Nothing contained in this article shall prevent any corporation, voluntary association, or individual from doing any act or acts set out in Code Section 15-19-50 to which the persons are a party; but, in preparing and filing affidavits in attachments and prosecuting such proceedings, it shall be unlawful for the plaintiffs to act through any agent or employee who is not a duly licensed attorney at law. Moreover, no financial institution, as defined by Code Section 7-1-4, whose deposits are federally insured shall be prohibited from giving any advice to its customers in matters incidental to providing financial services nor shall any person, firm, or corporation be prohibited from drawing any legal instrument for another person, firm, or corporation, provided that it is done without fee and solely at the solicitation and the request and under the direction of the person, firm, or corporation desiring to execute the instrument. Furthermore, a title insurance company may prepare such papers as it thinks proper or necessary in connection with a title which it proposes to insure, in order, in its opinion, for it to be willing to insure the title, where no charge is made by it for the papers.
(Ga. L. 1931, p. 191, § 1; Code 1933, § 9-401; Ga. L. 1937, p. 753, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1511, § 1; Ga. L. 2016, p. 375, § 1/HB 759; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 15/HB 323.)
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, in the second sentence, substituted "no financial institution, as defined by Code Section 7-1-4, whose deposits are federally insured" for "no bank" near the beginning and substituted "providing financial services" for "banks or banking" near the middle.
The 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, in the second sentence of this Code section, revised punctuation and substituted "provided that it is done" for "provided it is done".
Cross references.- Definition of title insurance, § 33-7-8.
Law reviews.- For annual survey of real property law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 395 (2004). For comment discussing whether title companies utilizing attorneys are engaged in the practice of law, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 349 (1964). For comment on Florida Bar v. Town, 174 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1965) as to unauthorized practice of law, see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 322 (1965). For comment on Georgia Bar Ass'n v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 657, 151 S.E.2d 718 (1966), discussing constitutional permissibility of legislative definition of practice of law and suggesting solutions to unauthorized practice of law, see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 486 (1967).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
- O.C.G.A. § 15-19-52 is not unconstitutional, but merely was obviated by the subsequent creation of the State Bar of Georgia as an administrative arm of the Supreme Court; thus, since the issue was within the Supreme Court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law, and not the constitutionality of that section, notice to the Attorney General was not required. Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 267 Ga. 801, 485 S.E.2d 22 (1997).
Construction with § 44-7-50. - Former Code 1933, § 9-401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-19-52) was not in conflict with former Code 1933, § 61-301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50), which allowed nonattorneys to demand possession of the tenant, and swear out an oath to the facts before a judge, in a proceeding against a tenant holding over. Connor v. O'Brien, 71 Ga. App. 588, 31 S.E.2d 678 (1944); Battles v. Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 80 Ga. App. 47, 55 S.E.2d 156 (1949).
Contempt proceeding is not among the "attachment" proceedings addressed by O.C.G.A. § 15-19-52. R.R.R. Ltd. Partnership v. Recreational Servs., Inc., 267 Ga. 757, 481 S.E.2d 225 (1997).
Swearing out warrant by agent.
- In dispossessory warrant proceeding, it is not a violation of this section for an agent, who is not a duly licensed attorney at law, to swear out the warrant, that is, make the affidavit upon which the proceeding is based. Connor v. O'Brien, 71 Ga. App. 588, 31 S.E.2d 678 (1944); Battles v. Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 80 Ga. App. 47, 55 S.E.2d 156 (1949).
Attorney as agent of highest rank.
- What an agent can do for a principal, an attorney at law can likewise do, because an attorney at law is an agent of the highest rank. Jackson v. Fincher, 128 Ga. App. 148, 195 S.E.2d 762 (1973).
Affidavit by attorney or agent.
- Ordinarily, an agent or attorney at law may make an affidavit to legal proceedings on behalf of a client. Jackson v. Fincher, 128 Ga. App. 148, 195 S.E.2d 762 (1973).
There are a limited number of matters in which an agent or attorney may not make an affidavit for a principal, notably, when an appeal is filed and a supersedeas is sought, or relief from payment of court costs is sought by affidavit in forma pauperis. Jackson v. Fincher, 128 Ga. App. 148, 195 S.E.2d 762 (1973).
Agent may make affidavit for client contesting amount or justice of plaintiff's claim in foreclosure on personalty. Jackson v. Fincher, 128 Ga. App. 148, 195 S.E.2d 762 (1973).
One person cannot make affidavit in name of another, though that person may make an affidavit in the person's own name as agent or attorney of such other, if the law so authorizes. Jackson v. Fincher, 128 Ga. App. 148, 195 S.E.2d 762 (1973).
Proof of attorney's representation of party is sufficient evidence of employment and authority.
- In proceedings in court, if an attorney at law purports to represent a party, proof of the fact that the attorney does represent the party is sufficient evidence of employment and of authority on the part of such attorney to act according to the attorney's own judgment in the election of remedies, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Jackson v. Fincher, 128 Ga. App. 148, 195 S.E.2d 762 (1973).
Signing of principal's name to petition by authorized agent.
- Mere signing of the name of the principal to a petition by a duly authorized agent, which petition is to be filed in court, does not constitute unlawful practice of law on the part of such agent as defined in former Code 1933, §§ 9-401 through 9-403 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-19-50 through15-19-52). Lanier v. Lanier, 79 Ga. App. 131, 53 S.E.2d 131 (1949).
Corporation can bring action on corporation's own behalf without a lawyer. Knickerbocker Tax Sys. v. Texaco, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 383, 203 S.E.2d 290 (1973).
Corporation must be represented by attorney in a court of record.
- Corporation is not a person for purposes of exercising a constitutional right to legal self-representation and is not permitted to have as its legal representative an individual who is not licensed to practice law in the courts of record of this state. Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 267 Ga. 801, 485 S.E.2d 22 (1997), overruling, Universal Scientific, Inc. v. Wolf, 165 Ga. App. 752, 302 S.E.2d 616 (1983); Knickerbocker Tax Systems, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 383, 203 S.E.2d 290 (1973); and Dixon v. Reliable Loans, Inc., 112 Ga. App. 618, 145 S.E.2d 77 (1965).
"Duly licensed attorney at law" required.
- Only a licensed attorney is authorized to represent a corporation in a proceeding in a court of record, including any proceeding that may be transferred to a court of record from a court not of record. Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 267 Ga. 801, 485 S.E.2d 22 (1997), overruling, Universal Scientific v. Wolf, 165 Ga. App. 752, 302 S.E.2d 616 (1983); Knickerbocker Tax Sys. v. Texaco, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 383, 203 S.E.2d 290 (1973); and Dixon v. Reliable Loans, 112 Ga. App. 618, 145 S.E.2d 771 (1965).
Banks' advising customers on matters incidental to banking through employees who are bar members proper.
- Banks that give advice to customers on matters incidental to banks or banking through their trust officer employees, who are members of the State Bar of Georgia, are not engaged in the practice of law. Robbins v. City of Rome, 230 Ga. 901, 199 S.E.2d 802 (1973).
Cited in Dixon v. Reliable Loans, Inc., 112 Ga. App. 618, 145 S.E.2d 771 (1965); In re Clarkson, 125 Ga. App. 481, 188 S.E.2d 113 (1972); Green v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 650, 193 S.E.2d 847 (1972); Rary v. Guess, 129 Ga. App. 102, 198 S.E.2d 879 (1973); Huber v. State, 234 Ga. 357, 216 S.E.2d 73 (1975); Smith v. Nations, 147 Ga. App. 623, 249 S.E.2d 676 (1978); In re Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 277 S.E.2d 36 (1981); In re Nichols, 248 Ga. 254, 282 S.E.2d 341 (1981); United States v. Allen, 699 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir. 1983).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Prosecution of claims in magistrate court.
- Only a member of the Georgia State Bar may represent another in a proceeding in magistrate court, but a corporation may appear pro se in such a proceeding by and through the corporation's nonattorney officer or employee. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-73.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 1, 119 et seq.
C.J.S.- 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, §§ 2, 29 et seq.
ALR.
- Right of corporation to perform or to hold itself out as ready to perform functions in the nature of legal services, 157 A.L.R. 282.
Validity of will drawn by layman who, in so doing, violated criminal statute forbidding such activities by one other than licensed attorneys, 18 A.L.R.2d 918.
Title examination activities by lending institution, insurance company, or title and abstract company, as illegal practice of law, 85 A.L.R.2d 184.
Propriety and effect of corporation's appearance pro se, through agent who is not attorney, 19 A.L.R.3d 1073.
Necessity that executor or administrator be represented by counsel in presenting matters in probate court, 19 A.L.R.3d 1104.
Operations of collection agency as unauthorized practice of law, 27 A.L.R.3d 1152.
What activities of stock or securities broker constitute unauthorized practice of law, 34 A.L.R.3d 1305.
Sale of books or forms designed to enable layman to achieve legal results without assistance of attorney as unauthorized practice of law, 71 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Existence and extent of right of litigant in civil case, or of criminal defendant, to represent himself before state appellate courts, 24 A.L.R.4th 430.
Propriety and effect of corporation's appearance pro se through agent who is not attorney, 8 A.L.R.5th 653.