The terms of court for the superior courts for each of the judicial circuits shall commence as follows:
(1) A LAPAHA CIRCUIT:
Atkinson County - First Monday in April and October.
Berrien County - First Monday in February and August.
Clinch County - Third Monday in March and September.
Cook County - Second Monday in January and July.
Lanier County - Fourth Monday in April and October;
provided, however, that if any term of court in the Alapaha Circuit begins on an official state holiday, the term of court shall commence on the following Tuesday; and if any other day within the term of court shall be an official state holiday, the court shall be closed for that holiday.
(2) A LCOVY CIRCUIT:
Newton County - Second and third Mondays in January, April, July, and October.
Walton County - First and second Mondays in February, May, August, and November.
(2.1) A PPALACHIAN CIRCUIT:
Fannin County - Second Monday in May and second Monday in November.
Gilmer County - Second Monday in April and second Monday in October.
Pickens County - Second Monday in March and second Monday in September.
(3) A TLANTA CIRCUIT:
Fulton County - First Monday in January, March, May, July, September, and November.
(4) A TLANTIC CIRCUIT:
Bryan County - Third Monday in March and first Monday in November.
Evans County - First Monday in February and first Monday in August.
Liberty County - Second Monday in February and September.
Long County - First Monday in March and third Monday in August.
McIntosh County - Third Monday in May and first Monday in December.
Tattnall County - Third Monday in April and October.
(5) A UGUSTA CIRCUIT:
Burke County - Fourth Monday in April and October.
Columbia County - Fourth Monday in March and September.
Richmond County - Third Monday in January, March, May, July, September, and November.
(5.1) B ELL-FORSYTH CIRCUIT:
Forsyth County - Second Monday in March, July, and November.
(6) B LUE RIDGE CIRCUIT:
Cherokee County - Second Monday in January, May, and September.
(7) B RUNSWICK CIRCUIT:
Appling County - Second and third Mondays in February and third and fourth Mondays in October.
Camden County - First Monday in April and November.
Glynn County - Second Monday in March and September.
Jeff Davis County - First and second Mondays in March; fourth Monday in September; and first Monday in October.
Wayne County - Third and fourth Mondays in April and November.
(8) C HATTAHOOCHEE CIRCUIT:
Chattahoochee County - Fourth Monday in March and September.
Harris County - Second Monday in January, May, and September.
Marion County - Fourth Monday in April and October.
Muscogee County - First Monday in February, April, June, August, October, and December.
Talbot County - Second Monday in March and November and third Monday in August.
Taylor County - Second Monday in February, June, and October.
(9) C HEROKEE CIRCUIT:
Bartow County - First Monday in February, May, August, and November.
Gordon County - First Monday in March, December, and June; and second Monday in September.
(10) C LAYTON CIRCUIT:
Clayton County - First Monday in February, May, August, and November.
(11) C OBB CIRCUIT:
Cobb County - Second Monday in January, March, May, July, September, and November.
(12) C ONASAUGA CIRCUIT:
Murray County - Second Monday in February and August.
Whitfield County - Second Monday in January and July.
(13) C ORDELE CIRCUIT:
Ben Hill County - Second and third Mondays in January; first, second, and third Mondays in April; third and fourth Mondays in June; and third and fourth Mondays in September and Monday following.
Crisp County - Third and fourth Mondays in February and Monday following; third and fourth Mondays in May; first, second, and third Mondays in August; and second and third Mondays in November.
Dooly County - First and second Mondays in February; fourth Monday in April and Monday following; third and fourth Mondays in July; and third and fourth Mondays in October.
Wilcox County - Second and third Mondays in March; fourth Monday in August and Monday following; and first and second Mondays in December.
(14) C OWETA CIRCUIT:
Carroll County - Second Monday in January and first Monday in April and third Monday in June and first Monday in October.
Coweta County - First Monday in March and first Tuesday in September.
Heard County - Third Monday in March and September.
Meriwether County - Third Monday in February, May, August, and November.
Troup County - First Monday in February, May, August, and November.
(15) D OUGHERTY CIRCUIT:
Dougherty County - Second Monday in January, March, May, July, September, and November.
(15.1) D OUGLAS CIRCUIT:
Douglas County - Second Monday in April and October.
(16) D UBLIN CIRCUIT:
Johnson County - Third Monday in March, June, September, and December.
Laurens County - Fourth Monday in January, April, July, and October.
Treutlen County - Third Monday in February and August.
Twiggs County - Second Monday in January, April, July, and October.
(17) E ASTERN CIRCUIT:
Chatham County - First Monday in March, June, September, and December.
(17.1) E NOTAH CIRCUIT:
Towns County - January 1 and July 1.
Union County - January 1 and July 1.
Lumpkin County - Fourth Monday in February and August.
White County - First Monday in April and October.
(18) F LINT CIRCUIT:
Henry County - Fourth Monday in January, April, and October and second Monday in July.
Griffin Circuit:
Fayette County - Second Monday in March and second Monday in September.
Pike County - Second Monday in March and second Monday in September.
Spalding County - Second Monday in March and second Monday in September.
Upson County - Second Monday in March and second Monday in September.
(20) G WINNETT CIRCUIT:
Gwinnett County - First Monday in March, June, and December and second Monday in September.
(21) H OUSTON CIRCUIT:
Houston County - First Monday in January, April, July, and October.
(22) L OOKOUT MOUNTAIN CIRCUIT:
Catoosa County - First Monday in March and second Monday in September.
Chattooga County - First Monday in February and August.
Dade County - First Monday in April and second Monday in October.
Walker County - First Monday in May and November.
(23) M ACON CIRCUIT:
Bibb County - First Monday in February, April, June, August, October, and December.
Crawford County - Third and fourth Mondays in March and October.
Peach County - First and second Mondays in March and August and third and fourth Mondays in November.
(24) M IDDLE CIRCUIT:
Candler County - First and second Mondays in February and August.
Emanuel County - Second Monday in January, April, July, and October.
Jefferson County - Second Monday in May and November.
Toombs County - Fourth Monday in February, May, August, and November.
Washington County - First Monday in March, June, September, and December.
(25) M OUNTAIN CIRCUIT:
Habersham County - January 1 and July 1.
Rabun County - January 1 and July 1.
Stephens County - January 1 and July 1.
(26) N ORTHEASTERN CIRCUIT:
Dawson County - First Monday in March and second Monday in September.
Hall County - Second Monday in January, April, and July, and first Monday in October.
(27) N ORTHERN CIRCUIT:
Elbert County - Third Monday in January and fourth Monday in July.
Franklin County - Third Monday in March and September.
Hart County - Third Monday in February and August.
Madison County - Third Monday in April and October.
Oglethorpe County - Third Monday in May and November.
(28) O CMULGEE CIRCUIT:
Baldwin County - Second Monday in January, April, July, and October.
Greene County - Fourth Monday in January, April, August, and November.
Hancock County - Fourth Monday in March and September.
Jasper County - Second Monday in February, May, August, and November.
Jones County - First Monday in February and August and third Monday in April and October.
Morgan County - First Monday in March, June, September, and December.
Putnam County - Third Monday in March, June, September, and December.
Wilkinson County - Fourth Monday in February, first Monday in April and October, and third Monday in August.
(29) O CONEE CIRCUIT:
Bleckley County - Second Monday in March and July and fourth Monday in October, and there shall be a grand jury for each term.
Dodge County - Third Monday in February, first Monday in June, and last Monday in September, and there shall be a grand jury for each term.
Montgomery County - First Monday in February and second Monday in August, and there shall be a grand jury for each term.
Pulaski County - Second Monday in April and September and first Monday in December, and there shall be a grand jury for each term.
Telfair County - Third Monday in March and August and first Monday in November, and there shall be a grand jury for each term.
Wheeler County - Last Monday in January and first Monday in August, and there shall be a grand jury for each term.
(30) O GEECHEE CIRCUIT:
Bulloch County - First Monday in February, May, August, and November.
Effingham County - First Monday in June and December.
Jenkins County - First Monday in March and September.
Screven County - Second Monday in January and first Monday in April, July, and October.
(31) P ATAULA CIRCUIT:
Clay County - Second Monday in March and September.
Early County - Second Monday in January and July.
Miller County - Third Monday in February and August.
Quitman County - Fourth Monday in March and September.
Randolph County - Second Monday in May and November.
Seminole County - Third Monday in April and October.
Terrell County - First Monday in June and December.
(31.1) P AULDING CIRCUIT:
Paulding County - Second Monday in January and July.
(32) P IEDMONT CIRCUIT:
Banks County - First Monday in February and August; and there shall be a grand jury for each term, but the grand jury shall not be required to be impaneled in the first day of each term.
Barrow County - First Monday in February and August; and there shall be a grand jury for each term, but the grand jury shall not be required to be impaneled in the first day of each term.
Jackson County - First Monday in February and August; and there shall be a grand jury for each term, but the grand jury shall not be required to be impaneled in the first day of each term.
(32.1) R OCKDALE CIRCUIT:
Rockdale County - First Monday in January, April, July, and October.
(33) R OME CIRCUIT:
Floyd County - Second Monday in January, March, July, and September and first Monday in May and November.
(34) S OUTH GEORGIA CIRCUIT:
Baker County - Third Monday in January and July.
Calhoun County - Last Monday in May and November.
Decatur County - First Monday in May and November.
Grady County - Third Monday in March and September.
Mitchell County - Third Monday in April and October.
(35) S OUTHERN CIRCUIT:
Brooks County - First Monday in April and October.
Colquitt County - First Monday in February and August.
Echols County - First Monday in February and August.
Lowndes County - First Monday in March and first Tuesday immediately following first Monday in September.
Thomas County - First Monday in April and October.
(36) S OUTHWESTERN CIRCUIT:
Lee County - Fourth Monday in April and October.
Macon County - Second Monday in May and November.
Schley County - Second Monday in February and August.
Stewart County - Third Monday in March and September.
Sumter County - Fourth Monday in February, May, and August and the Monday following the fourth Thursday in November.
Webster County - Second Monday in January and July.
(37) S TONE MOUNTAIN CIRCUIT:
DeKalb County - First Monday in January, March, May, July, September, and November.
(38) T ALLAPOOSA CIRCUIT:
Haralson County - Third Monday in January and August.
Polk County - Third Monday in March and July;
provided, however, that in the Tallapoosa Circuit, if the Monday set for the term of court to begin is a legal holiday, the term of court shall commence on the Tuesday next following that Monday.
(39) T IFTON CIRCUIT:
Irwin County - Second Monday in February and second Monday in August.
Tift County - Second Monday in March and second Monday in September.
Turner County - Second Monday in April and second Monday in October.
Worth County - Second Monday in January and second Monday in July.
(40) T OOMBS CIRCUIT:
Glascock County - Third Monday in February, May, August, and November.
Lincoln County - Fourth Monday in January, third Monday in April, fourth Monday in July, and third Monday in October.
McDuffie County - Second Monday in March, June, September, and December.
Taliaferro County - Fourth Monday in February, May, August, and November.
Warren County - Third Monday in January and first Monday in April, July, and October.
Wilkes County - First Monday in February, May, August, and November.
(40.1) T OWALIGA CIRCUIT:
Butts County - Second Monday in January, April, July, and October.
Lamar County - Second Monday in March, June, September, and December.
Monroe County - Second Monday in February, May, August, and November.
(41) W AYCROSS CIRCUIT:
Bacon County - Third Monday in April and October.
Brantley County - Fourth Monday in February and August.
Charlton County - Second Monday in February and August.
Coffee County - Second Monday in March and September.
Pierce County - Third Monday in March and September.
Ware County - Second Monday in April and October.
provided, however, that the grand jury shall not be required to be impaneled on the first day of each new term but upon a date and time as scheduled by the court.
(42) W ESTERN CIRCUIT:
Clarke County - Second Monday in January, April, July, and October.
Oconee County - Second Monday in March and September.
(Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 15; Ga. L. 1982, p. 439, §§ 1, 5; Ga. L. 1982, p. 536, § 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 546, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 12; Ga. L. 1983, p. 405, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 415, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 418, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 761, § 4; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 15; Ga. L. 1984, p. 331, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 351, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 439, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 440, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 498, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 281, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 230, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1526, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 2, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 37, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 250, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 294, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 295, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 296, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 257, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 258, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 551, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 283, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 920, § 2; Ga. L. 1991, p. 372, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1786, § 4; Ga. L. 1993, p. 447, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 805, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 360, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1052, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 829, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 220, § 4; Ga. L. 1999, p. 67, § 15; Ga. L. 1999, p. 81, § 15; Ga. L. 1999, p. 158, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1242, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1312, § 1; Ga. L. 2002, p. 405, § 3-4; Ga. L. 2002, p. 468, §§ 1, 3; Ga. L. 2006, p. 701, § 1/SB 264; Ga. L. 2006, p. 873, §§ 1, 2/HB 1496; Ga. L. 2006, p. 893, § 1/HB 1423; Ga. L. 2007, p. 47, § 15/SB 103; Ga. L. 2007, p. 89, § 1/SB 177; Ga. L. 2007, p. 278, § 1/HB 53; Ga. L. 2008, p. 324, § 15/SB 455; Ga. L. 2009, p. 847, § 1/HB 216; Ga. L. 2013, p. 570, § 3-1/HB 451; Ga. L. 2014, p. 482, § 1/SB 386; Ga. L. 2018, p. 231, § 1/HB 808; Ga. L. 2019, p. 313, § 1/HB 296.)
The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, deleted "second Monday in" preceding "October" in subparagraph (41)(A); substituted "February and August" for "January and second Monday in September" in subparagraph (41)(B); in subparagraph (41)(C), substituted "Second" for "Fourth", and substituted "August" for "September"; in subparagraph (41)(D), substituted "Second" for "Third", and substituted "September" for "October"; substituted "Third Monday in March and September" for "First Monday in May and first Monday in December" in subparagraph (41)(E); substituted "Second Monday in April and October" for "First Monday in April and second Monday in November" in subparagraph (41)(F); and substituted "the grand jury shall not be required to be impaneled on the first day of each new term but upon a date and time as scheduled by the court" for "if any term of court in the Waycross Circuit begins on an official state holiday, the term of court shall commence on the following Tuesday; and if any other day within the term of court shall be an official state holiday, the court shall be closed for that holiday" in the proviso of the ending undesignated paragraph of paragraph (41).
The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted "Second Monday in January, April, and July, and first Monday in October" for "First Monday in May and November and second Monday in January and July" in subparagraph (26)(B).
Code Commission notes.- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1998, paragraph (18.1) was redesignated as paragraph (5.1).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1999, punctuation was revised in subparagraphs (29)(B) and (29)(C) and in subparagraph (40.1)(A).
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1999, p. 67, §§ 1-10, not codified by the General Assembly, provided for the creation of the Towaliga Judicial Circuit, for the offices of the judge and district attorney, for transfer of pending litigation from the superior courts of Butts, Lamar, and Monroe counties, and other similar matters.
Ga. L. 2002, p. 468, § 4, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "As Section 2 of this Act provides for the Tifton Judicial Circuit, the November, 2002, term of court in Irwin County shall continue until the second Monday in February, 2003; the December, 2002, term of court in Tift County shall continue until the second Monday in March 2003; the October, 2002, term of court in Turner County shall continue until the second Monday in April 2003; and the October, 2002, term of court in Worth County shall continue until the second Monday in January, 2003." The reference to Section 2 of the Act should be to Section 3 of the Act.
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Equal protection.
- O.C.G.A. § 15-6-3, combined with O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171, does not deprive defendants of equal protection of the law despite the possibility of relatively longer trial waitings than in those circuits with more terms of court per year. Henry v. State, 263 Ga. 417, 434 S.E.2d 469 (1993).
Ga. L. 1996, p. 627, which establishes two terms of court for the City Court of Atlanta, is constitutional and does not violate equal protection. Cross v. State, 272 Ga. 282, 528 S.E.2d 241 (2000).
When the legislature deals with superior courts in fixing the terms at which the courts are to be held in the several counties, the legislature does so by general and not by special legislation. Burge v. Mangum, 134 Ga. 307, 67 S.E. 857 (1910); Geer v. Bush, 146 Ga. 701, 92 S.E. 47 (1917); Geer v. Colquitt Hdwe. & Furn. Co., 146 Ga. 811, 92 S.E. 515 (1917); Norris v. McDaniel, 207 Ga. 232, 60 S.E.2d 329 (1950).
Act fixing terms of a superior court and providing for attendance of grand juries thereat is a general law. Long v. State, 160 Ga. 292, 127 S.E. 842 (1925); Brown v. State, 242 Ga. 602, 250 S.E.2d 491 (1978).
Effect of amendment changing dates of terms of court.
- Amendment of O.C.G.A. § 15-6-3, so as to change the dates of commencement of terms of court, was not an ex post facto law as applied to the defendant, who was not at any time entitled to discharge and acquittal of the offenses with which the defendant was charged. Aspinwall v. State, 201 Ga. App. 203, 410 S.E.2d 388 (1991).
If, due to an error in the enactment, an amendment changing the terms of court from four to two had not gone into effect at the time the defendant moved for acquittal, the defendant was entitled to acquittal for failure to try the defendant within the term when the defendant's speedy trial demand was made. Houston v. State, 217 Ga. App. 783, 459 S.E.2d 583 (1995).
Reconvening did not require re-swearing.
- Although alternate jurors were substituted during the January term of court, the defendant pointed to no evidence that the January grand jury was ever formally discharged from the jury's duties prior to the end of the grand jury's term, thus, it continued to act within the jury's term of court and remained empowered to act until the last day of the jury's term and did not need to be re-sworn prior to returning to the defendant's second indictment. Durden v. State, 299 Ga. 273, 787 S.E.2d 697 (2016).
Speedy trial demand untimely.
- Defendant was indicted for felony murder and other charges during the June 2014 term of the trial court; the defendant did not file a valid demand in that term or the subsequent September 2014 term; and the December 2014 term began on December 1, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-3(20), making the defendant's December 5 speedy trial demand untimely under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(a). Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 252, 794 S.E.2d 60 (2016).
Cited in May v. State, 179 Ga. App. 736, 348 S.E.2d 61 (1986); Wade v. State, 258 Ga. 324, 368 S.E.2d 482 (1988); Lowery v. State, 188 Ga. App. 411, 373 S.E.2d 261 (1988); Housing Auth. v. Parks, 189 Ga. App. 97, 374 S.E.2d 842 (1988); Parks v. Gwinnett County, 190 Ga. App. 807, 380 S.E.2d 77 (1989); Kirk v. State, 194 Ga. App. 801, 392 S.E.2d 249 (1990); Holbrook v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 196 Ga. App. 382, 396 S.E.2d 253 (1990); Campbell v. State, 199 Ga. App. 25, 403 S.E.2d 882 (1991); Huff v. State, 201 Ga. App. 408, 411 S.E.2d 60 (1991); Bailey v. State, 209 Ga. App. 390, 433 S.E.2d 610 (1993); Groom v. State, 212 Ga. App. 133, 441 S.E.2d 259 (1994); McIver v. State, 212 Ga. App. 670, 442 S.E.2d 855 (1994); McKnight v. State, 215 Ga. App. 899, 453 S.E.2d 38 (1994); Baldwin v. State, 242 Ga. App. 205, 529 S.E.2d 201 (2000); Brooks v. State, 257 Ga. App. 515, 571 S.E.2d 504 (2002); Capital Cargo, Inc. v. Port of Port Royal, 261 Ga. App. 803, 584 S.E.2d 54 (2003); Cook v. State, 262 Ga. App. 446, 585 S.E.2d 743 (2003); Smith v. State, 263 Ga. App. 414, 587 S.E.2d 787 (2003); Masters v. Clark, 269 Ga. App. 537, 604 S.E.2d 556 (2004); Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 281, 620 S.E.2d 394 (2005); State v. Hitchcock, 285 Ga. App. 140, 645 S.E.2d 631 (2007); Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 646 S.E.2d 84 (2007); LaFette v. State, 285 Ga. App. 516, 646 S.E.2d 725 (2007); Ingram v. State, 286 Ga. App. 662, 650 S.E.2d 743 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020); Chishti v. State, 288 Ga. App. 230, 653 S.E.2d 830 (2007); Sallins v. State, 289 Ga. App. 391, 657 S.E.2d 309 (2008); Smith v. State, 283 Ga. 376, 659 S.E.2d 380 (2008); Jones v. State, 290 Ga. App. 490, 659 S.E.2d 875 (2008); Haupt v. State, 290 Ga. App. 616, 660 S.E.2d 383 (2008); Maples v. State, 293 Ga. App. 232, 666 S.E.2d 609 (2008); Coleman v. State, 293 Ga. App. 251, 666 S.E.2d 620 (2008); Taylor v. Peachbelt Props., 293 Ga. App. 335, 667 S.E.2d 117 (2008); Dasher v. State, 285 Ga. 308, 676 S.E.2d 181 (2009); Smith v. State, 297 Ga. App. 300, 676 S.E.2d 750 (2009); Tyner v. State, 298 Ga. App. 42, 679 S.E.2d 82 (2009); Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 889, 692 S.E.2d 379 (2010); Walker v. State, 290 Ga. 696, 723 S.E.2d 894 (2012); PHF II Buckhead LLC v. Dinku, 315 Ga. App. 76, 726 S.E.2d 569 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1257, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1041 (Ga. 2012); Sanusi v. Cmty. & S. Bank, 330 Ga. App. 198, 766 S.E.2d 815 (2014); Williams v. State, 331 Ga. App. 46, 769 S.E.2d 760 (2015); Charles v. State, 338 Ga. App. 688, 791 S.E.2d 584 (2016); Williams v. State, 339 Ga. App. 158, 793 S.E.2d 485 (2016); Brock v. RES-GA SCL, LLC, 340 Ga. App. 194, 796 S.E.2d 914 (2017); Blackmon v. Pena, 345 Ga. App. 7, 812 S.E.2d 112 (2018); Patterson v. State, 347 Ga. App. 105, 817 S.E.2d 557 (2018); Cason v. State, 348 Ga. App. 828, 823 S.E.2d 357 (2019); Gray v. State, 351 Ga. App. 703, 832 S.E.2d 857 (2019); Ringold v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Aug. 10, 2020).
Motions and Judgments
Effect of motion filed before end of term.
- Trial court did not err when the court modified an order granting defendant's motion for a new trial since the modification was made after the expiration of the term in which the order was entered and the state's motion for reconsideration, which sought to revive the conviction, was filed before the end of the term in which the court entered the order granting a new trial. Platt v. State, 200 Ga. App. 784, 409 S.E.2d 878, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 897, 409 S.E.2d 878 (1991).
Employee's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the employee's petition for judicial review of a denial of unemployment benefits, and the Fulton County Superior Court's order concerning the employee's motion, were untimely because the motion and decision were filed after the term of court in which the initial denial was made. Fed v. Butler, 327 Ga. App. 637, 760 S.E.2d 642 (2014).
After expiration of the term at which a judgment is entered, it is out of the power of the court to modify and revise the judgment in any matter of substance or in any matter affecting the merits; however, a default judgment may be set aside when the limited requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d)(2) are met. Lee v. Restaurant Mgt. Servs., 232 Ga. App. 902, 503 S.E.2d 59 (1998).
Regardless of whether O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(f) applied to defendant's December 2003 motion to set aside a sentence, that motion, filed four-and-one-half years after the sentence was imposed, was far too late; the motion was not filed in the term in which the sentence was entered, within a year of the date upon which the sentence was imposed, nor within 120 days of the trial court's receipt of a direct-appeal remittitur. Reynolds v. State, 272 Ga. App. 91, 611 S.E.2d 750 (2005).
Trial court erred by entering a second final decree of divorce pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g) after the term of court in which the first final decree had been entered had already expired because there were no clerical mistakes made with respect to the first final decree; the alleged mistake by the clerk, if any, related to the clerk's failure to file the husband's premature motion for new trial and had nothing to do with any alleged clerical errors in the first order and, accordingly, the trial court could not "correct" any mistake relating to the handling of the husband's motion for new trial by issuing a "corrected" second order based on a first order that contained no clerical mistakes. Tremble v. Tremble, 288 Ga. 666, 706 S.E.2d 453 (2011).
Assuming that a clerk made a "clerical mistake" by failing to later stamp file a husband's premature motion for new trial as a "response" to the trial court's first final decree of divorce, such a clerical mistake could not be "corrected" by the trial court issuing a second final divorce decree after the May term of court had ended; in order for a clerical mistake to be corrected, the clerical mistake must appear and be corrected in the actual judgment, order, or other part of the record in which the mistake has arisen, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g). Tremble v. Tremble, 288 Ga. 666, 706 S.E.2d 453 (2011).
Buyer of property at a sheriff's sale who was awarded attorney's fees against the former owner and the owner's attorney's limited liability partnership (LLP) was not entitled to amend the judgment to include the attorney and the attorney's later-formed limited liability company (LLC) because it did not seek to amend the order until a year later, outside the term of court of the original order. The addition of the attorney and the substitution of the LLP was substantive. Davis v. Crescent Holdings & Invs., LLC, 336 Ga. App. 378, 785 S.E.2d 51 (2016).
Court was without authority to vacate order outside of the term in which the order was entered.
- Superior court was without jurisdiction to entertain an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea, filed outside the term of court in which the plea was entered; hence, the trial court properly denied the relief sought. Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865, 561 S.E.2d 119 (2002).
Defendant's motion to vacate and set aside an order denying the defendant's motion in arrest of judgment was properly denied after the motion to vacate was filed 11 months after the denial of the motion in arrest of judgment, which was well beyond the respective terms of court in which the judgment of conviction and the denial of the motion in arrest of judgment were entered. Smith v. State, 257 Ga. App. 468, 571 S.E.2d 446 (2002).
Trial court improperly vacated the court's own order outside of the term in which the order was entered, so the order vacating the initial order was a nullity, but, as the initial order, which denied an application to modify or vacate an arbitration award, did not address a counterclaim seeking to confirm the arbitration award, it was not a final order, and so the later order confirming the award was affirmed. Tanaka v. Pecqueur, 268 Ga. App. 380, 601 S.E.2d 830 (2004).
Because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify a sentence in a term other than the term in which the sentence was imposed, and there was no claim that the sentence entered was void, an order vacating one sentence and reinstating another sentence was vacated and the matter was remanded with instructions for the trial court to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Barthell v. State, 286 Ga. App. 160, 648 S.E.2d 412 (2007).
Trial court properly denied a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to two counts of armed robbery because the motion was made after expiration of the term of court under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-3(11) in which the defendant was sentenced; thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion. Williams v. State, 301 Ga. App. 849, 689 S.E.2d 124 (2010).
Order dismissing the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea was affirmed because the trial court properly vacated only a discrete portion of the sentence relating to an improper parole condition and the remainder of the sentence was still in force; thus, the defendant had no absolute right to withdraw the plea since the motion to withdraw had to be filed within the term of court in which sentencing under the plea occurred. Thompson v. State, 348 Ga. App. 807, 824 S.E.2d 685 (2019).
Incorrectly styled motion timely filed due to court term.
- When a trial court issued a child support order on February 14, 2012 and the father filed a motion for relief on February 28, 2012, the father's motion (although incorrectly styled a motion for J.N.O.V.) was timely as a new trial motion under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40; it was also timely because, in DeKalb County, the January term of court ran from the first Monday in January until the first Monday in March, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-3(37). Wheeler v. Akins, 327 Ga. App. 830, 761 S.E.2d 383 (2014).
Other
Withdrawal of guilty pleas.
- Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to modify the defendant's sentence for theft by taking because, even assuming that defendant's motion could be treated as a motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea, the court lost jurisdiction to grant the motion on that basis when the term of court in which the defendant was sentenced expired. Martin v. State, 266 Ga. App. 190, 596 S.E.2d 705 (2004).
Trial court lacked jurisdiction to allow the defendant to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea when the term of court in which that defendant was sentenced expired. Tabatabaee v. State, 266 Ga. App. 462, 597 S.E.2d 518 (2004).
Because the term of court when the defendant was sentenced expired, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to allow the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. Thompson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 375, 631 S.E.2d 422 (2006).
Because Crisp County had multiple terms of court each year, and eight years passed before the defendant sought to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea, the trial court had no authority to permit the defendant to withdraw the plea. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658, 631 S.E.2d 687 (2006).
Because Rockdale County had four terms of court each year, and two full years passed before the defendant sought to withdraw a guilty plea, the trial court had no jurisdiction to permit withdrawal of the plea. Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 435, 637 S.E.2d 384 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).
Defendant's challenge of the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea failed because the defendant's motion was filed after the expiration of the term of court in which the plea was entered. Belcher v. State, 304 Ga. App. 645, 697 S.E.2d 300 (2010).
Plea counsel did not perform deficiently for failing to investigate a robbery charge in another county because the defendant's only available means to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea to the robbery charge was through habeas-corpus proceedings; the defendant's first mention of any challenge to the defendant's plea of guilty to the robbery charge was well beyond the term of court in which the defendant was sentenced. Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 705 S.E.2d 726 (2011).
Because the court of appeals was unable to determine from the record upon which of two Mondays the May term of Walton Superior Court began, the court assumes, without deciding, that the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea was timely filed; the language of O.C.G.A. § 15-6-3(2)(B) indicates that there are four terms in Walton County, Georgia and the superior court is authorized to begin the court's terms on either of those two Mondays. Burnett v. State, 309 Ga. App. 422, 710 S.E.2d 624 (2011).
Trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea because, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-3(39)(A), the defendant's motion was filed three weeks beyond the term of court in which the defendant was sentenced. Additionally, trial counsel was not required to advise the defendant of the effects of parole on the sentence. Hall v. State, 313 Ga. App. 670, 722 S.E.2d 392 (2012).
Judgment denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea was vacated and the case remanded with direction to dismiss the motion because the term of court had expired and, therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea since the term of court in which the defendant was sentenced had expired. Branner v. State, 355 Ga. App. 137, 843 S.E.2d 26 (2020).
Defendant's attorney did not waive demand by agreeing to continuance.
- Although a defendant's attorney agreed to a continuance in early December 2004, there was no evidence that the attorney agreed to continue the case past that term of court, which, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-5-3, did not end until February 2005, and in which the case could have been tried and was required to be tried following defendant's speedy trial demand under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 in the prior court term. Thornton v. State, 301 Ga. App. 784, 689 S.E.2d 361 (2009).