(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 815; Code 1863, § 4423; Ga. L. 1865-66, p. 233, § 2; Code 1868, § 4464; Code 1873, § 4538; Code 1882, § 4538; Ga. L. 1884-85, p. 59, § 1; Penal Code 1895, § 398; Penal Code 1910, §§ 389, 390; Code 1933, §§ 26-6401, 26-6402; Code 1933, § 26-2704, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1970, p. 236, § 7.)
Law reviews.- For note discussing organized crime in Georgia with respect to the application of state gambling laws, and suggesting proposals for combatting organized crime, see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 124 (1970).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Purpose of section.
- Former Penal Code 1895, § 398 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-12-23) was designed to prevent corruption of morals and is aimed against houses encouraging gambling. Thrower v. State, 117 Ga. 753, 45 S.E. 126 (1903).
In prohibiting a gaming house or a gaming place, it is intended to prevent the maintenance of a place at which persons gather for purpose of hazarding and betting money, whether subject matter of a single bet is or is not made penal. Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538, 150 S.E. 825 (1929); Friedman v. State, 64 Ga. App. 405, 13 S.E.2d 467 (1941).
Section is aimed only at place.
- Keeping of a gaming house or gaming place was a separate, well-defined offense, and entirely independent of criminality of betting carried on therein. Former Penal Code 1910, §§ 389, 390 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-12-23) was aimed at the place, not at players, not at game, nor at subject matter of wager. Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538, 150 S.E. 825 (1929).
Maintenance of a gaming house or a gaming place is a public nuisance. Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538, 150 S.E. 825 (1929).
"Place" defined. Thrower v. City of Atlanta, 124 Ga. 1, 52 S.E. 76, 110 Am. St. R. 147, 4 Ann. Cas. 1 (1905).
One may be acquitted of gambling yet convicted of operating a gambling house.
- Gambling is one thing and operating a gambling house is a kindred but entirely different thing; and different evidence is required to convict of these separate offenses. No absurdity or repugnancy is created by acquittal of gambling and conviction of operating a gambling house. McGahee v. State, 133 Ga. App. 964, 213 S.E.2d 91 (1975).
One may be guilty of operating a gambling house without participating in actual gambling. Miller v. State, 48 Ga. App. 786, 173 S.E. 491 (1934).
Proof of defendant's mental state may be inferred. Rivers v. State, 118 Ga. 42, 44 S.E. 859 (1903); Bashinski v. State, 122 Ga. 164, 50 S.E. 54 (1905); Bashinski v. State, 123 Ga. 508, 51 S.E. 499 (1905).
Attendant circumstances may show true character of house. Bell v. State, 92 Ga. 49, 18 S.E. 186 (1893); Bluhakis v. State, 18 Ga. App. 112, 88 S.E. 911 (1916).
Proof of single act of gaming is insufficient. White v. State, 115 Ga. 570, 41 S.E. 986 (1902).
Purpose for permitting game is immaterial. Alexander v. City of Atlanta, 13 Ga. App. 354, 79 S.E. 177 (1913).
Betting on a horse race is gaming. Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538, 150 S.E. 825 (1929).
Betting on a dog fight is gaming. Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538, 150 S.E. 825 (1929).
House or place for purpose of permitting gaming on dog races is a gaming house. Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538, 150 S.E. 825 (1929).
Bucket shop as violation of former Penal Code 1895, § 398 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-12-23). Anderson v. State, 2 Ga. App. 1, 58 S.E. 401 (1907).
House where race horse bets placed violated former Penal Code 1895 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-12-23). Thrower v. State, 117 Ga. 753, 45 S.E. 126 (1903).
One greeting people as people enter gaming house violates section.
- When one is indicted for operation of a gaming house, a misdemeanor, and the state's evidence discloses operation of a large gambling establishment having numbers of employees, a statement made by the defendant that the defendant was a greeter, working in the club to greet folks coming in amounts to a confession of guilt of the crime charged. Richards v. State, 56 Ga. App. 377, 192 S.E. 632 (1937).
Liability of wife residing in gambling house.
- See Bell v. State, 92 Ga. 49, 18 S.E. 186 (1893).
Evidence insufficient for conviction.
- Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's convictions of commercial gambling, possession of a gambling device, and keeping a gambling place because the seized machines were coin operated amusement machines (COAMs), as there was no evidence that the defendant tampered with the COAMs or otherwise did anything to remove the element of player skill and the state's evidence at most showed that the COAMs malfunctioned in some way to allow the police officer to win without nudging the wheels. Bartlett v. State, 351 Ga. App. 476, 829 S.E.2d 187 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0008, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 254 (Ga. 2020).
Cited in United States v. Crockett, 506 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); Dowdy v. State, 150 Ga. App. 137, 257 S.E.2d 41 (1979); Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S.E.2d 482 (1981); Evans v. State, 252 Ga. 312, 314 S.E.2d 421 (1984).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Disorderly Houses, § 1 et seq. 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Gambling, § 91 et seq.
C.J.S.- 38 C.J.S., Gaming, § 150 et seq.
ALR.
- Connection with place where gaming is carried on which will render one guilty as keeper thereof, 15 A.L.R. 1202.
Punchboard as a lottery, 163 A.L.R. 1279.
Gambling in private residence as prohibited or permitted by anti-gambling laws, 27 A.L.R.3d 1074.