(Code 1933, § 59-602a, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 270, § 1; Ga. L. 2011, p. 59, § 1-37/HB 415; Ga. L. 2016, p. 186, § 4/HB 941.)
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, in subsection (a), inserted "or her", and inserted ", on motion or petition of the district attorney," near the middle.
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 2011, p. 59, § 1-1/HB 415, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Jury Composition Reform Act of 2011.'"
Law reviews.- For annual survey on criminal law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2012).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Oath requirement inapplicable to civil investigations.
- O.C.G.A. § 15-12-68 is irrelevant to civil investigations conducted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-71 and/or O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et seq. State v. Bartel, 223 Ga. App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 4 (1996).
No particular oath is required for witnesses in civil investigations; thus, it was error to dismiss a perjury indictment on the basis of a deficient oath since the oath administered named the grand jury, specified the type of investigation, named the subject entities being investigated, and contained accepted language regarding the promise and obligation to testify truthfully. State v. Bartel, 223 Ga. App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 4 (1996).
Special purpose grand jury not authorized to return criminal indictment.
- Trial court erred in holding that a special purpose grand jury was authorized to return a criminal indictment against a county commissioner because there was no language under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100(a) giving a special purpose grand jury the power to return a criminal indictment; if the legislature had intended to empower a special purpose grand jury with the same powers and duties as a regular grand jury as provided in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-71, the legislature could have provided to that effect in § 15-12-100 or made reference to the powers enumerated in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-71. Kenerly v. State, 311 Ga. App. 190, 715 S.E.2d 688 (2011), cert. denied, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 265 (Ga. 2012).
Impact of special grand jury's overreach.
- Although the defendant established a violation of the impaneling order, which fixed the scope of the special purpose grand jury's investigative powers to county corruption, but not city, and it also constituted a violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-71 and15-12-102, neither dismissal of the indictment nor suppression of the evidence was the proper remedy for the grand jury's overreach as no violation of the defendant's constitutional rights nor a structural defect in the grand jury process occurred. State v. Lampl, 296 Ga. 892, 770 S.E.2d 629 (2015).