(Ga. L. 1884-85, p. 131, § 1; Ga. L. 1892, p. 108, § 1; Ga. L. 1893, p. 130, § 1; Penal Code 1895, §§ 511, 512, 730; Ga. L. 1905, p. 86, § 1; Penal Code 1910, §§ 512, 513, 782; Code 1933, §§ 26-1803, 26-7308, 26-7309; Code 1933, § 26-1307, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Code 1933, § 26-1307.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 1022, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 270, § 6; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1094, § 4; Ga. L. 2010, p. 999, § 3/HB 1002; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-26/HB 310; Ga. L. 2016, p. 811, § 2/HB 874.)
The 2016 amendment, effective May 3, 2016, rewrote this Code section.
Cross references.- Constitutional guarantee of free speech and press, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V.
Criminal possession of an explosive device, § 16-7-64.
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 2002, p. 1094, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Transportation Security Act of 2002'."
Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.
Law reviews.- For review of 1998 legislation relating to crimes and offenses, see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 80 (1998). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015). For comment, "State Constitutions as a Check on the New Governors: Using State Free Speech Clauses to Protect Social Media Users from Arbitrary Political Censorship by Social Media Platforms," see 69 Emory L.J. 111 (2019).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Distinguished from offense of obstruction of officer.
- Defendant's convictions and sentence for and obstruction of an officer did not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. The crimes are mutually independent and each is aimed at prohibiting specific conduct. Lemarr v. State, 188 Ga. App. 352, 373 S.E.2d 58 (1988).
Crime of terroristic threats focuses solely on conduct of accused. Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 274 S.E.2d 49 (1980).
Former Code 1933, § 26-1307 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37) included threats to individual persons. Echols v. State, 134 Ga. App. 216, 213 S.E.2d 907 (1975).
When crime complete.
- Crime of terroristic threats is complete when threat is communicated to victim with intent to terrorize. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975); Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 274 S.E.2d 49 (1980); Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 346, 447 S.E.2d 341 (1994).
When communication of threat is done to terrorize another, crime of terroristic threats is complete. Wilson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 501, 260 S.E.2d 527 (1979).
Intent to terrorize may be inferred from circumstances.
- When there is no direct evidence that the threats were made for the purpose of terrorizing another, the jury may infer such purpose from circumstances surrounding the threats. Moss v. State, 139 Ga. App. 136, 228 S.E.2d 30 (1976).
Direct evidence that threats were made for purpose of terrorizing another is not necessary if circumstances surrounding threats are sufficient for the jury to find the threats were made for such purpose. Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 274 S.E.2d 49 (1980); Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 346, 447 S.E.2d 341 (1994).
Threats against absent third party.
- Threat of physical violence against an absent third party is within the conduct prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37. Shepherd v. State, 230 Ga. App. 426, 496 S.E.2d 530 (1998).
Conviction reversed due to Sixth Amendment violation.
- Although the admission of a victim's statements to a deputy violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights as defendant was not able to cross-examine the victim, the error was harmless as to defendant's aggravated assault and battery convictions in light of the photographs of the victim's injuries and defendant's admission that defendant grabbed the victim around the neck and that the defendant might have hit the victim in the face; however, as the victim's statements were the only real evidence supporting the terroristic threats and obstructing a person making an emergency call convictions, those convictions were reversed. Miller v. State, 273 Ga. App. 761, 615 S.E.2d 843 (2005).
Defendant's prior conviction for making terroristic threats under Georgia law was not a predicate violent felony under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because it was indivisible and overbroad; thus, the defendant did not have three qualifying predicate offenses as required to support application of ACCA enhancement. United States v. Oliver, 955 F.3d 887 (11th Cir. 2020).
Defendant was improperly sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924, based on the defendant's prior convictions, including a prior Georgia conviction for making terroristic threats under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a) because § 16-11-37(a) was indivisible and overbroad under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) and, therefore, violation of that statute categorically did not constitute a predicate offense under the elements clause of the ACCA. United States v. Oliver, 955 F.3d 887 (11th Cir. 2020).
Cited in Williams v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 453, 192 S.E.2d 378 (1972); Gibbs v. State, 132 Ga. App. 886, 209 S.E.2d 691 (1974); Hornsby v. State, 139 Ga. App. 254, 228 S.E.2d 152 (1976); Cagle v. State, 141 Ga. App. 392, 233 S.E.2d 485 (1977); Cochran v. State, 151 Ga. App. 478, 260 S.E.2d 391 (1979); Wiggins v. State, 171 Ga. App. 358, 319 S.E.2d 528 (1984); Jones v. State, 253 Ga. 640, 322 S.E.2d 877 (1984); Shepherd v. State, 173 Ga. App. 499, 326 S.E.2d 596 (1985); Hillman v. State, 184 Ga. App. 712, 362 S.E.2d 417 (1987); Carver v. State, 185 Ga. App. 436, 364 S.E.2d 877 (1987); Chapman v. State, 258 Ga. 214, 367 S.E.2d 541 (1988); Wade v. State, 258 Ga. 324, 368 S.E.2d 482 (1988); Steele v. State, 196 Ga. App. 330, 396 S.E.2d 4 (1990); Wilburn v. State, 223 Ga. App. 476, 477 S.E.2d 909 (1996); Scott v. State, 225 Ga. App. 729, 484 S.E.2d 780 (1997); Taylor v. State, 226 Ga. App. 254, 485 S.E.2d 830 (1997); Bielen v. State, 265 Ga. App. 865, 595 S.E.2d 543 (2004); In the Interest of P.R., 282 Ga. App. 480, 638 S.E.2d 898 (2006); In the Interest of B.M., 289 Ga. App. 214, 656 S.E.2d 855 (2008); Hyde v. State, 291 Ga. App. 662, 662 S.E.2d 764 (2008); Lemming v. State, 292 Ga. App. 138, 663 S.E.2d 375 (2008); Williams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 193, 666 S.E.2d 703 (2008); Murray v. State, 297 Ga. App. 571, 677 S.E.2d 745 (2009); Abdul-Malik v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 852, 678 S.E.2d 555 (2009); Mullins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 368, 680 S.E.2d 474 (2009).
Constitutionality
Statute not unconstitutionally vague.
- Georgia's Terroristic Threats statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a), did not violate the due process clause and was not unconstitutionally vague as a person of ordinary intelligence could clearly understand the meaning of threatening to commit any crime of violence; and both Georgia and federal law plainly defined recklessness as the proper criminal mens rea requirement. Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 800 S.E.2d 348 (2017).
Former Code 1933, § 26-1307 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37) sufficiently meets constitutional test of due process. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).
Former Code 1933, § 26-1307 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37) adequately informs persons of conduct prohibited. Masson v. Slaton, 320 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Former Code 1933, § 26-1307 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37) is not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite. Masson v. Slaton, 320 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Terroristic threats are not protected speech under the First Amendment.
- Communication of terroristic threats to another person to commit crime of violence upon that person clearly falls outside of those communications and expressions which are protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).
Scope of section does not include protected speech.
- Former Code 1933, § 26-1307 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37) by its terms did not sweep within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute exercise of freedom of speech or of press. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).
Georgia's Terroristic Threats statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a), did not violate the defendant's First Amendment's right to free speech because the statute's reckless scienter was not overly broad as recklessness clearly required an analysis of the accused's state of mind at the time of the crime; and communicating a threat of violence in a reckless manner did meet the definition of a true threat as recklessness required a knowing act such as conscious disregard of a substantial risk. Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 800 S.E.2d 348 (2017).
Corroboration
Crime of terroristic threats requires corroboration of victim's testimony. Moss v. State, 148 Ga. App. 459, 251 S.E.2d 374 (1978).
Corroboration requirement satisfied by another to whom threat was communicated.
- Statutory requirement of corroboration does not demand corroboration by some evidence other than another party to whom it was communicated, which would preclude corroboration by covictim. Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 274 S.E.2d 49 (1980).
Quantum of corroboration need not in itself be sufficient to convict, but need only be that amount of independent evidence which tends to prove that incident occurred as alleged. Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 274 S.E.2d 49 (1980); Ellis v. State, 176 Ga. App. 384, 336 S.E.2d 281 (1985).
Threat to kill sufficiently corroborated.
- Defendant's isolated threats to kill officer transporting defendant to jail after arrest for domestic violence incident were sufficiently corroborated by defendant's angry, hostile and verbally abusive behavior to other two officers prior to defendant's arrest. Stone v. State, 210 Ga. App. 198, 435 S.E.2d 527 (1993).
Trial court did not err in revoking two years of a probated sentence because the evidence presented would have been sufficient to convict the probationer of making a terroristic threat pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a) in violation of probation, and it was more than sufficient to justify the revocation of a portion of the probationer's probated sentence; if properly corroborated, the probationer's statement that the probationer would shoot the probationer's spouse in the head with the probationer's pistol would be sufficient to show that the probationer threatened the probationer's spouse with a crime of violence with the purpose of terrorizing the spouse, and the spouse's testimony was corroborated despite the fact that the spouse was the only one who heard the threats and despite the fact that the spouse minimized their significance in the spouse's testimony. Geter v. State, 300 Ga. App. 396, 685 S.E.2d 342 (2009).
With regard to the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction for terroristic threats, evidence of injury to the victim's arm that appeared to be a gunshot, blood on the victim's front porch, and witness testimony that the witness heard a gunshot and a woman say that the victim was shot was sufficient corroboration of the defendant's threat to kill the victim. Lomax v. State, 319 Ga. App. 693, 738 S.E.2d 152 (2013).
Evidence sufficient for corroboration.
- See Ellis v. State, 176 Ga. App. 384, 336 S.E.2d 281 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 40, 369 S.E.2d 487, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 371 S.E.2d 432 (1988); Warnock v. State, 195 Ga. App. 537, 394 S.E.2d 382 (1990); Baker v. State, 225 Ga. App. 848, 485 S.E.2d 548 (1997); In re C.S.G., 241 Ga. App. 37, 525 S.E.2d 106 (1999); Sprayberry v. State, 241 Ga. App. 501, 527 S.E.2d 224 (1999); Bartlett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 49, 537 S.E.2d 362 (2000); In the Interest of C.A., 249 Ga. App. 280, 548 S.E.2d 37 (2001); Sampson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 206, 609 S.E.2d 110 (2004).
Evidence was sufficient for corroboration where threat to each victim was made in the presence of the other and each testified as to the threat to the other. Hamby v. State, 206 Ga. App. 791, 426 S.E.2d 670 (1992).
Sufficient evidence for corroboration was found in the testimony of one witness who saw the victim's agitated and incoherent state shortly after threat was communicated and also saw defendant standing outside waiting, and by the testimony of another witness who on another occasion saw defendant react to the presence of the victim by pointing defendant's finger aggressively at the victim as if defendant were targeting the victim. Sampson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 213, 433 S.E.2d 136 (1993).
Juvenile defendant provided corroboration to charges under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37 when responding to questions from director/supervisor of houseparent terrorized. In re J.L.W., 213 Ga. App. 630, 445 S.E.2d 575 (1994).
Defendant's violent behavior toward victim was sufficient corroboration for the police officer's testimony regarding defendant's terroristic threat and met the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a) even though the victim did not corroborate the officer's testimony that defendant made a threat. Drew v. State, 256 Ga. App. 391, 568 S.E.2d 506 (2002).
Victim of terroristic threat was not required to testify for there to be sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction; testimony from several witnesses who actually heard defendant make the threats to the victim, their identification of defendant's voice, and evidence that defendant showed up outside the apartment where the victim was located, which the jury could construe as additional circumstantial evidence that defendant made the threats with the purpose of terrorizing the victim, was sufficient. Worthington v. State, 257 Ga. App. 10, 750 S.E.2d 85 (2002).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for terroristic threats as the required corroboration was present after the defendant informed the instructor of a truck-driving school that two other instructors of the school who had failed the defendant previously should watch their mailboxes as the instructors would soon be getting presents; sufficient corroboration existed because a student who was present at the time the statement was made testified as to the threat that was made by the defendant. Denson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 342, 577 S.E.2d 29 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's terroristic threats convictions where two victims testified that the defendant threatened to kill the victims, and the testimony of each victim adequately corroborated the other. Evans v. State, 266 Ga. App. 405, 597 S.E.2d 505 (2004).
Given the defendant's violation of a restraining order, it was reasonable to conclude that the defendant intended or expected a threat, which the defendant made in the presence of an officer, to have been communicated to the victim, and the defendant's conviction of terroristic threat was affirmed; also, evidence that defendant was angry with the victim, violated a protective order, and was verbally abusive towards the victim, though slight, constituted sufficient corroborating evidence about the threat. Cobble v. State, 268 Ga. App. 792, 603 S.E.2d 86 (2004).
There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for terroristic threats under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a) because the evidence showed that defendant threatened to rape and kill a girlfriend's daughter and, although the threat was communicated only to the girlfriend, evidence that defendant had made other verbal threats to the girlfriend and violated a protective order, and that the girlfriend was afraid of defendant, constituted some evidence corroborating the girlfriend's testimony about the threat. Maskivish v. State, 276 Ga. App. 701, 624 S.E.2d 160 (2005).
Evidence sufficiently corroborated the victim's testimony in a case charging the defendant with making a terroristic threat, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37, where a classmate overheard the defendant ask the victim to complete the defendant's class project and an assistant principal who interviewed the victim about the threats testified that the victim was scared and cried during the interview. Smith v. State, 273 Ga. App. 843, 616 S.E.2d 183 (2005).
Police officer's testimony that the victim was visibly shaken and which reiterated a threat to kill made by the defendant and others who kidnapped the victim, when coupled with corroboration of the victim's visible fear, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of making terroristic threats. Pringle v. State, 281 Ga. App. 235, 635 S.E.2d 839 (2006).
When the victim testified that the defendant pulled out a black and silver handgun and threatened the victim with the gun, an officer's testimony that the officer recovered a loaded silver handgun minutes after the incident in the vehicle in which the defendant was riding sufficiently corroborated the victim's testimony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a). Because the victim's testimony was sufficiently corroborated, there was no merit to the defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, which was based on the act of making terroristic threats. Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 661 S.E.2d 634 (2008).
Victim's testimony as to a terroristic threats charge was adequately corroborated. Corroboration could consist of the victim's demeanor after the threat was communicated, and police described the victim as "very distraught" and crying from "severe fright" when police arrived on the scene. Jones v. State, 291 Ga. App. 296, 661 S.E.2d 651 (2008).
There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of making a terroristic threat as the evidence established that defendant told the parent of a child they shared that defendant was going to kill the parent. The appellate court found no merit to defendant's contention that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the parent's oldest child that defendant had also threatened to kill that oldest child as the indictment nor the conviction was regarding the threat to the oldest child. Mazza v. State, 292 Ga. App. 168, 664 S.E.2d 548 (2008).
Trial court did not err by denying a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a terroristic threats charge as the victim's testimony was sufficiently corroborated despite the fact that no one other than the victim heard the defendant's threats. Such corroboration included the testimony of the police officer who responded to the victim's9-1-1 call, who testified that the victim was upset and nervous, that the victim had bruises and scratches on the victim's body, and that the victim's clothes were dirty, and evidence of the fact that the victim called a credit card company to set up the emergency PIN number and that the defendant made actual withdrawals from that account. Hall v. State, 292 Ga. App. 544, 664 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, No. S08C1841, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 926 (Ga. 2008).
Sufficient corroborating evidence was presented to support the jury's verdict on a charge of making a terroristic threat, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(d)(2), and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to this charge under circumstances in which an officer responding to the victim's calls heard the defendant making threats over the telephone; the police officer's testimony regarding the threat against the victim was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of the victim and the victim's roommate that the defendant threatened the victim repeatedly over the previous three days and by the defendant's attack on the victim three days earlier. It was of no moment that the officer, rather than the victim, heard the specific threat at issue because the victim initially answered the phone before handing the phone to the officer, so it could have been inferred that the defendant intended the threat to be communicated to the victim rather than the officer. Walker v. State, 298 Ga. App. 265, 679 S.E.2d 814 (2009).
There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction on one count of the offense of terroristic threats as a witness testified that the witness heard the defendant threaten to kill the victim and put the victim in a swamp, and another witness recounted the same statement. Further, an officer also related a witness's initial statement, which was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement, and therefore, contrary to the defendant's argument, there was no requirement that the victim testify for there to be sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Mullins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 368, 680 S.E.2d 474 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient to provide the corroboration required under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a) because the defendant's behavior caused family members to become concerned for the victim's safety and to urge the victim to leave, and testimony was presented that the defendant followed the victim, who was the defendant's spouse, as the victim was attempting to leave, that the defendant had a knife, and that the defendant got into a violent struggle with two relatives who tried to keep the defendant away from the victim so that the victim could get away. Vaughn v. State, 301 Ga. App. 55, 686 S.E.2d 847 (2009), overruled on other grounds, State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011).
Any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime of terroristic threats beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim's testimony was corroborated by independent evidence of the injury to the victim's face and by an officer's testimony that when the officer arrived at the scene the officer saw that the victim was shaking, looked like the victim had been crying, and was scared. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 468, 718 S.E.2d 808 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0473, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 277 (Ga. 2012).
Victim's testimony regarding a defendant's terroristic threat to kill the victim by dropping a hair dryer into a filled bathtub with the victim, then forcing the victim to eat the defendant's feces was sufficiently corroborated by evidence of the events before and after the threat including evidence that police found feces and a hair dryer on the floor in the bathroom. Schneider v. State, 312 Ga. App. 504, 718 S.E.2d 833 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for making a terroristic threat, as the recorded conversation between the defendant and the victim, in which the defendant told the victim "You done played with my heart. I'm ready to die tonight. I think you need to be ready too," corroborated the victim's testimony. Crawford v. State, 318 Ga. App. 270, 732 S.E.2d 794 (2012).
In a terroristic threat case, a neighbor's testimony that a vehicle fitting the description of that owned by the defendant was the vehicle driven by the shooter and the defendant's text messages to the complainant after the incident sufficiently corroborated the complainant's testimony that the defendant threatened to kill the complainant. Brown v. State, 325 Ga. App. 237, 750 S.E.2d 453 (2013).
Victim's demeanor, distraught, shaking, sobbing, and crying, after the defendant threatened the victim was adequate corroboration to support the defendant's terroristic threat conviction. Long v. State, 324 Ga. App. 882, 752 S.E.2d 54 (2013).
Because the defendant's brother testified about the phone conversation in which the defendant told the brother that the victim was already dead, the state presented evidence that the defendant's sister told a responding officer that the defendant was holding the victim hostage and had threatened to blow the victim's head off, and one of the responding officers testified that the rifle identified by the victim as the one used to hold the victim at gunpoint was found on the floor in the living room upon the defendant being taken into custody, that combined testimony clearly was sufficient to corroborate the victim's testimony regarding the threat made by the defendant and to sustain the defendant's terroristic threats conviction. Lambert v. State, 325 Ga. App. 603, 754 S.E.2d 392 (2014).
Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault and terroristic threats based on the trial court properly admitting the victim's testimony identifying the defendant as the person who threatened to shoot the victim early in the morning, and the testimony of the victim's friend, who also identified defendant as the person who threatened to shoot the victim. Johnson v. State, 326 Ga. App. 220, 756 S.E.2d 303 (2014).
Evidence insufficient for corroboration.
- Where the victim's testimony is uncorroborated, defendant's conviction for the offense of a terroristic threat was not authorized and the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as to the offense of a terroristic threat. Hanvey v. State, 186 Ga. App. 690, 368 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 368 S.E.2d 357 (1988).
Evidence was not sufficient to support the charge of terroristic threats because the victim's testimony was completely uncorroborated. Murrell v. State, 317 Ga. App. 310, 730 S.E.2d 675 (2012).
State need not prove beyond reasonable doubt corroboration of victim in trial for terroristic threats. Wilson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 501, 260 S.E.2d 527 (1979).
Slight circumstances may be sufficient for corroboration, which is a question solely for jury. Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 274 S.E.2d 49 (1980).
Application
Threats made as part of kidnapping did not merge with kidnapping.
- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant on a charge of making terroristic threats and the conviction was not improper on the ground that the acts comprising the terroristic threats were included in the charge of kidnapping with bodily harm on which defendant was also convicted; the fact that defendant threatened the victim with violence during the kidnapping did not change the fact that the two crimes did not share the same essential elements. Fulcher v. State, 259 Ga. App. 648, 578 S.E.2d 264 (2003).
Threats made as part of rape did not merge with rape.
- Charge of issuing a terroristic threat did not merge into a charge of attempt to commit rape because the state used evidence other than defendant's statement, "shut up or I'll kill you," to prove that defendant attempted to commit rape, but evidence that two witnesses heard defendant say "shut up or I'll kill you" to defendant's victim was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for issuing a terroristic threat. Brewster v. State, 261 Ga. App. 795, 584 S.E.2d 66 (2003).
Court need not define murder, although it was crime threatened, absent request to do so. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).
Arrest for violating O.C.G.A.
§ 16-11-37 justified by probable cause. - See McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ga. 1983), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1984).
Attorney had to disclose information when client communicating threats.
- There was sufficient evidence that the defendant, who was convicted of making terroristic threats, expected or intended that the threats would be communicated to the victims, who were the defendant's spouse and the spouse's parent. From the defendant's knowledge of the attorney-client privilege and the defendant's letters and increasingly bizarre conduct and statements, the fact finder could conclude that the defendant intended the defendant's attorney to believe that the defendant was determined to carry out the threats and that the attorney had to report the threats to prevent the defendant from carrying the threats out. Brown v. State, 298 Ga. App. 545, 680 S.E.2d 579 (2009).
Evidence of prior possession of guns.
- Since a deliberate intent to terrorize is an integral part of this crime, evidence showing terroristic intent is not only relevant, but necessary, to proving such a case. Therefore, evidence of the prior possession of guns and earlier arrests are properly admitted to show terroristic intent. Carver v. State, 258 Ga. 385, 369 S.E.2d 471 (1988).
Evidence of gun used in commission of crime.
- When the defendants were convicted of terroristic threats, the trial court did not err by admitting a shotgun used in the crime spree into evidence without establishing an appropriate chain of custody as the state was not required to prove a chain of custody of the exhibit since the gun was a distinct and recognizable physical object which could be identified upon mere observation. Attaway v. State, 259 Ga. App. 822, 578 S.E.2d 529 (2003).
Threats against police officer.
- When the deputy sheriff testified that the defendant, at the scene of a fire, turned toward the deputy, kicked the deputy in the shin, and spit in the deputy's face, and two officers who transported the defendant to jail testified that the defendant threatened to "burn and bomb" the officers' homes when the officers and their families were in the homes, the evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of facts to find the existence of the offenses of simple battery and terroristic threats, beyond a reasonable doubt. Veit v. State, 182 Ga. App. 753, 357 S.E.2d 113 (1987).
When there was testimony that the defendant behaved in an angry, violent, and hostile manner to the officers, and that the defendant told the police officer several times that the defendant would kill the officer once the officer got off duty, sufficient corroboration was established to convict the defendant upon the uttered threat. Stone v. State, 210 Ga. App. 198, 435 S.E.2d 527 (1993).
Evidence that defendant and the victim had quarreled frequently over money, defendant had previously shot the victim in the shoulder with a shotgun, and that defendant had anonymously mailed a spent shotgun shell to the victim was sufficient to sustain conviction for committing terroristic threats. Hammock v. State, 210 Ga. App. 513, 436 S.E.2d 571 (1993).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction where the defendant threatened to find the arresting officer and to kill that officer. Moore v. State, 234 Ga. App. 332, 506 S.E.2d 685 (1998).
Corroborating evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of making a terroristic threat. Carter v. State, 239 Ga. App. 549, 521 S.E.2d 590 (1999).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendants' conviction for terroristic threats where in the commission of a spree of burglaries, defendants held a gun to the victims' head and threatened to kill them. Attaway v. State, 259 Ga. App. 822, 578 S.E.2d 529 (2003).
Because a burglary victim recognized defendant before a photographic lineup was introduced, defendant did not show deficient performance or prejudice based on trial counsel's failure to object to the lineup; in any event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, making terroristic threats, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1), (a)(2),16-7-1(a),16-8-41(a),16-11-37(a), and16-11-106(b)(1). Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 845, 608 S.E.2d 310 (2004).
Defendant's conviction of making a terroristic threat against an officer was supported by sufficient evidence as defendant threatened to kill the officer. Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. App. 544, 623 S.E.2d 725 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of terroristic threats, because the victim testified that defendant threatened to hurt and kill the victim, and the state presented evidence as corroboration that the victim was injured under the left eye during the incident. Nelson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 92, 625 S.E.2d 465 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer and making a terroristic threat or act, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-11-37(a), respectively, since the defendant was agitated when officers came to the residence to investigate complaints of a terroristic threat, the defendant brandished two knives at the officers which caused the officers to retreat outside of the residence, defendant refused to put the knives down despite being instructed to do so at gunpoint by the officers, and when the defendant threatened to stab an officer and raised the knife up, the defendant was shot in the hand. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. App. 884, 627 S.E.2d 897 (2006).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a defendant's convictions for a total of 20 counts of armed robbery, possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime, terroristic threats and acts, kidnapping, and aggravated assault arising out of four separate robberies because the victims' testimony, the physical evidence, and one victim's identification of the defendant as the robber provided sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the defendant's accomplice. Metoyer v. State, 282 Ga. App. 810, 640 S.E.2d 345 (2006).
Terroristic threats against family members.
- Convictions for theft, aggravated assault, and making a terroristic threat was supported by evidence because defendant admitted to taking gas cans, raised a machete to scare or strike the brother, the brother was frightened and ran, and defendant then threatened the brother and sister that if either called the sheriff the defendant would return and kill them. Turner v. State, 273 Ga. App. 535, 615 S.E.2d 603 (2005).
Evidence that the defendant refused to get into a patrol car and struggled with two officers, then told the defendant's spouse, "I will kill you when I get out of jail," supported the defendant's convictions of terroristic threats and obstructing or hindering a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-10-24(a) and16-11-37(a). For there to be a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a), a defendant did not have to have the immediate ability to carry out a threat. Reeves v. State, 288 Ga. App. 544, 654 S.E.2d 449 (2007).
Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant on a charge of terroristic threats since the defendant failed to carry the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated at the time the threats were made, and there was at least some evidence before the jury of each element of the charge of terroristic threats that the state was required to prove. Stewart v. State, 291 Ga. App. 846, 663 S.E.2d 278 (2008).
There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for terroristic threats as, regardless of any unfulfilled threats the defendant may have uttered in the past, the evidence authorized the jury to find that on the night of the incident at issue, the defendant threatened to kill a romantic friend/victim while the defendant pinned the victim down on the ground and raised a cinder block over the victim's head, with the purpose of terrorizing the victim. Moran v. State, 293 Ga. App. 279, 666 S.E.2d 726 (2008).
Evidence that showed that during an argument with the victim, the defendant dragged the victim off a couch by the victim's hair and threw a table at the victim, that the victim fled on foot and attempted to make a9-1-1 call, that the defendant pursued the victim in the defendant's truck, reached the victim, and held a knife to the victim, retreating only after another vehicle drove up, was sufficient to convict the defendant of terroristic threats. Stone v. State, 296 Ga. App. 305, 674 S.E.2d 31 (2009).
Threats to kill home occupants during burglary.
- Sufficient evidence supported the appellant's convictions for burglary, cruelty to children, terroristic threats, and aggravated assault as neither parent gave the appellant permission to enter their home, the appellant was identified as the intruder who held a knife to the child's neck, and struggled with one parent as the appellant tried to remove the child from the home, and the appellant threatened to kill one of the children while holding a knife to their neck. Cordova v. State, 351 Ga. App. 652, 832 S.E.2d 465 (2019).
Evidence sufficient to convict juvenile of terroristic threats.
- Juvenile court's adjudication entered against a juvenile on charges of aggravated assault and terroristic threats was upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence that: (1) the state adequately showed venue; and (2) the victim's testimony described the juvenile's act of pointing a gun, threatening to use the gun, and that such caused fear that something could happen as a result of those acts. In the Interest of J.A.L., 284 Ga. App. 220, 644 S.E.2d 162 (2007).
Because evidence of the defendant's act of pointing the defendant's finger like a gun and threatening the victim, along with the use of racial slurs and profanity, was sufficient to support a charge of terroristic threats, the defendant's conviction was upheld on appeal, supporting the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to that charge; further, as to the state's evidence as to the charge, given the equivalence between the words "ought" and "should," the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court overruled an objection to the state's assertion during closing argument that the defendant told the victim, "I ought to kill you." Self v. State, 288 Ga. App. 77, 653 S.E.2d 787 (2007).
Terroristic threat to burn down restaurant.
- When the facts demonstrated that the defendant threatened to burn down a restaurant and then proceeded to pour gasoline onto the restaurant's tables and carpet in front of numerous eyewitnesses, such was sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to convict defendant of attempt to commit arson and terroristic threats; moreover, the defendant's act of damaging the tables and carpet by pouring gasoline on them was sufficient to support a conviction of first-degree criminal damage to property. Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 219, 653 S.E.2d 810 (2007).
Terroristic threat against neighbor.
- Because defendant threw a leaf-blower into a neighbor, knocking the neighbor off the neighbor's motorcycle before defendant threatened to kill the neighbor, and because defendant then charged and attacked the neighbor with defendant's hands after the threat, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict defendant of making terroristic threats in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a). Hobby v. State, 298 Ga. App. 52, 679 S.E.2d 72 (2009).
Threats against police officer.
- Evidence that, after being arrested, the defendant head-butted an officer in the face and yelled death threats at the officer was sufficient to convict the defendant of obstruction of an officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), and terroristic threats, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a). Bradley v. State, 298 Ga. App. 384, 680 S.E.2d 489 (2009).
Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant intended to terrorize the victim by threatening to kill the victim, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a), by surrounding circumstances: (1) the defendant's anger at the victim for accusing the defendant of stealing a lawn mower and talking to the defendant's mother about the theft; (2) the defendant's previous threatening behavior; and (3) the defendant's refusal to leave. Martin v. State, 303 Ga. App. 117, 692 S.E.2d 741 (2010).
Terroristic threats against utility worker.
- Defendant's specific and repeat threats to shoot any electric company technicians who ventured onto the defendant's property and the defendant's repeated demands that the defendant's threats be noted in the defendant's account records supported the defendant's convictions for terroristic threats in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37. Nassau v. State, 311 Ga. App. 438, 715 S.E.2d 837 (2011).
Any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of terroristic threats, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37, hoax devices, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-85(a), and armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), because although circumstantial, the evidence authorized the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the defendant engaged in the acts that constituted the crimes; even though the defendant was apprehended while wearing clothing that did not match that described by the victims, an officer familiar with the habits of bank robbers testified that bank robbers like to wear multi-layer clothing and then shed clothes after the crime. Williams v. State, 312 Ga. App. 22, 717 S.E.2d 532 (2011).
Defendant's conviction for making a terroristic threat was affirmed because evidence showed that the defendant, after an enraged and profane confrontation, angrily returned to the scene to tell the victim that he was a "dead man." This authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant was threatening to kill the victim, which would meet the definition of a terroristic threat. Enuka v. State, 314 Ga. App. 466, 724 S.E.2d 471 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of terroristic threats, six counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because a witness testified that a vehicle fitting the description of the defendant's car was driven by the shooter who shot at the house of the complainant's mother where the complainant was staying; multiple gunshot holes were found in the side of the home; the complainant testified that, earlier that morning, the defendant had threatened to come to the house and kill the complainant; and the complainant received text messages from the defendant later that morning apologizing for what had happened. Brown v. State, 325 Ga. App. 237, 750 S.E.2d 453 (2013).
Trial court properly convicted the defendant of making a terroristic threat based on the evidence adduced at trial that established that the defendant's purpose in returning to a hair salon after a request for check cashing was rebuffed, loudly cursing the victims, and threatening to force the victims to the floor and shoot the victims was to terrorize the victims. Smith v. State, 319 Ga. App. 640, 738 S.E.2d 95 (2013).
Defendant's threats to kill both victims supported the terroristic threats convictions. Petro v. State, 327 Ga. App. 254, 758 S.E.2d 152 (2014).
Defendant's repeated declarations that the defendant wished a detective and the detective's family to suffer, combined with the defendant's statement that the defendant was likely to be released from jail soon, was sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant intended the defendant's statements to threaten violence against the detective and the detective's family in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37, although the defendant was presently in custody and unable to deliver on the threats, and although the detective laughed at the defendant. Edwards v. State, 330 Ga. App. 732, 769 S.E.2d 150 (2015).
Terroristic threats is violent felony under federal Armed Career Criminal Act.- Defendant's terroristic threats conviction under Georgia law qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act's, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), elements clause because Georgia's terroristic-threats statute was divisible, and the threat that predicated the defendant's conviction, threat "to commit any crime of violence," required threatened use of violent force against another. United States v. Oliver, 962 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2020).
Evidence was insufficient for conviction.
- There was insufficient evidence that defendant wrote the letter for the purpose of terrorizing the female supervisor because defendant put in writing defendant's reasons for wanting a transfer, which included that defendant wanted to take a gun and kill defendant's supervisor, directing the letter to human resources; there was no evidence to support an inference that defendant intended or expected the reason to be communicated to the supervisor; on the contrary, the record reflected that defendant went out of defendant's way to avoid contact or communication with the supervisor in light of defendant's feelings towards the supervisor. Stephens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 509, 610 S.E.2d 143 (2005).
Defendant's convictions for terroristic acts, aggressive driving, and criminal trespass were reversed on appeal since the only evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a roadway situation wherein the victim was tailgated and an object was thrown at the victim's car, causing a dent, was a police officer's hearsay testimony that the officer spoke to the defendant's mother, who indicated that defendant had not been home, and the hearsay statement of the defendant admitting to the tailgating and honking; this evidence was inadmissible hearsay and therefore, relying on the remaining evidence, insufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions. Patterson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 100, 650 S.E.2d 770 (2007).
In a juvenile delinquency case, after the state conceded that the state failed to establish venue, the state could not retry a defendant juvenile on a terroristic threat allegation because the state offered insufficient evidence that the defendant made a terroristic threat against an attendance officer (AO) in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a); the defendant's statement that the defendant was leaving school to get a gun did not demonstrate that the defendant made the statement to terrorize the AO. In the Interest of M.S., 292 Ga. App. 127, 664 S.E.2d 240 (2008).
Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for terroristic threats in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a) because there was no evidence in the record to support an inference that the defendant's threats were directed at a9-1-1 operator or the police, that the defendant had any particular victim in mind when the defendant communicated the defendant's threats to them, or that the defendant intended or expected that the defendant's threat would be conveyed to anyone besides them; the clear and oft-repeated purpose of the defendant's threats was not to terrorize the defendant's neighbors but rather to obtain a police response to disturbances on the defendant's block. Sidner v. State, 304 Ga. App. 373, 696 S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, No. S10C1664, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 904 (Ga. 2010).
Evidence at trial was not sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for terroristic threats because, while the defendant made a threatening statement about the victim, it was made to other people and there was no evidence to support an inference that the defendant intended or expected the statements, made to others who had no connection to the victim, to be conveyed to the victim. Steplight v. State, 301 Ga. 272, 800 S.E.2d 548 (2017).
Defendant's statement "you will regret this" and one incident of non-lethal violence against the victim two to three months before the shooting was not sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that when the communication was made to the victim the defendant was threatening to kill the victim and, thus, the conviction for terroristic threat had to be reversed. Bryant v. State, 306 Ga. 687, 832 S.E.2d 826 (2019).
Threats made for purpose of mental health evaluation insufficient.
- During an intake interview at a mental health evaluation facility, a defendant's threats regarding the defendant's sentencing judge were made for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment of mental health issues, not with the purpose of terrorizing the judge or intimidating the judge from attending legal proceedings as required for finding terroristic threats in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-10-32(b) and16-11-37. Koldewey v. State, 310 Ga. App. 788, 714 S.E.2d 371 (2011), cert. denied, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 239 (Ga. 2012).
Severance of trials.
- When the defendants were convicted of terroristic threats, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendants' motions to sever the defendants' trials as the defendants failed to make a clear showing of prejudice and a denial of due process protection. Attaway v. State, 259 Ga. App. 822, 578 S.E.2d 529 (2003).
Jury instructions.
- Even though only "terroristic threats" were charged in the indictment, a jury charge quoting verbatim the statutory language, referring to "terroristic threats and acts," was not shown to have caused confusion among the jurors. Martin v. State, 219 Ga. App. 277, 464 S.E.2d 872 (1995).
When the defendant's defense to the charge of terroristic threats was that the defendant never made any threats or intimidating remarks at all, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendant's requested instruction on the offense of harassing telephone calls. Todd v. State, 230 Ga. App. 849, 498 S.E.2d 142 (1998).
Although the trial court erred in instructing the jury on crime of terroristic threats, the error was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that the defendant was convicted for committing terroristic threats in a manner not averred by the indictment, and the trial court gave complete instructions to the jury during the course of the one-day trial, albeit not in the sequence required by O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24(b); the charge, although not consistent with the indictment, did not reasonably present the jury with an alternate basis for finding the defendant guilty of terroristic threats. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 468, 718 S.E.2d 808 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0473, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 277 (Ga. 2012).
Defendant waived the objection to the trial court's decision to recharge the jury on the elements of terroristic threats because the defendant did not object when the trial court announced the proposed recharge and asked for any objections before instructing the jury. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 468, 718 S.E.2d 808 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0473, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 277 (Ga. 2012).
Trial court's failure to recharge on corroboration was not plain error under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58(b) or substantial error that was harmful as a matter of law under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24(c) because in the court's instructions to the jury following closing argument, the trial court properly charged the jury that no person would be convicted of terroristic threats on the unsupported testimony of the party to whom the threat was made. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 468, 718 S.E.2d 808 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0473, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 277 (Ga. 2012).
Improper jury instructions.
- Trial court erred in instructing the jury that the jury could convict the defendant of committing terroristic threats, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a), in a manner not alleged in the indictment because the indictment alleged that the defendant threatened to commit murder with the purpose of terrorizing the victim, but the trial court twice instructed the jury that terroristic threats involved any violence or any crime of violence; under the circumstances, without a remedial instruction, it was probable that the jury found the defendant guilty of committing the act of terroristic threats in a manner not charged in the indictment, and defendant's right to due process was violated due to a fatal variance between the proof and the indictment. The jury charge constituted plain error which affected substantial rights of the defendant, and thus the failure to object to the jury instruction did not preclude appellate review of the charge. Milner v. State, 297 Ga. App. 859, 678 S.E.2d 563 (2009).
Defendant held sentenced beyond statutory maximum.
- Smith v. State, 186 Ga. App. 303, 367 S.E.2d 573 (1988).
Factual basis for Alford plea.
- When the prosecutor stated that the defendant went into the victim's camper, grabbed the victim by the arm, pulled out a knife, and threatened to cut out the victim's eyes, there was a factual basis to satisfy the defendant's Alford plea to terroristic threats under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a). Henry v. State, 284 Ga. App. 439, 644 S.E.2d 191 (2007).
Victim not required to actually hear threat.
- Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of terroristic threat was properly denied because the evidence, in the form of testimony by witnesses, was sufficient to support the charge and the victim was not required to have actually heard and understood the threat, as the other witnesses did hear and understand defendant's threat to burn the victim's house down. Armour v. State, 265 Ga. App. 569, 594 S.E.2d 765 (2004).
New trial not warranted when defense counsel failed to object to prosecutor's use of the term "terrorist" to describe defendant.
- Trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's motion for new trial based on the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel since trial counsel's performance was not deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor's comment during closing argument that the defendant was a terrorist because the comment was not impermissible when the defendant threatened to commit a crime of violence against another and made a terroristic threat in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37; the defendant brandished a gun at the victim, shot the victim, and pointed the gun at a bystander, threatening to shoot. Nash v. State, 285 Ga. 753, 683 S.E.2d 591 (2009).
Terroristic threats as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault.
- Terroristic threats was included in the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a matter of fact, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury accordingly. Messick v. State, 209 Ga. App. 459, 433 S.E.2d 595 (1993).
Because the offense of terroristic threats was included, as a matter of fact, in the charged delinquent act constituting the offense of aggravated assault if committed by an adult, juvenile was therefore properly apprised before the delinquency hearing that the juvenile could be found delinquent based on commission of an act constituting the offense of the lesser included offense of terroristic threats if committed by an adult. In re C.S.G., 241 Ga. App. 37, 525 S.E.2d 106 (1999).
Aggravated stalking charge, an aggravated assault charge, and a terroristic threats charge did not merge because all three crimes required the state to prove at least one fact different from the others; the crime of aggravated stalking required proof of a special bond condition prohibiting the defendant from having violent contact with the victim and that the defendant's conduct violated that condition, while the crime of aggravated assault required the state to prove an assault with a knife against the victim, and the crime of terroristic threats required proof that the defendant threatened to kill the victim. Vaughn v. State, 301 Ga. App. 55, 686 S.E.2d 847 (2009), overruled on other grounds, State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011).
Harassing telephone calls as lesser included offense of terroristic threats.
- Depending on the facts, harassing telephone calls may be an included offense of terroristic threats. Todd v. State, 230 Ga. App. 849, 498 S.E.2d 142 (1998).
Simple assault is not a lesser included offense of terroristic threats. McQueen v. State, 184 Ga. App. 630, 362 S.E.2d 436 (1987).
Communication of terroristic threat is not punishable under simple assault statute. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).
One may be guilty of simple assault without violating terroristic threats statute. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).
Mere fact that threats were communicated by telephone could not reduce offense to misdemeanor under former Code 1933, § 26-2610 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.1). Usher v. State, 143 Ga. App. 843, 240 S.E.2d 214 (1977).
Admissibility of victim's testimony of threatening phone calls.
- Victim's testimony of threatening phone calls, without identifying caller, and that the victim's family received numerous telephone calls was admissible to establish fact of telephone harassment, and was not subject to exclusion as hearsay. Wilson v. State, 131 Ga. App. 536, 206 S.E.2d 527 (1979).
Social media posts.
- Georgia's Terroristic Threats statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a), was not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant because, whether the defendant's post on a social media site met the required criminal intent was a question of fact reserved for the jury, not the appellate court. Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 800 S.E.2d 348 (2017).
Sufficient evidence of intent.
- Evidence of defendant's intent was sufficient to support a conviction of making a terroristic threat because defendant told a seven-year-old child that defendant was going to kill the child's mother. Williams v. State, 271 Ga. App. 755, 610 S.E.2d 704 (2005).
Defendant was properly convicted of terroristic threats in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37 because the jury was presented with sufficient evidence by which to find that the defendant intended to terrorize officers by communicating a threat to blow up the defendant's home using propane; although there was testimony that the defendant suffered from a history of mental illness, the defendant did not plead the affirmative defense of insanity, and the issue of the defendant's criminal intent was a question of fact for the jury, which was presented with sufficient evidence to establish the requisite criminal intent. Layne v. State, 313 Ga. App. 608, 722 S.E.2d 351 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant intended to terrorize the victims based on the defendant yelling at an officer trying to restrain the defendant that the defendant was going to kill the officer and the officer's family. Harper v. State, 337 Ga. App. 57, 785 S.E.2d 691 (2016).
Threat meant to terrorize, not part of armed robbery.
- Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant separately on the separate conviction for terroristic threats and armed robbery since the evidence was sufficient to show the robbery was complete, and since the money from the cash register was in defendant's possession before defendant made the alleged threat to the victim that defendant would kill the victim if the victim moved. Thus, the threat was not part of the armed robbery, but the evidence was sufficient to show that it was made with the purpose of terrorizing the victim. Barnett v. State, 204 Ga. App. 588, 420 S.E.2d 96 (1992).
Terroristic threats conviction did not merge with attempted armed robbery.
- Convictions for burglary, kidnapping, terroristic threats, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony did not merge with an attempted armed robbery conviction because the attempted armed robbery was complete before the crimes were committed inside the residence; the defendant discussed with the co-worker the idea to dress up as a heating and air technician to perform a robbery, traveled to the residence armed with handguns and a hollow clipboard used to conceal the handgun, and pointed the handgun at a victim before entering the house. McKinney v. State, 274 Ga. App. 32, 619 S.E.2d 299 (2005).
Probable cause shown to arrest.
- Police officer had both actual and arguable probable cause to arrest a suspect for making terroristic threats under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37 based upon the suspect's admission to making the statement that the defendant was "going to have his people get" the officer and that the defendant was going or wanted to "clip" the officer; the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on the suspect's related false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Alfred v. Powell, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2005).
Plaintiff failed to show that it was entirely unreasonable for the sheriff's deputy to believe, under the particular circumstances, that the deputy had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for making harassing phone calls and terroristic threats. Plaintiff did not contend that the alleged phone calls, assuming the calls were made and without regard to the identity of the caller, do not arguably establish the elements of both statutes: (1) repeated communications for the purpose of harassment; and (2) a threat to burn or damage the victims's house with the intention of terrorizing the victim. Taylor v. Taylor, 649 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. May 3, 2016)(Unpublished).
Sufficient indictment.
- Because the defendant could not admit the charges of aggravated assault and terroristic threats in the indictment and still be innocent, the indictment returned was not defective. Dudley v. State, 283 Ga. App. 86, 640 S.E.2d 677 (2006).
Defendant's threat to get a gun and shoot an officer's car, followed by defendant turning back toward defendant's tavern, may have constituted the crime of terroristic threats. Gay v. State, 179 Ga. App. 430, 346 S.E.2d 877 (1986).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Fingerprinting required.
- Offenses arising under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(d)(1) are designated as offenses for which those charged are to be fingerprinted. 2017 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 17-1.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats, §§ 46 et seq., 53, 61 et seq. 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Explosions and Explosives, § 192.
Hate Crimes and Liability for Bias-Motivated Acts, 57 POF3d 1.
C.J.S.- 86 C.J.S., Threats and Unlawful Communications, § 1 et seq.
ALR.- Vacancy or nonoccupancy of building as affecting its character as "dwelling" as regards arson, 44 A.L.R.2d 1456.
Validity and construction of terroristic threat statutes, 45 A.L.R.4th 949.
Validity, construction, and effect of "hate crimes" statutes, "ethnic intimidation" statutes, or the like, 22 A.L.R.5th 261.
Imposition of state or local penalties for threatening to use explosive devices at schools or other buildings, 79 A.L.R.5th 1.
Construction and application of § 2A6.1 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG § 2A6.1), pertaining to sentence to be imposed for making threatening communications, 148 A.L.R. Fed. 501.
Validity, construction, and application of 18 USCA § 844(e), prohibiting use of mail, telephone, telegraph, or other instrument of commerce to convey bomb threat, 160 A.L.R. Fed. 625.