A legal custodian has the right to physical custody of a child, the right to determine the nature of the care and treatment of such child, including ordinary medical care, and the right and duty to provide for the care, protection, training, and education and the physical, mental, and moral welfare of such child, subject to the conditions and limitations of the order and to the remaining rights and duties of such child's parent or guardian.
(Code 1981, §15-11-30, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
Law reviews.- For comment on Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979), regarding juvenile commitment to state mental hospitals upon application of parents or guardians, see 29 Emory L. J. 517 (1980).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2901, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-43 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-13, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
"Legal guardian."
- Grandmother was not a "legal guardian" of a child within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13 or O.C.G.A. § 19-9-22(2). Stills v. Johnson, 272 Ga. 645, 533 S.E.2d 695 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13).
Right to consent to adoption of child is one of those residual rights retained by a parent, notwithstanding the transfer of temporary legal custody of the child to another person. Skipper v. Smith, 239 Ga. 854, 238 S.E.2d 917 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2901); O'Neal v. Wilkes, 263 Ga. 850, 439 S.E.2d 490 (1994);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-43).
Powers and duties of juvenile court.
- Having committed a child to the Division of Children and Youth (now Division of Youth Services), which under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701 was self-executing in placing control over the child to the division for two years, or until the child was sooner discharged, or as provided for an extension of the two-year period on motion of the division, it was beyond the power of the trial judge to make further provision at that time in effect retaining jurisdiction over the child to prevent the mother from gaining physical custody of the child except subject to further order of the court or to require that the child upon release shall be returned to the child treatment center and the physical custody of this court. Mack v. State, 125 Ga. App. 639, 188 S.E.2d 828 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2901).
Visitation rights of a parent of a child in the custody of the Department of Family and Children Services are a residual "parental tie" which is not severed by the mere placement of the child in the temporary custody of the department, without a specific finding as to that right. In re K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-43).
Right to control medical care.
- Mother forfeited her right to control her child's medical care when she lost temporary custody of the child. In the Interest of C.R., 257 Ga. App. 159, 570 S.E.2d 609 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13).
Right of parent to object to immunization not found.
- After a child has been found to be deprived, the only remaining parental rights under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30) that have been recognized by the appellate courts were the rights to consent to an adoption of the child and to visit with the child; accordingly, the temporary custodian of the child had the authority to have the child immunized over the mother's religious objection to the immunization. In the Interest of C.R., 257 Ga. App. 159, 570 S.E.2d 609 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13).
Foster children.
- Former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-13,15-11-58 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-30,15-11-134, and15-11-200 et seq.), and O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-690.1, and49-5-12, which set out in clear detail the rights and services to which foster children are entitled, were not too vague and amorphous to be enforced by the judiciary and imposed specific duties on the state defendants; thus, the federal regulatory scheme embodied in the CSFR process does not relieve the state defendants of their obligation to fulfill their statutory duties to the foster children, nor does it provide a legal excuse for their failure to do so. Kenny A. v. Perdue, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13).
Intervention of county agency in adoption proceeding proper.
- County Department of Family and Children Services was properly permitted to intervene with regard to a couple's petition seeking to adopt a child as the child was adjudicated deprived and placed in the temporary custody of the department. While the biological parents' surrender of their parental rights was the basis for the adoption petition, the department remained the temporary legal custodian of the child and, given that the department's interest in the child as the temporary legal custodian, the juvenile court did not err by allowing the department to intervene through the department's objection to the adoption. Sastre v. McDaniel, 293 Ga. App. 671, 667 S.E.2d 896 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13).
Private cause of action.
- Following factors are relevant in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one: first, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one; third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for plaintiff? If foster children alleged that certain children services agencies and officials violated former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30), then that section conferred upon the children a private cause of action. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13).
Trial court erred in requiring a father to prove by clear and convincing proof that changed circumstances warranted modification of an order placing the father's children with their maternal aunts; the father retained an interest in the children, under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-58(i)(1) and15-11-13 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-30 and15-11-204), sufficient to support a right to petition for modification, and the father was only required to prove the motion under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-444 and15-11-608)by a preponderance of the evidence. In re J. N., 302 Ga. App. 631, 691 S.E.2d 396 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-13).
Cited in In the Interest of A. H., 332 Ga. App. 590, 774 S.E.2d 163 (2015).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2901, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Commitment does not necessarily require surrogate parent be appointed.- There is a distinction between children who are simply committed to the state for temporary care and supervision and those who are actually "wards of the state." Commitment of a child to the Division of Youth Services does not per se make a child a "ward of the state" for the purposes of 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. of a surrogate parent. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-53 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2901).