(Code 1981, §15-11-412, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
Law reviews.- For note criticizing jurisdiction of juvenile justice system over runaways and advocating alternative legal approaches, see 24 Emory L. J. 1075 (1975).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-20, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-48, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Applicability.
- Contrary to the defendant's claims, neither former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-67 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-442) nor former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-48(e) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-135,15-11-400, and15-11-412) applied to the defendant's case because both provisions applied when the child was found "unruly," and the defendant was adjudicated delinquent, not unruly. In the Interest of B. Q. L. E., 297 Ga. App. 273, 676 S.E.2d 742, cert. denied, No. S09C1197, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-48).
Suspect may first be booked if rights are observed.
- There was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-20 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-155,15-11-400,15-11-412, and15-11-504) because a juvenile suspect was first taken to a police station for booking purposes, if the juvenile was advised of the juvenile's rights under that section to be questioned elsewhere; the juvenile signed a waiver of these rights on an "advice to juveniles" form and was detained at a youth development center. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
Confession admissible if juvenile taken before county police.
- Juvenile defendant's confession was admissible despite the fact that the juvenile was not taken before an impartial juvenile intake officer but a member of the county police department since the defendant's mother was present during the juvenile's interrogation and it was not alleged that the officer failed to perform any duty imposed upon the officer. Worthy v. State, 253 Ga. 661, 324 S.E.2d 431 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-20).
All detention facilities not supervised and controlled by juvenile courts.
- Juvenile courts are not granted the power and authority to supervise and control all the various detention facilities. Jones v. State, 134 Ga. App. 611, 215 S.E.2d 483 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
No guarantee of all bed space desired by courts.
- Subsection (a) of former section contemplated otherwise than that the Department of Human Resources guarantee all bed space desired by the juvenile courts. Jones v. State, 134 Ga. App. 611, 215 S.E.2d 483 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
Confinement designation not exercise of court's jurisdiction.
- Juvenile court's order for detention was merely an order pursuant to the former statute; designating the place of confinement was not an exercise of jurisdiction by that court. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
Foster relationship gives rise to no state-created rights.
- Children are placed in foster homes as an alternative to institutional care for what is clearly designed as a transitional phase in the child's life. Therefore, in the eyes of the state, which creates the foster relationship, the relationship is considered temporary at the outset and gives rise to no state-created rights in the foster parents. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S. Ct. 3103, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403, and pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-19, which were subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Juvenile intake officer to locate appropriate juvenile facility.- Juvenile intake officer should make all reasonable efforts to locate an appropriate juvenile facility for the detention of an allegedly delinquent child before determining that such a facility was "not available" for purposes of the former statute. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-13 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
Juvenile court intake officers.
- Officers of the juvenile division of the sheriff's department may not also serve as juvenile court intake officers for purposes of compliance with former statutory provisions. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-66 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 47 et seq., 53 et seq., 66 et seq.
C.J.S.- 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 67 et seq., 156.
43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 140 et seq., 226 et seq., 239.
U.L.A.- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 15, 16.
ALR.
- What constitutes delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant, 45 A.L.R. 1533; 85 A.L.R. 1099.
Authority of court to order juvenile delinquent incarcerated in adult penal institution, 95 A.L.R.3d 568.
Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile, 5 A.L.R.4th 1211.
Foster parent's right to immunity from foster child's negligence claims, 55 A.L.R.4th 778.