(Ga. L. 1978, p. 2238, § 3; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 16; Ga. L. 1988, p. 415, § 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 416, § 7; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1094, § 5; Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 2-8/SB 308.)
Cross references.- Time limitation on prosecutions for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, § 17-3-1.
Transportation of passengers by carriers generally, § 46-9-130 et seq.
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 2002, p. 1094, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Transportation Security Act of 2002'."
Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 3-1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment of this Code section shall apply to all offenses committed on and after June 4, 2010, and shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before June 4, 2010, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecution.
Law reviews.- For article, "Crimes and Offenses," see 27 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 131 (2011).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Application to airports.
- In a case in which a gun rights organization and a Georgia state representative sought declaratory and injunctive relief because they asserted that Georgia House Bill (HB) 89 permitted any person who possessed a valid Georgia firearms license to carry a firearm in the non-sterile areas of the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, they argued unsuccessfully that the "notwithstanding" language of HB 89, codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(e), which authorized Georgia firearms license (GFL) holders to carry firearms in public transportation notwithstanding O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-122 through16-12-127, which is the Transportation Passenger Safety Act (TPSA), would be superfluous unless it was intended to make clear that a GFL holder could carry a firearm in an airport. They misleadingly focused only on O.C.G.A. § 16-12-127, but the "notwithstanding" language in HB 89 referred to all of the TPSA, and O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123(b), another section of the TPSA, prohibited boarding any bus or rail vehicle with a firearm; since public transportation included bus and rail vehicles such as those operated by Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, the "notwithstanding" language was needed to make clear that GFL holders could carry firearms onto such vehicles notwithstanding the TPSA. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Ga. 2008), aff'd, 318 Fed. Appx. 851 (11th Cir. 2009).
Evidence supported verdict of guilty but mentally ill on the defendant's bus hijacking charge as the defendant's mental illness did not prove legal insanity since the defendant told a psychologist that the defendant grabbed the steering wheel of a moving bus because the driver was in difficulty; a trier of fact could conclude that if the defendant was motivated by a delusion that others were planning to harm the defendant, the delusion did not justify forcibly exercising control over the bus as the defendant did not tell the psychologist that the defendant took over steering the bus because of the defendant's fear of being harmed. Robinson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 87, 611 S.E.2d 759 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of boarding a bus with a concealed weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123(b) because neither the bus driver nor a police officer detected a gun on defendant while the defendant was on a bus, but during an altercation with the officer immediately after leaving the bus, the defendant was seen striking the officer with a gun. Smith v. State, 301 Ga. App. 670, 688 S.E.2d 636 (2009).
Evidence sufficient for bus hijacking.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of bus hijacking, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123(a)(1)(A), because the jury was authorized to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exercised control of the bus by force; the defendant brandished a handgun in the open door of the bus as the defendant ordered a passenger to get off, and the bus driver testified that the driver did not feel free to drive away because the driver felt the driver's life was in danger and the driver did not want to agitate the defendant. Cannon v. State, 310 Ga. App. 262, 712 S.E.2d 645 (2011).
Cited in Herndon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 374, 626 S.E.2d 579 (2006).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
- Pocket or clasp knife as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 100 A.L.R.3d 287.
What constitutes "dangerous weapon" under statutes prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons in motor vehicle, 2 A.L.R.4th 1342.