The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each child who comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own home, as will secure his or her moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare as well as the safety of both the child and community. It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a juvenile justice system that will protect the community, impose accountability for violations of law, provide treatment and rehabilitation, and equip juvenile offenders with the ability to live responsibly and productively. It is the intent of the General Assembly to preserve and strengthen family relationships, countenancing the removal of a child from his or her home only when state intervention is essential to protect such child and enable him or her to live in security and stability. In every proceeding, this chapter seeks to guarantee due process of law, as required by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Georgia, through which every child and his or her parent and all other interested parties are assured fair hearings at which legal rights are recognized and enforced. Above all, this chapter shall be liberally construed to reflect that the paramount child welfare policy of this state is to determine and ensure the best interests of its children.
(Code 1981, §15-11-1, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
Cross references.- Programs and protection for children and youth, T. 49, C. 5.
Law reviews.- For comment on Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979), regarding juvenile commitment to state mental hospitals upon application of parents or guardians, see 29 Emory L. J. 517 (1980). For comment, "Victim Offender Mediation: When Divergent Paths and Destroyed Lives Come Together for Healing," see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 577 (2016). For comment, "Pre-Adjudication Access to Counsel for Juveniles," see 69 Emory L.J. 359 (2019).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-101 and former Code Section 15-11-1, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Legislative intent for exclusive custody and control of committed juvenile.
- Ga. L. 1963, p. 81 and Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, when construed in pari materia, evidence a legislative intent that, once the juvenile court judge in the judge's discretion commits a juvenile to the Division for Children and Youth (now Department of Human Resources), custody and control of the juvenile is thereby and thereafter exclusively in the department. In re R.D., 141 Ga. App. 843, 234 S.E.2d 680 (1977); In re R.L.M., 171 Ga. App. 940, 321 S.E.2d 435 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Purpose of Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, as stated in Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 was to "assist, protect, and restore" a child, and therein was specific statutory intent that Ga. L. 1971, p. 709 shall be liberally construed to that end. P.R. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 346, 210 S.E.2d 839 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-101).
Construction with former juvenile code provisions.
- Stated purpose of the juvenile code to protect and restore children whose well-being was threatened supported a finding that the term "subsistence", as used in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-36), included expenses that might be incurred due to the need for emergency medical treatment of a child in the physical custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice. In the Interest of J.S., 282 Ga. 623, 652 S.E.2d 547 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Juvenile court's primary responsibility is to consider the welfare of the child. Gardner v. Lenon, 154 Ga. App. 748, 270 S.E.2d 36 (1980) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 31); In re B.H., 190 Ga. App. 131, 378 S.E.2d 175 (1989);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Authority to require letters of apology.
- Juvenile court had the authority to order a juvenile defendant to write a 300-word letter of apology to a bailiff and a 500-word essay on appropriate behavior in court. In the Interest of P.W., 289 Ga. App. 323, 657 S.E.2d 270 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Orders terminating parental rights not beyond reach of court.
- Legislature has declared that Ga. L. 1971, p. 709 should be construed toward the end of providing for a child's welfare, "preferably in his own home." To this end, the appellate courts will not declare orders terminating parental rights, removing the child permanently from the child's own home, to be beyond the reach of the court issuing the order. To the contrary, the juvenile court judge who has second thoughts about such an action should take whatever steps necessary to ensure the correctness of the judge's action. In re P.S.C., 143 Ga. App. 887, 240 S.E.2d 165 (1977) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1).
Preference for preservation of family counsels against deprivation evidence.
- Former statute counseled against any unreasoned expansion of the type of evidence which will suffice to show deprivation, and probable continued deprivation, causing or likely to cause serious harm to a child, because of the Code's expressed preference for preservation of the family unit. Leyva v. Brooks, 145 Ga. App. 619, 244 S.E.2d 119 (1978) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1).
Commitment of delinquent for purpose of rehabilitation or treatment.
- Commitment of a delinquent child to a facility operated under the direction of the juvenile court, or to another local public authority, or to the Division of Children and Youth (now Department of Human Resources), or to the Department of Corrections is for essentially the purpose of rehabilitation or treatment. A.B.W. v. State, 231 Ga. 699, 203 S.E.2d 512 (1974) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1).
Confinement of juvenile implies need of supervision, correction, and training.
- Confinement as provided for by the juvenile code necessarily deprives the parents of their prima facie prerogative of training and supervision, and implies that the juvenile is, within the terms of the juvenile law, one who is in need of supervision beyond the control of the juvenile's parents and in need of correction and training which the parents cannot provide. Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1).
Deprivation was supported by sufficient evidence.
- Deprivation finding was supported by sufficient evidence which showed that the child victim suffered multiple fractures all over the body which indicated that the fractures occurred at different times, and the child had no disease predisposing the child to the fractures, and a doctor testified that the injuries were consistent with abusive non-accidental trauma. In the Interest of T.J., 273 Ga. App. 547, 615 S.E.2d 613 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Because the Department of Family and Children Services presented clear and convincing evidence of a parent's inability to control a son to the extent necessary for that child's mental, physical, and emotional health, and the parent was afforded sufficient due process, the juvenile court's deprivation finding was upheld on appeal; moreover, absent evidence of a custody dispute, the proceeding was not a pretextual custody battle which divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction. In the Interest of D.T., 284 Ga. App. 336, 643 S.E.2d 842 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Under the circumstances in the mother's case, the juvenile court correctly found that the evidence of the children's deprivation was clear and convincing under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1 and15-11-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1 and15-11-2) in that the evidence demonstrated that the minor children were not receiving adequate support for the children's mental health issues. The uncontrolled behavior of the children related to those issues was negatively affecting the children's academic and social well-being and there was also clear and convincing evidence that the mother was not utilizing available resources to address the children's problems, and that the mother had attempted to have one of the children hospitalized because she could not control the child; moreover, one of the children also exhibited severe mental health issues, including cutting herself and attacking other children, that were not adequately addressed. In the Interest of D. Q., 307 Ga. App. 121, 704 S.E.2d 444 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Custody questions may be resolved by juvenile court.
- Generally, the purpose of former O.C.G.A. T. 15, C. 11 was not to settle questions of custody by and between the parents of a minor child or children. However, it was proper for the juvenile court to decide custody issues when properly transferred to that court by the superior court. Neal v. Washington, 158 Ga. App. 39, 279 S.E.2d 294 (1981) (decided under former Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1).
No equal protection violation.
- Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Entry of Alford plea by juvenile.
- Juvenile court erred by denying a juvenile's request to enter an Alford plea since the Georgia General Assembly did not expressly prohibit the entry of Alford pleas in juvenile court, and the juvenile court was required to construe O.C.G.A. § 15-11-580 liberally to ensure the juvenile's best interests. In the Interest of B. C., 333 Ga. App. 763, 777 S.E.2d 52 (2015).
Commitment to Department of Juvenile Justice proper.
- Contrary to the defendant's contention, the commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice harmonized with the goals set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In the Interest of B. Q. L. E., 297 Ga. App. 273, 676 S.E.2d 742, cert. denied, No. S09C1197, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Juvenile court had no authority to impose attorney fees.
- Juvenile court properly concluded that the court had no authority to impose attorney fees under the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, because the juvenile court had not adopted O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, and there was no implicit attorney fee award for frivolous litigation in the former Juvenile Court Code, former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 et seq.; the Act does not apply to juvenile courts. In re T.M.M.L., 313 Ga. App. 638, 722 S.E.2d 386 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).
Cited in In the Interest of C. A. J., 331 Ga. App. 788, 771 S.E.2d 457 (2015); In the Interest of D. H., 332 Ga. App. 274, 772 S.E.2d 70 (2015).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Appoint guardian in deprivation proceedings.
- Under the principle that the former Juvenile Court Code was to be liberally construed toward the protection of the child whose well-being is threatened, deprivation proceedings arising from child abuse and neglect by a parent or caretaker present a conflict of interest, wherein the provisions of Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 concerning the appointment of a guardian ad litem would apply. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-131 (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1).
Juvenile Court Code (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 et seq.) and the Children and Youth Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 49-5-1 et seq.) should be read in pari materia. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-53 (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 13 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 1 et seq.
C.J.S.- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 5 et seq.
U.L.A.- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 1.
ALR.- Parent's involuntary confinement, or failure to care for child as result thereof, as evincing neglect, unfitness, or the like in dependency or divestiture proceeding, 79 A.L.R.3d 417.