The judges of the superior courts have authority:
(Orig. Code 1863, § 243; Code 1868, § 237; Code 1873, § 247; Code 1882, § 247; Civil Code 1895, § 4321; Penal Code 1895, § 792; Civil Code 1910, § 4850; Penal Code 1910, § 792; Code 1933, § 24-2616; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 15.)
Cross references.- Writ of prohibition, § 9-6-40 et seq.
Exclusive jurisdiction of superior courts over habeas corpus actions involving persons detained by virtue of sentence imposed by state court of record, § 9-14-43.
Authority of superior court judges in certain counties to appoint judges of juvenile courts, § 15-11-50.
Power of judges of superior courts to appoint court reporters, §§ 15-14-1,15-14-3,15-14-4.
Mandamus proceedings relating to election laws in superior courts, §§ 21-2-32,21-2-171.
Ne exeat and quia timet, §§ 23-3-20 et seq.,23-3-40 et seq.
Rules for service of senior judges, Uniform Superior Court Rules, Rule 18.
Law reviews.- For article, "The Writ of Habeas Corpus in Georgia," see 12 Ga. St. B. J. 20 (2007).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Duties of all judges.
- Every court's judges are charged with the duty of administering justice and maintaining dignity and authority of the court. Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. 881, 171 S.E. 699 (1933).
Phrase "all other powers necessarily appertaining to their jurisdictions" is broad and comprehensive. Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. 881, 171 S.E. 699 (1933).
Sua sponte dismissals.
- Trial court has inherent authority to dismiss sua sponte a complaint in an appropriate case. Georgia Receivables, Inc. v. Williams, 218 Ga. App. 313, 461 S.E.2d 280 (1995).
Trial court did not err in dismissing sua sponte a patient's battery claims in the absence of a motion for dismissal by the defendants, a dentist and related professional entities. A trial court had the inherent authority to dismiss sua sponte a complaint in an appropriate case; moreover, all of the defendants alleged the patient's failure to state a claim as an affirmative defense in their respective answers, and the entities specifically argued that the patient failed to state a claim for battery in the entities brief filed in response to the patient's motion to place the case on a trial calendar. Paden v. Rudd, 294 Ga. App. 603, 669 S.E.2d 548 (2008).
Blanket restrictions on pro se right of access.
- Although a court may in some circumstances issue sua sponte dismissals pursuant to the court's inherent authority recognized in O.C.G.A. § 15-6-9, a blanket prefiling order entered outside of a pending suit, imposing restrictions on the pro se right of access, may not be issued without a hearing on the court's contemplated action. In re Carter, 235 Ga. App. 551, 510 S.E.2d 91 (1998).
Nature of writ of supersedeas.
- Supersedeas is either a matter of statutory right, or vested in the discretion of the judge of the superior court under former Penal Code 1895, § 792 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-9). Gustoso Cigar Mfg. Co. v. Ray, 117 Ga. 565, 43 S.E. 984 (1903); Montgomery v. King, 125 Ga. 388, 54 S.E. 135 (1906).
Granting supersedeas if no regular attempt made.
- Under the power conferred upon judges of the superior courts by former Civil Code 1910, § 4850 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-9) to grant supersedeas, the judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, grant a supersedeas if the prevailing party is insolvent and irreparable injury is about to flow from enforcement of the judgment, although the losing party has made no attempt to obtain a supersedeas under former Civil Code 1910, § 6165 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-46 or O.C.G.A. § 5-6-47) at or before the filing of a bill of exceptions (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50). Biggers v. Hope, 176 Ga. 141, 167 S.E. 176 (1932).
Filing of notice of appeal in injunction cases does not serve as supersedeas. Citizens to Save Paulding County v. City of Atlanta, 236 Ga. 125, 223 S.E.2d 101 (1976).
Discretion in allowing writ of quo warranto.
- Judge may refuse to allow a writ of quo warranto filed unless the writ makes out a prima facie case in favor of the petitioner. Stone v. Wetmore, 44 Ga. 495 (1871).
Appeal from denial of writ of quo warranto.
- Writ of error (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50) lies from the refusal of a judge of the superior court to grant leave to file an information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto. McWilliams v. Jacobs, 128 Ga. 375, 57 S.E. 509 (1907).
Court's discretionary power to appoint attorneys.
- Courts have discretionary power independent of any statutory power to appoint attorneys to assist a prosecuting attorney in criminal cases. Mach v. State, 109 Ga. App. 154, 135 S.E.2d 467 (1964).
Authority to order expert evaluation of criminal defendant.
- Superior court of the county in which defendant was convicted of murder had authority, on defendant's motion for new trial, to order an expert evaluation of the defendant, who was incarcerated beyond the boundaries of the county in which the court sat. Zant v. Brantley, 261 Ga. 817, 411 S.E.2d 869 (1992).
Authority to question defendant about motion to withdraw guilty plea.
- Defendant lost the statutory right to withdraw an Alford plea when the trial court announced the court's sentence, and the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion or by questioning the defendant about defendant's motion before the court issued the ruling. Harpe v. State, 254 Ga. App. 458, 562 S.E.2d 521 (2002).
Judge of superior court has power to appoint grand jury foreperson, notwithstanding the practice that the grand jury selects its own foreperson. Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. 881, 171 S.E. 699 (1933).
If judge of superior court requires grand jury to elect the jury's own foreperson, it is based upon authority delegated by the judge to the grand jury, and is equivalent to the exercise of the authority of the judge. Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. 881, 171 S.E. 699 (1933).
In the absence of any statute to the contrary, the judge of the superior court has inherent power as the presiding officer of the court to appoint the foreprson of a grand jury from the number of those duly selected and required to serve. This authority vested in the judge by law is not affected by the custom of permitting the members of the grand jury to elect a foreperson. Peeples v. State, 178 Ga. 675, 173 S.E. 850 (1934).
Authority of superior court judge replacing disqualified judge.
- If the superior court judge was disqualified, the superior court judge of the other circuit may pass on an injunction without previous designation by the disqualified judge. Galloway v. Mitchell County Elec. Membership Corp., 190 Ga. 428, 9 S.E.2d 903 (1940).
If a superior court judge is disqualified, the superior court judge of another circuit may at interlocutory hearing pass chambers order on demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Galloway v. Mitchell County Elec. Membership Corp., 190 Ga. 428, 9 S.E.2d 903 (1940).
Bail amount.
- Sheriff of city court bound to obey mandate of superior court lowering amount of bail fixed by the sheriff. Maddox v. Cowart, 155 Ga. 606, 118 S.E. 39 (1923).
Grant of bail not authorized.
- While the trial court had authority to hear and determine the question of the inmate's request for bail under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-9(5)(A), the trial court exceeded the court's authority by granting bail to the inmate since the challenged sentence was originally imposed in a trial court of a different county. Under O.C.G.A. § 9-14-52(c), only the trial court that imposed the original sentence had authority to grant or deny the inmate's bail request. O'Donnell v. Durham, 275 Ga. 860, 573 S.E.2d 23 (2002).
Lower court to approve or disapprove certiorari bond before review.
- Judge of superior court, at time of sanctioning petition for certiorari, has no authority to approve certiorari bond if the bond has not been approved or disapproved by the judge who tried the case. Clark v. Morris Plan Bank, 194 Ga. 522, 22 S.E.2d 147, answer conformed to, 68 Ga. App. 174, 22 S.E.2d 415 (1942).
Restraining order within court's power even though not requested.
- Once the validity of a temporary restraining order (TRO) was established, there was no error in continuing the TRO in effect until another hearing could be held for a resolution of the issues in the case, this being within the trial judge's inherent power in order to preserve the status quo and the court's jurisdiction pending the final ruling; thus, the fact that the TRO had not been specifically prayed for by the plaintiffs did not invalidate the order. Stewart v. Brown, 253 Ga. 480, 321 S.E.2d 738 (1984).
Suspension of sheriff not authorized.
- Superior court was authorized to inflict summary punishment for contempt predicated upon the willful failure of a sheriff, an officer of the court, to obey an oral direction by the court to transfer a defendant to a jail in another county, but was not authorized to temporarily suspend the sheriff, an elected officer, from the sheriff's position. In re Irvin, 171 Ga. App. 794, 321 S.E.2d 119 (1984), modified on other grounds, 254 Ga. 251, 328 S.E.2d 215 (1985).
Post-judgment discovery in aid of execution.
- In action brought by bank against corporation seeking recovery on several notes and trade acceptances, as well as to recover an overdraft on a checking account, the trial court was without authority to direct the appellants, sole stockholders in the corporation, to either return all collateral to the premises of the corporation or to provide a list of the equipment. The proper procedure for obtaining such information is by post-judgment discovery in aid of execution, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 and appellee's contention that the order to provide a list was authorized pursuant to the trial court's inherent power to issue orders necessary to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction was without merit. Ponderosa Granite Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 Ga. App. 105, 325 S.E.2d 591 (1984).
Appeal from civil contempt order.
- While the appeal of an order finding a limited liability company (LLC) in civil contempt was pending, the LLC obtained a supersedeas under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-9, which stayed the application of the civil contempt order during the appeal. Therefore, the trial court erred in imposing civil contempt fines after issuance of the supersedeas. Stewart v. Tricord, LLC, 296 Ga. App. 834, 676 S.E.2d 229 (2009).
Cited in DeLacy v. Hurst, Purnell & Co., 83 Ga. 223, 9 S.E. 1052 (1889); Turner v. Cates, 90 Ga. 731, 16 S.E. 971 (1893); Cock v. Callaway, 141 Ga. 774, 82 S.E. 286 (1914); George v. Rothstein & Nelson, 35 Ga. App. 126, 132 S.E. 414 (1926); Dickey v. Morris, 166 Ga. 140, 142 S.E. 557 (1928); Sammons v. Nabers, 186 Ga. 161, 197 S.E. 284 (1938); Abney v. Harris, 208 Ga. 184, 65 S.E.2d 905 (1951); Rockefeller v. First Nat'l Bank, 213 Ga. 493, 100 S.E.2d 279 (1957); Central of Ga. Ry. v. City of Metter, 222 Ga. 74, 148 S.E.2d 661 (1966); Turner v. Bogle, 115 Ga. App. 710, 155 S.E.2d 667 (1967); Coweta Bonding Co. v. Carter, 230 Ga. 585, 198 S.E.2d 281 (1973); Turner v. Harper, 233 Ga. 483, 211 S.E.2d 742 (1975); Cook v. Howard, 134 Ga. App. 721, 215 S.E.2d 690 (1975); Jones v. State, 137 Ga. App. 612, 224 S.E.2d 473 (1976); Palmer v. State, 186 Ga. App. 892, 369 S.E.2d 38 (1988); Rowe v. Rowe, 195 Ga. App. 493, 393 S.E.2d 750 (1990); Durham v. Durham, 291 Ga. 231, 728 S.E.2d 627 (2012).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Power of nonresident judge to hear matters when originating court in vacation.
- Former Code 1933, §§ 24-2613 and 24-2617 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-12), when read in light of former Code 1933, § 24-2616 and Ga. L. 1968, p. 1104, § 9 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-40 and15-6-9) conferred authority on a nonresident superior court judge in chambers in that judge's own circuit to hear and determine by interlocutory or final judgment, in accordance with Ga. L. 1968, p. 1104, § 9 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-40(b)), any matter in a case from the originating superior court which arises while the originating superior court is in vacation. (However, see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-19.) 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-68.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges, § 21.
C.J.S.- 48A C.J.S., Judges, § 62 et seq.
ALR.
- Mandamus to compel court to assume or exercise jurisdiction where it has erroneously dismissed the cause or refused to proceed on the ground of supposed lack of jurisdiction, 4 A.L.R. 582; 82 A.L.R. 1163.
Mandamus to compel a court to take jurisdiction of a cause that it has erroneously dismissed for supposed insufficiency or lack of service, 4 A.L.R. 610.
Formality in authentication of judicial acts, 30 A.L.R. 700.
Necessity of raising objection to jurisdiction in court against which writ is sought as condition of application for writ of prohibition, 35 A.L.R. 1090.
Availability of writ of prohibition as means of controlling administrative or executive boards or officers, 115 A.L.R. 3; 159 A.L.R. 627.
Adequacy of remedy by appeal in criminal cases to preclude prohibition sought on the ground of lack or loss of jurisdiction, 141 A.L.R. 1262.
Right of party, in course of litigation, to challenge title or authority of judge or of person acting as judge, 144 A.L.R. 1207.