d 182 (2009); Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821, 681 S.E.2d 248 (2009); Bonker v. State, 298 Ga. App. 867, 681 S.E.2d 256 (2009); Jacobs v. State, 299 Ga. App. 368, 683 S.E.2d 64 (2009); Crawford v. State, 301 Ga. App. 633, 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009); Smith v. State, 304 Ga. App. 708, 699 S.E.2d 742 (2010); Smith v. State, 309 Ga. App. 241, 709 S.E.2d 823 (2011); Russell v. State, 319 Ga. App. 472, 735 S.E.2d 797 (2012); Hyman v. State, 320 Ga. App. 106, 739 S.E.2d 395 (2013); McGlasker v. State, 321 Ga. App. 614, 741 S.E.2d 303 (2013); Vann v. State, 322 Ga. App. 148, 742 S.E.2d 767 (2013); Avila v. State, 322 Ga. App. 225, 744 S.E.2d 405 (2013); Young v. State, 329 Ga. App. 70, 763 S.E.2d 735 (2014); State v. Owens, 296 Ga. 205, 766 S.E.2d 66 (2014); Williams v. State, 330 Ga. App. 606, 768 S.E.2d 788 (2015); In the Interest of C. M., 331 Ga. App. 16, 769 S.E.2d 737 (2015); Turner v. State, 331 Ga. App. 78, 769 S.E.2d 785 (2015); Howard v. State, 334 Ga. App. 7, 778 S.E.2d 19 (2015); McGil v. State, 339 Ga. App. 130, 793 S.E.2d 442 (2016); Johnson v. State, 341 Ga. App. 384, 801 S.E.2d 82 (2017); Cade v. State, 351 Ga. App. 637, 832 S.E.2d 453 (2019); Dodson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 412, 838 S.E.2d 87 (2020); Robinson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 420, 838 S.E.2d 92 (2020); Morgan v. State, 354 Ga. App. 754, 841 S.E.2d 430 (2020); Marcus v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., Ga. App. , 845 S.E.2d 782 (2020); Caldwell v. State, 355 Ga. App. 608, 845 S.E.2d 345 (2020); Brooks v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Aug. 24, 2020); Eggleston v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 28, 2020).
Indictment
Indictment must charge methods conjunctively.
- Although the aggravated assault statute contains disjunctively several methods by which the crime may be committed, proof of any one of which is sufficient to constitute the crime, an indictment must charge such methods conjunctively if it charges more than one of them. Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 878, 510 S.E.2d 570 (1998).
Written waiver of grand jury indictment required.
- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was void for lack of jurisdiction and had to be reversed because the evidence showed that the defendant verbally waived the defendant's right to a grand jury indictment at the start of trial and a written waiver was required by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70(a). Martinez v. State, 322 Ga. App. 63, 743 S.E.2d 621 (2013).
Consolidation of indictments proper.
- Trial court properly consolidated the indictments charging the defendant with armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and theft by receiving stolen property because joinder was not prejudicial or erroneous since evidence of the various intertwined crimes would have been admissible against the defendant had the indictments been tried separately; the trial court was authorized to find that the events in the indictments committed within a two-day period and involving guns and a car constituted a series of connected acts, and the connection between the robberies and the assaults helped identify the defendant. Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 796, 714 S.E.2d 584 (2011).
Indictment sufficient to charge aggravated assault.
- Indictment alleging that defendant made "an assault upon the person of Joe Jones, with a handgun, a deadly weapon" was sufficient to charge the crime of aggravated assault. Wallace v. State, 216 Ga. App. 718, 455 S.E.2d 615 (1995); Sam's Wholesale Club v. Riley, 241 Ga. App. 783, 527 S.E.2d 577 (1999).
Indictment charging that defendant's fists were likely to result in serious bodily injury was sufficient, and no reference to deadly weapons was required. Jay v. State, 232 Ga. App. 661, 503 S.E.2d 563 (1998).
In an indictment alleging that defendant assaulted the victim "by kicking her in the head and shoulder area and by striking her with his hands and feet," it was unnecessary to further allege that defendant used defendant's own hands and feet as deadly weapons or that there was intent to injure. Gafford v. State, 240 Ga. App. 251, 523 S.E.2d 336 (1999).
Indictment was sufficient to charge aggravated assault, which stated that defendant "did unlawfully make an assault upon the person of [victim], with a knife, the same being an object which when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury. . . ." Merneigh v. State, 242 Ga. App. 735, 531 S.E.2d 152 (2000).
Indictment which alleged that defendant assaulted another person with a box cutter by chasing the other person with the box cutter was sufficient to apprise defendant of the charge. Hogan v. State, 261 Ga. App. 261, 582 S.E.2d 210 (2003).
Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 was affirmed because the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury on the full definition of aggravated assault under § 16-5-21 and there was no reasonable probability that the jury convicted defendant on a portion of the offense that was not charged in the indictment. Hughes v. State, 266 Ga. App. 203, 596 S.E.2d 697 (2004).
Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was affirmed because the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof at trial; under the circumstances the terms "choke" and "strangulation" were synonymous. Hughes v. State, 266 Ga. App. 203, 596 S.E.2d 697 (2004).
Indictment charging defendant with "aggravated assault (family violence)" and "family violence battery (felony)" in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 was sufficient as it informed defendant of the charges and protected defendant against double jeopardy; it was the description in the indictment that characterized the offense charged, not the name given to the offense in the bill of indictment, and mere surplusage did not vitiate an otherwise sufficient indictment. State v. Barnett, 268 Ga. App. 900, 602 S.E.2d 899 (2004).
In two actions charging the defendant with being a party to the crime of aggravated assault allegedly committed with a codefendant, given that the first of two indictments failed to set out the elements of aggravated assault, and the state offered to nolle pros the same, the indictment was properly dismissed; however, a second and superseding indictment survived demurrer, as the elements of aggravated assault were sufficiently set out therein, and the disjunctive way that the offense was charged was not fatally defective as to the defendant, but simply limited the state's option of proving at trial the manner in which the aggravated assault was committed. State v. Daniels, 281 Ga. App. 224, 635 S.E.2d 835 (2006).
Because an indictment, which included charging language that the defendant "unlawfully, and with malice aforethought, caused the death of the victim by striking," placed the defendant on notice of a possible conviction of an assault upon the victim with the intent to murder or commit a violent injury, the defendant could be convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser included crime of malice murder; the only difference was that the malice murder indictment alleged that the defendant actually accomplished the murder, in addition to having intended to accomplish the murder. Reagan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 708, 637 S.E.2d 113 (2006).
There was no deficiency in an indictment charging the defendant with aggravated assault by making an assault upon the person of the victim with a certain semiautomatic pistol; the charge of aggravated assault tracked the statutory language of the offense, contained the elements thereof, and gave the defendant sufficient notice of the charge that the defendant needed to be prepared to defend. Garza v. State, 285 Ga. App. 902, 648 S.E.2d 84 (2007), vacated, in part, 300 Ga. App. 352, 685 S.E.2d 366 (2009).
Court of appeals rejected the defendant's claim that the indictment filed was fatally defective as the indictment properly charged the defendant with aggravated assault, specifying that the defendant's hands and feet "were likely to result in serious bodily injury." May v. State, 287 Ga. App. 407, 651 S.E.2d 510 (2007).
With respect to an aggravated assault conviction, a trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion in arrest of the judgment on the basis that the rule of lenity required that defendant be sentenced to a lesser charge of simple battery as the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction, and the indictment was not void on the indictment's face or otherwise deficient. Armstrong v. State, 292 Ga. App. 145, 664 S.E.2d 242 (2008).
As an indictment against the defendant inmate charged aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), based on the striking of a victim with an object likely to result in serious bodily injury, all of the essential elements were stated and the indictment was not deficient; the indictment was not void for failing to expressly allege the criminal intent. Powell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 833, 678 S.E.2d 524 (2009).
Indictment charged the defendant with the aggravated assault of the victim by assaulting the victim with the defendant's hands, which when used offensively against another person was likely to result in serious bodily injury, by striking the victim repeatedly about the head and face with the defendant's hands; thus, it was unnecessary for the indictment to allege that the defendant used hands as a deadly weapon. Walker v. State, 298 Ga. App. 265, 679 S.E.2d 814 (2009).
Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal on the grounds that a count in the indictment alleging aggravated assault was void because the indictment set forth all of the necessary elements of aggravated assault, specifically citing the aggravated assault statute, and informing the defendant that the defendant was accused of unlawfully assaulting the person of defendant's daughter, with objects, to wit: hands and an object, the description of which being unknown, which when used offensively against a person was likely to and did result in serious bodily injury. Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 687 S.E.2d 833 (2010), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that the crimes for which the defendant was charged, aggravated assault, making terroristic threats, and cruelty to children in the third degree, were committed on the date alleged in the indictment because there was sufficient evidence to support the allegations of the indictment; the exact date of the crimes was not a material allegation of the indictment because the exact date was not an essential element with respect to any of the charged offenses, and the date of the crimes proved at trial was prior to the return of the indictment and within the limitation periods for the crimes. Coats v. State, 303 Ga. App. 818, 695 S.E.2d 285 (2010), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).
There was no defect in the aggravated assault counts of an indictment a grand jury returned against the defendant because those counts alleged that the defendant did make an assault upon the person of a five-year-old boy and his mother with a knife, a deadly weapon; the language of the indictment tracked that of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and was not too vague to inform the defendant of the charges against the defendant. Belcher v. State, 304 Ga. App. 645, 697 S.E.2d 300 (2010).
In charging aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) as the predicate offense to felony murder, it was sufficient for the indictment implicitly to allege the use of a hatchet as a weapon which, when used offensively, was likely to result in serious bodily injury. Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 727 S.E.2d 112 (2012).
There was no basis to grant the defendant a special demurrer on the counts for aggravated assault and felony murder based on assault as the indictment informed the defendant that the state intended to prove that on a day when the defendant admitted the victim was in the defendant's custody, the defendant used an object that was likely to result in serious bodily injury to fatally injure the victim by causing damage to the victim's brain, which was sufficient notice for the defendant to prepare a defense. State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 759 S.E.2d 500 (2014).
Indictment adequately alleged aggravated assault as the indictment alleged that the defendant and the codefendant made an assault on others by discharging, without legal justification, a firearm from a vehicle in the direction of the others. Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 783 S.E.2d 622 (2016).
Indictment charging the defendant with knocking the victim to the ground causing a serious wound to the victim's head and doing so by a means likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively against a person was sufficient to place the defendant on notice that the defendant was charged with aggravated assault. Smith v. State, 335 Ga. App. 639, 781 S.E.2d 400 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).
Indictment was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer because the indictment charged the defendant with felony murder-having caused the death of the victim while committing the felony of aggravated assault, which was a felony; and the defendant could not admit the defendant caused the death of the victim while in the commission of aggravated assault and not be guilty of the crime. Brooks v. State, 299 Ga. 474, 788 S.E.2d 766 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 573, 196 L. Ed. 2d 451 (U.S. 2016).
Indictment insufficient to charge aggravated assault.
- An indictment did not set forth the elements of this crime where it failed to state that defendant placed defendant's own hands around the victim's neck in an attempt to use them as deadly weapons, or in an attempt to rape, rob, or murder the victim, and failed to state that, in placing defendant's hands around the victim's neck, defendant intended to inflict a violent injury or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently. Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 464 S.E.2d 198 (1995).
Because an indictment did not charge the defendant with all the elements of aggravated assault, it could not support a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); therefore, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal. Fleming v. State, 276 Ga. App. 491, 623 S.E.2d 696 (2005).
Admissions in indictment.
- Because the defendant could not admit the charges of aggravated assault and terroristic threats in the indictment and still be innocent, the indictment returned was not defective. Dudley v. State, 283 Ga. App. 86, 640 S.E.2d 677 (2006).
One count indictment was sufficient.
- One-count indictment against the defendant was held sufficient and did not violate the defendant's due process rights, because the indictment charged the defendant with felony murder by causing the death of the victim while committing the felony of aggravated assault and was sufficient to have withstood a general demurrer; the fact that the defendant failed to raise a special demurrer to the indictment prior to pleading to the merits of the indictment was a waiver of that argument. Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 611 S.E.2d 52 (2005).
Indictment not required to allege party status.
- Indictment's failure to allege that a defendant was a party to aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and first-degree child cruelty under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a),16-5-24(a), and16-5-70(b) did not require a showing that the defendant was the principal perpetrator under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21; the defendant's status as a party to the crimes was not an essential element used to increase the sentences for the crimes, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant could be convicted either as the principal perpetrator of the crimes or as a party thereto. Hill v. State, 282 Ga. App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (2006).
Indictment sufficient for assault by dentist against patient.
- Count nine in an indictment charging a defendant, allegedly an oral surgeon, with aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) was sufficient under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54(a) because the general intent required under § 16-5-21(a)(2) did not need to be expressly alleged and the use of the phrase "serious bodily harm" was substantially the same as the statutory language; additional pleading was not required simply because the case involved a doctor and a patient. State v. Austin, 297 Ga. App. 478, 677 S.E.2d 706 (2009).
Indictment alleging offensive use of fists also sufficient allegation of simple battery.
- After the defendant was indicted for aggravated assault and convicted of simple battery, language of the indictment tracking the aggravated assault statute by alleging that the offensive use of fists and feet resulted in bodily injury was also a sufficient allegation of simple battery. Buchanan v. State, 173 Ga. App. 554, 327 S.E.2d 535 (1985).
No fatal variance.
- Fact that an indictment charged the defendant with aggravated assault and battery by slicing the victim's neck with a knife, but the evidence showed the defendant used a box cutter, did not constitute a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof, because the defendant was sufficiently informed of the charges and faced no danger of further prosecution arising out of the incident. Lawson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 852, 630 S.E.2d 131 (2006).
In a case when the defendant, a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent based on aggravated assault, there was not a fatal variance between the allegations and the proof. The petition alleged that the defendant's use of a baton against a deputy amounted to an assault with an object likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively, and the proof supported this conclusion; any variance between the allegation that the defendant actually hit the deputy and proof that the defendant merely advanced on the deputy was thus immaterial. In the Interest of J.A.C., 291 Ga. App. 728, 662 S.E.2d 811 (2008).
There was not a fatal variance between an allegation that the defendant committed aggravated assault against all three members of a group and evidence that defendant only struck one member of the group because: (1) the evidence showed all three were in a group when the defendant fired a gun at the group; and (2) it was well established that the act of firing a weapon into a group made each individual in the group a separate victim and justified a separate count of aggravated assault for each victim. Martin-Argaw v. State, 311 Ga. App. 609, 716 S.E.2d 737 (2011).
Charge of entire aggravated assault statute not required.
- Trial court did not charge the entire aggravated assault statute, but defined aggravated assault as an "assault done in an aggravated manner," committed when a person assaulted another with a deadly weapon as alleged in the indictment; thus, there was no reasonable probability that the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault in a manner not charged in the indictment. Garza v. State, 285 Ga. App. 902, 648 S.E.2d 84 (2007), vacated, in part, 300 Ga. App. 352, 685 S.E.2d 366 (2009).
Indictment alleging rape and aggravated assault.
- Evidence showed that the kidnapping conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), was based on evidence showing that when the victim attempted to escape the initial attack, defendant grabbed the victim and dragged the victim to a more secluded area of the trailer park and the aggravated assault with intent to rape conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, was based on evidence that defendant beat the victim with the defendant's hands and fists with the intention of raping the victim; thus, the two crimes were separate offenses supported by different facts that did not merge as a matter of law. McGuire v. State, 266 Ga. App. 673, 598 S.E.2d 55 (2004).
Indictment alleging aggravated assault and aggravated battery.
- Because a conviction on a charge of aggravated assault could be based on the defendant's act of cutting of the victim's throat, while a conviction on a charge of aggravated battery could be based on the serious disfigurement of the victim's arms, a conviction could be entered on each count; hence, merger did not apply. Goss v. State, 289 Ga. App. 734, 658 S.E.2d 168 (2008).
Sufficient to withstand general demurrer.
- Indictment alleging that the defendant unlawfully made an assault upon a peace officer engaged in the performance of the officer's official duties with a motor vehicle, an object, which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury, was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer because the defendant could not admit to the facts other than the fact that the individual was a peace officer without being guilty of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. State v. Wilson, 318 Ga. App. 88, 732 S.E.2d 330 (2012).
Failure to file demurrer to indictment charging aggravated assault provided no basis for ineffective assistance of counsel.
- Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for new trial based on the defendant's claim that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of defense counsel failing to file a demurrer to an aggravated assault count on the premise that the allegations in the indictment did not adequately track the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 as, although the indictment did not state that the defendant used the defendant's hands as deadly weapons, that omission did not render the charge flawed since specific reference to a deadly weapon in an indictment must be seen as a general reference to the aggravating circumstance in § 16-5-21. As a result, any objection or demurrer would have been futile and, as such, the defendant's contention provided no basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Hall v. State, 292 Ga. App. 544, 664 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, No. S08C1841, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 926 (Ga. 2008).
Failure to file demurrer to indictment.
- Defendant's motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment challenging the wording of the indictment charging the defendant with aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), (3), were properly denied because the defendant could not have admitted the allegations of the indictment without admitting that the defendant was guilty of a crime, and, under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110, having failed to file a timely special demurrer, the defendant waived the right to a perfect indictment. McDaniel v. State, 298 Ga. App. 558, 680 S.E.2d 593 (2009).
Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the felony murder count of an indictment because the indictment contained sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice that the defendant was accused of the death of the victim as a result of an aggravated assault when the indictment alleged a specific, offensive use of the defendant's hands and feet and that when the defendant's hands and feet were used in a particular way they were objects which were likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury; the absence of self-defense, like general intent, did not have to be expressly alleged in an indictment, and even if some such allegation were necessary, language in the indictment asserting that defendant acted unlawfully and contrary to the laws of the state, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof was sufficient. Lizana v. State, 287 Ga. 184, 695 S.E.2d 208 (2010).
Waiver of challenge to indictment.
- Felony murder indictment was not deficient because the indictment did not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault because the defendant's failure to file a special demurrer seeking additional information before pleading guilty to the indictment constituted a waiver of the defendant's right to be tried on a perfect indictment. Brooks v. State, 299 Ga. 474, 788 S.E.2d 766 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 573, 196 L. Ed. 2d 451 (U.S. 2016).
Included Crimes
Which offense to sentence on.
- When the same facts were used to support aggravated assault and aggravated battery charges, the trial court erred in sentencing defendant on the aggravated assault count, the lesser included offense. Riden v. State, 226 Ga. App. 245, 486 S.E.2d 198 (1997).
Legislative intent as to aggravated assault upon police officer.
- Aggravated assault and aggravated assault upon police officer are separate and distinct crimes. Language in the caption to the bill which stated that the purpose of the statute was to define "the crime of aggravated assault upon a police officer" clearly indicated the intent of the General Assembly. Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 274 S.E.2d 455 (1981); but see Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).
Simple assault is lesser included offense of aggravated assault.
- Simple assault or assault (synonymous terms) is necessarily a lesser included offense of the greater crime of aggravated assault and is an essential part thereof. Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976).
Reckless conduct is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Bowers v. State, 177 Ga. App. 36, 338 S.E.2d 457 (1985).
In the defendant's trial on a charge of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b) because the latter was not a lesser-included offense of the former; while both offenses proscribed the same general conduct, i.e., subjecting another to actual injury or the possibility of injury, aggravated assault required proof that the forbidden act was intentional, while in the case of reckless conduct, the forbidden act is the product of criminal negligence. Chambers v. State, 308 Ga. App. 748, 708 S.E.2d 651 (2011).
Crimes included in aggravated assault with deadly weapon.
- Simple assault under former Code 1933, § 26-1301 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) and pointing a gun or pistol at another under former Code 1933, § 26-2908 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102) are both misdemeanors and included in the greater crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Morrison v. State, 147 Ga. App. 410, 249 S.E.2d 131 (1978).
Possession of firearm.
- Trial court properly refused to merge convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and aggravated assault. Pace v. State, 239 Ga. App. 506, 521 S.E.2d 444 (1999).
Cruelty to children can be lesser included crime under indictment for aggravated assault with deadly weapon. Williams v. State, 144 Ga. App. 130, 240 S.E.2d 890 (1977).
Cruelty to children count merged into count alleging aggravated assault, where both counts alleged the same facts, i.e., that defendant shot daughter. Cranford v. State, 186 Ga. App. 862, 369 S.E.2d 50 (1988).
Aggravated assault and false imprisonment did not merge.
- Defendant's conviction on a charge of false imprisonment did not merge with the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because each offense required proof of facts which the other did not: an assault and a weapon were not required for false imprisonment, and violation of liberty through arrest, confinement, or detention was not required for aggravated assault. Jackson v. State, 305 Ga. 614, 825 S.E.2d 188 (2019).
Unauthorized possession of weapon by inmate is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Weaver v. State, 176 Ga. App. 639, 337 S.E.2d 420 (1985).
Pointing weapon at another.
- In a homicide trial, defendant's act was clearly the felony of aggravated assault, not the misdemeanor of pointing a weapon at another, where the testimony showed that victim, as well as the three passengers in the victim's car, were aware of and understandably apprehensive of immediate violent injury, and defendant's own testimony revealed that defendant's purpose in pointing the weapon was to place victim in apprehension of immediate violent injury. Thus, the request for a charge on misdemeanor manslaughter was properly denied. Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 368, 359 S.E.2d 670 (1987); Rameau v. State, 267 Ga. 261, 477 S.E.2d 118 (1996).
Although pointing a firearm at another is an offense included in aggravated assault, it is not error to refuse a charge on it when the evidence does not reasonably raise the issue that defendant may be guilty of only the lesser crime. Head v. State, 233 Ga. App. 655, 504 S.E.2d 499 (1998); Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608, 533 S.E.2d 379 (2000).
Offense merged with attempted armed robbery.
- Since the defendant was indicted for aggravated assault for pointing a handgun at a victim, which was also a substantial step toward commission of the armed robbery, the trial court properly merged the defendant's aggravated assault conviction with the attempted armed robbery conviction. McKinney v. State, 274 Ga. App. 32, 619 S.E.2d 299 (2005).
Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault merged into the defendant's conviction for attempted armed robbery because the relevant aggravated assault provision did not require proof of any fact that was not also required to prove the attempted armed robbery as that offense could have been proved under the indictment in the case. Garland v. State, 311 Ga. App. 7, 714 S.E.2d 707 (2011).
Merger with armed robbery proper.
- Evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator who stole a victim's car and purse at gunpoint, coupled with evidence of the defendant's flight from police, possession of the stolen car, and possession of the revolver used in the crimes, was sufficient to support convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, armed robbery, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; however, the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact into the armed robbery conviction and sentence. Doublette v. State, 278 Ga. App. 746, 629 S.E.2d 602 (2006).
Merger of an aggravated assault count into an armed robbery count was required when the only evidence was that the defendant used a gun to rob the victim. There was not a separate aggravated assault before the robbery began; thus, there having been no additional violence used against the victim, it followed that the evidentiary basis for the aggravated assault conviction was "used up" in proving the armed robbery. Howard v. State, 298 Ga. App. 98, 679 S.E.2d 104 (2009).
Defendant's aggravated assault convictions merged into the defendant's armed robbery convictions because there was no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), that was not contained in armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not require proof of a fact that armed robbery does not, and because the assault requirement of aggravated assault is the equivalent of the "use of an offensive weapon" requirement of armed robbery, the "deadly weapon" requirement of this form of aggravated assault is the equivalent of the "offensive weapon" requirement of armed robbery. Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 700 S.E.2d 399 (2010).
Plea counsel performed deficiently in failing to argue for the merger of the defendant's convictions and sentences for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charges did not require proof of a fact that the armed robbery charges did not likewise require, and the defendant's aggravated assault convictions unquestionably merged into the defendant's armed-robbery convictions; the armed robbery counts in the indictment provided that the defendant unlawfully, with intent to commit theft, did take property from the person of the victim, by use of an offensive weapon, and the aggravated assault counts provided that the defendant did unlawfully make an assault upon the person of the victim with a steel rod, a deadly weapon, an object, which, when used offensively against a person, was likely to or actually did result in serious bodily injury, by beating the victim about the head and face with the steel rod. Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 705 S.E.2d 726 (2011).
Trial court erred in not merging a defendant's aggravated assault with attempt to rob conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), into the defendant's armed robbery conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. The offense of armed robbery contained a requirement, the taking of property, that aggravated assault did not, but aggravated assault with intent to rob did not require proof of a fact which armed robbery did not. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 541, 713 S.E.2d 689 (2011).
Trial court's failure to merge the defendant's aggravated assault conviction with the defendant's armed robbery conviction in imposing the sentence was erroneous because there was no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that was not contained in armed robbery; both crimes required proof of an intent to rob because the elements of the defendant's armed robbery charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) included an intent to rob, the use of an offensive weapon, and the taking of property from the person or presence of another, and the elements of the defendant's aggravated assault charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) included an assault upon the victim, an intent to rob, and the use of a deadly weapon. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).
Trial court erred by failing to merge an aggravated assault charge into an armed robbery charge because the victim testified repeatedly that the defendant was in the victim's apartment when the defendant shot the victim and that the victim fired a gun as soon as the victim saw the defendant point a gun at the victim while forcing the defendant's way in; both crimes were complete when the defendant pointed the gun at the victim while simultaneously entering the apartment, and there was no separate aggravated assault before the armed robbery began. Davis v. State, 312 Ga. App. 328, 718 S.E.2d 559 (2011).
Trial court erred in failing to merge the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), into the defendant's conviction for armed robbery conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), because the act of using an offensive weapon for the purposes of committing an armed robbery was the legal equivalent of assault for the purposes of committing an aggravated assault; it is not determinative under the merger analysis that the desired object of a defendant's armed robbery was something other than that which he or she actually took, but instead, what dictates merger is the fact that both crimes for which the defendant was convicted were predicated upon the same conduct. Hall v. State, 313 Ga. App. 66, 720 S.E.2d 181 (2011).
Defendant's conviction and sentence on one count for aggravated assault against the manager of a fast food restaurant as a party to co-defendant's acts had to be vacated because that count was alleged to have been committed by the act of co-defendant striking the manager about the head with the gun during the armed robbery, thus, the aggravated assault arose out of the same act or transaction as the armed robbery and it was included in and merged with the armed robbery as a matter of fact. Broyard v. State, 325 Ga. App. 794, 755 S.E.2d 36 (2014).
Aggravated assault count merged into conviction for armed robbery because the trial court failed to recognize that both charges arose from the same conduct, that of threatening the victim at gunpoint to make the victim open the cash register so the assailants could take cash and checks inside. Chambers v. Hall, 305 Ga. 363, 825 S.E.2d 162 (2019), cert. denied, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 5561, 205 L. Ed. 2d 174 (U.S. 2019).
Merger with armed robbery not proper.
- Trial court did not err in failing to merge counts of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the assault was completed before the armed robbery; the evidence showed that the defendant confronted the victim by entering the room with a pistol and threatening the victim, at which point, the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was completed. The evidence further showed that after threatening the victim, presumably to prevent the victim from retaliating against the defendant for a prior altercation, the defendant ordered the victim to empty the victim's pockets at gunpoint and took $200 from the victim, which comprised the armed robbery. Ransom v. State, 298 Ga. App. 360, 680 S.E.2d 200 (2009).
Defendant's sentence for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), was not void as a result of the trial court's failure to merge the convictions because the convictions did not merge for sentencing purposes since they did not involve the same conduct; the crime of armed robbery was complete when the defendant entered a restaurant and, with the use of a handgun, demanded and took money from a waitress, and, after completion of the armed robbery, the defendant pushed the gun against the waitress's neck and asked whether the waitress wanted to die, which formed the basis of the aggravated assault conviction. McKenzie v. State, 302 Ga. App. 538, 691 S.E.2d 352 (2010).
Because the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) for armed robbery could be sustained based upon the defendant's conduct with a shotgun, and because the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) for aggravated assault could be sustained based upon the defendant's conduct with a knife, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), the two convictions did not merge. Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 838, 700 S.E.2d 726 (2010).
Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault did not merge because each crime required proof of conduct that the other did not; the armed robbery as charged in the indictment required proof of intent to rob and that the victim's wallet was taken, while the aggravated assaults required proof that the victim's neck was slashed with a sharp weapon. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).
Trial court did not err in failing to merge the aggravated assault count of the indictment with the armed robbery count because the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to each of the crimes for which the defendant was indicted, and as a consequence, the defendant waived all defenses except that the indictment charged no crime, including the issue of whether the offenses merged as a matter of law or fact; the defendant chose to admit that the defendant committed the acts so the defendant could avoid a trial on the question of guilt or innocence, and having accepted the benefits of such a bargain, it would be contrary to public policy and the ends of justice to allow the defendant to avoid the consequences of the agreement. Carson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 225, 723 S.E.2d 516 (2012), overruled on other grounds, Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013).
Trial court erred by failing to merge the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly or offensive weapon and armed robbery for sentencing purposes because hitting a victim in the head with a handgun while demanding money were not separate and distinct acts but one uninterrupted criminal transaction. Haynes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 57, 743 S.E.2d 617 (2013).
Reckless conduct as lesser included offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
- Where evidence indicated that defendant might have merely fired a gun up into the air while the police were chasing the car in which defendant was riding, the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the offense of reckless conduct as a lesser included offense of an aggravated assault by attempting to injure. Shaw v. State, 238 Ga. App. 757, 519 S.E.2d 486 (1999).
Charge on reckless conduct not warranted.
- When the evidence, including defendant's own admissions, clearly established that the defendant repeatedly fired the weapon with the intention of scaring the victims, even if the defendant did not intend to hit them, the evidence established aggravated assault and there was no error in the failure to give an instruction on reckless conduct. Huguley v. State, 242 Ga. App. 645, 529 S.E.2d 915 (2000).
Rape includes lesser offense of assault with intent to rape or aggravated assault. Wingfield v. State, 231 Ga. 92, 200 S.E.2d 708 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 942, 94 S. Ct. 1949, 40 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1974).
Aggravated assault and kidnapping.
- Aggravated assault, with intent to rob as the factor in aggravation, is not a lesser included offense of kidnapping with bodily injury. Brown v. State, 232 Ga. App. 787, 504 S.E.2d 452 (1998).
Evidence that was required to convict defendant of three counts of aggravated assault differed from that which was required to prove the three kidnapping charges against defendant, as the aggravated assaults occurred when deadly weapons were pointed at the victims shortly after defendant and another assailant entered a certain store, whereas the kidnappings were complete when the three victims were later dragged from one room to another; thus, the aggravated assault convictions did not merge into the kidnapping convictions for sentencing purposes. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003).
Trial court's decision not to merge the conviction of kidnapping, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, with the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-8-41, was proper under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), as the facts that supported the kidnapping were not the same as those that supported the convictions for the other offenses; the kidnapping occurred when the defendant forced three store employees into an office, the aggravated assaults occurred when the defendant pointed a gun at one employee's head and hit another employee with it, and the armed robbery occurred when the defendant took money from the store safe. Hill v. State, 279 Ga. App. 666, 632 S.E.2d 443 (2006).
Kidnapping, aggravated assault, and rape were separate offenses, completed individually, and did not merge as a matter of fact; thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to merge the kidnapping counts into the aggravated assault and rape counts for purposes of sentencing. Dasher v. State, 281 Ga. App. 326, 636 S.E.2d 83 (2006).
Because there was independent evidence to support each of the offenses as indicted, a defendant's aggravated assault conviction did not merge as a matter of fact with either the aggravated battery or kidnapping with bodily injury convictions. Pitts v. State, 287 Ga. App. 540, 652 S.E.2d 181 (2007).
It was error for the trial court to impose separate sentences for the defendant's aggravated assault convictions because the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact with the defendant's conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury. Delgiudice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 397, 707 S.E.2d 603 (2011).
Aggravated assault convictions did not merge.
- Under the required evidence test, the defendant's two aggravated assault convictions did not merge because the assault with intent to murder count required the state to prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim, which the state was not required to prove for the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon count required the state to prove that the defendant used a deadly weapon, a knife, box-cutter, or other sharp-edged instrument, which the state did not have to prove for the conviction of aggravated assault with intent to murder. Howard v. State, 334 Ga. App. 229, 779 S.E.2d 5 (2015).
Aggravated assault is included offense of kidnapping with bodily injury.
- Because the elements of the crime of aggravated assault must have been proved in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of kidnapping with bodily injury, the aggravated assault is an included offense of the crime of kidnapping with bodily injury. Brown v. State, 247 Ga. 298, 275 S.E.2d 52, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 366, 70 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442 (1982), but see, Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996); Herring v. State, 224 Ga. App. 809, 481 S.E.2d 842 (1997).
When assault is committed with deadly weapon, simple assault is not lesser included offense. Hightower v. State, 137 Ga. App. 790, 224 S.E.2d 842 (1976).
When assault is committed with gun, simple assault is not a lesser included offense. Zachery v. State, 158 Ga. App. 448, 280 S.E.2d 860 (1981).
Simple assault is not a lesser included offense of an aggravated assault in which a gun or a knife is alleged to have been used as a deadly weapon. Weaver v. State, 182 Ga. App. 806, 357 S.E.2d 153 (1987).
Aggravated assault not lesser included offense.
- When the evidence used to prove the commission of an aggravated assault was not used at all in proving the commission of an aggravated battery, defendant's argument that the aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery was without merit. Grace v. State, 262 Ga. 746, 425 S.E.2d 865 (1993).
When an indictment alleged that an aggravated assault was committed with a firearm by shooting the victims, and an armed robbery alleged the use of an offensive weapon, the aggravated assault charge was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery as a matter of law, and the two offenses rarely merged as a matter of fact. Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (2004).
Mutiny in a penal institution and aggravated assault require proof of different elements and, therefore, the former offense cannot be a lesser included offense of the latter. Bierria v. State, 232 Ga. App. 622, 502 S.E.2d 542 (1998).
Simple battery.
- When an assault is committed with a deadly weapon, the simple battery is not a lesser included offense under aggravated assault. Powell v. State, 140 Ga. App. 36, 230 S.E.2d 90 (1976).
When the defendant was indicted for aggravated assault upon the person of another "with a bottle, an object which when used offensively against a person is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury," simple battery was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, and the jury was properly instructed as to the lesser included offense. Haun v. State, 189 Ga. App. 884, 377 S.E.2d 878, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 377 S.E.2d 878 (1989).
Offense of battery is not necessarily a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Although the element of physical or bodily harm is a requisite for battery, since the physical or bodily harm is committed with a deadly weapon, simple battery is not a lesser included offense. Givens v. State, 199 Ga. App. 845, 406 S.E.2d 272 (1991); Van Doran v. State, 244 Ga. App. 496, 53 S.E.2d 163 (2000).
"Affray" is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Rowland v. State, 228 Ga. App. 66, 491 S.E.2d 119 (1997).
When assault occurred after aggravated battery, and the evidence indicated that any intent defendant may have had to kill her husband before he was shot was abandoned immediately thereafter, when she prevented her son from shooting her husband a second time, it was error to deny her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to the offense of aggravated assault with intent to murder. Overstreet v. State, 182 Ga. App. 809, 357 S.E.2d 103 (1987).
Aggravated assault merged into aggravated battery.
- Because the indictment alleged only one act, the shooting of the victim, and because the evidence showed only that defendant's actions were the result of a single act of firing a series of shots in quick succession at the victim, the convictions for aggravated assault merged into the aggravated battery. Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 60, 539 S.E.2d 545 (2000).
Defendant's aggravated battery and aggravated assault convictions merged because the counts of the indictment were based on the same conduct of hitting the victim with a hammer, resulting in serious bodily injury to the victim's hand and one of the victim's fingers being rendered useless when the victim placed the victim's hands up in an attempt to protect the victim's head; the aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery because the aggravated assault required proof of a less serious injury than the aggravated battery. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).
In an aggravated assault and aggravated battery case arising out of an incident in which the defendant twice, in quick succession, slashed the throat of the victim, the defendant's girlfriend, the trial court erred by failing to merge the defendant's convictions, and the court of appeals erroneously affirmed that decision because the record sufficiently established that the defendant's actions were part of a continuous criminal act, committed at the same time and place and inspired by the same criminal intent; and the offenses, which were based on the single criminal act of the defendant cutting the victim's throat with a knife, only differed with respect to the seriousness of the injury or risk of injury suffered by the victim. Regent v. State, 299 Ga. 172, 787 S.E.2d 217 (2016).
Trial court erred by failing to merge the defendant's aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions for the purposes of sentencing as the aggravated assault conviction was a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery conviction because, although the aggravated battery provision required proof that the victim had the victim's body seriously disfigured, which was not a required showing under the aggravated assault provision, the latter provision did not require proof of any fact that was not also required to prove the aggravated battery; thus, the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault had to be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing. Evans v. State, 344 Ga. App. 283, 810 S.E.2d 164 (2018).
Aggravated assault did not merge with aggravated battery.
- Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery against the same victim did not merge for sentencing purposes, as the two offenses were proven with different facts: the assault occurred when defendant threatened the victim with a gun, and the battery occurred when defendant later shot the victim in the arm. Pennymon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 450, 582 S.E.2d 582 (2003).
Trial court did not err in refusing to merge the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-5-24, because the offenses were established by proving different facts; the defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault because there was evidence that the defendant assaulted the victim with a screwdriver, and the defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery because the victim's left lung was nonfunctional for a period of time due to the stab wound. Works v. State, 301 Ga. App. 108, 686 S.E.2d 863 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0458, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 251 (Ga. 2010).
Separate judgments of conviction and sentences for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), were authorized because the evidence authorized a finding that the defendant committed an initial aggravated assault and, after a deliberate interval, committed an aggravated battery in a different location and on a different part of the victim's body; because each offense required proof of a fact that the other offense did not, the crimes did not merge legally or factually. Brockington v. State, 316 Ga. App. 90, 728 S.E.2d 753 (2012).
Because the defendant's initial act of pointing the gun at the victim's head, an aggravated assault, was a separate act from the ensuing acts of aggravated battery in which the defendant shot and injured both of the victim's hands, the crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated battery did not merge. Thomas v. State, 325 Ga. App. 682, 754 S.E.2d 661 (2014).
Under the required evidence test, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery did not merge because the aggravated battery count required the state to prove that the defendant rendered a member of the victim's body useless, which the state did not have to prove for the conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and aggravated assault with an offensive weapon required the state to prove that the defendant used a hammer, an object likely to result in serious bodily injury, which the state did not have to prove for the aggravated battery conviction. Howard v. State, 334 Ga. App. 229, 779 S.E.2d 5 (2015).
Trial court did not err in failing to merge Count Three, charging the defendant with aggravated assault with intent to murder, into the aggravated battery convictions because the count of aggravated assault with intent to murder required proof of a fact - the intent to kill - that the aggravated battery counts did not, and the aggravated battery counts required proof of a fact - the infant's skull was rendered useless and the infant's face was disfigured - that the aggravated assault with intent to murder count did not; thus, the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant separately for aggravated assault with intent to murder as well as two counts of aggravated battery. Busby v. State, 332 Ga. App. 646, 774 S.E.2d 717 (2015).
Battery conviction merged into aggravated assault conviction.
- Trial court correctly ruled that the defendant's conviction for battery merged into the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the felony of aggravated assault did not merge into the misdemeanor battery. Gross v. State, 312 Ga. App. 362, 718 S.E.2d 581 (2011).
Carrying weapon without license is not included within aggravated assault with deadly weapon. Thomas v. State, 128 Ga. App. 538, 197 S.E.2d 452 (1973).
Elements of interference with government property are not included in the elements required for aggravated assault. Hyman v. State, 222 Ga. App. 419, 474 S.E.2d 243 (1996).
Aggravated assault not lesser included offense of burglary.
- Neither burglary nor aggravated assault was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to prove the other so the argument that an aggravated assault conviction must merge with a burglary conviction is without merit. Taylor v. State, 157 Ga. App. 212, 276 S.E.2d 691 (1981).
Attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault are separate and distinct crimes, and separate sentences were properly imposed. Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).
Aggravated assault is not included in attempted armed robbery as a matter of law, although these two offenses may as a matter of fact merge if the same facts are used to prove both offenses. However, where the underlying facts show that one crime was completed prior to the second crime, so that the crimes are separate as a matter of law, there is no merger. Gaither v. Cannida, 258 Ga. 557, 372 S.E.2d 429 (1988).
Convictions and sentences for both armed robbery and aggravated assault were proper, where each offense charged was clearly supported by its own set of facts. Millines v. State, 188 Ga. App. 655, 373 S.E.2d 838 (1988).
Attempted armed robbery as included offense of aggravated assault.
- Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury that the jury could find the defendant guilty of attempted armed robbery as an included offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob since the defendant was not entitled to a charge or verdict of attempted armed robbery when that offense could only be proved by showing that the defendant brandished a weapon in the faces of the victims with the intent to rob the victims, that is, that the defendant actually committed the greater offense, a completed aggravated assault with the intent to rob. Since the evidence that proved that the defendant committed an attempted armed robbery necessarily proved that the defendant committed the greater, completed crime of aggravated assault with intent to rob, there was no evidence that the defendant committed only the offense of attempted armed robbery and, therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on that lesser included offense. Pilkington v. State, 298 Ga. App. 317, 680 S.E.2d 164 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1717, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 54 (Ga. 2010).
Conviction for aggravated assault did not merge with conviction for armed robbery where the evidence showed that the defendant had completed the armed robbery at the time defendant assaulted the security guard. Loumakis v. State, 179 Ga. App. 294, 346 S.E.2d 373 (1986).
Offenses of aggravated assault and robbery did not merge as a matter of law, where although the occurrences happened within a short span of time, the robbery had been completed at the time defendant fired the gun and involved different actions and intents. Phelps v. State, 194 Ga. App. 493, 390 S.E.2d 899 (1990).
Aggravated assault conviction did not merge with armed robbery offenses for sentencing purposes because each crime required proof of an additional fact as the robbery required proof that defendant took the property of another, which was not required to prove aggravated assault, and assault required proof that the victim was placed in reasonable far of immediately receiving a violent injury, which armed robbery did not require. Nava v. State, 301 Ga. App. 497, 687 S.E.2d 901 (2009).
Aggravated assault did not merge with kidnapping and armed robbery charges because each count relied on separate facts. Howard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 437, 496 S.E.2d 532 (1998).
Aggravated assault with intent to rob did not merge with kidnapping offense.
- Defendant completed the act of aggravated assault with intent to rob when defendant initially approached the victim and told the victim that defendant intended to steal the car; this crime did not merge into the conviction for kidnapping, which was completed later. Robinson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 768, 610 S.E.2d 706 (2005).
Aggravated assault merged with kidnapping with bodily injury.
- An aggravated assault based on defendant's choking of the victim with an electrical cord merged into the kidnapping with bodily injury, and the sentence imposed for a count of aggravated assault was vacated. Nelson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 548, 629 S.E.2d 410 (2006).
Aggravated assault was included in armed robbery as matter of fact, when it was not the initial pointing of a pistol at the victim which prompted the victim to open a cash drawer but the subsequent cocking of the weapon by the assailant after the victim had told the assailant that the victim had no money and the actual firing of the weapon occurred virtually at the same moment as the victim was hitting the button to open the drawer. Moreland v. State, 183 Ga. App. 113, 358 S.E.2d 276 (1987).
Defendant's aggravated assault conviction should have merged with the defendant's armed robbery conviction as the two convictions were based on the same conduct in sticking a gun to a victim's head with the intent to rob the victim. Kirk v. State, 271 Ga. App. 640, 610 S.E.2d 604 (2005).
Defendants' aggravated assault convictions merged into their armed robbery convictions as simultaneous with showing the gun, defendants made clear that they intended to rob the victims, which they proceeded to do; there was not a separate aggravated assault before the robbery began. Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 612 S.E.2d 118 (2005).
Defendants' aggravated assault by striking a victim with a gun convictions merged into their armed robbery convictions as the robbery was not complete until the gunman struck the victim with the gun, thereby allowing defendant to take the victim's money. Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 612 S.E.2d 118 (2005).
Aggravated assault conviction merged with robbery conviction where victim was placed in fear of receiving bodily injury before the victim's money was taken. Luke v. State, 171 Ga. App. 201, 318 S.E.2d 833 (1984).
Defendant's five convictions of aggravated assault merged with defendant's conviction on five counts of attempted armed robbery where defendant's act of pointing a pistol at bank employees when defendant announced an intent to rob the bank was the act underlying both the convictions for attempted armed robbery and for aggravated assault. Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 148, 344 S.E.2d 639 (1986).
Since the evidence adduced to convict defendant of aggravated assault with intent to rob - that defendant threw the victim on the floor, hit the victim, and strangled the victim with a bed sheet - was part and parcel of the evidence underlying defendant's robbery conviction, the offenses merged as a matter of fact. Johnson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 157, 543 S.E.2d 439 (2000).
Aggravated assault merged with armed robbery, where the aggravated assault alleged separately in the indictment was the same assault alleged to have been committed in the course of the armed robbery. Cherry v. State, 178 Ga. App. 483, 343 S.E.2d 510 (1986).
When the defendant's offense of attempted armed robbery was included in the defendant's offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob a restaurant manager, only one sentence should have been imposed in connection with the two charges. Redding v. State, 193 Ga. App. 50, 386 S.E.2d 907 (1989).
Aggravated assaults did not merge with the robbery of two victims, where the robberies were completed, both victims having been deprived of their property, when they were marched off for another criminal purpose and the aggravated assaults on each victim occurred. Glass v. State, 199 Ga. App. 530, 405 S.E.2d 522 (1991).
Aggravated assault count merged into robbery count, where the only aggravated assault (committed by defendant) shown by the evidence was that by which the commission of the robbery was effectuated. Since there was no additional, gratuitous violence employed against the victim, the evidentiary basis for the aggravated assault conviction was "used up" in proving the robbery. Head v. State, 202 Ga. App. 209, 413 S.E.2d 533 (1991).
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to ask at sentencing that defendant's convictions for aggravated assault be merged into the armed robbery convictions was rejected as the convictions were merged at the motion for a new trial hearing. Buchanan v. State, 273 Ga. App. 174, 614 S.E.2d 786 (2005).
Separate sentences for aggravated assault and assault with the intent to rape.
- When there was evidence of assaults as the defendant wielded the knife that were gratuitous and unconnected with the assault with the intent to rape the victim, it was not error to sentence the defendant separately on the jury's findings of guilt for the aggravated assaults. Woodson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 67, 530 S.E.2d 2 (2000), aff'd, 273 Ga. 557, 544 S.E.2d 431 (2001).
Aggravated assault merged with criminal attempt to commit murder.
- Aggravated assault conviction merged into a criminal attempt to commit murder conviction, where both counts were based on allegations that defendant had stabbed the victim with a knife. Kelley v. State, 201 Ga. App. 343, 411 S.E.2d 276 (1991).
Merger of aggravated assault with malice murder.
- Convictions and sentences for aggravated assault with intent to murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon were vacated where the evidence showed that they both merged as a matter of fact with the malice murder conviction. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 368, 589 S.E.2d 563 (2003).
Because the evidence the state used to prove that the defendant committed aggravated assault was the same that it used to prove that defendant committed malice murder, the aggravated assault offense merged into the malice murder as a matter of fact. Thus, the separate judgment of conviction and sentence for aggravated assault had to be vacated. Ludy v. State, 283 Ga. 322, 658 S.E.2d 745 (2008).
Convictions against the defendant for both malice murder and aggravated assault were error under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(1) as the aggravated assault was included within the malice murder conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1) because the same conduct established the commission of both offenses. Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (2009).
With regard to a defendant's malice murder conviction arising from the suffocation death of the defendant's newborn daughter, the defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravated assault was vacated inasmuch as the evidence showed that the aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact with the malice murder conviction. Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 677 S.E.2d 82 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1123, 130 S. Ct. 1076, 175 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2010).
Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault of the victim merged into the conviction for malice murder of the victim because there was no evidence that the victim suffered a non-fatal injury prior to a deliberate interval in the attack and a fatal injury thereafter; the forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy catalogued the victim's wounds as "chop injuries" that fractured the victim's skull and incapacitated the victim and were likely inflicted with a hatchet, punctures and superficial, deep, and very deep incisions and stab wounds that were inflicted by knives. Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 724 S.E.2d 377 (2012).
Aggravated assault conviction should have merged into malice murder conviction because it was not clear there was any deliberate interval between the assaults. Schutt v. State, 292 Ga. 625, 740 S.E.2d 163 (2013).
Aggravated assault did not merge with malice murder.
- When the defendant fired a gun at someone and the bullet grazed the person, went through a wall, and killed another person, the aggravated assault and malice murder convictions did not merge for sentencing purposes. George v. State, 276 Ga. 564, 580 S.E.2d 238 (2003).
Aggravated assault not lesser included offense.
- Where an indictment alleged that an aggravated assault was committed with a firearm by shooting the victims, and an armed robbery alleged the use of an offensive weapon, the aggravated assault charge was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery as a matter of law, and the two offenses rarely merged as a matter of fact. Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (2004).
Trial court erred in sentencing defendant for malice murder and aggravated assault as the victim's death was caused by a combination of blunt force trauma and strangulation and the aggravated assault merged into the malice murder as a matter of fact. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005).
Defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravated assault was vacated as the malice murder and the aggravated assault charges merged as a matter of fact because the same evidence to prove aggravated assault as indicted, stabbing the victim with a knife, was used to prove malice murder. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 154, 611 S.E.2d 19 (2005).
Because the evidence that defendant assaulted the victim with a shotgun was used to prove both an aggravated assault and malice murder, the aggravated assault conviction merged by fact into the malice murder conviction. Nix v. State, 280 Ga. 141, 625 S.E.2d 746 (2006).
When a prisoner was convicted of malice murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(a), a jury did not return a verdict on felony murder counts because O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7 prohibited a conviction for both offenses for the death of a single victim. Further, the prisoner's crime of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) also merged with the malice murder offense as it was a crime included within the greater offense. Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1183, 129 S. Ct. 1336, 173 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2009).
Aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated assault with deadly weapon merged.
- Convictions for aggravated assault of a male victim with the intent to rob and aggravated assault of the male victim with a deadly weapon did not rely on distinct criminal acts, as the weapons used in the assault were also implements of the robbery and used with the same purpose and intent; since the same facts were used to prove both crimes, the different crimes merged as a matter of fact for sentencing purposes. Maddox v. State, 277 Ga. App. 580, 627 S.E.2d 166 (2006).
Armed robbery and aggravated assault with deadly weapon are separate crimes, and one is not included in other. Neither prohibits a designated kind of conduct generally while the other prohibits a specific instance of such conduct. Roberts v. State, 228 Ga. 298, 185 S.E.2d 385 (1971).
Aggravated assault and armed robbery not always different crimes.
- While aggravated assault and armed robbery are different crimes as a matter of law, they are not always so as a matter of fact. Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).
Conviction of aggravated assault and armed robbery constitutional.
- There was no violation of defendant's protection from double jeopardy in defendant's having been convicted of and punished for both the aggravated assault and armed robbery of defendant's victim, where the indictment charged armed robbery with the specific intent to commit a theft and the two acts were in fact separate though in close succession. Taylor v. State, 177 Ga. App. 624, 340 S.E.2d 263 (1986).
Charge of aggravated assault on a peace officer merges into a mutiny conviction because the aggravated assault charge is established by proof of less than all the facts required to establish the commission of mutiny. Lummen v. State, 180 Ga. App. 204, 348 S.E.2d 584 (1986).
Aggravated assault on a police officer merged with obstruction of a police officer.
- Trial court erred in failing to merge the defendant's convictions for four counts of obstruction of a police officer into the convictions for four counts of aggravated assault on a police officer because each count of the crime of obstruction was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish each count of the crime of aggravated assault; the state conceded that the trial court erred in failing to merge the convictions for obstruction into the convictions for aggravated assault on a police officer. Dobbs v. State, 302 Ga. App. 628, 691 S.E.2d 387 (2010).
Intent to harm victim not inconsistent with conscious disregard of risk of harming another.
- Multiple guilty verdicts for the same conduct that are based on varying levels of mens rea are not mutually exclusive; therefore, the jury's verdicts that the defendant, by shooting a gun in a parking lot and killing a bystander, was guilty of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and involuntary manslaughter predicated on reckless conduct, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-3(a) and16-5-60(b), were not inconsistent because the defendant could both commit assault with the intent to harm the victim and, at the same time, consciously disregard a substantial risk of harming another. State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 774 S.E.2d 106 (2015).
Assault with Deadly Weapon
"Assault with deadly weapon" and "assault with intent to murder" compared.
- While an assault with intent to commit murder is usually manifested by the use of some deadly weapon, yet the offense of an assault with intent to commit murder may be committed without a weapon likely to produce death. Wright v. State, 40 Ga. App. 118, 149 S.E. 153 (1929).
"Assault with deadly weapon" and "assault with an object used offensively" compared.
- Despite the defendant's claim that insufficient evidence was presented that the gun used in the commission of the charged crime was used as a deadly weapon, because the defendant was indicted for committing an assault by striking the victim on the side of the victim's head with the gun, an object when used offensively was likely to result in serious injury, no evidence of a deadly weapon was required at trial. Vonhagel v. State, 287 Ga. App. 507, 651 S.E.2d 793 (2007).
Assault with deadly weapon is essential element of offense of aggravated assault. Haygood v. State, 142 Ga. App. 627, 236 S.E.2d 696 (1977).
Assault with deadly weapon constitutes aggravated assault, felony. Ruff v. State, 150 Ga. App. 238, 257 S.E.2d 203 (1979).
Assault is aggravated when made with deadly weapon, regardless of intent. Ross v. State, 131 Ga. App. 587, 206 S.E.2d 554 (1974).
When jury can be given discretion to convict of lesser included offense.
- Under the proof in a case, the jury can be given the discretion to convict of a lower offense included in a higher felony charged, if they believe the evidence does not show a specific intent to kill. Jackson v. State, 99 Ga. App. 740, 109 S.E.2d 886 (1959).
Instruction on lesser offense and authorization to so convict.
- Under an indictment for murder the accused may be convicted of a lower grade of felony, or of a misdemeanor, if the lesser offense is one involved in the homicide and is sufficiently charged in the indictment; but whether the jury should be instructed on the law of a lesser offense, or they would be authorized to convict of a lesser offense, depends on the evidence. Moore v. State, 55 Ga. App. 213, 189 S.E. 731 (1937).
When one is charged with murder by shooting and the evidence does not demand a finding that the victim died from such gunshot wounds and the defendant admits the shooting, a verdict of guilty of assault with intent to murder may be authorized and it is not error to charge the jury on such lesser crime. Kimbro v. State, 113 Ga. App. 314, 147 S.E.2d 876 (1966).
Because the evidence showed that defendant committed an assault with intent and a deadly weapon, the crime constituted an aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); therefore, a charge on the lesser-included offenses of simple assault or reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20(a)(2) and16-5-60(b) was not warranted. Paul v. State, 296 Ga. App. 6, 673 S.E.2d 551 (2009).
Felony murder based on aggravated assault committed by police sergeant.
- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant, a former police sergeant, of felony murder based on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, specifically a TASER, because the medical examiner determined that the victim died from hypertensive cardiovascular disease exacerbated by physical exertion and conducted electrical stimulation from the application of the TASERs in drive-stun mode; and the state presented evidence that the repeated tasing of the victim in drive-stun mode over a span of about 20 minutes when the victim was exhausted from running and handcuffed not only inflicted intense physical pain, but also materially accelerated the victim's death minutes later. Eberhart v. State, 307 Ga. 254, 835 S.E.2d 192 (2019).
Intent is a question for the jury.
- When defendant contended the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict because defendant did not intend to shoot anyone, but only intended to scare off people who were attacking defendant's home and defendant's automobile, it was held that intent is a question for the jury, and the evidence was sufficient. Cade v. State, 180 Ga. App. 314, 348 S.E.2d 769 (1986).
State of mind of either a perpetrator or a victim, including whether a victim has been placed under reasonable apprehension of injury or fear from an event, when in issue, may be proved by indirect or circumstantial evidence. Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 12, 430 S.E.2d 157 (1993).
Intent to kill is not element of aggravated assault with deadly weapon. Emmons v. State, 142 Ga. App. 553, 236 S.E.2d 536 (1977); Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 243 S.E.2d 607 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).
Intent to injure is not an element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Collins v. State, 199 Ga. App. 676, 405 S.E.2d 892 (1991); Turner v. State, 205 Ga. App. 745, 423 S.E.2d 439 (1992); Jay v. State, 232 Ga. App. 661, 503 S.E.2d 563 (1998).
It is the reasonable apprehension of harm by the victim of an assault by a firearm that establishes the crime of aggravated assault, not the assailant's intent to injure. Collins v. State, 199 Ga. App. 676, 405 S.E.2d 892 (1991); Turner v. State, 205 Ga. App. 745, 423 S.E.2d 439 (1992).
Intent to harm the victim is not an element of aggravated assault, and the state needs only to prove that defendant committed an assault and that defendant used a deadly weapon in doing so; a jury's finding that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault was supported by evidence that defendant, armed with a knife, grabbed the victim as the victim was running; defendant and the victim struggled; the victim fell to the ground; defendant held a knife to the victim's neck, forced the victim into a near-by pick-up truck, and drove away; and while in the truck, the defendant punched the victim in the face and threatened to kill the victim. Bailey v. State, 269 Ga. App. 262, 603 S.E.2d 786 (2004).
Intent to scare victim not a defense.
- When the defendant discharged a firearm in the direction of the victim, the defendant committed aggravated assault, and defendant's claim that the defendant was just trying to scare the victim was no defense. Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 598, 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994).
Actual injury not required.
- There is no requirement that a victim actually be injured by the deadly weapon before a conviction for aggravated assault is authorized, since it is the reasonable apprehension of harm by the victim from exposure to the deadly weapon that establishes the crime of aggravated assault. Gilbert v. State, 209 Ga. App. 483, 433 S.E.2d 664 (1993).
When the defendant fired shots into the cab of a single cab pickup truck containing three people, the evidence was sufficient for a conviction of aggravated assault against the two victims who were not struck by a bullet, because one of those victims testified that the defendant shot at the victim and the jury could surmise that the victims not struck suffered apprehension of being shot. Cornelius v. State, 273 Ga. App. 806, 616 S.E.2d 148 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).
Criminal negligence cannot substitute for criminal intent in cases of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on either an attempt to commit violent injury to the person of another (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1)), or the commission of an act placing another in apprehension of receiving an injury (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2)). Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998), overruling Osborne v. State, 228 Ga. App. 758, 492 S.E.2d 732 (1007) and Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 598, 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994).
Aggravated assault with deadly weapon is completed when simple assault committed by means of deadly weapon. Scott v. State, 141 Ga. App. 848, 234 S.E.2d 685 (1977); Tuggle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 603, 244 S.E.2d 131 (1978); Hurt v. State, 158 Ga. App. 722, 282 S.E.2d 192 (1981); Doss v. State, 166 Ga. App. 361, 304 S.E.2d 484 (1983); Rust v. State, 264 Ga. App. 893, 592 S.E.2d 525 (2003).
Recanting of assault by victim.
- Investigative statements given by a passenger at the scene of a car accident and subsequent statement that defendant swung and hit the passenger with a gun constituted substantive evidence of defendant's guilt despite the passenger's subsequent recantation or equivocation. Hurst v. State, 258 Ga. App. 664, 574 S.E.2d 876 (2002).
Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict regarding an aggravated assault count involving defendant's spouse, even though the spouse testified that the spouse did not believe defendant would harm the spouse despite the fact that defendant had been carrying a gun, as the police testimony that the spouse was in a very fearful state when police found the spouse sufficiently showed that the spouse had a reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Gordian v. State, 261 Ga. App. 75, 581 S.E.2d 616 (2003).
Despite the recantation by a juvenile's parent at trial, because sufficient evidence that the juvenile placed the parent in reasonable apprehension of being struck with a hammer, which was in line with the allegations in the parent's complaint filed immediately following the incident, the juvenile court's adjudication against the juvenile for aggravated assault was upheld on appeal. In the Interest of C.B., 288 Ga. App. 752, 655 S.E.2d 342 (2007).
Assault on victim holding child.
- When the defendant discharged a firearm in the direction of a victim who was holding a two-year-old child in the victim's arms, the defendant's deliberate act could be found to have included an attempt to injure those at whom defendant aimed, and the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault upon the child. Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 598, 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994).
Assault against several people.
- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of three counts of aggravated assault after one victim testified about being fearful and that the defendant pointed a gun at all three victims. Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 554 S.E.2d 768 (2001).
Conspiracy for aggravated assault against officer not shown.
- Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault on a police officer because the state failed to show a mutual understanding between the defendant and anyone else to pursue the common criminal objective of shooting the officer. There was no evidence presented about how the defendant obtained the weapon from a co-indictee, and even though the defendant told the others to run after the defendant announced that the defendant was going to shoot the officer and the others ran, that evidence was insufficient to establish a conspiracy to commit aggravated assault on the officer. Frazier v. State, 349 Ga. App. 507, 826 S.E.2d 361 (2019).
Attempting injury with deadly weapon.
- Person commits aggravated assault when a person attempts to commit violent injury upon another person with a deadly weapon. Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 243 S.E.2d 607 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).
Reasonable apprehension of violent injury on part of victim must be shown.
- When the facts establish clearly that defendant committed an act with a deadly weapon which placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, this is sufficient to support the charge of aggravated assault; there is no requirement that a victim be actually injured, and the crime is complete without proof of injury. Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 350 S.E.2d 53 (1986).
To prove an assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), the state must show that the defendant acted with specific intent to violently injure the victim; that method of assault is a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant intended to violently injure someone. In the Interest of L. J., 337 Ga. App. 653, 788 S.E.2d 531 (2016).
Adjudication of delinquency for aggravated assault was reversed because the evidence showed that the juvenile shot the tire on the rear-passenger side, on the opposite side from where the victim was sitting inside the truck and the victim testified that the victim no longer perceived a threat from the juvenile shooting with the bow and arrow after the juvenile moved to the passenger side of the truck and was no longer pointing the bow in the victim's general direction. In the Interest of L. J., 337 Ga. App. 653, 788 S.E.2d 531 (2016).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the jury was authorized to credit the victim's statement of feeling panicked and scared and infer from that statement that the victim had the necessary reasonable apprehension to support a guilty verdict on the aggravated assault charge, even though other statements of the victim did not suggest the necessary apprehension. Martin v. State, 349 Ga. App. 656, 825 S.E.2d 227 (2019).
Evidence was sufficient to support the delinquency adjudication as the evidence showed that the defendant juvenile committed an aggravated assault because a butcher knife constituted a deadly weapon; the defendant placed the defendant's sister's boyfriend in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury as the defendant charged at the boyfriend with a butcher knife, forcing the boyfriend to quickly enter a vehicle and drive off; and the defendant placed the defendant's sister in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury as the defendant pushed and shoved the sister, told the sister that the defendant was going to beat the sister up, and charged at the sister with a butcher knife. In the Interest of J. H., 354 Ga. App. 253, 840 S.E.2d 633 (2020).
Unreasonable apprehension or suspicion of harm.
- Juvenile defendant was not authorized to stab the victim under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), where defendant was attacked by the victim from behind with the victim's fists, and could see that the victim did not have a weapon; defendant's belief that defendant's own life was in danger was a mere unreasonable apprehension or suspicion of harm, which was insufficient to justify the use of deadly force, and defendant was properly adjudicated a delinquent for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and for carrying a weapon onto a school bus under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(b). In the Interest of Q.M.L., 257 Ga. App. 22, 570 S.E.2d 92 (2002).
Fear is not the same as reasonable apprehension.
- Simple assault is defined as an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), an assault becomes aggravated when it is committed with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); thus, if the victim is in reasonable apprehension of an immediate violent injury from a weapon, an aggravated assault has occurred. Because reasonable apprehension of injury is not the same as simple fear, the testimony that the victim was not afraid of the defendant does not preclude conviction. Lunsford v. State, 260 Ga. App. 818, 581 S.E.2d 638 (2003).
Conviction upheld despite accident defense.
- Court would reject the contention that injuries to one victim were caused accidentally during the assault of the other victim since the defendant explicitly threatened the first victim's life and since the defendant's conviction could otherwise be supported by the doctrine of transferred intent. Harris v. State, 233 Ga. App. 696, 505 S.E.2d 239 (1998).
Conviction upheld despite coercion defense.
- When the defendant, on appeal, conceded to being present and participating in an armed robbery and the assault that occurred along with the robbery, but contended (as defendant did at trial) that the defendant was not a voluntary participant in the crimes but acted only out of fear for the defendant's own life through the coercion of other participants in the crimes, it was held that the jury was presented with sufficient admissible evidence to establish to the satisfaction of a rational trier of fact that guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. August v. State, 180 Ga. App. 510, 349 S.E.2d 532 (1986).
Conviction upheld despite self-defense argument.
- When the victim threw the hot contents of a frying pan at the defendant and the defendant then drew a knife from her blouse and stabbed the victim numerous times, but there were no eyewitnesses to the stabbing other than the victim and the defendant, and the defendant testified she stabbed the victim in self-defense in the belief that he was reaching into his pocket for a weapon and that, while she had meant to "hurt" the victim, she had not intended to kill him, a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt by causing the victim's death while committing the felony of aggravated assault. Henderson v. State, 256 Ga. 486, 350 S.E.2d 236 (1986).
Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault after the defendant pulled a gun on security personnel at a tavern after they took defendant's keys because of the defendant's intoxicated condition, notwithstanding the defendant's contention that the actions were in self-defense. Richardson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 890, 505 S.E.2d 57 (1998).
Testimony of a parent and two children that a defendant allegedly pointed a gun at their vehicle and that, as a result, they were in fear of being shot was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction on three counts of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); given the evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury obviously resolved the defendant's self-defense claim against the defendant. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).
Evidence plainly was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a) because the state presented more than ample evidence that the defendant's use of force was not justified under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a); based upon the victim's testimony and the victim's prior statement to the responding officer, the jury clearly was authorized to find that the defendant's acts of grabbing the victim by the hair, throwing the victim to the ground, and choking the victim to the point of unconsciousness constituted excessive force, and the prior and subsequent difficulties evidence and the similar transaction evidence the state presented supported the jury's decision to give little credence to the defendant's self-defense claim. Whitley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 553, 707 S.E.2d 375 (2011).
Words "deadly weapon," include all means or instrumentalities by which assaults with intent to commit murder may be made. Wright v. State, 40 Ga. App. 118, 149 S.E. 153 (1929).
Although hands are not per se "deadly weapons," where the defendant's hands were restrained by handcuffs, and a doctor testified that the victim's severe injuries were consistent with being struck by hands, fists, and handcuffs, there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault. Gamble v. State, 235 Ga. App. 777, 510 S.E.2d 69 (1998).
Proving that weapon is one likely to produce death.
- When an indictment charges the commission of the offense of assault with intent to murder by using a knife such as was "likely to produce death," the proof must show that it was a weapon of this character, but this may be done by evidence as to the nature of the wound, as well as direct proof of the character of the weapon. Jackson v. State, 56 Ga. App. 374, 192 S.E. 633 (1937).
Overwhelming evidence established that a handgun used to beat the victim several times in the head constituted a deadly weapon: the victim had open, bleeding wounds; the victim's sister described the victim's head as being "split open" where the victim "could see inside and everything;" and at the hospital, the victim received numerous staples in the victim's head. Gonzalez v. State, 350 Ga. App. 297, 829 S.E.2d 385 (2019).
Assault with deadly weapon while resisting arrest constitutes prima facie case of assault with intent to kill. Garrett v. State, 89 Ga. 446, 15 S.E. 533 (1892).
Unprovoked assault by police officer with deadly weapon justifying offender's killing policeman.
- If an officer who makes a lawful arrest for a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence does so in an unlawful manner by making an unprovoked assault with a weapon likely to produce death, and with intent to kill the offender, if the circumstances are sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man that a felony is intended, and the offender slays the officer, not in a spirit of revenge or for the purpose of preventing the lawful arrest, but to protect self from what is or what reasonably appears to be such a felonious assault, then, in either of such events, the killing would be justifiable. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).
Since an assault and battery is a misdemeanor and not a felony, the mere unlawful striking of an offender by an officer lawfully arresting the offender for a misdemeanor would not be sufficient to justify the offender in killing the officer, unless the conduct of the officer was such as to excite the fears of a reasonable man that a felony was in fact about to be committed, and the offender really acted on such fears. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).
Whether instrument used constitutes deadly weapon is properly for jury's determination. Quarles v. State, 130 Ga. App. 756, 204 S.E.2d 467 (1974); Ellis v. State, 137 Ga. App. 834, 224 S.E.2d 799 (1976); Harper v. State, 157 Ga. App. 480, 278 S.E.2d 28 (1981).
Because the jury viewed the weapon used in an attack subject to the underlying aggravated assault charge against the defendant, and received testimony and photographic evidence about the nature and extent of the victim's actual injuries and the manner in which the defendant used the shank to stab the victim in the area of several vital organs, the jury was authorized to infer from the evidence that the instrument was a deadly weapon. Ellison v. State, 288 Ga. App. 404, 654 S.E.2d 223 (2007).
Manner of weapon's use determinative of nature.
- Manner in which a weapon is used may determine whether that weapon is an offensive or deadly weapon for the purpose of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 314 S.E.2d 235 (1984).
Deadly weapon depends on object's use, wounds inflicted and the like.
- An object may be found to be a deadly weapon by the jury depending on the manner and means of its use, the wound inflicted, etc. Ellis v. State, 137 Ga. App. 834, 224 S.E.2d 799 (1976).
Assault with knife.
- There was sufficient evidence to support conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, against a waitress after defendant jumped over the restaurant counter, held a knife to the waitress' neck, and indicated that defendant would use the knife if another employee came closer; the conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 for aggravated assault of the other employee was also supported by sufficient evidence as the employee was cut by defendant's knife, which constituted suffering of a violent injury, and although the employee testified that the employee did not perceive a threat from the knife, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support such a finding. Lemming v. State, 272 Ga. App. 122, 612 S.E.2d 495 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009).
Sufficient evidence supported an aggravated assault conviction where the victim testified that, during a dispute, the defendant stabbed the victim several times with a knife, where defendant's sibling testified to a similar incident 11 days earlier, in which defendant assaulted the sibling during a dispute, where a witness testified that the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim because of the way the victim had treated the witness's friend, and where defendant admitted stabbing the victim, but claimed it was in self-defense. Cochran v. State, 277 Ga. App. 251, 626 S.E.2d 217 (2006).
Aggravated assault conviction was supported by sufficient evidence that, after the victim confronted the defendant about a comment made to the victim's spouse, the defendant stabbed the victim to death; witnesses saw the defendant fighting with the victim, saw the defendant fold up a knife after the victim fell, and the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim. Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 297, 627 S.E.2d 32 (2006).
Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer and making a terroristic threat or act, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-11-37(a), respectively, where the defendant was agitated when officers came to the residence to investigate complaints of a terroristic threat, the defendant brandished two knives at the officers which caused them to retreat outside of the residence, defendant refused to put the knives down despite being instructed to do so at gunpoint by the officers, and when the defendant threatened to stab an officer and raised the knife up, the defendant was shot in the hand. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. App. 884, 627 S.E.2d 897 (2006).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and aggravated sodomy in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a) although the defendant pointed to the defendant's previous sexual relationship with the victim and to alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim and the victim's friend; the appellate court refused to weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, and it found that the evidence, which included testimony that the defendant forcibly placed the victim in the defendant's truck, drove the victim across the state line to an apartment, forced the victim to have sex with the defendant, and cut the victim with a knife, was sufficient to convict. Martin v. State, 281 Ga. App. 64, 635 S.E.2d 358 (2006).
Testimony from an eyewitness that the defendant and the victim scuffled and fell to the ground, and that the defendant knelt over the victim, stabbing the victim repeatedly with a knife, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Lampley v. State, 284 Ga. 37, 663 S.E.2d 184 (2008).
In a trial for aggravated assault, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was armed with a knife when an apparently bloodstained knife was found on the defendant's person when the defendant was arrested, the defendant admitted both to possessing and brandishing the knife at the victim, and the victim testified that the victim was stabbed. Furthermore, the state was not required to prove the cause of the victim's injuries with medical evidence. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 224, 666 S.E.2d 600 (2008).
Evidence supported the convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. The victim's grandchild saw the defendant stab the victim after an argument, then went to a relative for help; the defendant then attacked the relative and fled, throwing the knife the defendant used to stab the victim in the bushes; when the defendant was found by police shortly thereafter, the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim; and a medical examiner testified that the bulk of the victim's stabs came from behind and that the cut on the defendant's hand was an offensive wound likely sustained as the defendant was stabbing the victim with enough force to break one of the victim's ribs. Butler v. State, 285 Ga. 518, 678 S.E.2d 92 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because a rational trier of fact could have inferred that the defendant's girlfriend apprehended a knife attack; jury could reasonably conclude that when the defendant threatened the girlfriend's life while holding a knife, and the girlfriend reached up with her hand, she was in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Wilson v. State, 304 Ga. App. 743, 698 S.E.2d 6 (2010).
Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that the defendant committed the offense of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the defendant's attempt to harm a bar patron was transferred to the manager of the bar who was injured; when the defendant retrieved a knife and the manager saw the knife the defendant had committed an act that placed the manager in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Brown v. State, 313 Ga. App. 907, 723 S.E.2d 115 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the victim testified that the defendant held a knife when the defendant told the victim to take her clothes off and to open her legs so that the defendant could have vaginal intercourse with her against her will; pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), that testimony alone was sufficient to support the conviction. Ellis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (2012).
Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the jury was authorized to conclude that the large knife the defendant held, which was introduced into evidence, was a deadly weapon and that the knife could be easily removed from the knife's sheath; the defendant threatened the victim in a way that put the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Gunter v. State, 316 Ga. App. 485, 729 S.E.2d 597 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary because the evidence showed that: (1) the defendant broke into his ex-girlfriend's home; (2) the defendant stabbed the ex-girlfriend's current boyfriend in the spine with a knife, paralyzing him; (3) the defendant cut his ex-girlfriend with a knife on the back of her head, on the side of her face, on her shoulder and back, and stabbed her in the stomach; and (4) the ex-girlfriend continued to bear scars from the knife attack. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012).
Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence in that, even absent fingerprint evidence, there was the identifications of two eyewitnesses as well as a bottle bearing the store's logo and the amount of cash and same denomination reported stolen found on the defendant's person and the testimony of a victim that the defendant used a knife. Hamlin v. State, 320 Ga. App. 29, 739 S.E.2d 46 (2013).
Evidence before the jury that the defendant said the victim was still alive after the victim's throat was cut because the defendant heard gurgling and testimony from the medical examiner that the victim was not necessarily dead when the victim's throat was slit was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault based on slitting the victim's throat. Schutt v. State, 292 Ga. 625, 740 S.E.2d 163 (2013).
Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was supported by the victim's testimony that the defendant entered the bedroom with the butcher knife, placed the knife to the victim's face, and cut the victim with the knife, causing the victim to fear for the victim's life. Petro v. State, 327 Ga. App. 254, 758 S.E.2d 152 (2014).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, one count of kidnapping with bodily injury, and one count of rape based on the testimony of the two female victims that the defendant offered to drive the victims home, but then took the victims to a remote location and ordered the women to undress while the defendant brandished a knife and, after one victim escaped, the defendant drove to another remote location and forced the other woman to engage in sexual intercourse. Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 796 S.E.2d 757 (2017).
Evidence that the defendant entered the victim's bedroom with a knife and that the victim suffered lacerations to the arm and head that required the victim's hospitalization was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. Williams v. State, 345 Ga. App. 692, 814 S.E.2d 818 (2018), overruled on other grounds by Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618, 837 S.E.2d 824 (2020).
Sufficient evidence supported the appellant's convictions for burglary, cruelty to children, terroristic threats, and aggravated assault as neither parent gave the appellant permission to enter their home, the appellant was identified as the intruder who held a knife to the child's neck, and struggled with one parent as the appellant tried to remove the child from the home, and the appellant threatened to kill one of the children while holding a knife to the child's neck. Cordova v. State, 351 Ga. App. 652, 832 S.E.2d 465 (2019).
Assault with knife to feet of child while allegedly removing splinters.
- From the physician's testimony regarding the puncture wounds on the child's feet and the medical opinion that the wounds were not consistent with someone attempting to remove splinters, the jury was authorized to infer that the knife used was a deadly weapon and, thus, the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Hillsman v. State, 341 Ga. App. 543, 802 S.E.2d 7 (2017).
Nature and location of wounds showing character of weapon.
- Even in absence of production or verbal description of weapon used, evidence as to nature, kind, and location of wounds inflicted by assailant is sufficient to allow jury to infer character of weapon. Wade v. State, 157 Ga. App. 296, 277 S.E.2d 292 (1981); Wright v. State, 211 Ga. App. 431, 440 S.E.2d 27 (1994).
State must show how object not per se deadly weapon is such in circumstances.
- When an object is not per se a deadly weapon within the meaning of Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1280 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21), it is incumbent upon the state to show the circumstances of the object's use which made the object a deadly weapon. Talley v. State, 137 Ga. App. 548, 224 S.E.2d 455 (1976).
Evidence sufficient to allow jury to infer character of weapon.
- Lethal character of the weapon used in making an assault may be inferred from the effect and nature of the wound inflicted. Wells v. State, 125 Ga. App. 579, 188 S.E.2d 407 (1972).
Even if the actual weapon alleged to be a deadly one in an indictment is not produced or described, evidence as to the nature, kind and location of the wounds inflicted by the assailant is sufficient to allow the jury to infer the character of the weapon. Zachery v. State, 153 Ga. App. 531, 265 S.E.2d 860 (1980).
Description of the injuries sustained by the victim is admissible to prove that the pistol used by the defendant was a deadly weapon. Howard v. State, 165 Ga. App. 555, 301 S.E.2d 910 (1983).
No evidence showed that aggravated assault could have occurred other than through use of deadly weapon.
- Although the indictment only referred to the commission of the crimes through the use of a deadly weapon, defendants did not point to evidence showing that an aggravated assault could have occurred other than through the use of a deadly weapon; moreover, because the trial court instructed the jury that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material allegation of the indictment, even if the aggravated assault charge was erroneous, such error was rendered harmless in light of the additional instruction. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).
Deadly weapon need not be introduced.
- It is not necessary for the state to admit into evidence the deadly weapon used by the defendant in order for the defendant to be found guilty of aggravated assault. Lattimer v. State, 231 Ga. App. 594, 499 S.E.2d 671 (1998).
With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, because two police officers testified that the defendant fired a gun, the testimony was sufficient to infer the presence of a weapon even though no weapon was introduced into evidence. Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 352, 651 S.E.2d 450 (2007).
It is not essential for state to locate bullets, bullet holes, or expended shells to establish the crime of aggravated assault. Radford v. State, 251 Ga. 50, 302 S.E.2d 555 (1983).
Admissible evidence of res gestae.
- Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and kidnapping; the victim's statement that the victim's sister was afraid of the defendant because the defendant had done the same thing to the sister was clearly admissible as part of the res gestae even if it incidentally placed the defendant's character in evidence. McLendon v. State, 258 Ga. App. 133, 572 S.E.2d 763 (2002).
Evidence sufficient for conviction.
- When the state's evidence shows that the victim was standing outside the victim's apartment when the defendant approached, the defendant accused the victim of stealing the defendant's television and attacked the victim, stabbing the victim with a knife, and after stabbing the victim, the defendant left the scene, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Jackson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 363, 349 S.E.2d 252 (1986).
Although expressing concern for personal safety, the defendant admitted seeing nothing but the victim's closed fist and that the defendant stabbed the victim with an eight-inch long butcher knife, the wound to the victim was in the victim's back, between the victim's shoulder blades and puncturing the victim's lung, although the defendant said the defendant stabbed the victim in the shoulder, and the sole defense was self-defense, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, there was sufficient evidence to authorize the trial judge, as trier of fact, to find appellant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Roberts v. State, 180 Ga. App. 646, 350 S.E.2d 39 (1986).
See Johnson v. State, 185 Ga. App. 167, 363 S.E.2d 773 (1987); Nash v. State, 222 Ga. App. 766, 476 S.E.2d 69 (1996); Littleton v. State, 225 Ga. App. 900, 485 S.E.2d 230 (1997); Harris v. State, 233 Ga. App. 696, 505 S.E.2d 239 (1998); Jones v. State, 233 Ga. App. 291, 503 S.E.2d 902 (1998); Head v. State, 233 Ga. App. 655, 504 S.E.2d 499 (1998); Tolliver v. State, 243 Ga. App. 180, 531 S.E.2d 383 (2000); Bartlett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 49, 537 S.E.2d 362 (2000).
When the record showed that defendant pointed a gun at the defendant's father and brothers-in-law during the kidnapping of his wife, the evidence was sufficient to render a conviction. Williams v. State, 207 Ga. App. 371, 427 S.E.2d 846 (1993).
Intentionally firing a gun at another, absent justification, is sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction of aggravated assault. Quinn v. State, 209 Ga. App. 480, 433 S.E.2d 592 (1993).
Testimony by the victim, in which the victim positively identified defendant as the person who entered the victim's home, and committed the crimes of robbery by intimidation, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a knife, aggravated battery and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, charged in the indictment and eyewitness testimony that defendant entered the victim's premises minutes before the attack of the victim was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of committing the crimes charged in the indictment. Mobley v. State, 211 Ga. App. 709, 441 S.E.2d 73 (1994).
Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall v. State, 264 Ga. 85, 441 S.E.2d 245 (1994).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, when the victim was attacked and beaten with fists and a round "fence pipe," the victim identified the defendant at trial as the victim's principal assailant, a witness testified to seeing the defendant pick up an object like a pole or stick and repeatedly strike the victim, and a wooden fence post with blood on the post was located a short distance from where the police found the victim. Peek v. State, 234 Ga. App. 731, 507 S.E.2d 553 (1998).
Victim's in-court identification of defendant as the assailant was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict that defendant committed aggravated assault with a handgun, a deadly weapon, as alleged in the indictment. Graham v. State, 236 Ga. App. 673, 512 S.E.2d 921 (1999).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) where: (1) an officer observed a broken truck window and saw the defendant disappearing into the woods behind grandmother's home; (2) one of the defendant's friends warned the officer that the defendant would probably shoot at the officer; (3) that friend testified that the friend had seen the defendant break the glass and take the gun from the truck; (4) the officers testified that they were able to identify the general type of weapon and the direction of travel of the first bullet; (5) the area was desolate and remote; and (6) no evidence showed the presence of any other person in the area at that time of night which was approaching midnight. Yawn v. State, 237 Ga. App. 206, 515 S.E.2d 182 (1999).
Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction since the victim testified that the defendant stabbed the victim in the arm and that the knife the victim observed in the defendant's possession was "maybe six or eight inches long with a handle on it," and two witnesses testified that they saw the defendant stab the victim with a large knife. Silas v. State, 247 Ga. App. 792, 545 S.E.2d 358 (2001).
Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault since: (1) the defendant snatched a woman's purse in the parking lot of a restaurant as she and her husband walked to the restaurant; (2) the husband pursued the defendant and managed to attach himself to the driver's side of the pick-up in which defendant sped away; and (3) the defendant nonetheless drove off, dragging the husband with him, managing to shake him from the vehicle, and leaving him injured on the ground. Bogan v. State, 249 Ga. App. 242, 547 S.E.2d 326 (2001).
Evidence that defendant threatened a daycare owner and two daycare workers with a handgun when they tried to stop defendant from taking defendant's daughter supported defendant's convictions of two aggravated assaults in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1). Diaz v. State, 255 Ga. App. 288, 564 S.E.2d 872 (2002).
Evidence was sufficient to establish aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), because defendant placed his wife in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, which assault was aggravated by the use of a shotgun in a threatening manner. Weaver v. State, 256 Ga. App. 573, 568 S.E.2d 836 (2002).
Evidence that defendant intentionally stabbed a man in the side with a knife after a confrontation was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Townsend v. State, 256 Ga. App. 837, 570 S.E.2d 47 (2002).
Evidence that defendant knew people lived inside a home and that there was a truck parked next to the home when defendant fired four or five shots from a .30 caliber rifle into the home at 10:30 A.M. was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and using a firearm in the commission of a felony. Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 570 S.E.2d 428 (2002).
Although the victim's statement to the police was sufficient to prove that defendant threatened to kill the victim as alleged in the indictment, proof that defendant threatened to kill the victim was not a necessary element of the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); evidence that defendant caused the victim to be very much afraid by pointing a pistol at the victim was sufficient to prove the offense. Thomas v. State, 257 Ga. App. 350, 571 S.E.2d 178 (2002).
Evidence that defendant pulled a knife out, struck it against the neck of a woman defendant was dating, and told the woman that defendant should have killed the woman was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault as it showed defendant assaulted the woman with a deadly weapon. Alvarado v. State, 257 Ga. App. 746, 572 S.E.2d 18 (2002).
Eyewitnesses saw defendant standing by the door of the barber shop shooting repeatedly at the murder victim, who died from those wounds, and the police recovered the pistol from defendant that shot the victim; thus, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21. Roberts v. State, 276 Ga. 258, 577 S.E.2d 580 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault where the record revealed that the defendant admitted to being in the apartment of the victim, who was the defendant's former love interest, the defendant admitted to having the gun, and the defendant's only defense was that the gun went off accidentally, which was contradicted by the evidence of the defendant's intentional punching and shooting of the victim. Milton v. State, 259 Ga. App. 660, 577 S.E.2d 862 (2003).
Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) was supported by sufficient evidence after the victim testified as to the attack, there were photographs which showed the victim's cuts, and the jury's decision was based in part on its weighing of the credibility of the witnesses; it was also determined that the sentence imposed was within the statutory guidelines of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(g) and was not more severe merely because defendant had requested a jury trial. Benham v. State, 260 Ga. App. 243, 581 S.E.2d 586 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of theft by taking, three counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), three counts of simple battery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime since: (1) there was evidence that the defendant entered a store, placed a knife to the neck of one of the three victims, forced that victim to the back of the store, aided another assailant who was armed with a gun to bind the victims and drag them to the back of the store, and stole money and other items from two of the victims; (2) the defendant confessed to the crimes during interviews with law enforcement officials; and (3) the defendant's confessions were corroborated by the testimony of one of the victims who, despite earlier being unable to identify the robbers, ultimately identified the defendant as one of the robbers. The corroborating victim's initial inability to identify the defendant posed an issue of credibility for the jury's resolution and did not require reversal. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003).
When a jury could believe that defendant shot a victim without aggravation rather than defendant's claim that a gun went off by accident during a struggle, ample evidence sustained the conviction for aggravated assault pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Wilson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 28, 581 S.E.2d 625 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the State of Georgia presented evidence that the defendant stabbed the defendant's love interest's child several times with a butcher knife. Even though the defendant argued that the defendant was merely defending against the child's attack with a bat, the jury was authorized by O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2) to reject the defendant's justification claim; the evidence showed that the love interest's child hit the defendant with a bat to protect the child's parent from the defendant, who forcefully entered their house and then charged the love interest's child, pushed the child down, and stabbed the child. Williams v. State, 268 Ga. App. 384, 601 S.E.2d 833 (2004).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault because: (1) the defendant was in an altercation with the victim at a dance; (2) eyewitnesses saw the defendant make a stabbing motion at the victim; (3) the victim died of a nine stab wounds, including one to the heart; (4) the defendant's burned blue jeans were found in the defendant's love interest's backyard; (5) the defendant provided an investigator with clean clothes the defendant allegedly wore at the dance; and (6) the victim's blood and DNA were found on the defendant's leather jacket and on the shirt the defendant's love interest wore to the dance. Rakestrau v. State, 278 Ga. 872, 608 S.E.2d 216 (2005).
Evidence supported defendant's conviction for malice murder and aggravated assault because the victim had defensive wounds on a hand, the victim's blood was found on defendant's shoe, a mixture of the victim's and defendant's blood was found on defendant's shirt, and the victim planned to ask defendant to leave the apartment. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 154, 611 S.E.2d 19 (2005).
There was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(2), because evidence was seen in one of the defendant's vehicles during a traffic stop, defendants were identified from the videotape of the stop, and the shotgun used by the assailant in the home invasion was found in one of the defendant's homes. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and a statutory violation, all in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1,16-5-21,16-7-1,16-8-41, and16-11-106, respectively, where the defendant and the codefendant went to a club with the intention of robbing someone, met the victim and drove the victim back to the victim's home, beat and fatally stabbed the victim, and upon leaving the victim's apartment, took some of the victim's belongings. Willoughby v. State, 280 Ga. 176, 626 S.E.2d 112 (2006).
Victim's testimony that the defendant threatened the victim with a knife and struck the victim with a lamp, and evidence that the victim was found in a bathroom with an electrical cord wrapped tightly around the victim's neck, and that the defendant's finger and palm prints were lifted from blood on the bathroom wall, allowed any rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of three counts of aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Nelson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 548, 629 S.E.2d 410 (2006).
Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, as the defendant was angered by the victim's presence in the residence, the defendant assaulted the victim with a baseball bat and threatened to kill the victim if the victim did not leave the residence, and when the victim returned to the residence, the defendant fatally shot the victim in the stomach. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).
Evidence supported a defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant repeatedly followed the victim in and out of a restaurant, and eventually chased the victim from the restaurant, firing at the victim at least nine times; (2) after the shooting, the defendant jumped into a silver truck and sped away; (3) the victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds; and (4) two witnesses identified the defendant from photographic lineups. Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 636 S.E.2d 538 (2006).
In spite of the defendant's contrary testimony, a conviction on a charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon a police officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and (c), was supported by sufficient evidence; the trial judge, as the trier of fact, was authorized to credit testimony that the defendant's act of pointing a gun at the victim's midsection caused that person a reasonable apprehension of fear, over testimony presented by the defendant. Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 656 S.E.2d 238 (2008).
Evidence of the defendant's shooting a victim, striking the victim's companion with a motorcycle helmet, the defendant's sibling's pointing a gun at the companion, and the sibling's pointing a gun at the victim and pulling the trigger, was sufficient to convict the defendant of four counts of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the defendant was responsible for the sibling's acts as an aider and abetter under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008).
Defendant's new trial motion based on insufficient evidence lacked merit, as the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and a weapons possession charge under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-11-106(b)(1); issues of credibility regarding witnesses' identification of defendant as the shooter were within the jury's province pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620). Williams v. State, 317 Ga. App. 248, 730 S.E.2d 726 (2012).
Evidence that the defendant, who threatened to kill the victim in the past, took the victim to a retention pond, shot the victim, wrapped the body with a large boulder, placed the victim in a retention pond, and, for days, misled the victim's mother and authorities about the victim's whereabouts was sufficient to support convictions for malice murder, felony murder, feticide, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm. Platt v. State, 291 Ga. 631, 732 S.E.2d 75 (2012).
Evidence that the defendant and others were present at the scene of the offense, shot at the victims' vehicle, and wounded two of the victims was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault. Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 733 S.E.2d 72 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault of the victim because the victim saw the defendant pointing the rifle in the victim's vicinity, the defendant fired the gun in the victim's direction, and the victim heard the shot and fell to the ground to avoid being shot at again; and the evidence supported a jury finding that the defendant intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury from a deadly weapon. Sears v. State, 298 Ga. 400, 782 S.E.2d 259 (2016).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because after the defendant pulled a knife on the former girlfriend, the former girlfriend told police and the defendant that the former girlfriend wanted the defendant out of the apartment; when the defendant came to retrieve the defendant's belongings, the defendant entered the bedroom the defendant had shared with the former girlfriend and began throwing things about and destroying the former girlfriend's personal property; when the victim entered the room and told the defendant to leave, the defendant reached for the defendant's knife and charged at the victim; and, during their fight, the defendant stabbed the victim five times with the knife. Wilson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 60, 783 S.E.2d 662 (2016).
Evidence including the victim's testimony that, while they were married, the defendant put his hands around the victim's throat and choked the victim, testimony from the victim's doctor and nurse about the victim's visible neck injuries, photographs of the victim's injuries, and the defendant's admission to putting the defendant's hands around the victim's throat was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault (family violence). Moore v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 21, 2020).
Identification of defendant.
- Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by sufficient evidence. While the defendant contended that the evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial, an eyewitness's identification of the defendant as the second gunman during the photographic lineup constituted direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).
Conviction of aggravated assault, murder, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was justified.
- See Brooks v. State, 250 Ga. 739, 300 S.E.2d 810 (1983).
Instruction on defense of accident or misfortune properly refused.
- Trial court properly refused to give a requested jury instruction on the defense of accident or misfortune, where defendant's own testimony showed that defendant was engaged in an attempt to commit an aggravated assault upon the victim when defendant's pistol discharged and the victim was struck by a bullet. Grude v. State, 189 Ga. App. 901, 377 S.E.2d 731 (1989).
Instruction using phrase "deadly weapon" correct.
- Trial court's use of the phrase "deadly weapon" in the jury instructions was a general reference to the aggravating circumstance in former O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2)), which also included any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury and was a correct instruction. State v. Easter, 297 Ga. 171, 773 S.E.2d 181 (2015).
Sentencing for aggravated assault with deadly weap