(Code 1981, §15-11-70, enacted by Ga. L. 2016, p. 443, § 1-6/SB 367; Ga. L. 2017, p. 585, §§ 1-2, 1-3/SB 174.)
Law reviews.- For article on the 2016 enactment of this Code section, see 33 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 139 (2016). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 115 (2017).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
C.J.S.
- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 389 et seq.
ARTICLE 3 DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
PART 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-401, pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-2, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this article, are included in the annotations for this part. See the Editor's note at the beginning of the chapter.
Deprivation
Broad definition of "deprived child."
- Former statute defined "deprived child" in broad enough terminology to allow sufficient latitude of discretion for juvenile court. Moss v. Moss, 135 Ga. App. 401, 218 S.E.2d 93 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Definition of "deprived child" focuses upon needs of child regardless of parental fault. Brown v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 136 Ga. App. 308, 220 S.E.2d 790 (1975); Cox v. Department of Human Resources, 148 Ga. App. 43, 250 S.E.2d 839 (1978); Hainut v. Houston County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 154 Ga. App. 556, 269 S.E.2d 61 (1980); Gardner v. Lenon, 154 Ga. App. 748, 270 S.E.2d 36 (1980) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
In considering a deprivation petition, the petition is brought on behalf of the child and it is the child's welfare and not who is responsible for the conditions which amount to deprivation that is the issue. Furthermore, such deprivation must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. In the Interest of D.L.W., 264 Ga. App. 168, 590 S.E.2d 183 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Primary factor in determining whether children are deprived is not the parents' circumstances, but the children's need. In the Interest of R.M., 276 Ga. App. 707, 624 S.E.2d 182 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Petition failed to allege valid allegations of deprivation.
- Granting of temporary custody of the mother's child to the mother's ex-boyfriend and his wife following their petition to have the boy adjudicated deprived was inappropriate because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding. The petition did not contain valid allegations of deprivation under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) and nothing in the record demonstrated that present drug use on the part of the mother had a negative effect on the child rising to the level of present deprivation; the petition was an attempt to obtain custody of the child. In the Interest of C. L. C., 299 Ga. App. 729, 683 S.E.2d 690 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Children with special needs.
- When employing the two-step test before terminating a parent's rights, a juvenile court order that a child was deprived, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), which was not appealed, was binding on a mother and satisfied the first factor of the test under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310); the juvenile court determined that due in part to a medical problem, the child had special needs and the mother lacked the ability to provide for the physical, mental, emotional, and moral conditions and needs of the child. In the Interest of J.T.W., 270 Ga. App. 26, 606 S.E.2d 59 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Because the juvenile court properly focused on the subject parent's abandonment of the child in support of the court's deprivation finding, and hence, the focus could not be on the adequate level of care given by the child's maternal grandparent, the court's deprivation finding was supported by sufficient evidence. Moreover, the state adequately showed that the parent was incapable of caring for any child, let alone this child, given that the child had special medical needs. In the Interest of A.B., 289 Ga. App. 655, 658 S.E.2d 205 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Present deprivation required.
- Juvenile courts of the state have jurisdiction with regard to a child who is alleged to be deprived, not a child who has allegedly been or will allegedly be deprived while in the legal custody of a nonresident parent. Lewis v. Winzenreid, 263 Ga. 459, 435 S.E.2d 602 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court's concern that a mother's children, who were previously deemed deprived, might be deprived in the future if the mother did not have an acceptable plan to prevent future occurrences of domestic violence did not support extending an agency's custody of the children due to a finding that the children continued to be deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107); there was no evidence that the mother's present actions rose to the level of deprivation of the children. In the Interest of T. D., 309 Ga. App. 9, 709 S.E.2d 883 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Standing to challenge deprivation finding.
- Despite being the child's primary caretaker since the death of the child's parent, because the child's grandparent had no legal right to custody of the child, the grandparent was not aggrieved by an order finding the child deprived, an award of custody to the child's cousin, and an attorney-fee award and, therefore, had no standing to challenge such order. In the Interest of J.R.P., 287 Ga. App. 621, 652 S.E.2d 206 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 207 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Merger of charges against the defendant for cruelty to children and contributing to the deprivation of a minor was not required because, although based on similar facts, each charge required proof of a fact not required to prove the other. Porter v. State, 243 Ga. App. 498, 532 S.E.2d 407 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Findings necessary.
- Because the trial court treated a deprivation determination as part of a custody determination, which does not require specific findings of fact, the case was remanded with direction that the court prepare findings of fact employing statutory standards for a determination of deprivation. In re J.B., 241 Ga. App. 679, 527 S.E.2d 275 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court's conclusion that returning a child to the mother's home after the child was in agency custody would be contrary to the child's welfare because of domestic violence issues and that the child's placement in a residential treatment program was appropriate for the child's needs was improper under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) as the juvenile court had to make appropriate findings of fact upon which the court based the court's finding of deprivation. In the Interest of T. D., 309 Ga. App. 9, 709 S.E.2d 883 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Findings are binding.
- Since a parent did not appeal a trial court's finding that the child was deprived, the parent was bound by that finding in the subsequent termination of parental rights proceeding. In the Interest of T.A., 279 Ga. App. 377, 631 S.E.2d 399 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
1. In General
Consideration of past conduct in finding deprivation.
- Mother's argument that the events leading to the instant deprivation petition represented a "one-time incident" during which she simply "fell off the wagon" lacked any merit because even though there was some evidence that the mother has experienced brief periods of relative stability as an adult, the record showed that she had been unable to maintain such stability; the court could consider the past conduct of the mother in making the court's determination that the deprivation of the children would continue if the children were left in the mother's care. In the Interest of H.E., 272 Ga. App. 604, 612 S.E.2d 909 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court may consider a mother's inability to properly care for one child as evidence that the mother will not be able to care for the mother's other children. In the Interest of R. B., 322 Ga. App. 421, 745 S.E.2d 677 (2013).
Deprivation of love and nurture is equally as serious as mental or physical disability. Elrod v. Hall County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 136 Ga. App. 251, 220 S.E.2d 726 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Unfortunate circumstances do not excuse improper care.
- While because of unfortunate economic or personal circumstances every family cannot demand nor expect an always adequate supply of the material necessities and conveniences for which the standard of living in the United States justly creates an expectation, at the same time occurrence of those unfortunate circumstances does not create carte blanche for ignoring proper care of dependent children. Vermilyea v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 746, 272 S.E.2d 588 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Quality of evidence affects determination of deprivation.
- Court must wait for deprivation to actually occur. Past acts of deprivation are certainly stronger proof and more convincing evidence upon which to decide the issue. But there is no reason why a determination of deprivation may not be made on proof that the conditions under which the child would be raised in the parent's home strongly indicate that deprivation will occur in the future. Jones v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 371, 271 S.E.2d 27 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Discretion of court in determining deprivation.
- Determination of deprivation and the decision to terminate parental rights based thereon is an exercise of discretion by the trial court and if based upon evidence will not be controlled by a reviewing court. Roberts v. State, 141 Ga. App. 268, 233 S.E.2d 224 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Chancey v. Department of Human Resources, 156 Ga. App. 338, 274 S.E.2d 728 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Deprivation from educational neglect.
- Evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's findings that the parents' children were deprived due to educational neglect as evidenced by the children's truancy, the home was unsafe with pill bottles laying around and a nail gun under the sink, and the parents' drug abuse. In the Interest of J.C., 264 Ga. App. 598, 591 S.E.2d 475 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Findings made in unrecorded hearing reversed.
- Because the juvenile court primarily based the court's decision that a parent's two children were deprived, awarding temporary custody of the children to the county, on evidence received at an unrecorded hearing, and a waiver requiring a transcript of that hearing was not in evidence, those findings were reversed, and the case was remanded. In the Interest of D.P., 284 Ga. App. 453, 644 S.E.2d 299 (2007) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Discovery from guardian ad litem's file.
- Juvenile order granting a guardian a protective order against a mother was vacated because the juvenile court erred in imposing blanket protection for the guardian ad litem's file under a privilege exception to discovery; on remand, the juvenile court was directed to exercise the court's discretion to determine whether the material sought by the mother was privileged or otherwise should not be subject to discovery. In the Interest of J. N., 344 Ga. App. 409, 810 S.E.2d 191 (2018).
2. Deprivation Found
Absence of proper parental care.
- In a criminal trial on charges that the defendant allowed the repeated rapes of the defendant's 11-year-old child, the rule of lenity did not require that the defendant's felony convictions for being a party to rape and cruelty to children to be subsumed by the misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the deprivation of a minor because different facts were necessary to prove the offenses. The rape conviction required proof under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-6-1(a)(1) that the defendant took affirmative steps to aid the rapist. The cruelty to children conviction required proof under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b) that the defendant caused excessive mental pain to the child. The conviction for contributing to the deprivation of a minor required proof under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) and O.C.G.A. § 16-12-1(b)(3) that the defendant failed to provide the child with proper care necessary for the child's health, which the state proved by showing that the defendant failed to seek prenatal care for the child even though the defendant knew that the child was pregnant. Johnson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 99, 640 S.E.2d 644 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Given evidence that the defendant's two young children were left unattended, resulting in one going outside in near freezing weather without the proper clothing, causing that child's body temperature to drop two degrees and suffer mild hypothermia, the defendant's two convictions for contributing to the deprivation of a minor were upheld on appeal. Ellis v. State, 283 Ga. App. 808, 642 S.E.2d 869 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Appeals court found that the evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that a parent's six children were deprived, and that the unexplained abuse was the result of the parent's inability to protect the children as the evidence showed that: (1) one child suffered unexplained sexual abuse while in the parent's care, and sustained a head injury while allegedly in the parent's aunt's care; and (2) another child was molested while the parent was asleep. In the Interest of S.Y., 284 Ga. App. 218, 644 S.E.2d 145 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Because the older of two children sustained multiple unexplained fractures while in the custody of the child's parents, this was sufficient evidence authorizing the juvenile court's finding that the older child was deprived and further supported evidence that a younger sibling was also deprived; thus, the juvenile court was authorized to find a lack of proper parental care and control based on the parent's failure to protect both children from injury. In the Interest of A.R., 287 Ga. App. 334, 651 S.E.2d 467 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Trial court properly terminated parental rights of two biological parents to their four children, ages seven, five, four, and two, as clear and convincing evidence established that parents were unable to feed and house the children and that they had essentially abandoned their parental responsibilities; examples of parental misconduct and inability of the parents to provide for the children included the parents' failure to show significant compliance with the reunification goals, their eviction from their home, and their failure to make regular visitation with the children. In the Interest of C.G., 289 Ga. App. 844, 658 S.E.2d 448 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Termination of a parent's rights to two children was upheld on appeal as the evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the children were deprived at the time of the termination hearing based on the parent's failure to provide proper parental care and control. The evidence also established that for over three years, the parent failed to make any progress in meeting reunification goals that were set, which demonstrated that the children's deprivation was likely to continue, and the best interests of the children included finding stability with the foster parent, who desired to adopt the children. In the Interest of A.G., 293 Ga. App. 383, 667 S.E.2d 176 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Deprivation prior to birth.
- Juvenile court erred in taking judicial notice of a psychological evaluation and citizen review panel's report issued in a mother's case prior to a child's birth because the juvenile court could not consider the evaluation or report to determine whether the child was without proper parental care or control or that the mother was unfit to parent the child; neither of the documents were tendered into evidence, and there was no testimony as to the contents of the documents. In the Interest of S. D., 316 Ga. App. 86, 728 S.E.2d 749 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parent imprisoned.
- The statutory finding of deprivation is based on an absence of proper parental care or control, not the temporary guardianship provided when the parent is in prison. In re J.L.M., 204 Ga. App. 46, 418 S.E.2d 415 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Termination of a mother's parental rights was upheld on appeal since the evidence showed that the mother never bonded with the child, was repeatedly incarcerated, and never attempted to contact the child's caregiver, the mother's aunt, to whom guardianship had been granted; the juvenile court's determination that the child was deprived and that such deprivation was likely to continue based on the mother's continuous criminal activity was supported by the evidence. In the Interest of S.R.M., 283 Ga. App. 463, 641 S.E.2d 666 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Although children were deprived under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) because their parent, who had been incarcerated on forgery and firearms charges, was living in a homeless shelter at the time of the termination hearing and was then unable to provide them with proper parental care, it had not been proven that the causes of the children's deprivation were likely to continue; the termination petition was filed while the parent was still incarcerated, and the parent was not given any realistic opportunity to fulfill the goals of a reunification plan. In the Interest of R.C.M., 284 Ga. App. 791, 645 S.E.2d 363 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Deprivation from inadequate treatment of psychological problems.
- Juvenile court did not err in finding that a 12-year-old child was deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) due to the child's severe psychological problems, which required in-patient treatment, because the child's mother had been unable to obtain the recommended treatment for the child and the child's mental health was deteriorating. In the Interest of V.A.D., 305 Ga. App. 23, 699 S.E.2d 346 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence of deprived child.
- Judge found by clear and convincing evidence that the child was a deprived child within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 and that such deprivation was likely to continue; that the continued deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child since the mother was serving jail time for a felony conviction, was a drug user, and failed to communicate with the child for over a year. In re H.M.T., 203 Ga. App. 247, 416 S.E.2d 567 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence was sufficient to permit the juvenile court to find clear and convincing evidence of the child's deprivation and that the child's mother's misconduct or inability to care for the child's needs resulted in abuse or neglect sufficient to render the mother unfit to retain custody. In re C.N., 231 Ga. App. 639, 500 S.E.2d 400 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Since the evidence at the hearing described the home life of a mother's three children and her failure to comply with Department of Family and Children's Service requests, it was sufficient for the juvenile court to find that one of the children was a deprived child. In re C.S., 236 Ga. App. 312, 511 S.E.2d 895 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parents' choice in exposing their child to an inappropriate and dangerous living environment showed a lack of parental judgment and careless disregard for the child's health and safety that was sufficient to support a finding that the child was deprived. In the Interest of B.M.B., 241 Ga. App. 609, 527 S.E.2d 250 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
On appeal, the mother argued that the juvenile court erred in considering her testimony during the deprivation hearing because the court had previously found her incompetent, but even without the mother's testimony, ample evidence supported the juvenile court's decision to extend the deprivation order because the juvenile court found that the child was deprived because the mother: (1) had not obtained counseling; (2) had not found stable housing; (3) did not have any source of income; (4) failed to attend parenting classes; and (5) failed to comply with the reunification plan. Additionally, because the crux of the juvenile court's inquiry was the mother's competence as a parent, it was illogical to preclude a trial court from considering the mother's testimony for that purpose. In the Interest of B.B., 267 Ga. App. 360, 599 S.E.2d 304 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court did not err in finding that there was ample evidence to support the court's finding that two children were deprived, that remaining in their mother's care was contrary to their welfare, and that the children needed protection while she endeavored to comply with a reunification plan because the mother repeatedly relapsed back into an unstable dangerous lifestyle, particularly when she was involved with abusive men or those with substance abuse problems. In the Interest of H.E., 272 Ga. App. 604, 612 S.E.2d 909 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's determination that a mother's child was deprived, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), due to the lack of proper parental care, that such deprivation was likely to continue or not be remedied due to the mother's failure to take responsibility for the child and to work at succeeding at the goals of the case plan, and that such deprivation would cause serious harm to the child, who needed a stable family environment; accordingly, termination of the mother's parental rights was proper pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320). In the Interest of B.S., 274 Ga. App. 647, 618 S.E.2d 695 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Children were properly found to be deprived, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), because their mother did not show that she was able to support them, she showed no past or present ability to care for them or house them, and she had exposed them to drug and alcohol abuse by other family members, as well as domestic violence. In the Interest of L.F., 275 Ga. App. 247, 620 S.E.2d 476 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Termination of a father's parental rights was supported by evidence of the adverse impact on the child of the mother's continuous drug abuse, the father's neglect of the father's other children, and by the two years the father waited before filing a petition to legitimate the child; the termination of a mother's parental rights was supported by evidence of the mother's egregious drug abuse, the repeated removal of the children from the mother's care, and the mother's failure to comply with the case plan goals. In the Interest of T.L., 279 Ga. App. 7, 630 S.E.2d 154 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parent's admission to methamphetamine use during a period that a child protective services investigation was pending, when the children had recently come into the parent's care, and after the parent had agreed to a drug screen, allowed a trial court to infer that the parent had a chronic drug problem which adversely affected the children, and supported the trial court's finding that the children were deprived. In the Interest of K.W., 279 Ga. App. 319, 631 S.E.2d 110 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Although a parent made substantial progress on a reunification plan while incarcerated, an order extending temporary custody for an additional year in favor of the Department of Family and Children Services was upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented that the parent was unable to: (1) establish stable housing; (2) complete a substance abuse assessment; and (3) demonstrate six months of clean drug screens. In the Interest of R.B., 285 Ga. App. 556, 647 S.E.2d 300 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
On appeal from an order finding the subject child was deprived, assuming certain findings of the juvenile court were not supported by the record, as the appealing parent contended, evidence that the child was physically and emotionally abused by that parent, and that the child lived in an unstable environment, was sufficient to support the order of deprivation. In the Interest of M.K., 288 Ga. App. 71, 653 S.E.2d 354 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Based on clear and convincing evidence that one parent admittedly suffered from a schizoaffective disorder that was both ignored and not treated with medication, and the other parent denied the existence of that disorder by continuing to leave the child in the first parent's care, sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the child was deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107). Moreover, the appeals court was not required to wait until the child suffered from harm before finding that child to be deprived. In the Interest of D.H.D., 289 Ga. App. 32, 656 S.E.2d 183 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
As a parent's actions, including not feeding the child or changing the child's diaper often enough, placed the child at risk, and the parent received one-on-one instruction and training for a considerable period of time, yet failed to put the training into practice and continued to risk the child's well-being, there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that the child was a "deprived child" as defined by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A). In the Interest of W. A. P., 293 Ga. App. 433, 667 S.E.2d 197 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Petition made valid allegations of deprivation as defined by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), including the mother's leaving the children with the father and not visiting them, the mother's lack of appropriate housing and stable employment, the mother's lack of financial support for the children, and the mother's use of one child's disability benefits to pay the mother's own bills rather than to care for the child. In the Interest of M. M., 315 Ga. App. 673, 727 S.E.2d 279 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Order finding the children to be deprived and discontinuing reunification services was supported by the evidence; the fact that the father was unable to provide parental care and control of the children at the time of the deprivation hearing because of the conditions of the father's bond constituted clear and convincing evidence that the children were deprived. In addition, there was evidence that the father moved the children to three different states to hide the children from the juvenile court, and the father had abused the children's mother causing the mother to leave the children to escape the father. In the Interest of A. S., 318 Ga. App. 457, 734 S.E.2d 225 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court properly determined that a mother's child was deprived within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 based on evidence in the record that the mother was living in the home where the putative father was residing despite the sexual abuse allegation the mother made against the father and, the mother failed to comply with the case plan for another child, including an investigation of the sexual abuse allegations against the father. In the Interest of R. B., 322 Ga. App. 421, 745 S.E.2d 677 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
When it is established that a parent has previously deprived, neglected, or abused one or more of their children and that the detrimental conditions existing at that time have not significantly changed, a juvenile court is under no obligation to return a child to the parent and wait until the child is harmed in order to find that there is evidence of that child's current deprivation.Specifically, a juvenile court is allowed to hear and weigh evidence of the past deprivation of other siblings when assessing the current deprivation of a child. In the Interest of R. B., 322 Ga. App. 421, 745 S.E.2d 677 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Exposure to "sexualized environment".
- There was ample evidence a child was deprived because a psychologist found that the child exhibited sexual knowledge that was unusual for the child's age and that the knowledge could indicate the child was exposed to a "sexualized environment," pornography, or sexual abuse; the child exhibited reactive attachment disorder as a result of being frequently "uprooted" and exposed to a transient and chaotic lifestyle, the child needed a stable environment in which the child could feel safe, and that the child would need long-term psychological treatment to address relationship issues. In the Interest of H.E., 272 Ga. App. 604, 612 S.E.2d 909 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Child with multiple fractures.
- Deprivation finding was supported by sufficient evidence which showed that the child victim suffered multiple fractures all over the child's body which indicated that the fractures occurred at different times, the child had no disease predisposing the child to the fractures, and a doctor testified that the injuries were consistent with abusive non-accidental trauma. In the Interest of T.J., 273 Ga. App. 547, 615 S.E.2d 613 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parental admission of not wanting to parent.
- There was clear and convincing evidence that supported a juvenile court's determination that a parent's child was deprived pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 due to the parent's admission that the parent did not want to parent the child, the parent's actions which were contrary to the child's best interest, the fact that the parent was placed under house arrest following two arrests for assault, and the parent's failure to comply with the goals of the parent's reunification plan within the context of a parental rights termination proceeding. In the Interest of J.D., 280 Ga. App. 861, 635 S.E.2d 226 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Failure to maintain parental bond.
- Evidence showed that two children were deprived for purposes of the termination of a parent's rights as: (1) the children had been found to be deprived and were not in the parent's custody; (2) the parent failed to maintain a parental bond as the parent did not visit the children once in nine months, failed to give the children birthday presents, and did not contact the foster parents; (3) the parent failed to complete the case plan although the parent completed parenting classes and a substance abuse evaluation, the parent moved at least nine times in two years and did not maintain regular contact with a child services agency; and (4) the parent paid $60 of $900 owed in child support and failed to support the children. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Sexual abuse.
- Evidence supported a finding that two of a mother's children were deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 when the mother continued to expose the children to their grandfather even though she believed an allegation that he had sexually abused one of them, repeatedly told DFCS personnel that the children were liars despite her own history of sexual abuse as a child, and continued to live with her fiance despite allegations that he had sexually abused the other child; furthermore, several referrals had been made to the DFCS pertaining to the children, including a substantiated claim of physical abuse. In the Interest of N.D., 286 Ga. App. 236, 648 S.E.2d 771 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parental inability resulting from death of other child.
- Trial court properly found that children were deprived; evidence authorized the court to find that anguish the parent felt at the death of another child, combined with other emotional and mental factors, made the parent unable or unwilling to provide the surviving children with proper parental care or control and that this situation, which existed in 2006, had not been remedied in 2007. In the Interest of T.P., 291 Ga. App. 83, 661 S.E.2d 211 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence from forensic pediatrician and clinical psychologist.
- There was no merit to a father's argument that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence in finding that three children were deprived and in authorizing the grant of a motion for nonreunification with the father. Although the father claimed that certain documents contained hearsay, it was presumed that the trial court in a nonjury trial would select only legal evidence; the father had not shown that the opinions of a forensic pediatrician and a clinical psychologist who were qualified as experts should have been excluded; the father had not made any argument as to how he was prejudiced by evidence apparently introduced against the mother; and an indictment for one child's injuries was properly admitted as the father's custody status was an issue in the case. In the Interest of A.R., 295 Ga. App. 22, 670 S.E.2d 858 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Psychological testimony on developmental delay.
- Evidence was sufficient to show that three children were deprived and to authorize the grant of a motion for nonreunification with their father. There was evidence that one child was seriously and intentionally injured while in either the sole or joint care of the father; the psychologist who evaluated the children, as well as their foster parent, testified as to numerous ways the children were developmentally delayed when initially taken into protective custody; and the father cited no evidence that he had made any attempt to maintain a parental bond with any of his children, met any of the other goals of the reunification plans, or otherwise provided for the needs of his children. In the Interest of A.R., 295 Ga. App. 22, 670 S.E.2d 858 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parental mental illness.
- Despite evidence that a parent had fulfilled many of the goals set for the parent by a juvenile court, sufficient evidence supported the court's finding that, as a result of the parent's mental illness, the parent could not adequately care for the parent's child, even if the parent's unfitness was unintentional. Therefore, sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that the child was deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) as to the parent. In re J. G., 308 Ga. App. 127, 706 S.E.2d 741 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Inadequate parental supervision.
- Because a mother's children had been found to be deprived, as defined in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), because her persistent failure to adequately supervise the children supported a finding that the deprivation was likely to continue, and because continued deprivation was likely to seriously harm the children, the mother's parental rights were properly terminated. In the Interest of T. A. H., 310 Ga. App. 93, 712 S.E.2d 115 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parent imprisoned.
- Parent's continued incarceration at the time of a termination of parental rights hearing authorized the court to find that the parent's children were presently deprived. In the Interest of D.T.A., 312 Ga. App. 26, 717 S.E.2d 536 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Unsubstantiated claims of child's illness.
- A 12-year-old child was deprived, given evidence that the child's mother made unsubstantiated claims that the child had 34 types of seizure disorders as well as ten to eleven deadly allergies, could not read more than 10 books a year in school, and could not bring books home from school; and the father testified that he would continue working, leaving the child in the care of the mother. In the Interest of A.L., 313 Ga. App. 858, 723 S.E.2d 76 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Failure to complete counseling.
- Juvenile court properly held that a 13-year-old grandson continued to be deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) because clear and convincing evidence established that the child was without the care necessary for the child's mental or emotional health based on the grandmother/guardian failing to complete family counseling as required. In the Interest of J. B., 319 Ga. App. 796, 738 S.E.2d 639 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Videotaping, stripping, and spanking resulted in deprivation.
- Evidence that the children's mother permitted and/or assisted her husband in making videotapes for distribution of the children being stripped and spanked was sufficient to show that the children were deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107). In the Interest of J.P., 253 Ga. App. 732, 560 S.E.2d 318 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Medical issues resulting in deprivation.
- Clear and convincing evidence supported an order adjudicating two children deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) because their sibling died of complications from tuberculosis (TB) after not receiving medical treatment for at least a month, the father had been twice diagnosed with active TB, but refused to admit he had TB, and the mother refused to take medication to keep her latent TB from becoming active, and would not admit that TB had anything to do with the death of the sibling. In the Interest of R.M., 276 Ga. App. 707, 624 S.E.2d 182 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
An order finding that a mother's two children were deprived was upheld on appeal since the evidence established that the mother's 12-year-old daughter was pregnant with the mother's 38-year-old boyfriend's child and the daughter had at least four sexual partners since the age of nine, and the mother's son had cavities so large that the cavities were visible in the boy's teeth and he had a very poor educational status; also, the mother failed to accept responsibility for the condition of the children. In the Interest of A.S., 285 Ga. App. 563, 646 S.E.2d 756 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Grandparent caused deprivation.
- When a grandparent who had adopted three grandchildren struck one in the face, leaving a mark, pushed a child into a tub of water after asking if the child wanted to drown, spanked the children with a belt, and struck one child with a belt buckle and another with an extension cord, there was sufficient evidence of deprivation under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107). In the Interest of T.R., 284 Ga. App. 742, 644 S.E.2d 880 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Alcohol abuse and domestic violence resulting in deprivation.
- In a deprivation case involving four children, sufficient evidence existed to support the order adjudicating the children deprived since the evidence established that the parents admitted chronically abusing alcohol and admitted that such abuse lead to domestic violence; the father of the children falsely accused child molestation against one of the children, which affected that child so badly that the child refused to live at home and required psychiatric treatment, and even without testimony as to the effect on the children, the juvenile court was authorized to infer from the evidence that the alcohol abuse and domestic violence in the home had an adverse effect on the minor children. In the Interest of E.D., 287 Ga. App. 152, 650 S.E.2d 800 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Molestation resulting in deprivation.
- Trial court properly found that a child was deprived and placed her in the temporary custody of her grandmother, given the evidence that the mother's boyfriend was molesting the child, that the mother knew of allegations that the boyfriend was molesting the child but continued to live with him, that the mother did not seek medical treatment for the child's vaginal rashes, and that the child had exhibited abnormal behavior over a period of months. In the Interest of L.A.T., 291 Ga. App. 312, 661 S.E.2d 679 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
In a mother's appeal of a juvenile court's declaration that a child was deprived, the juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in making that conclusion based on the sexual abuse of the child by the stepfather because the record established by clear and convincing evidence that the mother did not fully appreciate all that had to be done to protect the child and the child was minimizing the abuse and masking the continuing emotional impact of the experience due to psychological pressure from the mother. In the Interest of A. P., 299 Ga. App. 886, 684 S.E.2d 22 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
False allegations against spouse result in deprivation.
- Children, ages four and six, were deprived as defined in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) based on their mother's unwarranted and unrelenting insistence that their father, whom she was divorcing, had abused them, subjecting the children to repeated forensic interviews and invasive medical examinations, despite being warned that these repeated interviews were harmful to the children. In the Interest of S.K., 301 Ga. App. 35, 686 S.E.2d 814 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Since the evidence in the record showed that the child had been subjected to numerous medical examinations for sexual abuse at the mother's behest, in an apparent effort to frustrate or foreclose the father's right of visitation, and she persisted in having the child examined for possible sexual abuse, the juvenile court properly found that the mother's conduct was egregious and was properly considered by the juvenile court in reaching the court's deprivation finding. In the Interest of M.E., 265 Ga. App. 412, 593 S.E.2d 924 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Death of sibling factor in deprivation proceeding.
- Juvenile court did not err in adjudicating a child deprived and granting temporary custody of the child to the Department of Family and Children Services because the juvenile court did not rely mainly on hearsay testimony to establish the facts on which the court based the court's deprivation finding; the record contained clear and convincing evidence establishing that the child's sibling died under circumstances that constituted substantial evidence that such injury or death resulted from parental neglect or abuse pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311), and the record also contained evidence that the child was physically abused while in the parent's custody and, therefore, lacked the proper parental care necessary for physical and emotional health. In the Interest of K.B., 302 Ga. App. 50, 690 S.E.2d 627 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parental mental illness.
- Juvenile court's order finding a one-year-old child to be deprived was upheld on appeal as clear and convincing evidence existed that: (1) one parent suffered from a psychological disorder, which was not controlled by medication, and caused that parent to have delusions; and (2) the other parent, knowing the aforementioned condition of the first parent, left the child in that parent's care. In the Interest of M.D., 283 Ga. App. 805, 642 S.E.2d 863 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Termination order was upheld on appeal because the juvenile court was presented with clear and convincing proof sufficient to support the termination of parental rights: (1) the parent's mental health problems were unlikely to be remedied, resulting in a lack of proper parental care or control and the likelihood that the parent would not be able to provide a stable home; and (2) the parent failed to protect the children from harm in the past. Moreover, as a result of the aforementioned, the children faced a fairly grim scenario of mental health concerns of increasing severity as the children aged. In the Interest of H.K., 288 Ga. App. 831, 655 S.E.2d 698 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
There was sufficient evidence that a child was deprived based on the mother's increasingly severe mental health problems resulting in repeated hospitalizations, her unpredictable, angry, and violent outbursts directed at or committed in the presence of family members, her poor prognosis for bringing her behavior under control in the short term, and her conduct and demeanor during the deprivation hearing. In the Interest of S.D.H., 287 Ga. App. 684, 652 S.E.2d 570 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence sufficient to find deprivation or termination of parental rights.
- Evidence that parents were imprisoned for abusing one of their three children, and their parental rights were terminated as to that child; that a second child, while in their care, sustained permanent brain injuries due to abusive head trauma, and the child's arm was fractured in a manner consistent with abuse; and the fact that the parents invoked the Fifth Amendment during the deprivation hearing was sufficient to allow the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that their two children were deprived as defined by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107). In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga. App. 471, 667 S.E.2d 641 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights over her three children pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), based on a showing that the children were deprived pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), such deprivation continued due to the mother's lack of proper care or control, the deprivation was likely to continue, it was likely harmful to the children, and termination was in their best interests; the mother had chronic drug and alcohol abuse problems, as well as a lack of employment, and despite continuing case plans, she failed to comply or to correct those issues. In the Interest of P. D. W., 296 Ga. App. 189, 674 S.E.2d 338 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
There was sufficient clear and convincing evidence presented to authorize the juvenile court to find that a mother's child was deprived and that the deprivation was likely to continue, and consequently, that reunification of the child with the mother would be detrimental to the child and was not in the child's best interest because, while the juvenile court took into consideration the previous termination of the mother's parental rights in determining whether the child was deprived, the juvenile court also heard substantial evidence showing that the mother's mental, emotional, and financial condition had not changed significantly since her parental rights to her children were terminated and that despite the assistance of the Department of Family and Children Services and the loss of her four children the mother still lacked the necessary skills, judgment, and resources to properly care for the child. In re R. B., 309 Ga. App. 407, 710 S.E.2d 611 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Trial court did not err by finding, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-381,15-11-310,15-11-311,15-11-320, and15-11-471), that the child was deprived at the time of a termination hearing and that the mother was the cause of the deprivation as the evidence showed that the mother had a 12-year history of drug addiction, that she repeatedly used methamphetamine while pregnant with the child, that the mother's two other children were not in her custody, that she had multiple felony drug convictions, that she was in jail after the child's birth, that she failed to financially support the child until four weeks before the termination hearing, that she had lived in five separate residences since giving birth to the child, and that she made no attempt whatsoever to visit the child until one month prior to the termination hearing. In the Interest of Z. P., 314 Ga. App. 347, 724 S.E.2d 48 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) because clear and convincing evidence supported the court's finding that the children were deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107); the mother failed to complete counseling for her depression and parenting aide counseling, and the mother failed to exercise scheduled visits with the children. In the Interest of A. R., 315 Ga. App. 357, 726 S.E.2d 800 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Inability to control child.
- Because the Department of Family and Children Services presented clear and convincing evidence of a parent's inability to control a child to the extent necessary for that child's mental, physical, and emotional health, and the parent was afforded sufficient due process, the juvenile court's deprivation finding was upheld on appeal; moreover, absent evidence of a custody dispute, the proceeding was not a pretextual custody battle which divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction. In the Interest of D.T., 284 Ga. App. 336, 643 S.E.2d 842 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Under the circumstances in the mother's case, the juvenile court correctly found that the evidence of the children's deprivation was clear and convincing under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1 and15-11-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1,15-11-2,15-11-381, and15-11-471) in that the evidence demonstrated that the minor children were not receiving adequate support for the children's mental health issues. The uncontrolled behavior of the children related to those issues was negatively affecting the children's academic and social well-being and there was also clear and convincing evidence that the mother was not utilizing available resources to address the children's problems, and that the mother had attempted to have one of the children hospitalized because she could not control the child; moreover, one of the children also exhibited severe mental health issues, including cutting herself and attacking other children, that were not adequately addressed. In the Interest of D. Q., 307 Ga. App. 121, 704 S.E.2d 444 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Failure to take steps to reunite with child.
- Father's failure for three years to take the steps necessary to be reunited with a four-year-old daughter provided clear and convincing evidence that the deprivation was likely to continue, and the evidence was sufficient to establish that the termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child in light of the fact that at the time of the termination hearing, the child had spent three of the four years of life in foster care and the evidence showed the father's failure to establish a suitable home and a stable income, become drug free, or comply with reunification plan goals. In the Interest of J.A., 286 Ga. App. 704, 649 S.E.2d 882 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Physical abuse of other parent.
- Evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's ruling that a child was deprived pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) because the father had a history of physical abuse to the mother, and the child was exposed to repeated incidences of abuse; there was clear and compelling evidence showing a lack of proper parental control to such an extent that the child was adversely affected because the evidence showed that the child began exhibiting disturbing "cutting" and "burning" behaviors when the child and the mother moved in with the father, and the mother testified about the father's aggressive behavior toward the child. In the Interest of W. W., 308 Ga. App. 407, 707 S.E.2d 611 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Physical abuse of child.
- There was sufficient evidence to support a juvenile court's finding that a child was deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) because the mother physically abused the child on at least two occasions to the extent that officials at the child's school became concerned for the child's physical and emotional well being; although the mother sought anger-management counseling, the psychologist working with the mother testified that it was unwise to return the child to the mother's custody until and unless the mother sought further psychiatric counseling. In re T.S., 310 Ga. App. 100, 712 S.E.2d 121 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court did not err in finding that children were deprived and that their father was unable to provide proper parental care for the children because there was clear and convincing evidence to show that the father had engaged in past egregious conduct of a physically abusive nature toward one of the children; there was medical evidence regarding the nature and extent of the child's injuries and evidence that the injuries had been inflicted by the father. In the Interest of T. P., 310 Ga. App. 684, 713 S.E.2d 874 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Failure to seek family counseling.
- Clear and convincing evidence authorized the juvenile court to find that a child was currently deprived because the child was without the care necessary for the child's mental or emotional health; although the father argued that his completion of the case plan goals eliminated the original causes of the deprivation, the failure to complete family counseling continued the deprivation. In the Interest of H. J., 313 Ga. App. 255, 721 S.E.2d 197 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Deprivation of adopted child.
- In a deprivation case involving a nine-year-old adopted child, there was clear and convincing evidence establishing that the child was deprived by both parents based on one parent's sexual abuse of the child and the other parent's failure to protect the child from such abuse. In the Interest of B.H., 295 Ga. App. 297, 671 S.E.2d 303 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Termination for continuing deprivation.
- Since there was a prior hearing in which the appellant's children were determined to be "deprived," and in the termination hearing, the judge made explicit findings of fact concerning events since the original hearing and concluded that the conditions and causes of the deprivation were likely to continue and would not be remedied and that by reason thereof the children were suffering and would probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm, an order of termination was proper. Wynn v. Department of Human Resources, 149 Ga. App. 559, 254 S.E.2d 883 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Court of Appeals of Georgia rejected a parent's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an order terminating that parent's parental rights as the evidence showed that the parent failed to: (1) ensure that the child's educational needs were met; (2) safeguard the child from a sexually abusive relative; (3) maintain regular contact with the child; and (4) maintain adequate and stable housing and employment. Thus, because the child had been in foster care for three years prior to the termination hearing, had bonded with them and expressed a desire to be adopted by them, and the foster parents stood ready to adopt, termination was in the child's best interest. In the Interest of K.A.C., 290 Ga. App. 310, 659 S.E.2d 703 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the evidence showed that the child's deprivation was likely to continue under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) as the mother's sobriety was recent, her compliance with the drug treatment was mandatory to avoid jail, she failed to adequately support the child, her testimony in the termination hearing was evasive, she relinquished and lost custody of her two other children, she made no efforts whatsoever to contact or visit the child until the child was nine months old, and she was willing to reconcile with the father, who was also addicted to methamphetamine and had not completed any type of drug treatment. In the Interest of Z. P., 314 Ga. App. 347, 724 S.E.2d 48 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Sexual abuse.
- Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that the children were deprived within the meaning of former paragraph (8) of O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) since medical evidence showed that the children had been sexually abused. In re J.E.L., 189 Ga. App. 203, 375 S.E.2d 490 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
After finding there was clear and convincing evidence the father had molested the child, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by considering the evidence and deciding that the court had no choice but to protect the child by removing custody from the mother as well as the father since the mother refused to believe that the father had molested the child and was unwilling to remove the child from the danger presented by living with the father. In re B.H., 190 Ga. App. 131, 378 S.E.2d 175 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Finding that the father had sexually molested his youngest daughter in the presence of his eldest child along with expert testimony that the father was not responding to therapy provided clear and convincing evidence that the children were deprived due to parental misconduct and that the cause of that deprivation was likely to continue, warranting termination of the father's parental rights. In re R.E., 207 Ga. App. 178, 427 S.E.2d 512 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court's finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of deprivation was supported by the record because, in addition to the evidence that the minor child's legal father and the child's stepmother were touching the child inappropriately, there was evidence that the child was sexually abused by the legal father's cousins, and, based on the legal father's testimony, it did not appear that the legal father believed the child or that the father would protect the child from these cousins in the future. C.A.L. v. State, 307 Ga. App. 658, 705 S.E.2d 885 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
There was sufficient evidence to support a juvenile court's finding that two children and their younger siblings were deprived because the evidence showed that the father abused one of the children by forcing her to have sexual intercourse with him and that he also abused the second child by forcing her to fully undress and touching her breasts and buttocks in an inappropriate manner; the father admitted to those actions before later recanting, and several witnesses testified that the mother admitted to catching the father having sexual intercourse with the first child and doing nothing to stop it. As to the younger siblings, the juvenile court was authorized to find that the younger siblings were also deprived; even without direct testimony as to the effect on the younger siblings, the juvenile court was authorized to infer from the evidence that the sexual abuse of the children in the home had an adverse effect on the younger siblings. In the Interest of S.B., 312 Ga. App. 180, 718 S.E.2d 49 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Deprivation circumstances authorize removal of child from parent's custody.
- Evidence of the father's unfitness, his relationship with the children, and his abandonment of the children are sufficient to authorize a finding that the best interest of the children would not be served by placing the children in his custody. Milford v. Maxwell, 140 Ga. App. 85, 230 S.E.2d 93 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Evidence which established that the parents, both substance abusers, failed to provide proper parental care for their child, that the child suffered health problems as a result of the parent's neglect, and the parents' own admissions that they were incapable of providing for their child financially were sufficient for the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the child was a "deprived child." In re C.N.G., 204 Ga. App. 239, 419 S.E.2d 42 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
There was no merit in the mother's claim that the juvenile court erred in finding the child deprived because there was clear and convincing evidence that the acts complained of negatively impacted the child. The mother correctly argues that a deprivation petition brought under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) focuses upon the needs of the child regardless of the parental fault. However, the mother's fitness to parent is nonetheless in issue. Pertinently, it is undisputed in the evidence that being left at home alone had frightened the child; that the child markedly improved in school after the child's removal from the home; and that the mother was in complete noncompliance with the safety plan that she had signed. In the Interest of D.C., 268 Ga. App. 882, 602 S.E.2d 885 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Intervention of social worker did not preclude deprivation.
- Intense supervision of mother and her child by the mother's caseworker did not satisfy the care and control requirements of the law; although the intervention of the caseworker prevented the child from suffering any lasting harm, this did not preclude the child from being classified as deprived. Jones v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 371, 271 S.E.2d 27 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Parental decision to entrust child to caretakers was not deprivation.
- Trial court erred in concluding that a child was deprived since the evidence showed that the child's mother exercised good parental judgment in temporarily placing the child with caretakers and showed that while in their care, all of the child's physical, mental, and emotional needs were met. In the Interest of C.C., 249 Ga. App. 101, 547 S.E.2d 738 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parental decision to continue to live with abuser.
- As mother contravened the trial court's order by allowing the man who molested the mother's older child to continue living with her, the mother's younger child was deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) as the child was without proper parental care or control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health. In the Interest of K.C.H., 257 Ga. App. 529, 571 S.E.2d 515 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Mother's past behavior relevant.
- In deciding whether children were deprived, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), it was proper for a trial court to consider evidence of the mother's past conduct in deciding the likelihood that such conduct would continue in the future. In the Interest of L.F., 275 Ga. App. 247, 620 S.E.2d 476 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence sufficient for finding of deprivation.
- See In re J.R., 202 Ga. App. 418, 414 S.E.2d 540 (1992); In re W.J.G., 216 Ga. App. 168, 453 S.E.2d 768 (1995); In re S.S., 232 Ga. App. 287, 501 S.E.2d 618 (1998); In the Interest of S.B., 242 Ga. App. 184, 528 S.E.2d 278 (2000); In the Interest of W.P.H., 249 Ga. App. 890, 549 S.E.2d 513 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court's termination of parental rights over the child was proper pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) when the parent's lack of proper parental care or control amounted to deprivation of the child under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2), the parent failed to establish a bond with the child or substantially complete the goals of the parent's reunification plan, and the parent did not provide support to the child under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-2; further, the deprivation was deemed likely to continue and likely to result in harm to the child, and the child's best interest was served by termination of the parent's rights as the child had formed a bond with the foster parent. In the Interest of J.D., 280 Ga. App. 861, 635 S.E.2d 226 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court's deprivation finding entered against a parent was upheld on appeal given that the parent: (1) waived any claim of error to evidence submitted by the guardian ad litem during an ex parte meeting; and (2) failed to show any harm from the denial of a motion to continue the deprivation hearing, despite becoming ill during the proceedings, as the hearing had nearly concluded and no other evidence was to have been presented. In the Interest of S.P., 282 Ga. App. 82, 637 S.E.2d 802 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parent's challenge to the finding of deprivation by the juvenile court was rejected given clear and convincing evidence of a prior molestation by the parent's then live-in boyfriend and allegations of a subsequent molestation by the parent's current live-in boyfriend, which the parent refused to believe; these circumstances supported a finding that the parent failed to protect the child from emotional, if not physical, harm, and thus the child was deprived. In the Interest of S.V., 285 Ga. App. 772, 648 S.E.2d 109 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Department of family and children services established that a parent's children were deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(i) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310) with the following evidence: (1) the parent was not receiving drug treatment, had no stable housing, and had paid no child support; (2) the parent had not received mandated drug treatment or paid any child support; (3) the parent admitted having no suitable housing at the time the termination petition was filed, and the parent's post-petition acquisition of adequate housing was based solely on the ongoing good graces of the parent's new romantic companion, who was married to someone else. In the Interest of P. D. W., 296 Ga. App. 189, 674 S.E.2d 338 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Trial court's findings that a parent's children were deprived were supported by clear and convincing evidence; one child's bed-wetting and both children's excessive hunger were being punished with methods found inappropriate or abusive. Moreover, the parent was uncooperative and directed the children to be uncooperative. In the Interest of Z. D., 296 Ga. App. 389, 674 S.E.2d 630 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
As a parent's children had previously been deemed deprived, and the trial court was entitled to consider the fact that the parent had not completed a case plan as evidence that the children's deprivation was likely to continue if the children were returned to the parent, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's findings of deprivation under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107). In re J. A., 298 Ga. App. 11, 679 S.E.2d 52 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court did not err in finding that an infant was deprived because a rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the infant was deprived and that the deprivation was a result of the mother's parental misconduct or incapability when the infant was sexually abused during a time period in which the infant was in the care of the mother and father; the juvenile court was not required to determine which of the parents was responsible for the harm to the infant but that pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), the infant was without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health or morals, which was clearly shown based on the infant's being sexually abused while in the mother's care. In the Interest of K. L., 300 Ga. App. 557, 685 S.E.2d 464 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a juvenile court's determination that a child was deprived by the father because the child's mother presented a danger to the child, and the father deprived the child by failing to protect the child from the mother, who had chronic substance abuse problems and an extensive history of criminal activity; there was testimony that the father admitted that the father understood the danger and threat that the mother posed to the mother's children and that the father was permitting the mother to have contact with the child, despite the danger that the mother presented to the child, and given the conflicts in the testimony, the juvenile court was entitled to conclude that the father was dishonest in the father's testimony and was authorized to infer from the father's dishonesty that the father had permitted the child to have contact with the mother and that the father put the interests of the mother ahead of the best interest of the child. In the Interest of C.B., 308 Ga. App. 158, 706 S.E.2d 752 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence supported a juvenile court's order finding a parent's child to be deprived, as the parent failed to obtain stable housing or a job, and relied on others for transportation; moreover, the parent had failed to maintain meaningful contact with the child, admitting that the parent was emotionally unable to do so. In the Interest of D. S., 316 Ga. App. 296, 728 S.E.2d 890 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parental mental illness.
- Evidence was sufficient to support a juvenile court's finding that a child was deprived within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) since: (1) the mother suffered from a severe psychological disorder; (2) the mother could not care for the child without daily supervision; and (3) the mother's mental disorder was potentially dangerous to the child. In the Interest of D.L.W., 264 Ga. App. 168, 590 S.E.2d 183 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court did not err in considering the mother's testimony in determining whether her child was deprived, even though the juvenile court had previously found her mentally incompetent, as the juvenile court was authorized to consider any testimony, including that of the allegedly impaired parent, in determining the central issue of whether the parent was able to adequately provide for the child's needs; also, consideration of the mother's testimony supported the findings of the psychologist who testified that the mother's multiple mental disorders interfered with her ability to adequately care for her child. In the Interest of B.B., 268 Ga. App. 603, 602 S.E.2d 330 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Inadequate housing and employment.
- Court properly found that a child was deprived and terminated a mother's parental rights since the mother lacked permanent housing, the state had no verification that she was employed, she was in denial about her mental health condition, and she refused all treatment. In the Interest of B.B., 268 Ga. App. 858, 603 S.E.2d 333 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Court noting prior deprivation proceedings.
- Finding of deprivation was supported by the court taking judicial notice of prior deprivation proceedings before the same court relating to the parent's two older children. In the Interest of A.B., 285 Ga. App. 288, 645 S.E.2d 716 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parental drug abuse.
- Minor child was properly found to be deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) based on the unrehabilitated drug abuse under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(ii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310) by the mother, including during the pregnancy with the child, the juvenile court could properly infer an adverse impact on the child; the juvenile court was entitled to reject the mother's testimony that the mother had given up drugs, particularly in light of a positive drug screen just two months before the deprivation hearing and the lack of treatment. In the Interest of N.H., 297 Ga. App. 344, 677 S.E.2d 399 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court did not err in granting a motion filed by a county department of family and children services to extend the department's temporary custody of a mother's children because clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that the children remained deprived; there was evidence that the mother was a chronic drug user who remained unrehabilitated even after her children had been removed from her custody, and the evidence of chronic unrehabilitated drug use, along with the evidence that the mother had not completed her reunification case plan goals, authorized the juvenile court to conclude that the children would continue to be deprived if the children were returned to the mother. In the Interest of Q.A., 306 Ga. App. 386, 702 S.E.2d 701 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Inadequate housing.
- In a termination of parental rights proceeding, clear and convincing evidence showed the children were presently deprived, under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2(8)(A) and15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(i) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-107, and15-11-310), because the children's father said the father could not care for the children at the time of the termination hearing and had no stable housing. In the Interest of E.G., 315 Ga. App. 35, 726 S.E.2d 510 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
3. Deprivation Not Found
No showing of abandonment or deprivation found.
- See In re J.C.P., 167 Ga. App. 572, 307 S.E.2d 1 (1983); In re E.R.D., 172 Ga. App. 590, 323 S.E.2d 723 (1984); In re D.S., 217 Ga. App. 29, 456 S.E.2d 715 (1995); In the Interest of M.L.C., 249 Ga. App. 435, 548 S.E.2d 137 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence insufficient for finding of deprivation.
- Evidence was uncontroverted that the appellant had taken care of her child to the best of her ability and that the child's basic physical, mental, and emotional needs had been met by the appellant; thus, while the court did not condone the appellant's transitory lifestyle, her previous drug use, her relationship with an abusive husband, and her leaving the child unsupervised in her car for even a short period of time, such conduct alone was not clear and convincing evidence that the child was deprived under the definition set forth in O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) and that temporarily removing custody of the child from the appellant would be best for the child's welfare. In re D.E.K., 236 Ga. App. 574, 512 S.E.2d 690 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Trial court improperly concluded, based on mischaracterization of evidence and reliance on inadmissible evidence, that a father's abuse of the mother rendered the father's children by a previous relationship deprived. In the Interest of C.D.E., 248 Ga. App. 756, 546 S.E.2d 837 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Trial court erred in finding that a child was deprived pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), and in ordering that temporary custody be placed in the child's aunt, as the trial court's order reflected that the order was based on a stipulation of deprivation, which was inaccurate, and the mother had only stipulated to a grant of temporary custody for a short time, but had not conceded the issue of deprivation; moreover, the court's order was also based on a mischaracterization and misstatement of the evidence, as well as on unsubstantiated hearsay, rendering the evidence insufficient to support the finding of deprivation. In the Interest of S.J., 270 Ga. App. 598, 607 S.E.2d 225 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Trial court erred in finding that the child was deprived as defined in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 and in ordering continued custody in the Department of Family and Children Services because there was no competent evidence of the mother's present mental impairment, evidence did not substantiate the finding that the child was at risk for child abuse, and none of the evidence presented reflected poorly on the mother's parental fitness. In the Interest of K.S., 271 Ga. App. 891, 611 S.E.2d 150 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court erred in finding that two children were deprived since: (1) one child's appointment with a therapist was missed due to transportation issues and was not timely rescheduled because the mother did not have a telephone; (2) there was no evidence that the mother's occasional drug use adversely affected the children; (3) the mother denied allegations that a child had been crying for long periods of time, that she had shouted at the child to "shut the hell up," and that men were coming in and out of the apartment at all hours; and (4) there was no indication that additional drug screenings and assessments were required under a protective order. In the Interest of A.J.I., 277 Ga. App. 226, 626 S.E.2d 195 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court's order finding that a mother deprived her child, and an award of temporary custody to the child's paternal grandparents, was reversed because: (1) the order was not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) evidence concerning the amount of support the mother provided at a time when she was a non-custodial parent became largely irrelevant once the prior temporary custody order expired and she regained custody; (3) once this occurred, a new deprivation proceeding had to be commenced, requiring proof of current deprivation, and such was not proven; (4) the record was ambiguous regarding the finding that the mother's current employment was insufficient to cover her monthly expenses; and (5) the mother was taking steps to care for the child's needs, such as ensuring that the child's Medicaid eligibility was in proper order, enrolling the child in pre-kindergarten, and scheduling dental and medical appointments. In the Interest of G.S., 279 Ga. App. 89, 630 S.E.2d 607 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court erred in extending temporary custody in the Department of Family and Children Services for an additional 12 months as: (1) the child's father was found to be a fit parent and was fully able to assume custody; (2) there was no testimony that the father was not capable of taking care of the child; and (3) the father completed every aspect of the case plan and was eligible for day-care assistance; thus, the evidence presented at the hearing fell far short of meeting the clear and convincing standard necessary to support a finding of deprivation. In the Interest of J.P., 280 Ga. App. 100, 633 S.E.2d 442 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court erred in finding that a child was deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) because the evidence demonstrated that the mother properly cared for the child and that the child's needs were being met; the only reason a county department of family and children services (DFACS) filed the deprivation petition was because the mother was in DFACS care and because of possible future deprivation, but that was not the standard since the state had to present evidence of present deprivation, which the state failed to do. In the Interest of S. D., 316 Ga. App. 86, 728 S.E.2d 749 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence did not support a finding of deprivation because there was no psychological evaluation included in the record, or reports from treating physicians, or medical reports indicating any mental impairment or how that mental impairment might limit the mother's parental abilities, and the only other evidence in this regard was from the grandmother about the mother having ADHD, learning disabilities, and being "mildly retarded." In the Interest of D. W., 318 Ga. App. 725, 734 S.E.2d 543 (2012).
Juvenile court erred in finding that the child was deprived as the mother and the child lived with the maternal grandmother, there was no evidence that the mother was unable to care for the child, and the isolated instance of the child being without supervision, caused by the mother's temporary hospitalization and the grandmother being away, did not constitute parental unfitness authorizing a finding of deprivation and severance of the parent-child relationship. In the Interest of L. K., 322 Ga. App. 163, 744 S.E.2d 352 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Juvenile court erred by finding that a mother's three children were deprived under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) because the case lacked clear and convincing evidence to support that finding since only one incident of domestic violence occurred in front of the children, and the mother responded appropriately by calling the police. In the Interest of H. B., 324 Ga. App. 36, 749 S.E.2d 38 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Mother was entitled to reversal of an order finding the child deprived because the only witness was the child's case manager, who testified that the child was taken into custody because the mother's seven other children were previously adjudicated deprived and there was concern with regard to mental health issues and housing, both of which had been dealt with by the mother. In the Interest of R. S. T., 323 Ga. App. 860, 748 S.E.2d 498 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Cluttered and dirty home insufficient for deprivation.
- Juvenile court erred in finding that a child was deprived because although the mother's home appeared cluttered and dirty, the environment was otherwise suitable; moreover, for about three weeks prior to the hearing, the mother showed continued improvement in achieving the goal of the safety plan, which appeared to be to provide a suitable environment for the child. In the Interest of T. L., 269 Ga. App. 842, 605 S.E.2d 432 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Criticism of child insufficient for deprivation.
- While there was evidence in a child deprivation proceeding of a stepfather's anger and verbal aggression towards State of Georgia employees and that the child at issue was often quiet and withdrawn while in the mother's and stepfather's care, an order finding the child deprived and removing the child from the mother was reversed since insufficient evidence existed to establish deprivation. The state failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to support the deprivation finding since the state presented evidence of only one episode where the stepfather criticized the child. In the Interest of D.S., 283 Ga. App. 767, 642 S.E.2d 431 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Single episode of pulling gun on parent insufficient for deprivation.
- Juvenile court erred by finding that clear and convincing evidence existed supporting a finding that three children were deprived within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) because a single incident, albeit highly inappropriate, wherein the mother's boyfriend pulled a gun on the mother was insufficient and did not demonstrate abuse of the children. In the Interest of S. M., 321 Ga. App. 827, 743 S.E.2d 497 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
No proof of harm to child.
- Finding that a one-year-old child was deprived was reversed on appeal because the mother's parenting ability had never been called into question, and the only other issue identified in the record was a single altercation between the father and mother, who no longer resided together and that incident did not involve abuse of the child, who was two months old at the time, and the record contained no allegation nor proof of harm to the child. In the Interest of R. L., 321 Ga. App. 837, 743 S.E.2d 502 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Domestic abuse insufficient for deprivation.
- There was absolutely no basis for the trial court to conclude that a father's abuse of the mother rendered the mother's child by a previous relationship a deprived child at the time of the deprivation hearing since: (1) there was absolutely no evidence presented that the mother was anything other than a fit parent for her children, and the only person who even expressed an opinion on the subject testified that she had no concerns whatsoever about the mother's ability to parent her children; (2) the only basis for asserting that any of the children were deprived was the father's violence toward the mother; and (3) the evidence was undisputed that the mother and father were no longer living together at the time of the deprivation hearing and were in the process of obtaining a divorce. In the Interest of C.D.E., 248 Ga. App. 756, 546 S.E.2d 837 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
It was error to find deprivation under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) since the trial court relied on a history of domestic violence between the parents, but the only evidence of such history was the hearsay statement of the mother; even if an incident of domestic violence between the parents happened as the child described, there was no evidence that the child was harmed. In the Interest of H.S., 285 Ga. App. 839, 648 S.E.2d 143 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Requiring financial assistance insufficient for deprivation.
- Trial court erred in finding the father's child was deprived and in transferring the child to the custody of the county child welfare agency. The child was not "deprived" within the meaning of that term under Georgia law as clear and convincing evidence did not show that the child was without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health or morals, although the record did show that the parent at times struggled to provide for the child and needed the financial assistance of others from time to time in order to do so. In the Interest of E.M., 264 Ga. App. 277, 590 S.E.2d 241 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Reading ability of parents as justification for deprivation.
- Trial court's judgment finding that a mother's children continued to be deprived was reversed since, although the trial court based the court's finding partly on the mother's reading level, the case plan only required that the mother enroll and participate in literacy training, not that she reach a certain reading milestone. The mother substantially complied with the goals of the case plan, and there was no evidence of continued deprivation presented to reach the clear and convincing threshold. In the Interest of C.F., 266 Ga. App. 325, 596 S.E.2d 781 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Parent's Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy insufficient for deprivation.
- Trial court erred in finding a child deprived due to her mother's Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSBP) since: (1) the child's symptoms were witnessed by medical professionals; (2) the child's symptoms began to subside before the child was removed from her parents; (3) the mother's therapist did not diagnose her with MSBP; (4) the trial court's decision was based on experts' opinions that were based on incorrect assumptions; and (5) the child services department's expert's opinion did not show that the mother had abused the child by subjecting her to unnecessary medical treatment or that she was a deprived child. In the Interest of A.B., 267 Ga. App. 466, 600 S.E.2d 409 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
No deprivation of special needs child.
- Although a child's disability, when coupled with a parent's limitations, might form a legitimate basis for finding the child to be deprived, when the evidence presented against that parent did not meet the definition of "deprived," and no evidence was presented that the parent was incapable of meeting the child's special needs, clear and convincing evidence was lacking to support a deprivation finding entered against that parent. In the Interest of D.N.K., 282 Ga. App. 430, 638 S.E.2d 861 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Improper actions of grandparent not deprivation.
- Juvenile court erred when the court entered an order finding a young child deprived as defined by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107); although the child's grandparent acted improperly in yelling at the child and pushing the child's face into the side of a car, there was no evidence of any physical or emotional harm to the child, the incident was isolated, and there was no evidence that the grandparent had any past mental or emotional problems. In the Interest of C.L.Z., 283 Ga. App. 247, 641 S.E.2d 243 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence of deprivation supports finding that child will suffer serious harm.
- Same facts that support a juvenile court's conclusion that a child is deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), and that the deprivation is likely to continue if placed with the parent, also support a conclusion that continued deprivation would likely cause the child serious harm under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310). In re A. R., 302 Ga. App. 702, 691 S.E.2d 402 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Willfulness in abuse by babysitter.
- Evidence of willfulness necessary to sustain conviction under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), the contributing to the deprivation of a minor statute, was shown since the evidence established that the defendant babysitter knew that the infant needed immediate medical attention, and that the babysitter failed to seek medical treatment for the infant. Hoang v. State, 250 Ga. App. 403, 551 S.E.2d 813 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Psychological evaluation.
- In determining that children were deprived, the trial court did not err in 2007 in considering a deposition of a psychologist who had evaluated a parent in 2006; that evaluation contained both an assessment of the parent's parental incompetency at the time of the evaluation and a prediction of the likelihood of future improvement; moreover, the trial court had held evidence open for any additional testimony from the psychologist, although none was presented. In the Interest of T.P., 291 Ga. App. 83, 661 S.E.2d 211 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Father not found unfit.
- Trial court erred in awarding temporary custody of a child to the department of family and children services. While the mother's unfitness due to her drug use was proved by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court did not find that the father's threats to and arguments with the mother and her family members harmed the child and, therefore, the court's findings did not establish the father's unfitness. In the Interest of C.R., 292 Ga. App. 346, 665 S.E.2d 39 (2008) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Inadequate Housing
Evidence of deprived child.
- Juvenile court's ruling that a child was deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) was supported by clear and convincing evidence of deprivation based on evidence of the parent's multiple unconfirmed allegations of sexual abuse and the parent's lack of employment and stable housing. In the Interest of J.S., 295 Ga. App. 861, 673 S.E.2d 331 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Children had been found to have been deprived due to inadequate housing and the parent's failure to provide adequate support for the children due to the parent's unstable employment. Since, by the time of the subsequent termination hearing, the parent had failed to comply with a case plan by staying drug-free, maintaining stable housing and employment, attending weekly Narcotics Anonymous meetings, and paying child support, the conditions leading to the prior unappealed finding of deprivation continued to exist. In the Interest of K.R., 298 Ga. App. 436, 680 S.E.2d 532 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Evidence that a mother provided her children with inadequate housing for over a year, had been unemployed for over a year, had not completed a budget, and had just applied for public assistance and Social Security benefits was sufficient to support a judgment that the children were deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107). In the Interest of T.V., 302 Ga. App. 124, 690 S.E.2d 457 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's rights to three minor children under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320) because the children were deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) as the parents failed to provide the children with adequate and stable housing and financial support, and the mother failed to maintain an emotional bond with the children. In the Interest of T. C., 302 Ga. App. 693, 691 S.E.2d 603 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, §§ 24A-401, 24A-2301A, 24A-2302A, and 24A-3301, and pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-37, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Court's jurisdiction encompasses deprivation proceedings.
- Inasmuch as the juvenile court's jurisdiction encompasses proceedings in which a child was alleged to be deprived, Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-211,15-11-212, and15-11-215) applied to a "deprived child" as defined in the statute. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-131 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
"Deprived child" includes child who is abused, neglected, or exploited.
- Although Ga. L. 1974, p. 438, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5) did not explicitly mention "deprived" children that definition was certainly inclusive of a child who was abused, neglected, or exploited. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-131 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
"Threatened harm to child's welfare" included in "deprived child."
- Inasmuch as the court in Elrod v. Department of Family & Children Servs., 136 Ga. App. 251, 220 S.E.2d 726 (1975), spoke of "probable deprivation," "substantial danger," and the "likelihood of substantial threat to a child's physical, mental, moral or emotional well-being," the definitional elements of "deprived child" include "threatened harm to the child's welfare." 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-131 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).
Appointment of guardian in deprivation proceedings.- Under the principle that the law is to be liberally construed toward the protection of the child whose well-being is threatened, deprivation proceedings arising from child abuse and neglect by a parent or caretaker present a conflict of interest wherein the provisions concerning the appointment of a guardian ad litem would apply. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-131 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-3301).