(Code 1981, §15-11-134, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
Cross references.- Motion for extension of Juvenile Court order, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 4.5.
Time limitations upon other orders of disposition in Juvenile Court proceedings, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 15.3.
Law reviews.- For article, "An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-41, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-58, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Applicability.
- Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-134) was inapplicable since a child remained in the legal custody of the child's father with whom the child had been residing for several months prior to the deprivation hearing as the child was not placed in the custody of the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services. In the Interest of K.J., 268 Ga. App. 843, 602 S.E.2d 861 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
In a termination of parental rights case, the court rejected the parents' argument that the parents had been deprived of the opportunity to achieve reunification under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-202) because the Department of Family and Children Services had not promptly presented a second reunification plan; while the parents had made laudable efforts to comply with the second case plan, the parent had not complied with the first plan; moreover, former § 15-11-58 did not apply to termination proceedings. In the Interest of T.W.O., 283 Ga. App. 771, 643 S.E.2d 255 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Limits on dispositional power of trial judge after initial commitment.
- Except as provided in subsection (b) (now subsection (a)) of former Code 1933, § 24A-2701 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-134) the commitment for an additional two years, the trial judge can neither terminate nor extend the disposition, and after the Division of Youth Services had physical custody under the order, the judge was also prevented from changing, modifying, or vacating the order on the ground that changed circumstances so required in the best interests of the child.(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701) Mack v. State, 125 Ga. App. 639, 188 S.E.2d 828 (1972); Department of Human Resources v. J.R.S., 161 Ga. App. 262, 287 S.E.2d 713 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).
Jurisdiction.
- Superior court properly declined jurisdiction in a custody action brought by grandparents because once a juvenile court took jurisdiction of a deprivation action concerning the child and, later, a termination action of parental rights, the court took jurisdiction of the entire case of the minor child including the issues of disposition and custody. Segars v. State, 309 Ga. App. 732, 710 S.E.2d 916 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Foster children.
- Former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-13 and15-11-58 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-30,15-11-134, and15-11-200 et seq.),20-2-690.1, and49-5-12 were not too vague and amorphous to be enforced by the judiciary and impose specific duties on the state defendants; thus, the federal regulatory scheme embodied in the CSFR process did not relieve the state defendants of the defendants obligation to fulfill the defendants statutory duties to the foster children, nor did the former statute provide a legal excuse for the defendants failure to do so. Kenny A. v. Perdue, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Removal from home.
- Since a minor was living with the minor's aunt and uncle for over 10 years and they thereafter commenced a private child deprivation proceeding against the minor's mother, it was determined that former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-134) was inapplicable to the action and, accordingly, the procedures outlined therein did not have to be followed prior to the juvenile court making an order that the legal custody be vested in the aunt and uncle. Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58 required that the child be "removed" from the child's home, but since the child already considered home to be with the child's aunt and uncle, the juvenile court had not removed the child and the procedures therein did not apply. In the Interest of J.W.K., 276 Ga. 314, 578 S.E.2d 396 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
There was sufficient support for the trial court's finding that continued custody in a grandparent who had adopted three grandchildren would be contrary to the welfare of the children since the grandparent had struck one child in the face, leaving a mark, spanked the children with a belt, pushed one child into a tub of water after asking if the child wanted to die and drown, and struck one child with an extension cord and another with a belt buckle; the trial court found that the children had suffered emotional trauma because of the grandparent's acts and that the grandchildren's condition improved significantly when the grandchildren were removed from the grandparent's home and placed with relatives. In the Interest of T.R., 284 Ga. App. 742, 644 S.E.2d 880 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Relative placement not a priority.
- Children were entitled to have juvenile court's order awarding the aunt and uncle custody vacated because the rehearing court erroneously held that the Juvenile Code established a preference for relative placement; while former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-134,15-11-202, and15-11-203) listed the custody options available to a juvenile judge in a certain order, the list was not to be construed as expressing a legislative intent for priority of placement. In the Interest of J. C. W., 318 Ga. App. 772, 734 S.E.2d 781 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Evidence insufficient for finding of deprivation.
- Juvenile court erred in extending temporary custody in the Department of Family and Children Services for an additional 12 months as: (1) the child's father was found to be a fit parent and was fully able to assume custody; (2) there was no testimony that the father was not capable of taking care of the child; and (3) the father completed every aspect of the case plan and was eligible for day-care assistance; thus, the evidence presented at the hearing fell far short of meeting the clear and convincing standard necessary to support a finding of deprivation. In the Interest of J.P., 280 Ga. App. 100, 633 S.E.2d 442 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).
Evidence sufficient for finding of deprivation.
- Because the Department of Family and Children Services presented clear and convincing evidence of a parent's inability to control a child to the extent necessary for that child's mental, physical, and emotional health, and the parent was afforded sufficient due process, the juvenile court's deprivation finding was upheld on appeal; moreover, absent evidence of a custody dispute, the proceeding was not a pretextual custody battle which divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction. In the Interest of D.T., 284 Ga. App. 336, 643 S.E.2d 842 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
In a deprivation case involving four children, sufficient evidence existed to support the order adjudicating the children deprived since the evidence established that the parents admitted chronically abusing alcohol and admitted that such abuse led to domestic violence; the father of the children falsely accused child molestation against one of the children, which affected that child so badly that the child refused to live at home and required psychiatric treatment, and even without testimony as to the effect on the children, the juvenile court was authorized to infer from the evidence that the alcohol abuse and domestic violence in the home had an adverse effect on the minor children. In the Interest of E.D., 287 Ga. App. 152, 650 S.E.2d 800 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Mother's parental unfitness based on the mother's long term drug abuse, including during the mother's pregnancy with the minor child, was shown by clear and convincing evidence and permitted the award of temporary custody of the child to the county department of family and children services under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-134,15-11-202, and15-11-203). In the Interest of N.H., 297 Ga. App. 344, 677 S.E.2d 399 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Clear and convincing evidence under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(a) established that a child was deprived due to parental unfitness because the mother was unable to care for the child from birth due to mental instability, the father was intentionally absent for the first two months of the child's life, and although the parents had married, neither had a job or stable housing, and the mother's mental instability had not been addressed. In re V.D., 303 Ga. App. 155, 692 S.E.2d 780 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Juvenile court did not err in granting a motion filed by a county department of family and children services to extend the department's temporary custody of a mother's children because clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that the children remained deprived; there was evidence that the mother was a chronic drug user who remained unrehabilitated even after her children had been removed from her custody, and the evidence of chronic unrehabilitated drug use, along with the evidence that the mother had not completed her reunification case plan goals, authorized the juvenile court to conclude that the children would continue to be deprived if the children were returned to the mother. In the Interest of Q.A., 306 Ga. App. 386, 702 S.E.2d 701 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
No equal protection violation.
- Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Procedure
Findings made without transcript reversed.
- Because the juvenile court primarily based the court's decision that a parent's two children were deprived, awarding temporary custody of the children to the county, on evidence received at an unrecorded hearing, and a waiver requiring a transcript of that hearing was not in evidence, those findings were reversed, and the case was remanded. In the Interest of D.P., 284 Ga. App. 453, 644 S.E.2d 299 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
Failure to follow required procedures.
- Juvenile court erred by not holding a preliminary protective hearing within 72 hours after the children were placed in foster care, by not giving the mother proper notice of the hearing, and by not making the required written findings regarding the children's welfare. In the Interest of R. B., 346 Ga. App. 564, 816 S.E.2d 706 (2018).
Temporary custody and visitation rights.
- Juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify an order granting temporary custody of a deprived child to the Department of Family and Children Services and to permit visitation by parents who filed a petition for visitation rights four months after the custody order. In re K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).
Consolidated proceedings not appealable when party consented.
- Having consented to the consolidation of nonreunification proceedings with termination proceedings, the mother could not challenge the procedure for the first time on appeal. In the Interest of A.S.O., 243 Ga. App. 1, 530 S.E.2d 261 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1176, 121 S. Ct. 1150, 148 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 50. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 56 et seq., 110 et seq.
C.J.S.- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 224 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 38 et seq., 63 et seq., 73 et seq., 90 et seq.
U.L.A.- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 36.