(Code 1981, §15-11-443, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-35/SB 364; Ga. L. 2015, p. 540, § 2-5/HB 361.)
Cross references.- Age of majority, § 39-1-1.
Motion for extension of Juvenile Court order, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 4.5.
Time limitations upon other orders of disposition in Juvenile Court proceedings, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 15.3.
Law reviews.- For article, "An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973). For article surveying developments in Georgia juvenile court practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 167 (1981). For review of 1998 legislation relating to courts, see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 54 (1998). For annual survey of law on appellate practice and procedure, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 25 (2010). For review of 1996 juvenile proceedings legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 88 and 91 (1996).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-41, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-70, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Constitutionality of provision for extension of custody.
- Provision of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-443 and15-11-607) permitting the court to extend an order of disposition for two years did not violate constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy since the statute operated to further the accomplishment of the juvenile's treatment and rehabilitation. In re T.B., 268 Ga. 149, 486 S.E.2d 177 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).
Construction with O.C.G.A. § 17-14-10. - Despite the fact that former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-443 and15-11-607) allowed for a juvenile probation order to be extended if, among other things, a hearing was held prior to the expiration of the order upon motion of a party or on the court's own motion, the juvenile court erred in extending a juvenile's probation and imposing the condition that restitution be paid without making the requisite findings set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-14-10, such as the juvenile's financial condition. In the Interest of C.S., 280 Ga. App. 781, 635 S.E.2d 176 (2006), overruled on other grounds, McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70).
Applicability.
- Provisions of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-443 and15-11-607) were not applicable in proceedings under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-709) for termination of parental rights. In re V.S., 230 Ga. App. 26, 495 S.E.2d 142 (1998).
Juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in transferring a former juvenile's case to the superior court because, as a 28-year-old adult, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter, and the court could not be assured that the former juvenile would receive the appropriate treatment for the necessary length of time in the juvenile system; furthermore, the transfer under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(a)(3) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) did not violate substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Interest of R.T., 278 Ga. App. 225, 628 S.E.2d 662 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70).
Contrary to a juvenile's claim that the juvenile court erred in committing the juvenile into the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice for two years consecutive to a 60-day boot camp program, the disposition was valid under both former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-66(b)(1) and15-11-70(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-443,15-11-600, and15-11-607) as: (1) the former granted the court the discretion, in a case involving a felony offense, to order the juvenile to serve up to a maximum of 60 days in a youth development center in addition to any other treatment or rehabilitation; and (2) under the latter, an order of disposition continued in force for two years, or until the child was sooner discharged by the department. In the Interest of J.R., 280 Ga. App. 143, 633 S.E.2d 447 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70).
Exclusive jurisdiction for at least two years over deprived children.
- Juvenile Code vests exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court for at least two years over matters concerning children whom the juvenile court has duly found to be deprived. West v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 425, 254 S.E.2d 373 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701).
Statute permitted a juvenile court to extend an order of probation until the juvenile reached the age of 21 years. State v. Crankshaw, 243 Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701).
Credibility of witnesses in custody.
- Witness who is under commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice is equally subject to the allegation that the witness is shading their testimony in favor of the state in order to obtain more favorable treatment. Wright v. State, 279 Ga. 498, 614 S.E.2d 56 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70).
Juvenile adjudication of witness.
- Trial court's restriction of the defendant's cross-examination of two state's witnesses about their juvenile adjudications was error as the state's case relied primarily on these witnesses, who provided the only evidence that the defendant shot the victim; thus, the defendant's conviction for felony murder was reversed. Wright v. State, 279 Ga. 498, 614 S.E.2d 56 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70).
Extension of probation proper.
- Juvenile's argument on appeal that the juvenile court was not authorized to extend an order of probation for the purpose of payment of restitution, and in doing so, the juvenile court assumed a prosecutorial role, lacked merit, given the language in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-607) and the state policy pronounced in O.C.G.A. § 17-14-5. In the Interest of C.S., 280 Ga. App. 781, 635 S.E.2d 176 (2006), overruled on other grounds, McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70).
Juvenile's inability to comply with the juvenile court's order to complete 120 days of a reporting program without extending probation was directly attributable to the juvenile's actions in violating probation and, thus, the juvenile court did not err in extending the juvenile's probation period. In the Interest of M. A. I., 319 Ga. App. 578, 737 S.E.2d 585 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-70).
Custody by Department suspends parental right.
- Removal of custody of the child from the parents is a determination that, for whatever length of time custody is exercised by the Department of Family and Children Services, this right has been suspended, although not finally terminated. Rodgers v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 235, 276 S.E.2d 902 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).
Effect of order reversing termination of parental rights.
- After the court of appeals reversed an order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights, on remand, the juvenile court, which had already extended an order giving custody to the Department of Family and Children Services for two years, lacked authority to extend the order further. In re B.G., 231 Ga. App. 39, 497 S.E.2d 572 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Unexpired order of commitment.- Department of Corrections properly has custody of an individual under the provisions of a criminal sentence which was imposed subsequent to an unexpired order of commitment; at the expiration of the criminal sentence, alternative arrangements for custody should be made for the remainder of the term of commitment. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-20 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 50. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 54 et seq., 110 et seq.
C.J.S.- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 224 et seq.
U.L.A.- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 36.