A petition alleging that a child is a child in need of services may be filed by a parent, a guardian, a legal custodian, a law enforcement officer, a guardian ad litem, an attorney who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed and believes that such facts are true, or a prosecuting attorney. Except when such petition has been filed by a prosecuting attorney, it shall not be accepted for filing unless the court or a person authorized by the court has determined and endorsed on the petition that the filing of the petition is in the best interests of the public and such child. When such petition is filed by a prosecuting attorney, the prosecuting attorney shall be authorized to conduct the proceedings on behalf of the state as parens patriae.
(Code 1981, §15-11-420, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-32/SB 364; Ga. L. 2015, p. 540, § 2-3/HB 361.)
Cross references.- Definition of grandparent and securing of rights, § 19-7-3.
Law reviews.- For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971). For article, "An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973). For article, "Child Custody - Jurisdiction and Procedure," see 35 Emory L. J. 291 (1986). For article, "Hush, Little Baby, Don't Say a Word: How Seeking the 'Best Interests of the Child' Fostered a Lack of Accountability in Georgia's Juvenile Courts," see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 531 (2007). For article, "The Prosecuting Attorney in Georgia's Juvenile Courts," see 13 Ga. St. B. J. 27 (2008). For note criticizing jurisdiction of juvenile justice system over runaways and advocating alternative legal approaches, see 24 Emory L. J. 1075 (1975). For comment on grandparents' visitation rights in Georgia, see 29 Emory L. J. 1083 (1980).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601, former Code Section 15-11-37, and pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-24, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Former Code section was not unconstitutional on the ground that the former section violated due process of law by permitting the juvenile court to allow the case to be transferred to the superior court by merely disallowing the filing of a petition such as would vest jurisdiction in the juvenile court, without the benefit of any transfer hearing. Treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right, but one granted by the General Assembly; therefore, the General Assembly may restrict or qualify that right as the General Assembly sees fit. Lane v. Jones, 244 Ga. 17, 257 S.E.2d 525 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601).
No deprivation of due process in giving juvenile court judge discretion as to filing of petitions in that court. This section was for the best interests of the public, as well as the child. Lane v. Jones, 244 Ga. 17, 257 S.E.2d 525 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601).
Party not deprived of due process by judge's refusal to accept petition.
- Juvenile judge's refusal without a hearing to accept a petition alleging delinquency and thereby accept jurisdiction of a case does not deprive a party of due process of law. Lane v. Jones, 626 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928, 101 S. Ct. 1384, 67 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601).
Findings of likelihood of continued deprivation sufficient.
- Because orders entered by the juvenile court before the Department of Human Resources (DHR) filed its termination petition related to that petition, specifically declaring the child to be deprived and that the child had been in the temporary legal custody of the DHR for over 14 months with no indication that the conditions of deprivation will be alleviated in the future, the court either substantially complied with or satisfied by implication the endorsement requirements showing that the filing of the petition was in the best interest of the public and the child. In the Interest of V.D.S., 284 Ga. App. 582, 644 S.E.2d 422 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 635 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A., § 15-11-37).
Only petition can confer jurisdiction.
- Juvenile court's issuance of order of detention did not result in that court's taking jurisdiction because only a "petition" within the meaning of the former section could commence a juvenile proceeding. Longshore v. State, 239 Ga. 437, 238 S.E.2d 22 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601).
Purpose of requiring an endorsement in the petition is to assure that the court, or someone acting for the court, has made such a determination before proceedings are commenced against the child. Such a determination can be made by the court and entered in the record by way of the order of detention. The purpose of the statute being fulfilled, the petitions are not void for lack of an endorsement. J.G.B. v. State, 136 Ga. App. 75, 220 S.E.2d 79 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601).
No custody habeas corpus proceeding without legal right of custody.
- Habeas corpus proceeding to obtain the custody of minor children may not be brought by a person claiming no legal right of custody. This does not mean that a person concerned with the welfare of a child, who is being raised under conditions detrimental to the child's welfare, has no remedy. Spitz v. Holland, 243 Ga. 9, 252 S.E.2d 406 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601).
Finding of deprivation if children's mother killed by father.
- Regardless of the evidence, the court is authorized to find children to be deprived when their mother has been killed by their father. George v. Anderson, 135 Ga. App. 273, 217 S.E.2d 609 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Painter v. Barkley, 157 Ga. App. 69, 276 S.E.2d 850 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601).
Construction with former provisions.
- Nonprofit advocacy organization was authorized to file a deprivation petition which was separate and distinct from the initial deprivation adjudication since there is no statutory requirement that a petition for modification must be filed under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-42 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-312), instead of a deprivation petition under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-24 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-150,15-11-390, and15-11-420). In re A.V.B., 222 Ga. App. 241, 474 S.E.2d 114 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-24).
Great aunt and uncle.
- Child's great aunt and uncle had standing to bring a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's father and mother. In re J.J., 225 Ga. App. 682, 484 S.E.2d 681 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-24).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24-2403, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
School official not liable for investigative referral of deprivation.- School official would not be held liable in a legal action founded upon the official's good faith referral of a child neglect, abuse, or abandonment situation to a county department of family and children services for investigation. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 746 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2403).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 75 et seq.
C.J.S.- 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 184 et seq., 191 et seq.
U.L.A.- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 19, 20, 21.
ALR.- Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.