(Code 1981, §15-11-320, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2018, p. 19, § 1-2/HB 159; Ga. L. 2020, p. 241, § 4/SB 439.)
Cross references.- Time limitations upon orders of disposition - commitment to Division of Youth Services, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 15.2.
Law reviews.- For annual survey of law of domestic relations, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 179 (1986). For annual survey on law of domestic relations, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 201 (1990). For article on the 2018 amendment of this Code section, see 35 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 77 (2018).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under pre-2000 Code Sections 15-11-51, 15-11-54, 15-11-81, and 15-11-90, and pre-2014 Code Sections 15-11-94 and 15-11-103, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Placement with relative of putative father.
- Evidence supported termination of a father's parental rights since the child was deprived; the court properly refused to consider placing the child with either the father's parents or his sister after terminating the father's parental rights. In the Interest of M.D.B., 262 Ga. App. 796, 586 S.E.2d 700 (2003) decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-103).
Equal protection and due process.
- By not raising the issue below, a parent in a termination of parental rights case waived the parent's arguments that the trial court violated equal protection and due process by not determining whether the parent's mental health concerns affected the parent's ability to complete the specific goals in the parent's case plan; moreover, there was uncontradicted evidence that despite the parent's mental health problems, the parent understood the case plan, appreciated the plan's requirements, and could have completed the plan, but did not do so, and the parent testified that the parent was able both physically and mentally to care for the child. In the Interest of H.M., 287 Ga. App. 418, 651 S.E.2d 527 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
O.C.G.A.
§ 15-11-70 not applicable. - Provisions of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-443 and15-11-607) as to orders of disposition and recommendations regarding unification were not applicable in proceedings under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320). In re V.S., 230 Ga. App. 26, 495 S.E.2d 142 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Primary consideration in proceeding to terminate parental rights was welfare of child. In re Creech, 139 Ga. App. 210, 228 S.E.2d 198 (1976); Avera v. Rainwater, 150 Ga. App. 39, 256 S.E.2d 648 (1979) (decided under former law).
Parental misconduct or incapability must be shown.
- For the termination of parental rights, there must be a showing of parental unfitness caused either by intentional or unintentional misconduct resulting in abuse or neglect of the child, or by what is tantamount to a physical or mental incapability to care for the child. Howard v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 306, 277 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former law).
Petition to terminate own rights not authorized.
- Statutory authority of the juvenile court to entertain petitions to terminate parental rights does not extend to petitions by parents seeking judicial imprimatur of their own voluntary abandonment of parental responsibility. In re K.L.S., 180 Ga. App. 688, 350 S.E.2d 50 (1986) (decided under former law).
Responsibility cannot be terminated by contract.
- Father could not voluntarily abandon his parental responsibility by contract. Diegel v. Diegel, 261 Ga. App. 660, 583 S.E.2d 520 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Agency custody does not oust judicial jurisdiction.
- That a "deprived child" may be in agency custody at the time of the hearing on termination of parental rights does not oust the juvenile court from jurisdiction to determine the ultimate issue of custody. In re K.C.O., 142 Ga. App. 216, 235 S.E.2d 602 (1977) (decided under former law).
Exercise of custody by county department suspends, but does not terminate, parental rights.
- Removal of custody of the child from the parents is a determination that, for whatever length of time custody is exercised by the department of family and children services, this right has been suspended, although not finally terminated. Rodgers v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 235, 276 S.E.2d 902 (1981) (decided under former law).
Venue for foster child in residential county.
- Proceeding to terminate parental rights may be commenced in the county in which the child resides in a foster home. Cain v. Department of Human Resources, 166 Ga. App. 801, 305 S.E.2d 492 (1983) (decided under former law).
Legitimation rights of putative father must first be determined.
- Within the context of a parental rights termination proceeding, a juvenile court had the discretion to determine whether to grant an extension of time for a putative father to serve his legitimation petition on the mother, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(b), former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-283), and Georgia case law that allowed application of the procedural rules set out in the Civil Practice Act, including O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c) relating to service and extensions thereto; accordingly, the juvenile court's refusal to hear the legitimation petition was error as was the decision to terminate the putative father's parental rights under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320) without first determining whether he had standing or not under the legitimation action. In the Interest of A.H., 279 Ga. App. 77, 630 S.E.2d 587 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Biological father who fails to seek to legitimate his child following receipt of proper notice of termination proceedings may not thereafter object to the termination of his parental rights. In the Interest of A.W., 242 Ga. App. 26, 528 S.E.2d 819 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Father lacked standing to challenge termination order.
- Given a biological father's failure to legitimate the child at issue, the father lacked standing to challenge the juvenile court's termination of parental rights order. In the Interest of L.S.T., 286 Ga. App. 638, 649 S.E.2d 841 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Withdrawal of consent not allowed.
- After voluntarily consenting to a termination of parental rights, a parent could not change the parent's mind because such consent was undertaken in writing, in open court, and upon the advice of counsel; further, no statutory authority existed allowing a parent to withdraw the voluntary consent to the termination of parental rights. In the Interest of T.C.D., 281 Ga. App. 517, 636 S.E.2d 704 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Right to counsel.
- Parent, who was represented by counsel during the course of a termination of parental rights proceeding, could not prove that the parent was denied counsel during the proceeding because, beyond the parent's claim that the parent was denied counsel, the parent failed to show what arguments the parent would have advanced, what evidence the parent would have produced in the parent's favor, or how the parent would have been successful had the parent been represented by counsel; moreover, in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the termination of the parent's parental rights, there was nothing in the record that would support a finding of harm. In the Interest of M.S., 279 Ga. App. 254, 630 S.E.2d 856 (2006), overruled on other grounds, In re J.M.B., 296 Ga. App. 786, 676 S.E.2d 9 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion denying a father's motion for a continuance of a termination hearing on the basis that the father's attorney did not have sufficient time to prepare for the termination hearing because the father delayed requesting court-appointed counsel and waited until the day before the hearing to ask for a continuance. In the Interest of A.R.K.L., 314 Ga. App. 847, 726 S.E.2d 77 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
No ineffective counsel.
- Parent did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding as: (1) the counsel's failure to call an employer of the parent as a witness was reasonable since the employer had been disbarred for child molestation; (2) in the absence of a showing how the attorney's actions in conducting discovery compromised the parent's representation, there was no error in the juvenile court's finding that the parent had adequate access to counsel; and (3) claims as to counsel's failure to properly follow up on the issue of relative placement and to argue for a continuance were without merit. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Denial of continuance not abuse of discretion.
- Given that the procedural history of a termination of parental rights action was one of continuing delay and postponement because a parent failed to show: (1) that a continuance of the hearing was an entitlement; (2) what arguments and evidence would have been advanced; or (3) that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different if the parent or counsel had been present, the juvenile court's denial of a continuance of a termination hearing was not an abuse of discretion. In the Interest of R.L.J., 285 Ga. App. 887, 648 S.E.2d 189 (2007), overruled on other grounds, In re J.M.B., 296 Ga. App. 786, 676 S.E.2d 9 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Determination whether needs met by temporary custody.
- Although sufficient evidence was presented to authorize termination of parental rights, the case was remanded to the trial court to determine if the child's needs could be met by temporary custody to some agency or individual as opposed to a complete severance of all parental rights. Jones v. Department of Human Resources, 168 Ga. App. 915, 310 S.E.2d 753 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
In a hearing on parental custody in a divorce action, the trial court erred in awarding custody of the parties' minor children to the Department of Family and Children Services based upon findings that the children were deprived and the parents unfit because the mother had no notice that the superior court judge might award custody of the children to a third party based upon standards of deprivation. Watkins v. Watkins, 266 Ga. 269, 466 S.E.2d 860 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Agency required to make thorough search for relative placement.
- Juvenile court erred in failing to require the child services agency to make a thorough search for a suitable relative placement for a child whose mother's parental rights were terminated. In the Interest of A.K., 272 Ga. App. 429, 612 S.E.2d 581 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court did not err in failing to place two children with a relative as a child services agency investigated placement with a parent's sibling (who did not want the children), the grandparents (who were financially unstable and had a history of child abuse), and a great-grandparent (who was on disability and in poor health); on the other hand, the children had formed a bond with their foster parents, who were raising the children as their own. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Jurisdiction properly exercised.
- Juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over termination proceedings pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-28 and15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10 and15-11-320) as the petition was filed by the mother, who had already been awarded sole physical custody of the child and as the termination petition dealt specifically with factors relating to the father's inability to provide proper care and support for the child such that the father's parental rights should be terminated. In the Interest of A.R.K.L., 314 Ga. App. 847, 726 S.E.2d 77 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination petition was not a disguised adoption matter.
- Contrary to a father's contention, the termination petition filed by the child's mother was not actually a disguised adoption matter that could be properly heard only in superior court. The stepfather's mere expression of a desire to adopt the child at some time in the future was not sufficient for the court to conclude that the petition was filed in connection with an adoption proceeding; there was no evidence that an adoption petition was pending at the time that the petition was filed; and the petition, which stated that the father failed to provide for the support of the child and failed to have any contact with the child, alleged grounds sufficient for termination. In the Interest of A.R.K.L., 314 Ga. App. 847, 726 S.E.2d 77 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Order deficient.
- Superior court's order in termination of parental rights action was deficient because it did not include specific findings of fact showing that the mother abandoned the child, and it did not include specific factual findings showing that the mother failed to provide care and support for the child without justifiable cause. Moreover, the superior court's conclusion that adoption was in the child's best interest also lacked particularity. Dell v. Dell, 324 Ga. App. 297, 748 S.E.2d 703 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Criteria for Termination
Criteria justifying termination.
- Affirmative evidence of moral unfitness, physical abuse, abandonment, refusal to support, or similar misconduct by a parent or the likelihood of substantial threat to a child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional well-being justifiably warrants the termination of a parent's right to a child. Elrod v. Hall County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 136 Ga. App. 251, 220 S.E.2d 726 (1975) (decided under former law).
Thread running through parental right termination cases manifests moral unfitness, physical abuse, and abandonment. Patty v. Department of Human Resources, 154 Ga. App. 455, 269 S.E.2d 30 (1980) (decided under former law).
Court in arriving at the court's decision in terminating parental rights should use, among other criteria, moral unfitness, physical abuse, and abandonment by a parent. Gardner v. Lenon, 154 Ga. App. 748, 270 S.E.2d 36 (1980) (decided under former law).
Custody may be lost if a child is found to be destitute or suffering, if the child is being reared under immoral influences, or if the child is found to be deprived and likely to be harmed thereby. In re M.M.A., 166 Ga. App. 620, 305 S.E.2d 139 (1983) (decided under former law).
Parental rights may be terminated when the child is deprived and the court finds that the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied and that by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm. The last two statutorily required findings are necessary only in cases of termination of parental rights. In re J.C.P., 167 Ga. App. 572, 307 S.E.2d 1 (1983), but see In re A.W., 240 Ga. App. 259, 523 S.E.2d 88 (1999) (decided under former law).
Determining the propriety of termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the court shall determine if there exists clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability; secondly, if such evidence exists, the court then considers whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, given the physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs of the child, including the need for a stable home. In re G.L.H., 209 Ga. App. 146, 433 S.E.2d 357 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re B.C., 235 Ga. App. 152, 508 S.E.2d 774 (1998);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Juvenile court employed a two-prong analysis for determining whether parental rights should be terminated under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-10-310 and15-10-320) first, the court determined whether there was clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or that the parent was unable to care for and control the child; and, second, the court determined whether termination was in the best interest of the child. In the Interest of A.M., 259 Ga. App. 537, 578 S.E.2d 226 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Detailed findings for termination.
- Termination of parental rights was allowed when the trial judge made detailed findings regarding the criteria to meet the two-step test, specifically, the court found that within the 18 months preceding the court's order, the defendant made no attempt to contact or communicate with the child, and the child was readily adoptable. In re H.M.T., 203 Ga. App. 247, 416 S.E.2d 567 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Considerations for the court.
- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)- (C)(ii)-(iii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), in cases when the child was not in the custody of the parent who was the subject of the termination of parental rights proceedings and in determining whether the child was without proper parental care and control, the court should consider, without being limited to, whether the parent without justifiable cause failed significantly for a period of one year or longer prior to the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights: (1) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree; and (2) to comply with a court ordered plan designed to reunite the child with the parent or parents. In the Interest of J.J., 259 Ga. App. 159, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Egregious conduct was one factor in termination proceedings.
- Egregious conduct or evidence of past egregious conduct of a parent toward the parent's child or another child of a physically, emotionally, or sexually cruel or abusive nature was one factor a court may consider in determining whether the child was without proper parental care and control under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-318). In the Interest of J.P., 253 Ga. App. 732, 560 S.E.2d 318 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Because a mother's children had been found to be deprived, as defined in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-107), because her persistent failure to adequately supervise the children supported a finding that the deprivation was likely to continue, and because continued deprivation was likely to seriously harm the children, the mother's parental rights were properly terminated. In the Interest of T. A. H., 310 Ga. App. 93, 712 S.E.2d 115 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Findings
Required explicit statutory findings should be made in accordance with Ga. L. 1970, p. 170, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52). Crook v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 137 Ga. App. 817, 224 S.E.2d 806 (1976) (decided under former law).
Juvenile courts were given wide discretion, once deprivation was found, either to terminate the rights of the parent or issue an order under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34. Painter v. Barkley, 157 Ga. App. 69, 276 S.E.2d 850 (1981) (decided under former law).
Explicit findings of fact as well as conclusions of law are required to be made in juvenile court cases which seek a termination of parental rights. Avera v. Rainwater, 147 Ga. App. 505, 249 S.E.2d 340 (1978) (decided under former law).
Trial court erred in failing to make explicit findings of fact regarding parental inability or misconduct and in failing to draw explicit conclusions of law and, thus, the court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights in her three children. In the Interest of S.W.J.P.D., 275 Ga. App. 272, 620 S.E.2d 497 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Final order terminating the mother's parental rights did not include findings of fact and conclusions of law as required. The order was deficient because the order did not address any of the criteria for termination of parental rights, the order did not include specific findings of fact showing that the mother abandoned the child, and the order did not include specific factual findings showing that the mother failed to provide care and support for the child without justifiable cause. Dell v. Dell, 324 Ga. App. 297, 748 S.E.2d 703 (2013).
Finding under former statute was not required to be explicit but could be implicit from the disposition made in the order and the evidence adduced at the hearing. Moss v. Moss, 135 Ga. App. 401, 218 S.E.2d 93 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-3201).
Judgment must show compliance with statutory criteria.
- Judgment having such a final, ultimate, and significant result as that of severing the rights of a parent to a child must conclusively show compliance with the statutory criteria prescribed as a condition precedent for such termination; a dry recitation that certain legal requirements have been met is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of the law; the judgment must set forth sufficiently explicit findings. McCary v. Department of Human Resources, 151 Ga. App. 181, 259 S.E.2d 181 (1979) (decided under former law).
Superior court's order was deficient because the order did not address any of the criteria for termination of parental rights pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-94, it did not include specific findings of fact showing that the mother abandoned the child, and the order did not include specific factual findings showing that the mother failed to provide care and support for the child without justifiable cause. Moreover, the superior court's conclusion that adoption was in the child's best interest also lacked particularity and, therefore, the mother was entitled to an order vacating the grant of the stepmother's petition for adoption. Dell v. Dell, 324 Ga. App. 297, 748 S.E.2d 703 (2013) (decided under former law).
Denial of maternal grandmother's petition for custody proper.
- In a termination of parental rights proceeding, a juvenile court did not err by denying the maternal grandmother's petition for custody of the child because the grandmother had never seen the child and called the state only once about the child. In the Interest of S.R.C.J., 317 Ga. App. 699, 732 S.E.2d 547 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Dry recitation that certain legal requirements are met is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the law with regard to termination of parental rights. In re H.T., 198 Ga. App. 463, 402 S.E.2d 83 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Order terminating parental rights must contain explicit findings supporting conclusions that: (1) the child is deprived; (2) the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied; and (3) by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm. Griffith v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 649, 284 S.E.2d 666 (1981) (decided under former law).
Explicit findings required for termination.
- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), a finding of parental misconduct or inability required clear and convincing evidence of the following four factors: (1) that the child was deprived; (2) that the cause of the deprivation was a lack of proper parental care or control; (3) that the cause of the deprivation was likely to continue or was not likely to be remedied; and (4) that the continued deprivation was likely to cause physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child. In the Interest of A.M., 259 Ga. App. 537, 578 S.E.2d 226 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination decision supported by "parental misconduct" findings.
- Once a juvenile court made explicit findings as to the existence of "parental misconduct," as defined in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311), the court did not have to make further factual findings to support the court's decision to terminate parental rights. In re G.K.J., 187 Ga. App. 443, 370 S.E.2d 490 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Explicit finding of deprivation or abandonment required.
- Explicit conclusions of law conforming to statutory requirements are required in termination of parental rights cases. Accordingly, an appellate court may not supply by implication a finding of deprivation or abandonment. Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 148 Ga. App. 219, 251 S.E.2d 134 (1978) (decided under former law).
Explicit finding of deprivation is necessary and the appellate court will not supply by implication such a finding. Roberts v. State, 139 Ga. App. 353, 228 S.E.2d 376 (1976), later appeal, 141 Ga. App. 268, 233 S.E.2d 224 (1977) (decided under former law).
Termination proper when explicit finding of deprivation.
- When there was a prior hearing in which the children were determined to be "deprived" and, in the termination hearing, the judge made explicit findings of fact concerning events since the original hearing and concluded that "the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue and will not be remedied and that by reason thereof, the children are suffering and will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm," an order of termination was proper. Wynn v. Department of Human Resources, 149 Ga. App. 559, 254 S.E.2d 883 (1979) (decided under former law).
In a termination of parental rights case, there was clear and convincing evidence that the children were deprived as required under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310); the juvenile court entered three unappealed orders finding that the children were deprived, and the father was bound by the orders. In the Interest of M.R., 282 Ga. App. 91, 637 S.E.2d 743 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 56 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Parental rights are terminated only when there is profoundly detrimental, egregious, parental conduct underlying the statutorily mandated determination of deprivation and probable continued deprivation. Madray v. Department of Human Resources, 146 Ga. App. 762, 247 S.E.2d 579 (1978) (decided under former law); Shover v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 38, 270 S.E.2d 462 (1980);(decided under former law).
Termination authorized for conclusion of deprivation.
- When the findings of fact supported by the evidence authorized the conclusion of law that the children were deprived and that the conditions that caused the deprivation are likely to continue, the termination of parental rights was authorized. Roberson v. Department of Human Resources, 148 Ga. App. 626, 252 S.E.2d 57 (1979) (decided under former law).
Order need not recite words "in the best interest of the child."
- While former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320) mandated the juvenile court consider "the best interest of the child" before ruling on a petition to terminate a parent's rights in the child, the subsection contained no explicit statutory requirement that an order recite the words "in the best interest of the child" before the order was correct under the law. In re T.M.H., 197 Ga. App. 416, 398 S.E.2d 766 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Trial court's findings were sufficiently explicit to support termination. In re G.T.T., 199 Ga. App. 706, 405 S.E.2d 750 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Parent could challenge findings when changed circumstances.
- When a parent's inability that supported an initial finding of deprivation, the parent's absence due to incarceration, no longer existed at the time of the hearing on the termination petition, the parent's failure to appeal earlier deprivation orders did not preclude the parent from challenging the juvenile court's finding that the children were deprived at the time of the hearing on the termination petition. In the Interest of R.C.M., 284 Ga. App. 791, 645 S.E.2d 363 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Unreasoned expansion of evidence not favored.
- Former Code 1933, § 24A-101 counseled against any unreasoned expansion of the type of evidence which will suffice to show deprivation, and probable continued deprivation, causing or likely to cause serious harm to a child because of the Code's expressed preference for preservation of the family unit. Leyva v. Brooks, 145 Ga. App. 619, 244 S.E.2d 119 (1978) (decided under former law).
Due regard for rights of parents in termination hearing.
- Termination hearing seeks above all else the welfare of the child, with due regard for the rights of the natural and adoptive parents. In re Levi, 131 Ga. App. 348, 206 S.E.2d 82 (1974) (decided under former law); Gardner v. Lenon, 154 Ga. App. 748, 270 S.E.2d 36 (1980);(decided under former law).
Court must relate welfare of child to parental misconduct and not to the vagaries or vicissitudes that beset every family on its journey through the thickets of life. Shover v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 38, 270 S.E.2d 462 (1980) (decided under former law).
It is not proper to consider the question of the termination of parental rights based solely upon a "welfare of the child" test, without some required showing of parental unfitness, caused either by intentional or unintentional misconduct resulting in the abuse or neglect of the child, or by what is tantamount to physical or mental incapability to care for the child. Ray v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 81, 270 S.E.2d 303 (1980) (decided under former law); Chancey v. Department of Human Resources, 156 Ga. App. 338, 274 S.E.2d 728 (1980); Brown v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 106, 276 S.E.2d 155 (1981) (decided under former law);(decided under former law).
It is not proper to consider the question of termination of parental rights based solely upon a "welfare of the child" test, without some required showing of parental unfitness, caused either by intentional or unintentional misconduct resulting in the abuse or neglect of the child, or by what is tantamount to physical or mental incapability to care for the child. Griffith v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 649, 284 S.E.2d 666 (1981) (decided under former law); Dale v. Hall County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 159 Ga. App. 654, 284 S.E.2d 669 (1981) (decided under former law).
Factors showing misconduct may be used to support finding of best interest.
- Same factors which show the existence of parental misconduct or inability can also be used to support a finding that the termination of parental rights would be in the child's best interests. In re M.L.P., 236 Ga. App. 504, 512 S.E.2d 652 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Authority to conduct best interests analysis.
- Trial court erroneously found that the court had no discretion to consider whether the parties' agreement, voluntarily terminating the father's parental rights under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 as part of the divorce settlement, was in the best interests of the child; the trial court, which had authority under O.C.G.A. § 19-9-5(b) to reject a custody agreement as being against the child's best interests and which had authority under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320) to ascertain whether a voluntary termination was in the child's best interests, was to reject the agreement if it was not in the child's best interests. Taylor v. Taylor, 280 Ga. 88, 623 S.E.2d 477 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Order of department compliance.
- Although a prior order of the court which allegedly required the department to monitor the father's parenting skills was not made a part of the record, when there was evidence which established that the department complied with the order and the father failed to cooperate, the trial court properly concluded that the court's order had not been violated or that if the order had been violated, the violation was not relevant to the court's decision on the merits. In re C.G.A., 204 Ga. App. 174, 418 S.E.2d 779 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Evidence
Present situation must be considered prior to termination.
- Juvenile court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights after the child was beaten by the mother's husband so severely that she had to be placed on life support since the Department of Family and Children Services failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the mother was presently unfit and that the deprivation would continue unless her parental rights were terminated; there was no evidence that the child had been deprived while in her mother's care prior to the mother's marriage and as the husband had been removed from the child and the mother's life, the primary cause of the child's deprivation had been remedied. In addition, the mother acted entirely on her own to improve her abilities to care for her child so that a similar situation did not recur. In the Interest of V.E.H., 262 Ga. App. 192, 585 S.E.2d 154 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Evidence requirements showing parental misconduct or inability.
- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) and (b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), construing the evidence most favorably to the findings of the court, the question on appeal of a termination of parental rights was whether a rational trier of fact could have found clear and convincing evidence: (1) of parental misconduct or inability; and (2) that terminating parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Parental misconduct or inability was shown by evidence: (1) that the child was deprived; (2) lack of parental care caused the deprivation; (3) such was likely to continue; and (4) the continued deprivation was likely to cause serious harm to the child. In the Interest of M.L., 259 Ga. App. 534, 578 S.E.2d 190 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Two-step analysis.
- Termination of parental rights case involves a two-step analysis, first, there must be a finding of parental misconduct or inability, which requires clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the child is deprived; (2) the lack of proper parental care or control is the cause of the deprivation; (3) the cause of the deprivation is likely to continue; and (4) continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child. If these four factors exist, then the court must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, considering the child's physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs, including the need for a secure, stable home. In the Interest of N.L., 260 Ga. App. 830, 581 S.E.2d 643 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Testimony of child might be best testimony as to mother-child relationship in an action to sever parental rights. Harper v. Department of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 758, 285 S.E.2d 220 (1981) (decided under former law).
Inability to properly rear children.
- Same factors that show a parent's inability to properly rear her children also may provide proof that termination of parental rights would be in the children's best interests. In re S.J.C., 234 Ga. App. 491, 507 S.E.2d 226 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Same factors showing parental misconduct used for termination.
- Same factors that show parental misconduct or inability can support a juvenile court's finding that termination of parental rights is in the children's best interests. In the Interest of N.L., 260 Ga. App. 830, 581 S.E.2d 643 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Same evidence showing parental misconduct used for termination.
- Same evidence showing parental misconduct or inability may establish the requirement to show that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interest. In the Interest of A.B., 274 Ga. App. 230, 617 S.E.2d 189 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Information not obtainable from parent's attorney.
- Child's paternal grandparents were not entitled to subpoena the attorney who had represented the child's mother in several DUI cases in order to obtain information concerning her "alcohol problem," since the information sought could have been obtained through other sources. In re N.S.M., 183 Ga. App. 398, 359 S.E.2d 185 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Reversal not required by hearsay evidence.
- Consideration of hearsay evidence contained in reports received from various doctors, teachers, and other diagnostic specialists did not require reversal of a juvenile judge's decision on the termination of parental rights, since there was ample evidence to support the judge's finding of continued deprivation even without reliance on the hearsay records. In re J.T.S., 185 Ga. App. 772, 365 S.E.2d 550 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Criminal acts of mental and physical abuse.
- Clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability, including criminal acts of mental and physical child abuse were present. In re R.E.C., 187 Ga. App. 35, 369 S.E.2d 323 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Factors showing parental inability used for termination.
- Court may look at the same factors which show parental inability to care for a child to support a finding that termination of parental rights would be in the child's best interest, and since those factors, combined with the mother's uncertainty as to when she would be able to care for the child, were factored into the child's need for a permanent home and emotional stability, there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. In re J.O.L., 235 Ga. App. 856, 510 S.E.2d 613 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Staleness of evidence.
- When the evidence of parental misconduct was stale and there was an absence of clear and convincing evidence that the deprivation was likely to continue, termination of parental rights was inappropriate. In re R.U., 223 Ga. App. 440, 477 S.E.2d 864 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Evidence of parent's character is admissible in a termination of parental rights proceeding as the proceeding inherently involves character issues, specifically the parent's ability to provide proper parental care and control; while most civil cases require the factfinder to determine the truth only with regard to the discrete transactions in issue, termination cases require the factfinder to predict a parent's future conduct and ability to parent. Davis v. Rathel, 273 Ga. App. 183, 614 S.E.2d 823 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence of father's past behavior.
- Based on the father's past behavior, the length of time his problems have persisted, and his own admissions, the juvenile court did not err in terminating his parental rights. In the Interest of D.L.D., 248 Ga. App. 149, 546 S.E.2d 11 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Focus on past actions of parent.
- Juvenile court properly focused on evidence of the mother's past physical, mental, and emotional neglect of her other children in terminating her parental rights. In the Interest of Z.B., 252 Ga. App. 335, 556 S.E.2d 234 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
More weight given to past behavior than positive promises.
- Termination of a mother's parental rights was upheld since the evidence showed that, despite the mother's claim that she had changed while in prison and that she would be divorcing her husband who was prone to mistreat their children, the children had already suffered serious second-degree burning. In re T.M.R., 208 Ga. App. 499, 430 S.E.2d 865 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Despite recent efforts made by the mother to comply with some of the case plan goals, the trial court was entitled to place more weight on negative past facts than positive promises as to the future and to find that the deprivation was likely to continue in light of the mother's past conduct; clear and convincing evidence established that the deprivation was likely to continue since the facts showed that the mother failed to complete the agency's reunification plan, failed to complete drug treatment, had repeated incarcerations, and failed to support the children, as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-2 and former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)- (C)(ii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311). In the Interest of A.H., 278 Ga. App. 192, 628 S.E.2d 626 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence supported the termination of a parent's parental rights: the parent's recent stable housing and income and the parent's unsubstantiated claims of drug rehabilitation were outweighed by the parent's four-year abandonment of the children; the parent's recent drug use; the parent's failure to control a seizure disorder; and the parent's failure to maintain a bond with the children. In the Interest of R.C.M., 284 Ga. App. 791, 645 S.E.2d 363 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Past history given more weight than future promises.
- During the 32-month period that the child was in foster care, because a mother: (1) failed to maintain a job, failed to provide adequate financial support for the child, failed to consult with a psychiatrist, failed to obtain a driver's license, and failed to secure stable, adequate housing; (2) gave birth to two more children and was struggling to support them on her own; and (3) failed to achieve many of the goals set out in her reunification plan, including missing approximately half of her scheduled visits with the child, clear and convincing evidence was presented to support termination of her parental rights; further, despite her efforts to obtain her GED and an offer of employment that she planned to accept following the termination hearing, such effort was not conclusive of parental fitness in light of her history of neglect. In the Interest of J.G.-S., 279 Ga. App. 102, 630 S.E.2d 615 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Discounting promises for future.
- In light of a parent's continued lack of housing or employment, repeated failure to comply with the case plan, and continued mental instability coupled with a failure to complete mandated mental health and substance abuse treatment, clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's order terminating that parent's parental rights; moreover, in making this determination, the juvenile court was authorized to consider the parent's past conduct and to discount promises to obtain stable housing and employment in the future. In the Interest of D.P.E., 282 Ga. App. 529, 639 S.E.2d 535 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence must pertain to present circumstances.
- When the evidence of the mother's purported parental unfitness considered by the trial court consisted of episodes which occurred in the past and since there was no clear and convincing evidence of her current unfitness, even though the mother's life had been marked by a recurring pattern of drug abuse, crime, and incarceration, because there was no compelling evidence presented which would clearly convince a rational trier of fact that the child's past deprivation would continue so as to authorize the total termination of the mother's parental rights, the trial court's order totally terminating the mother's parental rights was reversed. In re N.F.R., 179 Ga. App. 346, 346 S.E.2d 121 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Terminated caseworker's unavailability affected parental termination.
- Summary of terminated caseworker's files was hearsay evidence and should not have been introduced into evidence; without summary, the state lacked clear and convincing evidence to show that parental rights should be terminated. In the Interest of A.A., 252 Ga. App. 167, 555 S.E.2d 827 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Calling father as adverse witness.
- Juvenile court did not err in a parental rights termination proceeding pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-320) when the court allowed paternal grandparents who petitioned for permanent custody of their grandchildren to call the father as an adverse witness, subject to cross-examination pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611), as there was no due process violation of the father's rights pursuant to U.S. Const., amend. 14 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I. In the Interest of D.J., 279 Ga. App. 355, 631 S.E.2d 427 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Witness credibility decision, supported by evidence, undisturbed.
- Under the provisions of the Juvenile Code, the judge sits as the trier of fact. Decisions as to the credibility of witnesses rest solely with the judge, and if there is any evidence to support the judge's findings, those findings will not be disturbed. Powell v. Department of Human Resources, 147 Ga. App. 251, 248 S.E.2d 533 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Chancey v. Department of Human Resources, 156 Ga. App. 338, 274 S.E.2d 728 (1980) (decided under former law).
Unwilling parent could be cross-examined.
- Former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611) applied to termination proceedings, which were civil, not criminal, in nature; therefore, a parent had no right to refuse to be called as a witness for cross-examination by the Department of Family and Children Services. In the Interest of A.R.A.S., 278 Ga. App. 608, 629 S.E.2d 822 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence of treatment of newborn properly excluded.
- In light of the parent's history and failure to make adequate progress under the parent's case plan as to child one and child two, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to admit subsequent evidence of the conditions surrounding a third newly-born child as those conditions did not change the parent's treatment of and lack of bonding with child one and two. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Citizen review panel reports contain hearsay that cannot be considered in determining whether clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of a parent's rights. In the Interest of N.G., 257 Ga. App. 57, 570 S.E.2d 367 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
To find abandonment, there must be sufficient evidence of actual desertion, accompanied by intention to sever entirely, so far as possible to do so, the parental relation, throw off all obligations growing out of the relationship, and forego all parental duties and claims. Thrasher v. Glynn County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 162 Ga. App. 702, 293 S.E.2d 6 (1982), but see In re A.W., 240 Ga. App. 259, 523 S.E.2d 88 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Clear and Convincing Standard
Evidentiary standard for termination of parental rights is compelling facts to establish the necessary lack of proper parental care or control. Brown v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 106, 276 S.E.2d 155 (1981) (decided under former law).
Clear and convincing evidence of the elements set out in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311) as to deprivation was required to authorize the termination of parental rights. In re L.A., 166 Ga. App. 857, 305 S.E.2d 636 (1983) (decided under former law); In re S.G.T., 175 Ga. App. 475, 333 S.E.2d 445 (1985);(decided under former law).
Third party must show "clear, convincing" evidence.
- As between a natural parent and a third party (grandparent), the parent can be deprived of custody only if one of the conditions specified in O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1 and19-7-4, or one of the other legal grounds, is found to exist by clear and convincing evidence. Brant v. Bazemore, 159 Ga. App. 659, 284 S.E.2d 674 (1981) (decided under former law).
When a third party sued the custodial parent to obtain custody of a child and to terminate the parent's custodial rights in the child, the parent is entitled to custody of the child unless the third party shows by "clear and convincing evidence" that the parent is unfit or otherwise not entitled to custody under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1 and19-7-4. Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-33(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-600) required the court after a hearing to find "clear and convincing evidence" of "deprivation" before an order of termination could be entered. Heath v. McGuire, 167 Ga. App. 489, 306 S.E.2d 741 (1983) (decided under former law).
Clear and convincing evidence found of compelling facts authorizing termination of parental rights.
- See White v. Department of Human Resources, 167 Ga. App. 731, 307 S.E.2d 686 (1983) (decided under former law); In re K.E.B., 193 Ga. App. 382, 388 S.E.2d 1 (1989); In re C.M., 194 Ga. App. 503, 391 S.E.2d 26 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re S.T., 201 Ga. App. 37, 410 S.E.2d 312 (1991); In re M.R., 213 Ga. App. 460, 444 S.E.2d 866 (1994), overruled on other grounds, In re C.S.W., 231 Ga. App. 444, 498 S.E.2d 813 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re K.S.W., 233 Ga. App. 144, 503 S.E.2d 376 (1998); In re R.M., 232 Ga. App. 727, 503 S.E.2d 635 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In the Interest of J.H., 244 Ga. App. 788, 536 S.E.2d 805 (2000);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of father's parental rights.
- In a termination of parental rights proceeding, clear and convincing evidence showed the deprivation suffered by a father's children was likely to cause serious harm, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), because: (1) the father had no bond with the children,; and (2) a child's removal from foster care would be emotionally devastating. In the Interest of E.G., 315 Ga. App. 35, 726 S.E.2d 510 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of mother's parental rights.
- Order terminating a mother's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence based on the mother's past conduct, present incarceration, lack of parental bond, and failure to support her child, deprivation was likely to continue, and termination was in the child's best interests. In the Interest of P.A.T.L., 264 Ga. App. 901, 592 S.E.2d 536 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
As a mother's children had been in foster care for three years, and during that time period she did not complete her case plan by finding stable housing and employment, clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that termination of her parental rights under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320) was in the children's best interest. In the Interest of C.T.M., 278 Ga. App. 297, 628 S.E.2d 713 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
County Department of Family and Children Services presented clear and convincing evidence that the cause of a child's deprivation by his mother was likely to continue as the juvenile court properly considered: (1) the mother's past conduct in making this determination; and (2) that despite assistance from the Department, the mother maintained a relationship with a man who abused her, failed to pay child support, failed to maintain stable housing or employment, refused to cooperate with the Department's counselor, and was unable to care for the child or the child's siblings. In the Interest of S.R.B., 273 Ga. App. 39, 614 S.E.2d 150 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
When mother's triplets were removed at three months of age in 2001, the mother made some efforts to address drug problems, but showed no prospect of providing support or a stable home for the children, and the mother continued to use drugs after a treatment program, and failed to complete numerous terms of a parent reunification plan, clear and convincing evidence supported termination of the mother's parental rights. In the Interest of J.A.R.S., 262 Ga. App. 237, 585 S.E.2d 184 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights in her two children as clear and convincing evidence supported findings that the mother was unable to properly parent them because their deprivation was likely to continue or would likely not be remedied, since the evidence showed that she had spent some time in jail, was currently in jail for five years, and had trouble maintaining stable employment and housing even when she was not in jail. In the Interest of C.B.H., 262 Ga. App. 833, 586 S.E.2d 678 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights as the lack of care or control was likely to continue in light of the mother's history of neglect, including her consideration of placing the children with their grandmother, who had abused the mother as a child; further, the mother's failure to meet any of the reunification goals and her relapse into criminal behavior while she was failing to meet the goals of her case plans supported this finding. In the Interest of C.T.M., 273 Ga. App. 168, 614 S.E.2d 812 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) because clear and convincing evidence supported the court's finding that the children were deprived under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-107); the mother failed to complete counseling for her depression and parenting aide counseling, and the mother failed to exercise scheduled visits with the children. In the Interest of A. R., 315 Ga. App. 357, 726 S.E.2d 800 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of parental rights of mother and father.
- See In re J.T.S., 185 Ga. App. 772, 365 S.E.2d 550 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re K.G.L., 198 Ga. App. 891, 403 S.E.2d 464 (1991); In re F.C., 239 Ga. App. 545, 521 S.E.2d 470 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re C.J.B., 239 Ga. App. 755, 521 S.E.2d 891 (1999); In re J.V., 241 Ga. App. 621, 526 S.E.2d 386 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Clear and convincing evidence supported termination.
- State presented clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(i)-(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310) when: (1) the parents did not appeal the deprivation order, so it was undisputed that the children were deprived; and (2) the parents did not accomplish the goals of the reunification plan as the parents failed to: maintain stable employment, maintain stable and sanitary housing, successfully complete the required psychological counseling, learn and apply budgeting and home management skills, and make regular child support payments. The record supported findings that the cause of the children's deprivation was unlikely to be remedied and that the continued deprivation was likely to cause physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children. In the Interest of M.E.S., 263 Ga. App. 132, 587 S.E.2d 282 (2003).
Clear and convincing evidence supported an order terminating the parent's parental rights, specifically that: (1) the parent exhibited a willingness to put a drug addiction before the needs to the child; (2) the parent failed to establish a strong parental bond with the child; and (3) the child exhibited a strong risk of developing behavioral and attachment problems if not adopted. Moreover, the aforementioned evidence supported a finding that the child's deprivation was likely to continue and that termination was in the child's best interest. In the Interest of E.J., 284 Ga. App. 814, 644 S.E.2d 906 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Order terminating a parent's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence as: (1) an order finding the child deprived was not appealed; (2) a determination that the child was without proper care and control was binding against the parent; (3) the parent failed to complete the reunification case plans; and (4) adoption proceedings were in place. In the Interest of I.G., 285 Ga. App. 162, 645 S.E.2d 649 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Because the juvenile court was presented with sufficient evidence to satisfy by clear and convincing proof that termination of a biological mother's parental rights was properly based on the child's deprivation, and that the deprivation was likely to continue due to the mother's criminal past, a lack of a bond with the child, and a failure to provide the child with a stable lifestyle, the termination was upheld on appeal. Moreover, sufficient evidence was presented that the child was doing well in foster care, could not tolerate being abandoned again, and that the current foster parent had been identified as an adoptive resource. In the Interest of M.J.G., 288 Ga. App. 754, 655 S.E.2d 333 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Given clear and convincing evidence of a parent's drug abuse, failure to comply with case plan goals both before and during periods of incarceration, lack of a parental bond with the child, and failure to provide financial support, the juvenile court properly terminated that parent's parental rights and found that the child's deprivation was likely to continue and would result in serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm. In the Interest of R.D.B., 289 Ga. App. 76, 656 S.E.2d 203 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Despite a natural parent's alleged recent life changes, due to the parent's instability, lengthy history of drug abuse, failure to establish a bond and financially support the children at issue, and the childrens' history in foster care, the juvenile court's finding that the deprivation was likely to continue, and that such deprivation was likely to harm the children, was supported by clear and convincing evidence. In the Interest of A.H., 289 Ga. App. 121, 656 S.E.2d 254 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
In a termination of parental rights proceeding, clear and convincing evidence showed the children were presently deprived, under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2(8)(A) and15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(i) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-107 and15-11-310), because the children's father said the father could not care for the children at the time of the termination hearing and had no stable housing. In the Interest of E.G., 315 Ga. App. 35, 726 S.E.2d 510 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Clear and convincing standard inapplicable to alternative dispositions.
- "Clear and convincing" evidence standard which applies to child dispositions that result in the most severe method of disposition, the complete termination of parental rights, does not apply to alternate dispositions; a thorough investigation of all such possible alternatives is expected before recourse to complete termination of parental rights is sought. In re P.F.J., 174 Ga. App. 47, 329 S.E.2d 194 (1985) (decided under former law).
Actions of Parents
Improper to terminate rights of illegal alien.
- When a father, an illegal alien, cooperated with the court and the Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS), participated in mediation, was trying to obtain legal residency, worked full time, paid child support, consistently visited his daughter, and had a positive relationship with her, the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights on grounds that he might someday be deported and the child be sent to Mexico or returned to the care of DFCS. In the Interest of M.M., 263 Ga. App. 353, 587 S.E.2d 825 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination appropriate when children living in filth.
- To determine the best interests of the children, the juvenile court may consider the same factors that supported its finding of parental inability; hence, when the children were raised in filth and the mother did nothing to demonstrate that she could maintain a stable, sanitary home, the juvenile court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights. In the Interest of A.B., 251 Ga. App. 827, 555 S.E.2d 159 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Contest between parents.
- In a contest between the parents, the award of custody by a divorce court vests the custodial parent with a prima-facie right. Ordinarily, the trial court should favor the parent having such a right. In re M.M.A., 166 Ga. App. 620, 305 S.E.2d 139 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
In order to forfeit the custodial parent's prima-facie right to custody, the court must find either that the original custodian is no longer able or suited to retain custody or that the conditions surrounding the child have so changed that modification of the original judgment would have the effect of promoting the child's welfare. It is a change for the worse in the conditions of the child's present home environment rather than any purported change for the better in the environment of the noncustodial parent that the law contemplates under this theory. In re M.M.A., 166 Ga. App. 620, 305 S.E.2d 139 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Substance abuse by both parents.
- Judgments terminating the parental rights of a mother and father to their three children pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310 were affirmed because of their excessive use of and history of chronic substance abuse, which caused their inability to maintain consistency in employment and the children to be dependent, their failure to comply with the court ordered plan designed to reunite the family, no due process violations occurred, and the children had bonded well with their foster families.
Children
Children need stability.
- When a child's behavior improved after being placed in state custody, but she continued to need regular counseling and a stable, consistent home environment, there was no error in the juvenile court's implicit conclusions that continued deprivation would seriously harm the child and that termination of parental rights was in her best interest. In re D.N.M., 235 Ga. App. 712, 510 S.E.2d 366 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Termination of a mother's parental rights was in 12-year-old child's best interest because the child had been in foster care periodically and needed a stable home, the child was well-adjusted with the foster parents, the child's performance at school was vastly improved, the child rarely missed school, and the child wanted to stay with the foster family and go to school. In the Interest of R.H.L., 272 Ga. App. 10, 611 S.E.2d 700 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence of a mother's repeated failures to remain drug free and to take the steps necessary to reunite with her child was sufficient to prove that her children's continued deprivation would cause the children serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm, and it was well settled that the children needed permanence of home and emotional stability or they were likely to suffer serious emotional problems. In the Interest of A.B., 274 Ga. App. 230, 617 S.E.2d 189 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's determination that a mother's child was deprived, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-107), due to lack of proper parental care, that such deprivation was likely to continue or not be remedied due to the mother's failure to take responsibility for the child and to work at succeeding at the goals of her case plan, and that such deprivation would cause serious harm to the child, who needed a stable family environment; accordingly, termination of the mother's parental rights was proper, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311). In the Interest of B.S., 274 Ga. App. 647, 618 S.E.2d 695 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's determination pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311) that, there being clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability, termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, considering the child's physical, mental, emotional, and moral needs, and the child's need for a secure and stable home. In the Interest of B.J.F., 276 Ga. App. 437, 623 S.E.2d 547 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
In a termination of parental rights case involving a mother who had mental health and substance abuse issues, continued deprivation was likely to cause harm to the child under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310) as a psychologist testified that the child needed a stable environment or the child was likely to act out. In the Interest of D.A.B., 281 Ga. App. 702, 637 S.E.2d 102 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Children with special needs.
- When employing the two-step test before terminating a parent's rights, a juvenile court order that a child was deprived, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-107), which was not appealed, was binding on a mother and satisfied the first factor of the test under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310); the juvenile court determined that due in part to a medical problem, the child had special needs and the mother lacked the ability to provide for the physical, mental, emotional, and moral conditions and needs of the child. In the Interest of J.T.W., 270 Ga. App. 26, 606 S.E.2d 59 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
"Continued deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional or moral harm to the child" factor for the termination of mother's parental rights was satisfied as: (1) the child required a stable routine with constant monitoring of the child's physical symptoms to maintain the child's emotional and physical health; and (2) a psychologist testified that the mother would be unable, given her limited cognitive abilities, to provide the care the child needed. In the Interest of K.N., 272 Ga. App. 45, 611 S.E.2d 713 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Best interest of the child factor for the termination of a mother's parental rights was satisfied because the mother failed to establish a parental bond with the child, failed to comply with her case plan, limited cognitive abilities and personality disorder impaired her ability to attend to the child's many special needs, child's visits with his parents were disturbing to the child, and the child was doing well in the custody of the Department of Family and Children's Services and would benefit by staying with the capable and caring foster parents. In the Interest of K.N., 272 Ga. App. 45, 611 S.E.2d 713 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to a child because the child had severe developmental delays when the child entered foster care and made tremendous improvements in a structured one-on-one learning environment; the mother failed to complete a reunification plan and her parenting skills were severely impaired by recurring psychological problems; the mother failed to obtain housing or employment; to improve her parenting skills specific to her child's special needs; to continue psychological counseling, to support the child; or to maintain any parental relationship with the child. In the Interest of A.K., 272 Ga. App. 429, 612 S.E.2d 581 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
There was sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support a juvenile court's termination of a father's parental rights over his two children, each of whom was severely handicapped, as the father's limited cognitive abilities made it difficult for him to be the sole parent, he was unable to properly care for the children and to maintain a clean home, they had been deemed deprived, and termination was in their best interests; also, they had bonded with their foster families and did not have much of a bond with their father. In the Interest of M.W., 275 Ga. App. 849, 622 S.E.2d 68 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court's termination of a parent's parental rights was affirmed as sufficient evidence supported a finding that the children were likely to suffer serious harm if the parent's parental rights were not terminated since: (1) the children needed a very structured environment, without which it was likely that the children would lack basic social functioning; (2) the parent was mentally, emotionally, and financially unable to manage her own life without the substantial assistance of her parents; (3) the parent was either unwilling or unable to develop necessary parenting skills; (4) the children were in a stable foster home with nurturing foster parents where their special needs were met; (5) there was no parental bond between the biological parent and the children; and (6) the foster parent was interested in adopting the children. In the Interest of K.L., 280 Ga. App. 773, 634 S.E.2d 870 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Father's incarceration history, the father's failure to support the child, and the father's lack of interest in the child showed that the father could not be relied on to meet the needs of the child, who had special needs; termination of the father's parental rights, therefore, was in the child's best interest under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311). In the Interest of E.K., 280 Ga. App. 818, 635 S.E.2d 214 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of a mother's parental rights was upheld on appeal since the mother stipulated to depriving the child, had a mental disability which prevented the mother from giving the child the proper care in light of the child's special needs, including failing to provide the child with prescription medication, and the mother continued a relationship with a boyfriend who had sexually abused the child; the reviewing court found clear and convincing evidence established that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights. In the Interest of B.S., 283 Ga. App. 724, 642 S.E.2d 408 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
There was sufficient evidence to support the termination of a mother's parental rights since the evidence showed that the mother lacked the intellectual and emotional capacity to care for her two children, particularly the younger child, who had special needs as the result of injuries inflicted by his father; the mother was in denial about the younger child's condition and about the injuries that had been inflicted upon the child, had not refrained from using physical discipline on the children, had not paid child support, had not created a meaningful bond with the children and the children had thrived in foster care. In the Interest of R.S., 287 Ga. App. 228, 651 S.E.2d 156 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
It was proper to terminate a father's parental rights to a special needs child since the father had failed to comply with case plan goals or to acknowledge or address his mental health problems, there was ample evidence of his low intellectual functioning and its negative impact on his parenting skills, doctors had testified that the child would not be safe with the father and the father would not be able to parent a special needs child, and the father had failed to maintain a parental bond with the child in a meaningful way. In the Interest of B.W., 287 Ga. App. 54, 651 S.E.2d 332 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
It was proper to terminate a mother's parental rights to a special needs child since the mother had not supported the child, had been repeatedly incarcerated, had not seen the child in three years or attempted to maintain contact with the child, had not completed a drug treatment program, had not remained drug free for more than eight or nine months, and had failed to comply with any of her case plan goals; considering the special needs of the child, the harmful effects of prolonged foster care, and the evidence of the mother's drug abuse and failure to comply with case plan goals, the trial court was authorized to conclude that terminating the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. In the Interest of B.W., 287 Ga. App. 54, 651 S.E.2d 332 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence of emotional difficulties of child insufficient.
- Evidence in an action to sever parental rights that the child has emotional difficulties, fantasies, and nightmares about living with his mother may not alone deprive the mother of parental rights. Harper v. Department of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 758, 285 S.E.2d 220 (1981) (decided under former law).
Foster care.
- Juvenile court could consider the adverse effects of prolonged foster care in determining that the children's continued deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310). In the Interest of M.C.L., 251 Ga. App. 132, 553 S.E.2d 647 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the deprivation was likely to cause physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children in a termination of parental rights proceeding since: (1) the children became upset when the mother made promises and representations that she did not keep, including promises that she would visit or that they could come home with her; (2) one child became upset when her mother urged her to lie about the abuser's sexual abuse; and (3) the juvenile court considered that the children needed a stable home situation, and that prolonged foster care was detrimental. In the Interest of A.M., 259 Ga. App. 537, 578 S.E.2d 226 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Child in foster care for extensive time.
- Termination of a parent's parental rights was affirmed as the children had been in the care of their foster parents since they were three months old and had not seen the parent in over 27 months; the parent's caseworker opined that the children were still deprived due to neglect. In the Interest of S.B., 287 Ga. App. 203, 651 S.E.2d 140 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Failure to communicate with children and foster parents.
- Evidence showed that a parent's lack of care and control was the cause of two children's deprivation for purposes of the termination of a parent's rights as: (1) the parent's history of erratic visitation and unstable housing and employment was the cause of the instability, lack of bonding, and lack of child support that two children would face if reunited with the parent; (2) the parent failed to take advantage of regular visitation opportunities, did not establish stable housing, did not maintain stable employment, and provided inadequate child support; and (3) the parent did not maintain communication with the children's foster parents about the children or the parent's availability for visitation. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Living conditions and economic circumstances of foster family.
- Evidence concerning the living conditions and economic circumstances of the child's foster parents who had expressed an interest in adopting the child was not relevant to the first portion of the test under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311), the determination of whether there was clear and convincing evidence showing parental misconduct or inability; however, such evidence was relevant to the second part of the statutory test, a determination of whether termination of the parental rights of the natural parents was in the best interest of the child, since it showed the merits of an alternative placement available to the child. In re J.M.G., 214 Ga. App. 738, 448 S.E.2d 785 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Detrimental effects of prolonged stay in foster care considered.
- Adoptability of the children is never a basis for the determination of unfitness of the parents inasmuch as the finding of unfitness must rest upon its own merit. The court is nevertheless authorized to consider the severe detrimental effects of a prolonged stay in foster care under the ephemeral hope of change but without the real prospect of parental improvement that would justify such a prolonged stay in foster care. In re G.M.N., 183 Ga. App. 458, 359 S.E.2d 217 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Sufficient Evidence for Termination
Evidence held sufficient to justify termination of parental rights.
- In re J.L.Y., 184 Ga. App. 254, 361 S.E.2d 246 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re B.M., 184 Ga. App. 291, 361 S.E.2d 269 (1987); In re S.B., 188 Ga. App. 364, 373 S.E.2d 46 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re J.A.B., 189 Ga. App. 79, 374 S.E.2d 839 (1988); In re J.M.K., 189 Ga. App. 140, 375 S.E.2d 131 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re C.J.S., 195 Ga. App. 741, 395 S.E.2d 35 (1990); In re J.R., 202 Ga. App. 418, 414 S.E.2d 540 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re C.D.P., 211 Ga. App. 42, 438 S.E.2d 155 (1993);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Parent's parental rights were properly terminated when the parent failed to appeal an order finding that the parent's three minor children were deprived, steadfastly refused to cooperate with the Department of Family and Children Services with respect to a reunification plan, and completely failed to provide for the children's education. In the Interest of N.Q., 260 Ga. App. 118, 578 S.E.2d 920 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence held sufficient to justify termination of parental rights.
- Termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest because the children were in need of stability and permanence in their lives, their mother could not provide either, and the children had developed close bonds with their foster parents, who wished to adopt them. In the Interest of M.E.M., 272 Ga. App. 451, 612 S.E.2d 612 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of parental rights was proper based upon evidence of the mother's failure to contest a prior deprivation finding, continued drug use, lack of parental care or control, failure to obtain suitable housing, inability to maintain stable employment, failure to cooperate with the case plan, and failure to seek or maintain counseling or drug abuse treatments; the court was authorized to find that the children's continued deprivation would have a detrimental effect on them in light of the evidence that the children had improved due to the stability they realized while in foster care. In the Interest of D.D., 273 Ga. App. 839, 616 S.E.2d 179 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Evidence supported the termination of the mother's parental rights pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311) because the mother showed no justifiable cause for her failure, over a two-year period, to meet the goals of her case plan, provide support for her child, or visit him for over one year, evidence of domestic violence in the child's presence and the mother's failure to comply with the requirements of the reunification plan authorized the juvenile court to find that the child's continued deprivation would be detrimental, and termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the child. In the Interest of M.M., 276 Ga. App. 211, 622 S.E.2d 892 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Since a parent did not dispute that the parent's child was deprived and never appealed any of the orders finding that the child was deprived, a trial court's order terminating parental rights was supported by sufficient evidence which included evidence that the parent failed to provide the department with information as to the parent's whereabouts, failed to achieve financial stability, and physically, financially, and emotionally neglected the child; further, the trial court was authorized to infer from the evidence of past conduct that the improvements in the parent's situation were insufficient to justify maintaining the child in limbo in hopes that the parent could, at some point, provide an adequate home for the child. In the Interest of C.J., 279 Ga. App. 213, 630 S.E.2d 836 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Juvenile court was authorized to terminate a parent's parental rights based on: (1) an unappealed prior deprivation order; (2) the reasonable likelihood that the parent would be incapable of providing a stable home environment in the foreseeable future; and (3) the fact that the children had been in foster care for over five years and in need of some semblance of permanency; moreover, the conflicting testimony did not preclude the juvenile court from finding that no reasonable likelihood existed that the parent would ever be capable of providing a stable home. In the Interest of D.E., 282 Ga. App. 519, 639 S.E.2d 526 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Order terminating a parent's parental rights was upheld on appeal, and was held to be in the child's best interests, given evidence of the parent's history of incarcerations, substance abuse, and inability to care for any of the parent's six children, as well as the bond the child developed with the foster family and their desire to adopt; moreover, because the parent did not challenge the deprivation order, no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence showing that reasonable reunification efforts were made could be raised. In the Interest of R.D.B., 282 Ga. App. 628, 639 S.E.2d 565 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Juvenile court's order terminating a parent's parental rights was upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence that the two children involved were deprived and that such deprivation was likely to continue given the parent's past untreated drug abuse, failure to pay child support, continued unemployment, failure to maintain stable housing, and failure to maintain a parental bond with the children. In the Interest of M.A.S., 284 Ga. App. 102, 643 S.E.2d 370 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Evidence was sufficient to support termination of a parent's parental rights after the trial court found that the parent neglected and failed to supervise the children; the parent had made little or no progress on the parent's case plan, tested positive for drugs, did not complete required classes, failed to visit the children during at least one six-week period, spent time in prison, failed to maintain stable housing and employment, and the children were thriving with foster parents who wished to adopt the children. In the Interest of M.D.L., 285 Ga. App. 357, 646 S.E.2d 331 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Termination of a parent's parental rights was proper in light of the parent's: (1) failure to provide stable and adequate housing; (2) drug use; (3) lack of stable employment; (4) ongoing difficulty with anger; (5) failure to pay child support; (6) historical reluctance to work with the department of family and children services; (7) frequent failure to appear for supervised visitation; and (8) failure to bond with the children when the parent did appear, as well as the behavioral and emotional problems of the children. In the Interest of A.D.M., 288 Ga. App. 757, 655 S.E.2d 336 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 402 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Juvenile court's order terminating a parent's parental rights was upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence including: (1) a prior unappealed finding that the children were deprived; (2) the parent's history of drug use and mental issues; (3) the parent's failure to pay child support; (4) the lack of a significant parental bond with the children; and (5) the parent's unemployment. In the Interest of K.A.B., 285 Ga. App. 537, 646 S.E.2d 736 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Juvenile court properly ordered a mother's termination of her parental rights to her child because clear and convincing evidence showed that the child's continued deprivation was likely to cause the child serious harm based on the mother's failure to show an end to her drug abuse, her failure to provide for the child, the absence of a bond between the mother and the child, the child's bond with her foster parents, and the foster parents' wish to adopt. In the Interest of S.R.C.J., 317 Ga. App. 699, 732 S.E.2d 547 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was upheld because the evidence showed that the mother had committed repeated criminal acts resulting in the mother's incarceration, the mother had a history of acting violently toward those close to the mother, and the mother failed to attend drug and alcohol assessment, maintain a stable home, or make any child support payments. In the Interest of D. T. A., 318 Ga. App. 182, 733 S.E.2d 466 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Termination of the father's parental rights was supported by evidence that the father was not capable of caring for the child without assistance and the father's niece was not deemed an appropriate placement for the child due to inconsistent drug test results and unstable financial status. In addition, the mother continued to reside with the father, making the father's residence an unsafe place for the child to live. In the Interest of T.G., 318 Ga. App. 191, 733 S.E.2d 777 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Trial court's order terminating parental rights was supported by evidence that the parents temporarily stopped using drugs but were again using illegal drugs by the time of the termination hearing, they were attempting to circumvent drug testing, and they had not undergone drug treatment even though failure to do so was a basis for deprivation finding. In the Interest of B. W., 325 Ga. App. 899, 756 S.E.2d 25 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of parental rights proper.
- Juvenile court's termination of a parent's parental rights over the parent's child was proper pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) since the parent's lack of proper parental care or control amounted to deprivation of the child under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-107,15-11-381, and15-11-471), the parent failed to establish a bond with the child or substantially complete any of the goals of the parent's reunification plan, and the parent did not provide support to the child under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-2; further, the deprivation was deemed likely to continue and likely result in harm to the child, and the child's best interest was served by termination of the parent's rights as the child had formed a bond with the foster parent. In the Interest of J.D., 280 Ga. App. 861, 635 S.E.2d 226 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of parental rights appropriate.
- Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of a parent's parental rights on the ground of parental misconduct or inability under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320) because, despite years of intervention, the parent failed to manage the parent's anger and control the parent's substance abuse, the parent abused the spouse, abused and neglected the parent's children, and made little effort to support the children or to attempt to meet the goals of the case plan; the children had been doing well in the care of their foster parents and their foster parents all expressed interest in adoption. In the Interest of M.S., 279 Ga. App. 254, 630 S.E.2d 856 (2006), overruled on other grounds, In re J.M.B., 296 Ga. App. 786, 676 S.E.2d 9 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of a parent's parental rights was proper in light of the parent's: (1) continued psychological and emotional instability; (2) multiple incarcerations; (3) alcohol abuse; (4) lengthy history with the department of family and children services, including the termination of rights to three other children; (5) lack of material improvement; and (6) lack of concern about the seven children, as well as the emotional and behavioral problems from which all of the children suffered. In the Interest of A.D.M., 288 Ga. App. 757, 655 S.E.2d 336 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 402 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence sufficient for termination of both parents' parental rights.
- See In re C.D.P., 238 Ga. App. 393, 519 S.E.2d 37 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re J.H., 240 Ga. App. 309, 523 S.E.2d 374 (1999); In the Interest of J.W.H., 245 Ga. App. 468, 538 S.E.2d 112 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In the Interest of J.L.K., 245 Ga. App. 860, 539 S.E.2d 507 (2000); In the Interest of R.G., 249 Ga. App. 91, 547 S.E.2d 729 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94); In the Interest of K.C., 249 Ga. App. 680, 549 S.E.2d 737 (2001); In the Interest of B.B., 268 Ga. App. 858, 603 S.E.2d 333 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Since a rational trier of fact could have found that misconduct or inability by the mother and father existed and that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children, the trial court did not err in terminating the parents' rights to their children under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320). The evidence was sufficient to show that the children's deprivation was likely to continue since the mother failed to complete her case plan and the father, who was incarcerated, had a history of domestic violence and had failed to receive the domestic violence counseling required by the case plan. In the Interest of C.S., 279 Ga. App. 831, 632 S.E.2d 665 (2006), reversed on other grounds, 282 Ga. 7, 644 S.E.2d 812 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Trial court's order terminating the parental rights of both parents was supported by sufficient evidence that: (1) the parents failed significantly to comply with a reunification plan without justification; (2) the child's deprived status was caused by the parents' lack of proper care and control, and that deprivation was likely to continue; and (3) the child needed permanence and stability, which was amply being provided by the foster family. In the Interest of C.N.I., 280 Ga. App. 305, 633 S.E.2d 660 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Trial court properly terminated parental rights when: the parents' failure to comply with a case plan, their housing and financial instability, and their unwillingness to face their substance abuse showed that their lack of parental care or control caused the children's deprivation; the mother's fragile mental health and unstable financial situation and the father's inability to obtain steady employment or stable housing, delay in addressing his drug problems, and untruthfulness in altering pay records indicated that the lack of care or control was likely to continue; and the record supported findings that continued deprivation would cause serious harm to the children and that termination was in their best interests. In the Interest of T.W.O., 283 Ga. App. 771, 643 S.E.2d 255 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Orders terminating the parental rights of both parents were upheld on appeal as supported by: (1) deprivation findings that were not appealed; (2) the parents' unwillingness to address their mental health issues and substance abuse problems; (3) the long history of deficiencies in the supervision of their children; and (4) their failure to comply with the case plan. In the Interest of Am.T., 284 Ga. App. 847, 644 S.E.2d 923 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Parents' rights to their four children were properly terminated since: the parents had not appealed from a previous finding of deprivation, and the conditions upon which the earlier finding was based still existed; the parents had not received drug treatment or submitted to drug screens, had little or no contact with the children, had paid inadequate child support, and had failed to complete case plan goals; the father had been repeatedly incarcerated; the mother was unemployed at the time of the hearing and the father had held his current job for only two days; and the parents lived in housing that they could not afford and that was too small for four children. In the Interest of R.N.H., 286 Ga. App. 737, 650 S.E.2d 397 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
It was proper to terminate both parents' rights to a child when neither parent interacted with the child at visits, paid the required child support, remained drug-free for six months, maintained stable housing, or completed recommended treatment resulting from psychological evaluations; further, the mother had never shown any evidence of employment and had completed parenting classes only just before the termination petition was filed, and the father had never completed the classes. In the Interest of J.A.S., 287 Ga. App. 125, 650 S.E.2d 788 (2007), overruled on other grounds, In re J.M.B., 296 Ga. App. 786, 676 S.E.2d 9 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
As neither parent sufficiently complied with their reunification plans, maintained stable residences for six months, completed drug screens, satisfied their child support obligations, or maintained a job for six months, and both were unfit to care for the child, the child was deprived, and this deprivation was likely to continue, clear and convincing evidence supported terminating their parental rights. In the Interest of D.O.R., 287 Ga. App. 659, 653 S.E.2d 314 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Father's parental rights were properly terminated pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) because a rational trier of fact could have found that termination was in the child's best interest since there was evidence of the father's past parental misconduct, including his inability to provide emotional and financial support for the child; his history of violence; his lack of interest in the well-being of the child; and his failure to attempt to contact the child, despite knowledge of the mother's serious drug addiction, for over four years. In the Interest of T. B., 267 Ga. App. 484, 600 S.E.2d 432 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence sufficient to authorize termination of father's parental rights.
- See Turner v. Wright, 217 Ga. App. 368, 457 S.E.2d 575 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re A.M.V., 222 Ga. App. 528, 474 S.E.2d 723 (1996); In re E.N.H., 216 Ga. App. 209, 453 S.E.2d 778 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re T.B.R., 224 Ga. App. 470, 480 S.E.2d 901 (1997); In re D.B.G., 226 Ga. App. 29, 485 S.E.2d 575 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re S.N.N., 230 Ga. App. 109, 495 S.E.2d 602 (1998); In re R.D.S.P., 230 Ga. App. 205, 495 S.E.2d 867 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re R.M.M, 232 Ga. App. 553, 502 S.E.2d 480 (1998); In re N.J.W., 233 Ga. App. 130, 503 S.E.2d 366 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re F.G., 233 Ga. App. 153, 503 S.E.2d 387 (1998); In re C.J.V., 236 Ga. App. 770, 513 S.E.2d 513 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re J.C., 237 Ga. App. 533, 515 S.E.2d 847 (1999); In re S.B., 237 Ga. App. 692, 515 S.E.2d 209 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re A.N.M., 238 Ga. App. 21, 517 S.E.2d 548 (1999); In re D.L.T., 238 Ga. App. 491, 519 S.E.2d 257 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re J.K., 239 Ga. App. 142, 520 S.E.2d 19 (1999); In re T.L.H., 240 Ga. App. 201, 523 S.E.2d 50 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re R.H., 240 Ga. App. 551, 524 S.E.2d 257 (1999); In the Interest of H.D.M., 241 Ga. App. 805, 527 S.E.2d 633 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In the Interest of L.H., 242 Ga. App. 659, 530 S.E.2d 753 (2000); In the Interest of C.P., 242 Ga. App. 698, 531 S.E.2d 117 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In the Interest of M.C.J., 242 Ga. App. 852, 531 S.E.2d 404 (2000); In the Interest of R.D., 243 Ga. App. 44, 532 S.E.2d 146 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In the Interest of M.C., 243 Ga. App. 707, 534 S.E.2d 442 (2000); In the Interest of S.H.P., 243 Ga. App. 720, 534 S.E.2d 161 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In the Interest of L.S., 244 Ga. App. 626, 536 S.E.2d 533 (2000); In the Interest of C.T., 247 Ga. App. 522, 544 S.E.2d 203 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In the Interest of D.S., 247 Ga. App. 569, 545 S.E.2d 1 (2001); In the Interest of J.L.H., 247 Ga. App. 602, 544 S.E.2d 520 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In the Interest of J.J.W., 247 Ga. App. 804, 545 S.E.2d 21 (2001); In the Interest of D.T.C., 248 Ga. App. 788, 548 S.E.2d 11 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In the Interest of H.L.W., 249 Ga. App. 600, 547 S.E.2d 799 (2001); In the Interest of M.D.B., 262 Ga. App. 796, 586 S.E.2d 700 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of father's parental rights was justified based on his failure to provide support and communicate with the children, even though the petition was filed less than one year since his last support payment. In re K.A.C., 229 Ga. App. 254, 493 S.E.2d 645 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Termination of a father's parental rights was authorized when the father had sexually abused his children, was unable to maintain housing and employment outside of a sheltered environment, did not complete an ordered psychosexual evaluation or regular, random drug screening, interfered with his children's treatment for psychological disorders, and indicated no intention to change his current living arrangements. In the Interest of C.F., 251 Ga. App. 708, 555 S.E.2d 81 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence that the father made little effort, even when he was not incarcerated, to establish a meaningful relationship with the child, visited the child only twice, offered no financial support, and had not taken any steps to establish a stable home was sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights. In the Interest of D.W., 265 Ga. App. 782, 595 S.E.2d 616 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence of the father's continuing failure to attend the children's medical appointments, his refusal to work on his case plan, his refusal to obtain recommended treatment for substance abuse, his failure to maintain stable housing, and conclusions drawn by a psychologist who evaluated the father, all supported the juvenile court's finding that the father's lack of proper parental care or control caused the deprivation which led to the termination of his parental rights as to his two children. In the Interest of J.P., 268 Ga. App. 32, 601 S.E.2d 409 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Testimony that the children had bonded with their foster family, who had provided a nurturing, stable environment for the children and who desired to adopt the children, in conjunction with evidence of the father's lack of financial and proper medical support authorized the conclusion that termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interest. In the Interest of J.P., 268 Ga. App. 32, 601 S.E.2d 409 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of a father's parental rights was affirmed despite the father's allegation that his confrontation rights were violated when he had to cross-examine a mother over the telephone. In the Interest of M.H.W., 275 Ga. App. 586, 621 S.E.2d 779 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of a father's parental rights was justified by evidence that the father used and sold drugs, abused the children and their mother, was paranoid, delusional, schizoid, and narcissistic, and that the children were fearful of being reunited with the father. In the Interest of C.L.C., 277 Ga. App. 297, 626 S.E.2d 531 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence supported the termination of a father's parental rights when the father failed to complete his case plan, including the requirements that he undergo regular drug screens and maintain stable housing and employment, and had not maintained a meaningful parental bond with the child; a continued deprivation was likely to seriously harm the child, who had bonded with her foster family, and these factors supported a finding that termination was in the child's best interest. In the Interest of M.C., 287 Ga. App. 766, 653 S.E.2d 120 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of father's parental rights appropriate.
- Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of a father's parental rights because: (1) the father had committed egregious acts toward the child and had physically, mentally, and emotionally neglected the child through a pattern of physical violence and threats towards the child's mother in the child's presence; (2) the father's imprisonment for that abuse had a demonstrable negative effect on the parent-child relationship; (3) the father had failed for a period of one year or longer to maintain a parental bond with the child; (4) the child's deprivation was likely to continue; (5) the father's parental misconduct was and would continue to be harmful to the child; and (6) it was in the child's best interest to terminate the father's parental rights. Davis v. Rathel, 273 Ga. App. 183, 614 S.E.2d 823 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Trial court's decision to terminate a putative father's parental rights in his child, and a father's parental rights in his two children, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) and (B) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311), was supported by clear and convincing evidence, based on the conclusive finding that the children were deprived, that they would likely continue to be deprived, that such deprivation would likely cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children, and that termination was in the children's best interest; the fathers had each been incarcerated, failed to complete the case plan goals, had a past history of non-support and/or domestic violence, demonstrated a lack of parental care and control, and the children had been doing well in foster care. In the Interest of T.A.M., 280 Ga. App. 494, 634 S.E.2d 456 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Father's parental rights properly terminated.
- Father's failure for three years to take the steps necessary to be reunited with a four-year-old daughter provided clear and convincing evidence that the deprivation was likely to continue, and the evidence was sufficient to establish that the termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child in light of the fact that at the time of the termination hearing, the child had spent three of the four years of life in foster care and the clear and convincing evidence showed the father's failure to establish a suitable home and a stable income, become drug free, or comply with reunification plan goals. In the Interest of J.A., 286 Ga. App. 704, 649 S.E.2d 882 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence sufficient for termination of mother's parental rights.
- See In re D.S., 176 Ga. App. 482, 336 S.E.2d 358 (1985); In re B.G., 180 Ga. App. 502, 349 S.E.2d 509 (1986); In re A.T., 187 Ga. App. 299, 370 S.E.2d 48 (1988); In re S.M., 188 Ga. App. 495, 373 S.E.2d 280 (1988); In re A.O.S., 189 Ga. App. 860, 377 S.E.2d 870 (1989); In re K.P.E., 196 Ga. App. 759, 397 S.E.2d 39 (1990); In re B.L., 196 Ga. App. 807, 397 S.E.2d 156 (1990); In re D.R.C., 198 Ga. App. 348, 401 S.E.2d 754 (1991); In re G.T.T., 199 Ga. App. 706, 405 S.E.2d 750 (1991); In re J.M.C., 201 Ga. App. 173, 410 S.E.2d 368 (1991); In re J.R., 201 Ga. App. 199, 410 S.E.2d 458 (1991); In re S.L.B., 214 Ga. App. 802, 449 S.E.2d 334 (1994); In re J.D.D., 215 Ga. App. 68, 449 S.E.2d 655 (1994); In re J.M.W., 216 Ga. App. 166, 453 S.E.2d 764 (1995); In re W.J.G., 216 Ga. App. 168, 453 S.E.2d 768 (1995); In re A.Q.W., 217 Ga. App. 13, 456 S.E.2d 284 (1995); In re M.J.T., 217 Ga. App. 356, 457 S.E.2d 265 (1995); In re L.S.F., 217 Ga. App. 478, 458 S.E.2d 370 (1995); In re A.M.B., 219 Ga. App. 133, 464 S.E.2d 253 (1995); In re L.M., 219 Ga. App. 746, 466 S.E.2d 887 (1995); In re J.M.D., 221 Ga. App. 556, 472 S.E.2d 123 (1996); In re R.L.M., 221 Ga. App. 343, 471 S.E.2d 245 (1996); In re N.C., 228 Ga. App. 875, 492 S.E.2d 895 (1997); In re H.L.W., 229 Ga. App. 264, 493 S.E.2d 637 (1997); In re K.H., 229 Ga. App. 307, 494 S.E.2d 69 (1997); In re R.N., 224 Ga. App. 202, 480 S.E.2d 243 (1997); In re T.B.R., 224 Ga. App. 470, 480 S.E.2d 901 (1997); In re E.C., 225 Ga. App. 12, 482 S.E.2d 522 (1997); In re V.S., 230 Ga. App. 26, 495 S.E.2d 142 (1998); In re J.B.A., 230 Ga. App. 181, 495 S.E.2d 636 (1998); In re C.D.C., 230 Ga. App. 237, 495 S.E.2d 872 (1998); In re A.C., 230 Ga. App. 395, 496 S.E.2d 752 (1998); In re C.W.S., 231 Ga. App. 444, 498 S.E.2d 813 (1998); In re C.W.D., 232 Ga. App. 200, 501 S.E.2d 232 (1998); In re J.M.B., 231 Ga. App. 875, 501 S.E.2d 259 (1998); In re C.L.R., 232 Ga. App. 134, 501 S.E.2d 296 (1998); In re J.B.A., 232 Ga. App. 345, 501 S.E.2d 862 (1998); In re J.S., 232 Ga. App. 876, 502 S.E.2d 788 (1998); In re K.W., 233 Ga. App. 140, 503 S.E.2d 394 (1998); In re C.J.V., 236 Ga. App. 770, 513 S.E.2d 513 (1999); In re I.G., 236 Ga. App. 642, 513 S.E.2d 53 (1998); In re M.N.H., 237 Ga. App. 471, 517 S.E.2d 344 (1999), overruled in part by State v. Herendeen, 279 Ga. 323, 613 S.E.2d 647 (2005); In re S.B., 237 Ga. App. 692, 515 S.E.2d 209 (1999); In re K.D.S., 237 Ga. App. 865, 517 S.E.2d 102 (1999); In re A.N.M., 238 Ga. App. 21, 517 S.E.2d 548 (1999); In re C.N.H., 238 Ga. App. 50, 517 S.E.2d 589 (1999); In re S.C.M.H., 238 Ga. App. 159, 517 S.E.2d 598 (1999); In re C.D.A., 238 Ga. App. 400, 519 S.E.2d 31 (1999); In re I.S., 238 Ga. App. 304, 520 S.E.2d 470 (1999); In re J.K., 239 Ga. App. 142, 520 S.E.2d 19 (1999); In re N.B., 239 Ga. App. 336, 521 S.E.2d 47 (1999); In re W.M, 239 Ga. App. 319, 521 S.E.2d 230 (1999); In re B.M.L., 239 Ga. App. 511, 521 S.E.2d 448 (1999); In re A.S.H., 239 Ga. App. 565, 521 S.E.2d 604 (1999); In re B.L.S., 239 Ga. App. 771, 521 S.E.2d 906 (1999); In re A.W., 240 Ga. App. 259, 523 S.E.2d 88 (1999); In re J.M.S.M., 240 Ga. App. 294, 523 S.E.2d 357 (1999); In re J.L.T., 241 Ga. App. 464, 524 S.E.2d 740 (1999); In re A.M.L., 242 Ga. App. 121, 527 S.E.2d 614 (2000); In the Interest of T.M.S., 242 Ga. App. 442, 529 S.E.2d 892 (2000); In the Interest of C.G.B., 242 Ga. App. 705, 531 S.E.2d 107 (2000); In the Interest of D.B., 242 Ga. App. 763, 531 S.E.2d 172 (2000); In the Interest of A.S.O., 243 Ga. App. 1, 530 S.E.2d 261 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1176, 121 S. Ct. 1150, 148 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (2001); In the Interest of L.S.D., 243 Ga. App. 626, 534 S.E.2d 109 (2000); In the Interest of A.D., 243 Ga. App. 727, 534 S.E.2d 457 (2000); In the Interest of V.M.T., 243 Ga. App. 732, 534 S.E.2d 452 (2000); In the Interest of D.H., 243 Ga. App. 778, 534 S.E.2d 466 (2000); In the Interest of S.T., 244 Ga. App. 119, 534 S.E.2d 869 (2000); In the Interest of M.D., 244 Ga. App. 156, 534 S.E.2d 889 (2000); In the Interest of J.M.M., 244 Ga. App. 171, 534 S.E.2d 892 (2000); In the Interest of A.L.B., 245 Ga. App. 776, 538 S.E.2d 557 (2000); In the Interest of C.R., 245 Ga. App. 697, 538 S.E.2d 776 (2000); In the Interest of F.C., 248 Ga. App. 675, 549 S.E.2d 125 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009); In the Interest of A.M.W., 249 Ga. App. 22, 547 S.E.2d 401 (2001); In the Interest of J.M.D., 249 Ga. App. 457, 548 S.E.2d 454 (2001); In the Interest of T.F., 250 Ga. App. 96, 550 S.E.2d 473 (2001); In the Interest of D.N.B., 258 Ga. App. 481, 574 S.E.2d 574 (2002); In the Interest of A.M., 259 Ga. App. 537, 578 S.E.2d 226 (2003); In the Interest of D.B.P., 262 Ga. App. 1, 584 S.E.2d 256 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Evidence justified termination of the mother's parental rights since the record was replete with circumstantial evidence which clearly and convincingly established that the child was emotionally harmed and would likely be so harmed in the future by the mother. In re E.P.N., 193 Ga. App. 742, 388 S.E.2d 903 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Nature of and circumstances surrounding mother's convictions on 14 counts of enticing a child for indecent purposes, child molestation, aggravated sodomy, and incest per se established the requisite aggravating circumstances to justify termination of her parental rights when her convictions pertained to her two minor female children, when there was a recurring pattern of such conduct directed toward them from which it was reasonably inferred that the cause of the deprivation was likely to continue. In re S.H., 204 Ga. App. 135, 418 S.E.2d 454 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Mother's likelihood of continued inability to parent warranted termination of her parental rights given her emotional problems, inability to hold a job and pattern of behavior in chasing dangerous companions. In re B.P., 207 Ga. App. 242, 427 S.E.2d 593 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
When the mother, without justifiable cause, failed significantly for a period of one year or longer prior to the filing of the termination petition to comply with the reunification plan and failed to provide for the support of the child as required by the plan, and since the court was authorized to find a mental inability on the part of the mother to care for the child, the court did not err in terminating the mother's rights based on the paramount importance of the welfare of the child. In re A.S.M., 214 Ga. App. 668, 448 S.E.2d 703 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Evidence was sufficient to permit the juvenile court to find clear and convincing evidence of child's deprivation and that the child's mother's misconduct or inability to care for the child's needs resulted in abuse or neglect sufficient to render her unfit to retain custody. In re C.N., 231 Ga. App. 639, 500 S.E.2d 400 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Evidence supported termination of the biological mother's parental rights since there was no question that the children were deprived, the mother's inability to care for the children was the cause of their deprivation, the deprivation was likely to continue, the children were likely to be harmed by the continued deprivation, and the termination of the mother's parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. In re S.J.C., 234 Ga. App. 491, 507 S.E.2d 226 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
When children were initially taken from the mother's home because she held no job, could not provide stable living conditions, and failed to provide them with appropriate medical care and schooling, the court was entitled to infer from the fact that the mother had done nothing in six years to make changes in her life, that the deprivation was likely to continue, and termination of parental rights was justified. Parker v. Kennon, 235 Ga. App. 272, 509 S.E.2d 152 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
When the juvenile court recognized that there was positive evidence showing that a mother was attempting to address her crack cocaine addiction and that she interacted well in supervised visits with her child, but that other evidence showing mental retardation, severe deficits in adaptive functioning, and a long history of chronic abuse of crack cocaine, rendered her unable to parent the child independently, the finding that the child was deprived and that the lack of proper parental care and control was the cause of a deprivation which was likely to continue, causing serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child was justified, and supported termination of the mother's parental rights in the child's best interests. In re L.H., 236 Ga. App. 132, 511 S.E.2d 253 (1999), overruled in part by State v. Herendeen, 279 Ga. 323, 613 S.E.2d 647 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Juvenile court's order terminating a mother's parental rights was upheld as sufficient evidence was presented supporting the termination, including that: (1) the mother failed to substantially comply with the case plan requirements for a year or more; (2) it was likely that continued deprivation would be damaging to the well-being of the child; (3) the mother never provided proof of regular drug treatment or regular employment, she failed to maintain stable housing, and eviction warrants were taken out against her for non-payment of rent; (4) the mother failed to provide adequate proof that she received mental health treatment; and (5) the mother did not regularly visit the child or provide any financial support. In the Interest of A.M., 275 Ga. App. 630, 621 S.E.2d 567 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Evidence was sufficient for termination of parental rights since the mother had multiple arrests for driving under the influence, was unable to establish a safe and stable living environment for her children, and was unable to maintain consistent employment. In the Interest of N.M.H., 252 Ga. App. 353, 556 S.E.2d 454 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court properly terminated mother's parental rights in the face of clear and convincing evidence that the mother could not properly care for the child and that termination was in the best interest of the child given the mother's history of drug abuse, infliction of "boo boo's", and locking of the child in a closed up automobile in the middle of July. In the Interest of T.W., 255 Ga. App. 674, 565 S.E.2d 925 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of appellant mother's parental rights as to her two youngest daughters because: (1) the mother did not appeal deprivation orders of the juvenile court; (2) the mother failed to comply with the reunification plan; (3) for nine years the mother failed to meet the reunification goals regarding her five older children; (4) the children's deprivation was likely to continue and have a detrimental effect on them; and (5) the foster parents, who were one of the daughter's paternal grandparents, were ready to adopt both girls. In the Interest of N.G., 257 Ga. App. 57, 570 S.E.2d 367 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Finding existence of factors of parental inability and that lack of proper parental care or control caused the deprivation of the children was supported by clear and convincing evidence. The mother committed past egregious conduct toward her children of a physically or abusive nature and the mother had a mental deficiency of such a nature that she was unable to adequately provide for the children. In the Interest of D.B., 257 Ga. App. 497, 572 S.E.2d 9 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence authorized the juvenile court to terminate the mother's parental rights to her daughter since the mother had a history of criminal behavior and drug addiction, and demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to meet the case plan goals for reunification with the daughter. In the Interest of B.N.S., 259 Ga. App. 622, 578 S.E.2d 242 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Mother's parental rights were properly terminated under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320) since: (1) the mother failed to appeal the deprivation order, and could not challenge the finding that the child was deprived; (2) the mother had a serious mental illness that made her unfit to parent under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(i) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311), and the juvenile court could conclude that the child's deprivation was caused by lack of proper parental care or control; (3) the cause of the deprivation was likely to continue and was likely to cause serious harm to the child in light of the mother's failure to consistently treat her mental condition; and (4) the termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the child, considering the factors that supported the finding of parental inability, that the child had been in the same home since birth, and that the child's foster home wished to adopt the child. In the Interest of D.D.B., 263 Ga. App. 325, 587 S.E.2d 822 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was upheld since the mother insisted that she would allow the child to visit a home in which violence was prevalent, failed to maintain a home for herself, failed to attend regular visitations or financially support the child, and failed to meet the goals of the many reunification plans presented to her; it was also determined that termination was in the best interest of the child. In the Interest of G.B., 263 Ga. App. 577, 588 S.E.2d 779 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Trial court's termination of a mother's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320) since she failed to comply with the conditions of a prior deprivation order, the trial court found that returning the child to the mother would likely cause harm to the child, and it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's rights since: the mother had not bonded with the child; had a drug abuse problem that the mother had only stopped a few months prior to the termination hearing; the mother had not held down a job as required; the mother had not made the required child support payments; and the mother's visitation was very infrequent. In the Interest of A.S.R.H., 265 Ga. App. 30, 593 S.E.2d 59 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court involved in termination proceeding erred in finding that the mother was incapable of forming an emotional bond with her two minor children as the evidence in the record did not support such a conclusion, but the error in making that finding was harmless and the termination of the mother's parental rights in her two children was still warranted since a number of other findings that she did not even challenge were supported by the record and warranted the termination of her parental rights. In the Interest of M.T.C., 267 Ga. App. 160, 598 S.E.2d 879 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Viewed in a light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling, evidence authorized the juvenile court to find that a mother continued to be a drug abuser; that her felony convictions, imprisonment, and resultant separation from her children had a demonstrably negative effect on the quality of her relationship with them; that the children's sibling died under circumstances evidencing parental neglect or abuse; that the mother failed to comply with the family reunification case plan; and that the cause of her children's deprivation, therefore, had not been remedied; consequently, there was no merit in her claim that termination of her parental rights was unwarranted. In the Interest of M.T.M., 267 Ga. App. 492, 600 S.E.2d 430 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights was supported by sufficient evidence and, therefore, was not overturned on appeal; the evidence showed that the children were deprived, which was a finding that the mother did not contest, and that because the mother had failed to fulfill the conditions of the mother's reunification plan for two years, that the termination was in the best interest of the mother's two children. In the Interest of T.G., 269 Ga. App. 278, 603 S.E.2d 764 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Sufficient evidence supported a decision to terminate a mother's parental rights because: (1) the children were deprived due to the mother's physical, mental, or emotional neglect; (2) the mother exposed the children to egregious living conditions, was unable to maintain a stable home for them, did not provide them proper nutrition and medical care, and subjected them to episodes of domestic violence and drug abuse by her boyfriend; (3) the mother failed to address the mental health needs of herself and the children; (4) after the children were placed in the custody of the Department of Family and Children Services, the mother failed to comply with the reunification case plans goals; (5) even though the mother completed an initial mental health evaluation, she failed to follow through with the recommended treatment; (6) there was expert testimony concerning the mother's emotional instability; and (7) there was also evidence of the mother's refusal to accept responsibility for her problems or behavior, the mother's placing her needs in front of those of the children, the mother's anger over the recommendation that the children sleep separately despite reports that one had molested the other, the mother's inability to effectively discipline the children or to learn discipline techniques, the mother's deference to her boyfriend's decisions for the children's medical care, even when not in the best interest of the children, and the mother's refusal to seek proper treatment for one child who was diagnosed with severe attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder. In the Interest of H.Y., 270 Ga. App. 497, 606 S.E.2d 679 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Sufficient evidence supported a termination order because the mother, inter alia, failed to pay child support, failed to complete anger management and parenting classes, tested negative at only one of 21 drug screens, showed mental issues at the termination hearing itself, was diagnosed with bipolar and other mental disorders but failed to receive any treatment, failed to appear on time or at all for 11 scheduled visitations, and had six other visitations terminated early due to her behavior, including one involving an assault on a supervisor, and because, among other things, the father refused to sign the case plan, saw the children only once after the deprivation hearing, never paid any child support, was ordered to have no contact with another child as a result of a guilty plea for child sexual molestation, and was in jail for probation violation. Since neither of the trial court's two orders finding that both children were deprived were appealed, the parents were bound by their factual findings for purposes of the termination proceeding. In the Interest of M.K.H., 270 Ga. App. 564, 607 S.E.2d 202 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence was sufficient to support termination of a mother's parental rights as: (1) the child was previously found to be deprived; (2) the mother's lack of parental care caused the deprivation as she was diagnosed with amphetamine abuse and psychological problems, the child's siblings were permanently removed from her, and she pled guilty to cruelty to children, as to those children; (3) the deprivation's cause was likely to continue, given the mother's lack of stable employment and housing, her failure to pay child support, her non-attendance at visitation, pending criminal charges, and mental illness; (4) continued deprivation would seriously harm the child, given these facts and the fact that the child was removed from the mother at two days of age and was doing well in foster care; and (5) termination was in the child's best interest, given the facts previously found. In the Interest of A.M.A., 270 Ga. App. 769, 607 S.E.2d 916 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
There was no error in the termination of parental rights because, given the mother's inability to successfully complete a drug treatment program and her failure to fulfill the other provisions in her case plan, the misconduct or inability was likely to continue and unlikely to be remedied; under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320), the children were adjudicated deprived primarily due to the mother's drug problems and her neglect of them, she remained a high school dropout who was financially dependent upon her boyfriend, and she was unemployed. In the Interest of L.W., 276 Ga. App. 197, 622 S.E.2d 860 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination order under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) was supported by sufficient evidence, including the mother's failure to obtain stable, legal income or stable housing, although the mother had almost two years to meet these goals of the reunification case plan, the mother's acknowledgement that the mother was entirely dependent upon a boyfriend, the mother's failure to address marital instability and follow a psychologist's recommendations, and the mother's concession that the children were deprived due to medical neglect and other factors; based on this, and other evidence, the trial court found that the mother's lack of parental care was the cause of the deprivation. The same facts supported the finding that the children were deprived, that the deprivation was likely to continue, and the continued deprivation would likely have caused the children serious harm. In the Interest of K.A.S., 279 Ga. App. 643, 632 S.E.2d 433 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Trial court properly held that termination of a mother's parental rights was in her 20-month-old child's best interest. The mother had been incarcerated for most of her child's life, missed several visits with the child before the incarceration, lacked stability, and had a lengthy history with the department of family and child services involving her older children; there was evidence that the mother suffered significantly from substance abuse and would have difficulty changing her behavior; and the child's foster parents wished to adopt the child. In the Interest of T.B., 288 Ga. App. 794, 655 S.E.2d 680 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of mother's parental rights appropriate.
- Termination of a mother's parental rights was proper when the juvenile court determined by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) a mother's deprivation of her children would likely continue because she had quit her job, failed to secure other stable employment, moved several times because she could not afford housing, was arrested, and had jeopardized her probation by drinking again; and (2) termination was in the best interest of the children because their grandmother, who had custody of them, was providing a stable home environment and because contact with the mother was detrimental to the children. In the Interest of K.N.C., 264 Ga. App. 475, 590 S.E.2d 792 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court properly terminated a mother's parental rights as the mother was bound by the deprivation, temporary custody, and non-reunification orders, which were not appealed; considering the mother's alcohol abuse, frequent incarceration, and failure to change substantially her lifestyle, the evidence supported the findings that the children were deprived due to lack of proper parental control or inability, that the deprivation was likely to continue, and that the continued deprivation would cause serious harm to the children. In the Interest of K.M.C., 273 Ga. App. 276, 614 S.E.2d 896 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence allowed a finding that a mother's children were deprived at the time of the termination order as the mother continued to reside in the same unsanitary house that the Department of Children and Families found unsuitable for the children, and she continued to have a relationship with the father; thus, the conditions upon which the trial court's deprivation findings were based still existed at the time of the termination hearing. In the Interest of K.L.M., 316 Ga. App. 246, 729 S.E.2d 452 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Parental rights of mother properly terminated.
- Trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of the mother in the minor child as the mother conceded the child was deprived and that her conduct caused that deprivation; in addition, clear and convincing evidence showed the existence of the remaining factors necessary to terminate parental rights as the evidence showed that because of her past conduct the deprivation was likely to continue and that the continued deprivation would likely cause serious harm to the minor child. In the Interest of D.E., 269 Ga. App. 753, 605 S.E.2d 394 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Mother's parental rights in her children were properly terminated, because: (1) she did not appeal a prior finding that the children were deprived; (2) the deprivation was caused by a lack of parental care due to the mother's imprisonment, which had a demonstrable negative effect on the parent-child relationship pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(iii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-1-311), excessive drug use, making her unable to provide for the children pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(ii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311), and her failure to comply with a court-ordered plan to reunite her with the children pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(C)(iii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311); (3) clear and convincing evidence showed the deprivation was likely to continue, as the mother was highly likely to continue abusing drugs and did not achieve financial or residential stability; (4) the deprivation was likely to harm the children due to the mother's repeated failure to remain drug free and her failure to take steps to reunite with the children, causing a lack of a permanent home for the children and emotional instability; and (5) termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests, considering their mental, emotional, and moral condition and their need for a secure and stable home. In the Interest of A.B., 274 Ga. App. 230, 617 S.E.2d 189 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination in best interests of children.
- Mother's current living situation which could not accommodate all three children coupled with her longstanding inability or refusal to comply with reunification plans or bond with her children supported a finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. In the Interest of D.M.H., 242 Ga. App. 47, 528 S.E.2d 816 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Although the mother appeared to have made some progress, sufficient evidence was presented to support the trial court's findings that the children's deprivation was likely to continue, that the continued deprivation would be likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children, and that termination of the mother's rights was in the best interests of the children. In the Interest of J.S.G., 242 Ga. App. 387, 529 S.E.2d 141 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94) In the Interest of B.I.F., 264 Ga. App. 777, 592 S.E.2d 441 (2003);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of a parent's rights was in the best interests of the children since: (1) child one suffered multiple bone fractures by the age of four months, and the parent could not reasonably explain those injuries; (2) the children had been placed in foster care and had bonded with their foster parents; (3) child two cried uncontrollably when placed in the parent's care during scheduled visitation, but did not do so when with others; and (4) the parent was unemployed and had never paid any of the required child support. In the Interest of K.J.M., 282 Ga. App. 72, 637 S.E.2d 810 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of a parent's parental rights was in two children's best interests as: (1) the foster parents of the children had fully incorporated the children into their families, treated the children as their own, and desired to adopt the children; (2) each child's foster parents regularly communicated with the other child's foster parents and facilitated visits between the children; (3) in contrast, the biological parent failed to regularly visit the children and went for months without seeing the children or communicating with the foster parents; (4) the parent failed to give birthday presents to the children and missed a Christmas visit; and (5) despite the mandates of the parent's case plan, the parent failed to provide financial support, to obtain stable housing, or to obtain stable employment. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of parental rights was in the best interests of three children as the children were in need of supervision, treatment, and rehabilitation; the children were and would continue to suffer from deprivation; and a continued relationship with the parents would cause further harm. The record also supported the conclusion that the mother would not protect the children from the father in the future. In the Interest of A.B., 283 Ga. App. 131, 640 S.E.2d 702 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Based on the evidence of a mother's prior drug problems, her failure to support or develop any bond or contact with the child, her willingness to reconcile with the father, and the foster parents' desire to adopt the child, the trial court did not manifestly abuse the court's discretion by finding that termination was in the child's best interest. In the Interest of Z. P., 314 Ga. App. 347, 724 S.E.2d 48 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Placement with grandparent inappropriate following parental rights termination.
- Based on a mother's housing and employment instability, failure to comply with a reunification plan, and lack of bonding with her child, the mother's parental rights were properly terminated under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320); the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court refused to award custody to the grandmother under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-103(a)(1) based on the court's conclusion that such a placement was not in the child's best interests. In the Interest of J.W.M., 273 Ga. App. 20, 614 S.E.2d 163 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Medical and psychological conditions of parent.
- Clear and convincing evidence supported the order terminating a parent's rights to two minor children as the children's deprivation was due primarily to the parent's mental illness and failure to take prescribed medication to address that illness, and during more than 30 months the parent was given to work on a reunification case plan, the parent failed to comply with the requirements of the plan. In the Interest of O. B., 337 Ga. App. 401, 787 S.E.2d 344 (2016).
Insufficient Evidence for Termination
Limited education is not basis for termination.
- Termination of parental rights was reversed for both the mother and father because failure to complete school cannot be the primary reason to terminate parental rights, nor are delays in meeting some goals of a court-ordered reunification plan alone sufficient. In the Interest of T.B., 242 Ga. App. 564, 529 S.E.2d 620, 529 S.W.2d 620 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Limited education and poor conditions insufficient for termination.
- When the mother has only a ninth-grade education, lives in a trailer without water or toilet facilities in the rear of her mother's yard, has no steady job, and has a husband in prison, parental rights may not be severed absent a showing of misconduct or physical or mental disability of the mother. Harper v. Department of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 758, 285 S.E.2d 220 (1981) (decided under former law).
Status as teenager insufficient for termination of parental rights.
- While the evidence showed only that at the time of the hearing the mother was 16 years old, unemployed, without prospects for future employment, and without any stable living arrangements, this was insufficient as a matter of law to authorize the termination of her parental rights. Chancey v. Department of Human Resources, 156 Ga. App. 338, 274 S.E.2d 728 (1980) (decided under former law).
Imprisonment insufficient for termination.
- Even though mother was incarcerated "on arrest for possession of cocaine and intent to solicit prostitution," denial of termination of parental rights was authorized based on the lack of evidence that the child was deprived due to parental unfitness or that the deprivation was likely to continue. In re R.A., 226 Ga. App. 18, 486 S.E.2d 363 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Order terminating a mother's parental rights was reversed, despite the fact that the juvenile court correctly found clear and convincing evidence that the child was deprived due to the mother's incarceration, as no clear and convincing evidence was presented against the mother that the cause of the deprivation was likely to continue and would not be remedied, the child was only 20 months old at the time of the termination hearing, and no other evidence was presented against the mother as to the issue of unfitness. In the Interest of J.A.W., 281 Ga. App. 545, 636 S.E.2d 725 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Although the father had not communicated with the child or provided support for a period of time given the fact that the father had been incarcerated, the court did not conclude that the father had abandoned the child within the meaning of the law nor did the court made specific factual findings or conclusions of law concerning the issue of justifiable cause; thus, the court did not address any of the criteria for termination pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320). Ray v. Hann, 323 Ga. App. 45, 746 S.E.2d 600 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Petition for adoption inappropriate when both parties equally able to meet child's needs.
- Because the evidence showed that the child's needs could be equally met in either the mother's or the grandparent's home, the trial court abused the court's discretion in terminating the mother's parental rights under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) and O.C.G.A.19-8-10 and granting the grandmother's and the step-grandfather's petition for adoption under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2. McCollum v. Jones, 274 Ga. App. 815, 619 S.E.2d 313 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Parent recovering from drug abuse.
- Department of children and family services failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a mother was unfit and that her children's deprivation would continue unless her parental rights were terminated since: (1) the mother completed an eight-week intensive drug treatment program; (2) subsequent drug screening tests introduced into evidence revealed that she was drug-free; and (3) though not required to do so by the reunification plan, the mother joined Narcotics Anonymous and attended meetings twice a week. In the Interest of L.J.L., 247 Ga. App. 477, 543 S.E.2d 818 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court erred in determining that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of a mother's parental rights because there was insufficient evidence supporting the finding that the children's deprivation was likely to continue as the mother had undergone treatment and was told not to have contact with the children; there was no evidence admitted that a failure to maintain a bond existed or to support the finding of excessive or chronic unrehabilitated drug abuse. In the Interest of C. G., 324 Ga. App. 110, 749 S.E.2d 411 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence of parent's psychological problems insufficient.
- Trial court erred in finding child deprived and in ordering continued custody of the child in the Department of Family and Children Services because there was no competent evidence supporting the finding that the mother suffered from a mental impairment; the social worker's testimony that the mother's obstetrician thought the mother had cuts on her wrist that might have been self-inflicted, and that the obstetrician was concerned because the mother was crying and depressed after her child was taken away, there were no psychological evaluations or reports from treating physicians in the record, or medical reports indicating any mental impairment or how said mental impairment might limit the mother's parental abilities. In the Interest of K.S., 271 Ga. App. 891, 611 S.E.2d 150 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Isolated incident of leaving child alone insufficient.
- When the only evidence of actual neglect by the natural mother is an isolated incident where she left the child alone for approximately 45 minutes, while such behavior is reprehensible, this incident is not so compelling as to clearly convince a rational trier of fact that the child's past deprivation will continue so as to authorize the total termination of parental rights. In re S.M., 169 Ga. App. 364, 312 S.E.2d 829 (1983) (decided under former law).
No intercession simply because child's lot substandard.
- Seldom does the state wield so awesome a power as when the state permanently cuts the family ties between parent and child. While the state may not sit blindly idle as a child suffers unconscionable hardship, neither may the state blithely intercede simply because the child's lot is substandard. Shover v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 38, 270 S.E.2d 462 (1980) (decided under former law).
Poverty alone insufficient grounds for termination.
- It was error to terminate a mother's parental rights as it was not shown that the children's deprivation was likely to continue; the mother met virtually all of her case plan goals except for paying child support and her shortcomings with regard to her case plan stemmed largely from her poverty, which alone was not a basis for termination. In the Interest of C.T., 286 Ga. App. 186, 648 S.E.2d 708 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Parent's medical condition insufficient for termination.
- Termination of parental rights was not justified since there was less than "clear and convincing" evidence that parental unfitness, which included severe abuse by the mother, would not be remedied, and there was no competent evidence showing that the father's physical disability would likely impair his ability to care for the child. In re K.E.B., 190 Ga. App. 121, 378 S.E.2d 171 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Cohabiting with divorced, drinking spouse insufficient.
- Mother's resumption of a cohabitation arrangement with her former spouse who had developed a drinking problem did not support termination of her parental rights as an unfit parent since the evidence indicated the mother was, inter alia, gainfully employed. In re A.D., 208 Ga. App. 438, 430 S.E.2d 809 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Child wanted to live with parent.
- Although a parent's past was far from exemplary, the evidence presented did not clearly and convincingly establish that the child's deprivation would continue and not likely be remedied to support termination of parental rights. The child informed the court that the child wanted to live with the parent, and since the parent's release from prison, the parent's drug screens were negative. In the Interest of K.D.E., 288 Ga. App. 520, 654 S.E.2d 651 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
No intercession because mother deemed failure by society.
- Mother's failure fully to live up to societal norms for productivity, morality, cleanliness, and responsibility does not summarily rob her of the right to raise her own offspring, nor does it end the child's right to be raised by the child's own mother. R.C.N. v. State, 141 Ga. App. 490, 233 S.E.2d 866 (1977) (decided under former law); Patty v. Department of Human Resources, 154 Ga. App. 455, 269 S.E.2d 30 (1980); Shover v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 38, 270 S.E.2d 462 (1980) (decided under former law);(decided under former law).
Termination unauthorized absent finding of child suffering.
- Even though "the child is a deprived child and that the conditions and causes of deprivation are likely to continue," absent a finding "that by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm," termination of parental rights is not authorized. Patty v. Department of Human Resources, 151 Ga. App. 555, 260 S.E.2d 551 (1979) (decided under former law).
No evidence of present parental misconduct or inability.
- When the mother had been sober and drug free for two years, took all available rehabilitation and parenting classes during a recent incarceration, was presently employed, was current on child support, and took advantage of all opportunities to communicate with her child, the juvenile court properly found no evidence of present parental misconduct or inability. In re J.E.E., 235 Ga. App. 247, 509 S.E.2d 147 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Based on the brief and insubstantial testimony given by the parole officer and the caseworker, there was no clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability. Absent such evidence, the juvenile court erred in taking the drastic action of terminating the mother's parental rights. In the Interest of A.G.I., 246 Ga. App. 85, 539 S.E.2d 584 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
No clear and convincing evidence justifying termination.
- Termination of parental rights was erroneous in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the child's deprivation with respect to the mother was likely to continue or would not be remedied, or that the child was likely to suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm caused by the father. In re K.J., 226 Ga. App. 303, 486 S.E.2d 899 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Because the state failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that a child's deprivation was likely to continue or that the child would be harmed by a continuing relationship with the father, as the evidence showed that the father: (1) substantially complied with the case plan; (2) was cooperative with the case workers; and (3) was diligent in establishing and maintaining a strong bond with the child, the order terminating the father's parental rights was reversed. In the Interest of S.M.W., 287 Ga. App. 288, 651 S.E.2d 211 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
No clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct.
- When the primary allegation of parental misconduct was failure to comply with a case reunification plan, and when the evidence was undisputed that the parent had complied with four of the plan's five goals, and when the only unmet goal was completing high school, and when the parent quit high school to marry and get a job to provide a home for the child, there was by no means clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct by the mother. In the Interest of T.B., 242 Ga. App. 564, 529 S.E.2d 620, 529 S.W.2d 620 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
In a termination of parental rights matter, the record failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the children's deprivation was likely to continue as both parents made significant progress on their case plans, and it was clear that the children were emotionally attached to the parents; the record showed that the father completed everything required in the case plan except with regard to child support, and the mother "was wonderful with the children" during supervised visits. In the Interest of A.F., 283 Ga. App. 509, 642 S.E.2d 148 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Clear and convincing evidence of a parent's misconduct or inability sufficient to justify a termination of that parent's parental rights under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) was lacking; no evidence was presented that any continued deprivation of the child would cause the child physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm, and termination of the parent's parental rights was not shown to be in the child's best interest; thus, the trial court properly denied a petition to terminate parental rights. In the Interest of K.C.R., 283 Ga. App. 593, 642 S.E.2d 214 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Insufficient evidence for termination of parental rights.
- As insufficient evidence was presented of a parent's parental misconduct or inability, a reunification plan was never implemented, and the parent made efforts to establish a stable home, despite shortcomings in the efforts to pay child support and in pursuing visitation, clear and convincing evidence did not support terminating the parent's parental rights; moreover, sufficient evidence was presented to negate the juvenile court's finding that the parent was unfit. In the Interest of T.E.T., 282 Ga. App. 269, 638 S.E.2d 412 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Insufficient findings to support termination.
- Although the trial court was allowed to consider a father's criminal history in determining whether his parental rights should be terminated and the appellate court found that any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of a child's deprivation was likely to continue, the appellate court could not affirm the trial court's judgment that the father's failure to provide care for the child was likely to harm the child because the trial court failed to support the court's judgment with explicit factual findings. In the Interest of R.S., 255 Ga. App. 756, 566 S.E.2d 461 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Insufficient evidence of deprivation.
- Evidence that the cause of two children's deprivation was likely to continue for purposes of terminating the mother's parental rights was problematic since: (1) although the mother had not had contact with the children, she was ordered not to have contact; (2) the children were not deprived while in the mother's care prior to her marriage to her husband, who sexually abused the daughter, and the husband was no longer in contact with the mother or the children; (3) the mother failed to pay child support breaching a legal duty; (4) the mother lived with her fiance which raised questions, but no home study was performed; and (5) the daughter was troubled, but her condition was not caused by the mother. In the Interest of J.H., 267 Ga. App. 541, 600 S.E.2d 650 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Juvenile court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights with respect to the mother's child because, concerning whether continued deprivation would cause or would be likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child, the evidence was insufficient. In the Interest of J. J. S., 321 Ga. App. 86, 741 S.E.2d 207 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was reversed because the record did not support a finding that the deprivation was likely to continue since the mother had secured employment and housing, had attended a parenting class, completed a psychological evaluation, consistently visited the children, and started making child support payments. In the Interest of C. J. V., 323 Ga. App. 283, 746 S.E.2d 783 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Insufficient evidence that continued deprivation likely to cause harm.
- Juvenile court's finding that the deprivation of a mother's children was likely to continue did not state any specific facts that led to the conclusion that there was a likelihood of serious harm from continued deprivation; thus, the matter was remanded for appropriate findings and conclusions. In the Interest of K.L.M., 316 Ga. App. 246, 729 S.E.2d 452 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Detrimental and egregious parental conduct not demonstrated.
- Although evidence showed poverty and instability in the mother's living arrangements, the evidence did not demonstrate the profoundly detrimental and egregious parental conduct which led to the termination of rights in previous cases. R.C.N. v. State, 141 Ga. App. 490, 233 S.E.2d 866 (1977) (decided under former law).
While the lifestyle and income-producing ability of the mother who lived in a trailer with a friend's family and did babysitting and housework were not exemplary, they could not be said to be so profoundly detrimental or egregious as to warrant the permanent termination of her parental rights to her child. Shover v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 38, 270 S.E.2d 462 (1980) (decided under former law).
Deprivation unlikely to cause serious harm to child.
- Trial court erred in entering judgment terminating the mother's parental rights to her child even though there was evidence concerning the mother's past behavior, the mother's inability to provide a home or support for the child, and the mother's failure to comply with significant portions of the mother's case plan for reunification showing by clear and convincing evidence that the causes of the child's deprivation were likely to continue; insufficient evidence was presented to show that continued deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child, thus, termination of the mother's parental rights was improper. In the Interest of J.H., 258 Ga. App. 211, 573 S.E.2d 481 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence insufficient to authorize termination of mother's parental rights.
- See In the Interest of A.W., 249 Ga. App. 278, 547 S.E.2d 797 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94); In the Interest of D.F., 251 Ga. App. 859, 555 S.E.2d 225 (2001); In the Interest of J.M., 251 Ga. App. 380, 554 S.E.2d 533 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Hearsay.
- Based upon the juvenile court's express reliance upon hearsay in an exhibit to support the court's conclusion that a parent suffered from schizophrenia to such a degree that the parent was unable to provide for the needs of the parent's child, termination of parental rights was inappropriate. In the Interest of C. A., 316 Ga. App. 185, 728 S.E.2d 816 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of mother's parental rights inappropriate.
- Mother's parental rights could not be terminated in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the mother's mental disorder, which was identified as the cause of her child's deprivation, was likely to continue or not be remedied. In re C.G., 235 Ga. App. 23, 508 S.E.2d 246 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Decision terminating mother's parental rights was reversed after it was shown that her circumstances had changed significantly because she was no longer in jail, was working full-time, had undergone drug counseling, had established a home, and her daughter had a strong emotional attachment to her. In re K.M., 240 Ga. App. 677, 523 S.E.2d 640 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
When the department of family and children services failed to present clear and convincing evidence that mother's children were likely to suffer serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm if parental rights were not terminated, evidence was insufficient to warrant termination of mother's parental rights. Trial judge's decision could not rest on dry recitation that certain legal requirements were met to satisfy requirements of the law. In the Interest of J.M., 251 Ga. App. 380, 554 S.E.2d 533 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence before the trial court did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the mother's neglect of her child was likely to continue and termination was inappropriate since: the mother had been unaware of the child's location despite her best efforts to locate the child, a previous finding of deprivation did not mean that there would be continued deprivation, there was no case plan for reunification, and the child was living with grandparents and would not suffer without permanent placement. In the Interest of B.F., 257 Ga. App. 76, 570 S.E.2d 385 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Although a mother had difficulty establishing a stable home environment and she had poor judgment in selecting a partner, there was insufficient evidence that continued exposure to the mother or continued deprivation of the child would cause the child serious physical, mental, or moral harm, and a decision to terminate the mother's parental rights was not supported pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310); at the time of the termination hearing, the mother was in a good marriage, lived in a home with her in-laws, had obtained a job, and seemed to understand the importance of a stable life. In the Interest of J.T.W., 270 Ga. App. 26, 606 S.E.2d 59 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of a mother's parental rights was improper because, although the evidence showed that the children were deprived and that the mother's lack of proper parental care caused the deprivation, in that the mother had been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and mild mental retardation but neglected to take the medication prescribed to treat her condition, resulting in the mother's inability to maintain employment and a stable, safe home environment, there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's conclusion that the continued deprivation was likely to cause serious harm to the children. In the Interest of J.S.B., 277 Ga. App. 660, 627 S.E.2d 402 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Mother was entitled to reversal of the order terminating the mother's parental rights because the mother's circumstances at the time of the termination hearing were significantly different from those which caused the child to be removed from the mother's custody; among other things, the mother established stable housing near a child care center that could provide specialized care for the child, had obtained a driver's license, was a college student, had exercised unsupervised visitation, had attended most of the child's medical appointments, had completed anger and violence counseling, had completed parenting classes, and knew how to care for the medically fragile child. In the Interest of M. T. F., 318 Ga. App. 135, 733 S.E.2d 432 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's order terminating the mother's parental rights to the child because it was undisputed that the mother had completed most of the mother's case plan goals by the time the termination petition was filed. The mother had submitted to two psychological evaluations, attended a parenting class, and worked steadily toward achieving stable housing, and the specific requirement that she participate with the recommendations of a developmental disability organization was not added to her case plan until two months before the petition was filed and the mother was participating, to some extent, with the organization. In the Interest of D. J., 320 Ga. App. 247, 739 S.E.2d 730 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper as a failure to terminate the mother's rights would not cause or was not likely to cause the children serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm because the children would not be harmed seriously were the children to remain in foster care, by virtue of either their relationship with their mother or the impermanency of that situation; the mother had positive visits with the children; the children were happy to see their mother; the children were not performing poorly in school or displaying significant age-inappropriate behavioral problems; and the lack of specific evidence regarding potential harm mandated reversal as the mother and children were bonded and emotionally close. In the Interest of E. M. D., 339 Ga. App. 189, 793 S.E.2d 489 (2016).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper because, although the evidence supported the finding that the children's dependency was likely to continue and would not likely be remedied, the state did not sufficiently establish that the children were likely to suffer harm under the status quo as there was no evidence that their continued relationship with their mother was harmful; and the juvenile court's generalized findings that the children would experience doubt, uncertainty and hesitancy in life, and that foster care would not provide the kind of stability they needed, and would put them at risk of delinquency, other anti-social behavior, and "foster care drift" did not show how each child would be harmed by the status quo. In the Interest of A. S., 339 Ga. App. 875, 794 S.E.2d 672 (2016).
Evidence insufficient for termination of father's parental rights.
- See In the Interest of V.S., 249 Ga. App. 502, 548 S.E.2d 490 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Father was entitled to have the order terminating the father's parental rights reversed because the testimony indicated that the father had maintained a bond with the children, and the father was making progress on the father's case plan, completing parental and anger management classes, addressing the father's substance abuse issue, maintaining suitable employment for a long period of time, and maintaining suitable housing. In the Interest of C. S., 319 Ga. App. 138, 735 S.E.2d 140 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of father's parental rights inappropriate.
- Termination of the parental rights regarding two children with two separate fathers was inappropriate because it was undisputed that neither father ever abused either child. In re D.C.N.K., 232 Ga. App. 85, 501 S.E.2d 268 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Juvenile court erred in terminating father's parental rights in the daughter when the juvenile court failed to make the required legal conclusion regarding whether the daughter's continued deprivation would cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to her, as well as supporting findings of fact; thus, a remand was necessary for an appropriate ruling. In the Interest of M.D.F., 263 Ga. App. 50, 587 S.E.2d 199 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Reliance on citizen's review panel insufficient.
- Record showing heavy reliance on the recommendations of a citizen's review panel and on the mother's past unfitness did not present sufficient competent evidence for termination of her parental rights. In re M.L.P., 231 Ga. App. 223, 498 S.E.2d 786 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).
Parent with mental retardation.
- Insufficient evidence supported the termination of a parent's rights because the record showed that while the parent had mental retardation, the parent functioned well despite the mental disability and had the skills necessary to provide for and raise a family, including two children, in Arkansas; thus, there was a lack of evidence that the deprivation was to continue. In the Interest of O. B., 337 Ga. App. 401, 787 S.E.2d 344 (2016).
Deprivation
Parent's lack of parental care or control caused deprivation.
- Affirmance of the juvenile court's order terminating a parent's parental rights was ordered as the parent failed to comply with the case plan outlined, and the parent's failure to obtain stable housing, continued financial instability, and prolonged unwillingness to address mental health issues showed that the parent's lack of parental care or control caused the children's deprivation; hence, the parent's motion for a new trial was properly denied. In the Interest of J.M.N., 285 Ga. App. 203, 645 S.E.2d 685 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Court upheld an order terminating a parent's parental rights which was supported by sufficient evidence that the children at issue lacked proper parental care and that the cause of the deprivation was likely to continue, based on that parent's admitted drug use, failure to pay child support, failure to establish a bond with the children, and consent to a non-reunification plan, satisfying former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(ii) and (iii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310). In the Interest of H.C., 285 Ga. App. 631, 647 S.E.2d 333 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Deprivation continuing from parental drug abuse.
- Juvenile court's findings supported the conclusion that the children were dependent at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing due to a lack of proper parental care and control because the parent's continuing substance abuse was evidenced by the parent's prior positive drug screen and several refused screenings (which the Division of Family and Children Services treated as positive); and because the parent was unable to pay even a symbolic amount of child support or to provide stable housing. In the Interest of A. S., 339 Ga. App. 875, 794 S.E.2d 672 (2016).
Evidence of deprivation sufficient.
- Evidence was sufficient to show both deprivation and that the deprivation resulted from the mother's conduct. In the Interest of S.B., 242 Ga. App. 184, 528 S.E.2d 278 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence supported the finding that the children's deprivation was caused by the mother because the mother abandoned the children and left them with her mother and her mother's husband, who had been charged with sex crimes, she failed to maintain meaningful or consistent contact with either the Department of Family and Children Services or the children for over a year and made no effort to support the children financially, the mother made no effort to comply with the reunification plan, and she surrendered her parental rights in the children. In the Interest of M.E.M., 272 Ga. App. 451, 612 S.E.2d 612 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights as the mother was bound by a juvenile court's order finding that the children were deprived as a result of neglect, including inadequate housing and the mother's substance abuse; the mother did not appeal the juvenile court's finding. In the Interest of C.T.M., 273 Ga. App. 168, 614 S.E.2d 812 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Termination of a parent's rights was proper as there was sufficient evidence that the children would be deprived if returned to their parent's custody given the parent's lack of employment, the parent's inability to financially support the children, their failure to receive further anger management counseling, and failure to complete domestic violence counseling; also, child one's unexplained injuries were evidence of deprivation. In the Interest of K.J.M., 282 Ga. App. 72, 637 S.E.2d 810 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Evidence showed that two children were deprived for purposes of the termination of a parent's rights as: (1) the children had been found to be deprived and were not in the parent's custody, and the parent failed to maintain a parental bond as the parent did not visit the children once in nine months, failed to give the children birthday presents, and did not contact the foster parents; (2) the parent failed to complete the case plan, although the parent completed parenting classes and a substance abuse evaluation, the parent moved at least nine times in two years and did not maintain regular contact with a child services agency; and (3) the parent paid $60 of $900 owed in child support and failed to support the children. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Reunification
Reunification plan not required.
- Department of Family and Children Services was not obligated in every case to create a plan for reunification, nor was the juvenile court required to reunite a child with the child's parent in order to obtain current evidence of deprivation or neglect; when the parental rights were at issue as to a parent who did not have custody of the child, the court must determine whether the child was without proper parental care and control by considering the criteria established by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311). In the Interest of T. B., 267 Ga. App. 484, 600 S.E.2d 432 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Because the parental rights to a mother's other four children had previously been terminated around the time the mother's infant child was born, the juvenile court did not err in approving a non-reunification plan involving that infant child pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(a)(4)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320); further, a presumption of non-reunification arose based on the mother's medically verified mental deficiency. In the Interest of J.P., 280 Ga. App. 100, 633 S.E.2d 442 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).
Reunification not appropriate.
- Juvenile court did not err in terminating the reunification services and approving the non-reunification plan because clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that the child was deprived based on the mother's long-term substance abuse and that such deprivation was likely to continue and cause harm to the child. In the Interest of J. T., 322 Ga. App. 4, 743 S.E.2d 571 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).