The provisions of Code Section 13-5-30 do not extend to the following cases:
(29 Car. II, c. 3, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 1127; Ga. L. 1853-54, p. 58, § 1; Code 1863, § 1953; Code 1868, § 1941; Code 1873, § 1951; Code 1882, § 1951; Civil Code 1895, § 2694; Civil Code 1910, § 3223; Code 1933, § 20-402.)
Cross references.- Parol contract between employer and overseer, § 10-6-121.
Law reviews.- For article discussing the anachronistic nature of the Georgia contracts Code as dramatized by comparing the doctrine of consideration as it is formulated in the Restatements of Contracts and in Code 1933, Title 20 (now this title), and the interpretative approach Georgia courts have taken in dealing with such Code, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1979). (But see amendments by Ga. L. 1981, p. 876.) For article, "Promissory Estoppel and the Georgia Statute of Frauds," see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 204 (1980). For comment on Baxley Hdwe. Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga. 359, 140 S.E. 869 (1927), see 1 Ga. L. Rev. No. 3 P. 51 (1927).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Section applicable only where performance expressly or impliedly accepted.
- Estoppel to deny existence of valid contract under former Code 1933, § 20-401 (see O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30) provided for in former Code 1933, § 20-402 (see O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31) was available only where performance made by one side had been expressly or impliedly accepted by the other. Nowell v. Mayor of Monroe, 177 Ga. 648, 171 S.E. 136, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 665, 171 S.E. 143 (1933).
Exceptions do not supply oral promise.
- Statutory exceptions to the statute of frauds provide for limited circumstances in which the law will enforce an alleged oral promise against the promisor, notwithstanding the legal requirement that such a promise be in writing, but those exceptions do not supply the missing element of an underlying oral promise on the part of the alleged promisor. Tidwell v. Emory Univ., 180 Ga. App. 357, 349 S.E.2d 245 (1986).
Oral agreement unenforceable absent statutory exceptions.
- Purported oral agreement between a corporate provider of extended vehicle service contracts and an independent contractor concerning the independent contractor's administration of recreational-vehicle accounts was not enforceable because it was not memorialized in writing, and no exceptions to the statute of frauds set forth in O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31 applied. Auto. Prot. Corp. v. Jones, F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 9, 2008)(Unpublished).
Relief granted is allowed upon principle of estoppel, and it is incumbent upon complainant to show not only that the complainant's act was performed in pursuance of and on faith of contract, but that the action was accepted by other party in accordance therewith, mutuality of action or action's equitable equivalent being an essential ingredient of cause of action. Nowell v. Mayor of Monroe, 177 Ga. 648, 171 S.E. 136, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 665, 171 S.E. 143 (1933).
There must be a conjoint action of parties in order to avoid statute of frauds. Nowell v. Mayor of Monroe, 177 Ga. 648, 171 S.E. 136, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 665, 171 S.E. 143 (1933).
Mere non-action is not performance, either partial or complete, and will not, therefore, take parol contract out of statute of frauds. Augusta S.R.R. v. Smith & Kilby Co., 106 Ga. 864, 33 S.E. 28 (1899); Hesterlee v. Hesterlee, 27 Ga. App. 169, 107 S.E. 889 (1921); Kennington v. Small, 36 Ga. App. 176, 136 S.E. 326 (1926); Armstrong v. Reynolds, 36 Ga. App. 594, 137 S.E. 637 (1927); Gragg v. Hall, 164 Ga. 628, 139 S.E. 339 (1927); Baxley Hdwe. Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga. 359, 140 S.E. 869 (1927); Home Mixture Guano Co. v. McKoone, 168 Ga. 317, 147 S.E. 711 (1929); Neely v. Sheppard, 185 Ga. 771, 196 S.E. 452 (1938); Alodex Corp. v. Brawner, 134 Ga. App. 630, 215 S.E.2d 527 (1975).
Doing of contemplated act furnishes consideration for original agreement, even though such agreement at the agreement's inception was nudum pactum. Wilson v. Whitmire, 212 Ga. 287, 92 S.E.2d 20 (1956).
Contract of guaranty is subject to provisions of this statute. Sikes v. Mallonee, 11 Ga. App. 632, 75 S.E. 988 (1912) (see O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31).
If one party has not signed contract, that party's acceptance is inferred from performance under the contract, in part or in full, and that party becomes bound. Cooper v. G.E. Constr. Co., 116 Ga. App. 690, 158 S.E.2d 305 (1967).
Contract partly executed by corporation, though ultra vires, will be enforced when corporation has received benefits thereunder in its corporate capacity. Cooper v. G.E. Constr. Co., 116 Ga. App. 690, 158 S.E.2d 305 (1967).
Parol agreement establishing disputed or unascertained boundary, if executed, controls deeds.
- When dividing line between coterminous owners is indefinite, unascertained, or disputed, owners may by parol agreement, duly executed, establish line which will control the owners' deeds, notwithstanding statute of frauds. Holland v. Shackelford, 220 Ga. 104, 137 S.E.2d 298 (1964). But see Smith v. Lanier, 199 Ga. 255, 34 S.E.2d 91 (1945); Callaway v. Armour, 207 Ga. 229, 60 S.E.2d 367 (1950).
Performance sufficient to remove agreement to adopt and devise from statute of frauds see Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolff, 191 Ga. 111, 11 S.E.2d 766 (1940).
Testimony relating to oral agreement to purchase land, inadmissible unless it fell within exception to former Code 1933, § 20-401 (see O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30). Walters v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 347, 185 S.E. 572 (1936).
Cited in Knight v. Knight, 28 Ga. 165 (1859); Rawson v. Bell, 46 Ga. 19 (1872); Petty v. Kennon, 49 Ga. 468 (1873); Barnett Line of Steamers v. Blackmar & Chandler, 53 Ga. 98 (1874); Goolsby v. Bush, 53 Ga. 353 (1874); Wimberly v. Bryan, 55 Ga. 198 (1875); Steininger v. Williams, 63 Ga. 475 (1879); Storey v. Weaver, 66 Ga. 296 (1881); Wooten v. Wilcox, Stilson & Co., 87 Ga. 474, 13 S.E. 595 (1891); Ambrose v. Ambrose, 94 Ga. 655, 19 S.E. 980 (1894); English v. S.P. Richards Co., 109 Ga. 635, 34 S.E. 1002 (1900); Bluthenthal & Bickart v. Moore, 111 Ga. 297, 36 S.E. 689 (1900); McLeod v. Hendry, 126 Ga. 167, 54 S.E. 949 (1906); Wholesale Mercantile Co. v. Jackson, 2 Ga. App. 776, 59 S.E. 106 (1907); Empire Cotton Oil Co. v. Sellars, 18 Ga. App. 377, 89 S.E. 454 (1916); Stone Mt. Granite Corp. v. Patrick, 19 Ga. App. 269, 91 S.E. 286 (1917); Edwards v. Trustees of Baptist Church, 147 Ga. 15, 92 S.E. 531 (1917); Clemons v. Estes, 24 Ga. App. 480, 101 S.E. 312 (1919); Terrell Land Co. v. Newberry, 29 Ga. App. 77, 113 S.E. 817 (1922); Sherman v. Stephens, 30 Ga. App. 509, 118 S.E. 567 (1923); Varnell v. Varnell, 156 Ga. 853, 120 S.E. 319 (1923); In re Stone-Moore-West Co., 292 F. 1004 (N.D. Ga. 1923); Mendel v. C.L. Barrett & Son, 32 Ga. App. 581, 124 S.E. 107 (1924); F.E. Nellis & Co. v. Houser, 33 Ga. App. 266, 125 S.E. 790 (1924); Hall v. Wingate, 159 Ga. 630, 126 S.E. 796 (1924); Norman & Griffin v. Shealey, 33 Ga. App. 534, 126 S.E. 887 (1925); Marshall v. Hicks, 159 Ga. 871, 127 S.E. 273 (1925); Peoples Bank v. Harry L. Winter, Inc., 161 Ga. 898, 132 S.E. 422 (1926); Schadmann v. Durrence, 37 Ga. App. 640, 141 S.E. 331 (1928); M.C. Kiser Co. v. Rosenbloom, 41 Ga. App. 183, 152 S.E. 273 (1930); Powell v. Clements, 172 Ga. 381, 157 S.E. 699 (1931); Mallory v. Clay County, 173 Ga. 59, 159 S.E. 578 (1931); First Nat'l Bank v. Rountree, 173 Ga. 117, 159 S.E. 658 (1931); Wright v. Harber, 175 Ga. 696, 165 S.E. 616 (1932); Dunn & McCarthy, Inc. v. Pinkston, 47 Ga. App. 514, 170 S.E. 922 (1933); Evans v. Sawilowsky, 179 Ga. 547, 176 S.E. 625 (1934); Pope v. Barnett, 50 Ga. App. 199, 177 S.E. 358 (1934); Tanner v. Campbell, 182 Ga. 121, 184 S.E. 705 (1936); Stonecypher v. Georgia Power Co., 183 Ga. 498, 189 S.E. 13 (1936); Parham v. Kennedy, 60 Ga. App. 52, 2 S.E.2d 765 (1939); Pope v. Lovett, 188 Ga. 524, 4 S.E.2d 152 (1939); Poole v. Atlanta Joint Stock Land Bank, 189 Ga. 59, 5 S.E.2d 368 (1939); Feagin v. Georgia-Carolina Inv. Co., 63 Ga. App. 815, 11 S.E.2d 813 (1940); Duggar v. Quarterman, 191 Ga. 314, 12 S.E.2d 302 (1940); West v. Vandiviere, 192 Ga. 90, 14 S.E.2d 711 (1941); Milton v. Milton, 192 Ga. 778, 16 S.E.2d 573 (1941); Kutash v. Gluckman, 193 Ga. 805, 20 S.E.2d 128 (1942); Carl v. Hansbury, 67 Ga. App. 830, 21 S.E.2d 302 (1942); Myers v. Adcock, 198 Ga. 180, 31 S.E.2d 160 (1944); Cantrell v. Johnston, 74 Ga. App. 74, 38 S.E.2d 893 (1946); Clarke v. Phillips, 204 Ga. 772, 51 S.E.2d 848 (1949); Larkins v. Boyd, 205 Ga. 69, 52 S.E.2d 307 (1949); Barron v. Anderson, 205 Ga. 487, 53 S.E.2d 682 (1949); Garner v. Mayor of Athens, 206 Ga. 815, 58 S.E.2d 844 (1950); Seabolt v. Christian, 82 Ga. App. 167, 60 S.E.2d 540 (1950); Harris v. Underwood, 208 Ga. 247, 66 S.E.2d 332 (1951); Fimian v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 209 Ga. 113, 70 S.E.2d 762 (1952); McCullough v. Patterson, 86 Ga. App. 147, 70 S.E.2d 873 (1952); United States v. Ridley, 120 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ga. 1954); Dealers Disct. & Inv. Co. v. Mitchell Motors, Inc., 101 Ga. App. 900, 115 S.E.2d 420 (1960); Samford v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 216 Ga. 215, 115 S.E.2d 517 (1960); Piedmont Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 103 Ga. App. 225, 119 S.E.2d 63 (1961); Dawn Mem. Park v. Southern Cemetery Consultants, 115 Ga. App. 180, 154 S.E.2d 258 (1967); Sanders v. Vaughn, 223 Ga. 274, 154 S.E.2d 616 (1967); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Rowe, 121 Ga. App. 99, 172 S.E.2d 866 (1970); Paradies & Co. v. Southeastern Personnel, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 825, 186 S.E.2d 304 (1971); Thompson v. Frost, 125 Ga. App. 753, 188 S.E.2d 905 (1972); Roberts v. Harrell, 230 Ga. 454, 197 S.E.2d 704 (1973); Smith v. Top Dollar Stores, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 60, 198 S.E.2d 690 (1973); Pickett v. Paine, 230 Ga. 786, 199 S.E.2d 223 (1973); Willis v. Kemp, 130 Ga. App. 758, 204 S.E.2d 486 (1974); Smith v. Moeller, 132 Ga. App. 184, 207 S.E.2d 669 (1974); Blanton v. Moseley, 133 Ga. App. 144, 210 S.E.2d 368 (1974); Osborne v. Martin, 136 Ga. App. 86, 220 S.E.2d 19 (1975); Nicholelli v. Connell, 137 Ga. App. 563, 224 S.E.2d 511 (1976); Smith v. Hornbuckle, 140 Ga. App. 871, 232 S.E.2d 149 (1977); B-Lee's Sales Co. v. Shelton, 141 Ga. App. 870, 234 S.E.2d 702 (1977); Williams v. Southland Corp., 143 Ga. App. 111, 237 S.E.2d 639 (1977); Grace v. Roan, 145 Ga. App. 776, 245 S.E.2d 17 (1978); Crosby v. Jones, 241 Ga. 558, 246 S.E.2d 677 (1978); Moorman Ingram Tractors, Inc. v. Harrington Mfg. Co., 146 Ga. App. 398, 247 S.E.2d 159 (1978); Garden of Eden, Inc. v. Eastern Sav. Bank, 244 Ga. 63, 257 S.E.2d 897 (1979); Knight v. Munday, 152 Ga. App. 406, 263 S.E.2d 188 (1979); Sams v. Duncan & Copeland, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 765, 266 S.E.2d 546 (1980); Wheeler v. Aiken, 154 Ga. App. 280, 267 S.E.2d 883 (1980); Wiggins v. White, 157 Ga. App. 49, 276 S.E.2d 104 (1981); Robinson v. Johns, 157 Ga. App. 639, 278 S.E.2d 181 (1981); Fritts v. Mid-Coast Trading Corp., 166 Ga. App. 31, 303 S.E.2d 148 (1983); Sierra Assocs., Ltd. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 169 Ga. App. 784, 315 S.E.2d 250 (1984); Atlanta Dairies Coop. v. Grindle, 182 Ga. App. 409, 356 S.E.2d 42 (1987); South Atl. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Gibbs, 257 Ga. 521, 361 S.E.2d 167 (1987); Rose v. O'Brien, 191 Ga. App. 36, 380 S.E.2d 730 (1989); Stolz v. Shulman, 191 Ga. App. 864, 383 S.E.2d 559 (1989); Derbyshire v. United Bldrs. Supplies, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 840, 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990); Baxley Veneer & Clete Co. v. Maddox, 198 Ga. App. 235, 401 S.E.2d 282 (1990); Liniado v. Alexander, 199 Ga. App. 256, 404 S.E.2d 602 (1991); Daniell v. Clein, 206 Ga. App. 377, 425 S.E.2d 344 (1992); Yates v. Trust Co. Bank, 212 Ga. App. 438, 443 S.E.2d 293 (1994); Brown v. Little, 217 Ga. App. 632, 458 S.E.2d 669 (1995); Acuff v. Proctor, 267 Ga. 85, 475 S.E.2d 616 (1996); Whiten v. Murray, 267 Ga. App. 417, 599 S.E.2d 346 (2004); Crop Production Services, Inc. v. Moye, 345 Ga. App. 228, 812 S.E.2d 565 (2018).
Fully Executed Contracts
Full execution and acceptance thereof removes agreement from statute of frauds.
- Contract to pay rent in advance to enable lessor to complete apartment by agreed date, when fully executed by lessees, and accepted by lessor, is taken out of statute of frauds. Carroll v. Witter, 75 Ga. App. 632, 44 S.E.2d 165 (1947).
When a company sued the company's accountants regarding the accountants participation in a sale of the company's assets, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the accountants because the company ratified the actions of the company's employee who had apparent authority to conduct the sale when the company retained the proceeds of the sale and accepted a return of the assets sold, in settlement of another lawsuit; the "equal dignity" rule in O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(1) did not require the ratification to be in writing because the contract between the company and the purchaser of the company's assets was fully executed, and the company was estopped to deny the apparent authority of the employee because the company retained the fruits of the sale. R.W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 601 S.E.2d 177 (2004).
Statute of frauds inapplicable to contract which has been fully performed on both sides. Steininger v. Williams, 63 Ga. 475 (1879).
Oral contract for sale of land, when fully executed, is removed from statute of frauds. Hale v. Lipham, 64 Ga. App. 796, 14 S.E.2d 236 (1941).
Parol modification of agreement within statute of frauds, if fully executed, is valid. Strickland v. Jelks, 18 Ga. App. 86, 88 S.E. 906 (1916), later appeal, 20 Ga. App. 604, 93 S.E. 260 (1917).
Full Performance Accepted on One Side
Full performance on one side removes agreement from statute of frauds.
- When agreement is entered into, upon sufficient consideration to sell real and personal property and divide proceeds, and agreement has been fully performed on one side, other party will be decreed to execute the agreement in full, notwithstanding agreement is by parol, and relates to land as well as personalty. Watkins v. Watkins, 24 Ga. 402 (1858).
District court erred in granting a company judgment on the pleadings as to an investment broker's breach-of-contract claim because the broker adequately pled that the company assented, by the company's conduct, to an engagement letter's terms, and the statute of frauds under O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(5) did not foreclose enforcing the unsigned letter since the allegations, accepted as true, were sufficient to invoke the performance and acceptance exception to the statute of frauds under O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(2). Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Mid-South Capital, Inc., 690 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2012).
Defendant was properly convicted of felony theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 for failing to transmit to a law firm payments the defendant received for indigent defense work because the statute of frauds, O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(5), was not implicated; the firm performed the firm's part of the parties' agreement in paying the defendant a salary, providing rent-free office space, and offering administrative support, among other things. Clarke v. State, 317 Ga. App. 471, 731 S.E.2d 100 (2012).
Full performance, accepted, of oral agreement to enter written contract, satisfies paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31. - Oral agreement to enter into written contract, promptly and fully performed by party and such performance accepted by other party, meets requirements of the law. Langenback v. Mays, 205 Ga. 706, 54 S.E.2d 401 (1949).
Given evidence that the father sufficiently performed that part of an oral agreement at issue with a child for the latter to transfer title to a house, specifically by selling the father's house and paying the child the proceeds in exchange for the child's promise to convey, when the child failed to convey the house the trial court properly granted the father a constructive trust based on fraud, denied the child a directed verdict, and sustained the jury's verdict. Perry v. Perry, 285 Ga. App. 892, 648 S.E.2d 193 (2007).
Payment in full on oral contract for sale of land.
- In a suit for specific performance brought by a plaintiff seeking to enforce an alleged oral contract to sell real property, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant based on the statute of frauds preventing recovery to the plaintiff; the plaintiff had presented evidence establishing the existence of an oral contract for the sale of the property and that it was excepted from the statute of frauds based on the plaintiff's performance of paying for the property in full, and thus, issues of fact remained as to whether defendant's decedent had accepted performance through payments received by a sibling and whether, in light of the plaintiff's previous tenancy, the plaintiff's performance was inconsistent with the lack of a contract to sell the property. Edwards v. Sewell, 289 Ga. App. 128, 656 S.E.2d 246 (2008).
Full payment for land, accepted by vendor, is sufficient performance. Rawlins v. Shropshire, 45 Ga. 182 (1872).
Execution, delivery, and acceptance of deed as removing agreement from statute of frauds.
- When, in consideration of parol promise, a deed to land is executed and delivered, maker of promise is not relieved from performing deed by statute of frauds, there having been full performance by maker of deed and acceptance, together with possession thereunder, by other party. Stringer v. Stringer, 93 Ga. 320, 20 S.E. 242 (1894); Gaskins v. Moore, 50 Ga. App. 529, 179 S.E. 422 (1935).
Execution of deed, upon payment of purchase price, brings transaction within paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31. - When owner of land, on payment of entire purchase price, at request of one of vendees, executes deeds, oral contract falls within this exception to statute of frauds. Flagg v. Hitchcock, 143 Ga. 379, 85 S.E. 125 (1915).
Payment of purchase money and delivery of deed and possession removes transaction from statute of frauds.
- When purchase money for land has been paid, and deed to and possession of land delivered, such allegations take transaction out of statute of frauds. McKee v. Cartledge, 79 Ga. App. 629, 54 S.E.2d 665 (1949).
Tender of deed alone, without acceptance or possession under parol agreement not within exceptions.
- Parole contract for sale of land is not brought within exceptions to statute of frauds by vendor's making out and tendering to vendee a deed to land, unless vendee accepts the deed. Graham v. Theis, 47 Ga. 479 (1873).
Parol contract for sale of land is not brought within exceptions to statute by vendor's making out and tendering to vendee a deed, unless vendee accepts the deed, and merely going into possession of land by vendee under parol contract is not sufficient, unless the vendee's additional acts are such as would render it impossible to restore vendor to the vendor's former status, and thus make it fraudulent and inequitable not to enforce contract either in equity or in action at law for damages. Gaskins v. Moore, 50 Ga. App. 529, 179 S.E. 422 (1935).
Remaining on job until contract of sale signed sufficient performance.
- When evidence showed that company officials had promised to give plaintiff severance pay in return for plaintiff's remaining on the job until the sale of the company had been consummated, and plaintiff did not resign until after plaintiff had been advised by an official that the sale had taken place, nor finalize plaintiff's resignation until the plaintiff had discussed with an official of the new owner the possibilities of the plaintiff remaining with the company under the new regime, the evidence did not demand the conclusion that the agreement required plaintiff to continue on the job until the stock was transferred, and the jury was clearly authorized to conclude that the plaintiff fulfilled the plaintiff's part of the bargain by remaining until the contract of sale was executed. Amax, Inc. v. Fletcher, 166 Ga. App. 789, 305 S.E.2d 601 (1983).
Loan advances not full performance.
- A lender's decision to make advances under written loans for construction of buildings not contemplated under the loans did not establish the lender's intent to waive requirements of the written loans and proceed under a different oral agreement; the original loans specified that advances made did not have the effect of waiving the lender's right to demand payment and, thus, a performance argument fails. Bridges v. Reliance Trust Co., 205 Ga. App. 400, 422 S.E.2d 277 (1992).
Part Performance
1. In General
O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(4) inapplicable where there has been part performance under paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31. - While contract involving any interest in land must be in writing to bind the parties, § 13-5-30(4) does not extend to cases where there has been such part performance of contract as would render it fraud of party refusing to comply, if court did not compel performance. Kinney v. Youngblood, 216 Ga. 354, 116 S.E.2d 608 (1960).
O.C.G.A.
§ 23-2-131 controls in equity and O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(3) controls at law as to oral land sales. - Former Code 1933, § 37-802 (see O.C.G.A. § 23-2-131) applied only to actions for specific performance or damages in lieu thereof, in equity. In law cases, former Code 1933, § 20-402 (see O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31) controlled. Moore v. Deal, 75 Ga. App. 823, 44 S.E.2d 571 (1947).
Must be certain and definite.
- A parol contract sought to be enforced based on part performance must be certain and definite in all respects. Lemming v. Morgan, 228 Ga. App. 763, 492 S.E.2d 742 (1997).
It was error not to direct a verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) to a putative property owner in an action by various family members, seeking to impose a constructive trust on real property under former O.C.G.A. § 53-12-93(a), as it was inequitable to grant the family members an interest in the property because the putative owner had worked on the farm for over 18 years and had spent significant sums on the property compared to the very minimal amounts contributed by the family members over the years; the doctrine of part performance as an exception to the statute of frauds under O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(3) was inapplicable because the oral agreement was not sufficiently certain or definite for purposes of enforcement. Troutman v. Troutman, 297 Ga. App. 62, 676 S.E.2d 787 (2009).
Part performance required to obviate statute of frauds must be substantial and essential to contract.
- See Norman v. Nash, 102 Ga. App. 508, 116 S.E.2d 624 (1960); Forest Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 120 Ga. App. 600, 171 S.E.2d 743 (1969); Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 147 Ga. App. 31, 248 S.E.2d 9 (1978); Metzgar v. Reserve Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 404, 254 S.E.2d 517 (1979); Zager v. Brown, 242 Ga. App. 427, 530 S.E.2d 50 (2000).
Part performance which will take contract out of operation of statute of frauds is such as is, within terms of agreement, an essential part of the contract, and as such is essential to performance of contract. Bentley v. Smith, 3 Ga. App. 242, 59 S.E. 720 (1907); Lewis v. Southern Realty Inv. Corp., 42 Ga. App. 171, 155 S.E. 369 (1930); Alexander-Seewald Co. v. Marett, 53 Ga. App. 314, 185 S.E. 589 (1936); disapproved on other grounds sub nom. Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 243 Ga. 116, 252 S.E.2d 606 (1979); Dameron v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 257, 192 S.E. 446 (1937).
Part performance is something substantial, and is generally essential to performance of contract. Hotel Candler, Inc. v. Candler, 198 Ga. 339, 31 S.E.2d 693 (1944).
Acts which are merely preparatory or preliminary to the performance of a contract are not enough, but performance which is substantial and essential to the contract and results in benefit to one party and detriment to the other obviates the statute of frauds. Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga. App. 39, 354 S.E.2d 666 (1987).
Question of fact remained as to whether the parties performance of the terms outlined in the memorandum were sufficient to save those terms from the statute of frauds. Gryder v. Conley, 352 Ga. App. 891, 836 S.E.2d 120 (2019).
Part performance refers to performance of contract provisions, not acts in reliance on contract.
- Act of part performance done must be in performance of and in pursuance of parol contract. The contract is void at law, and is only enforced because courts of equity have, for prevention of fraud, set up certain defined exceptions to the statute. Simonton, Jones & Hatcher v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 51 Ga. 76 (1874).
Part performance referred to in paragraph (3) must be part performance of contract; and doing by either party of some independent act, not part of the contract, does not become part performance because doer of act was led so to act by belief or understanding that parol contract would be performed by other party. Giradot v. Giradot, 172 Ga. 230, 157 S.E. 282 (1931); Hotel Candler, Inc. v. Candler, 198 Ga. 339, 31 S.E.2d 693 (1944).
Act done to constitute performance, must be in performance of and pursuant to parol contract. Alexander-Seewald Co. v. Marett, 53 Ga. App. 314, 185 S.E. 589 (1936), disapproved sub nom. Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 243 Ga. 116, 252 S.E.2d 606 (1979).
Part performance to contractor for parol sale of lands to relief must be part performance of terms of contract. Doing of independent thing, even though act would not have been done but for contract, is not sufficient. Neely v. Sheppard, 185 Ga. 771, 196 S.E. 452 (1938).
Part performance with which paragraph (3) deals is part performance of contract. Doing of an independent thing, even though act would not have been but for the contract, is not sufficient. Smith v. Davidson, 198 Ga. 231, 31 S.E.2d 477 (1944).
Part performance which will take contract out of statute of fraud is performance of essential part of the contract; doing of an independent act, even though it would not have been done but for the contract, is insufficient. Wells v. H.W. Lay & Co., 78 Ga. App. 364, 50 S.E.2d 755 (1948).
Part performance which will remove contract from statute of frauds refers to performance of provisions of contract and not to acts done by one because of one's belief in and reliance on agreement. Spiegel v. Hays, 103 Ga. App. 293, 119 S.E.2d 123 (1961).
Performance of acts independent of and not required by terms of contract will not be sufficient to constitute part performance so as to bring it within exception of paragraph (3). Moon v. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n, 223 Ga. 696, 157 S.E.2d 461 (1967).
Part performance of parol contract for sale of land which constitutes valid exception to statute of frauds must be part performance of the contract, and doing by either party of some independent act, not part of the contract, does not become part performance, because doer of act was led so to act by belief that parol contract would be performed by other party. Ellis v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 237 Ga. 612, 229 S.E.2d 417 (1976).
Part performance must be of contract sued upon, not of another materially different contract.
- Part performance by seller of another contract, materially different from contract sued upon, is not part performance of contract sued upon and therefore will not operate to remove contract sued from statute of frauds. Curry Grocery Co. v. Brown, 30 Ga. App. 711, 119 S.E. 217 (1923).
Part performance, to obviate statute of frauds, must benefit one party and be detrimental to the other. See Norman v. Nash, 102 Ga. App. 508, 116 S.E.2d 624 (1960); Forest Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 120 Ga. App. 600, 171 S.E.2d 743 (1969); Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 147 Ga. App. 31, 248 S.E.2d 9 (1978); Metzgar v. Reserve Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 404, 254 S.E.2d 517 (1979); Smith Serv. Oil Co. v. Parker, 250 Ga. App. 270, 549 S.E.2d 485 (2001).
Part performance relied upon must have not only resulted in benefit to promisor, but in loss or injury to promisee. In such case, uncertainty of parol evidence is to be endured rather than allow promisor to take unjust and inequitable advantage of promisee. Dameron v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 257, 192 S.E. 446 (1937).
Part performance of oral contract of employment which is void under statute of frauds, which has resulted in benefit to employer and injury to employee will operate to exempt contract from requirements of statute. White v. Simplex Radio Co., 61 Ga. App. 157, 5 S.E.2d 922 (1939).
When loss may have been voluntarily incurred by party in preparing to perform parol contract, but there was no evidence showing that such acts were of any benefit to other party so as to estop that party from asserting statute of frauds, acts were not in part performance of obligations arising under such contract or of an essential part thereof, such as would take contract out of statute of frauds. Cofer v. Wofford Oil Co., 85 Ga. App. 444, 69 S.E.2d 674 (1952).
Mere circumstance that verbal agreement has been in part performed without benefit or detriment to parties can afford no reason, such as to control action of any court, whether of law or equity, for holding parties bound to perform what remains executory. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 88 Ga. App. 563, 76 S.E.2d 819 (1953).
While oral contract within statute of frauds may be taken out by part performance thereof where one party to contract performs some act essential to performance of the contract which results in loss to that party and benefit to other party thereto, mere fact that one party enters upon performance of agreement which shows no loss to that party or benefit to the other party, is not sufficient to take contract out of operation of statute. Forest Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 120 Ga. App. 600, 171 S.E.2d 743 (1969); Freeman v. Baker, 147 Ga. App. 168, 248 S.E.2d 298 (1978).
Fraud refers to injury or loss sustained in performing for benefit of other.
- Fraud means some injury or loss sustained in performing in part for benefit of party against whom injured one complains. Neuhoff v. Swift & Co., 54 Ga. App. 651, 188 S.E. 831 (1936).
Attempted performance, resulting in neither loss nor benefits, insufficient to avoid statute of frauds.
- Mere fact that one party attempts performance which results in no loss to one or benefit to other is not sufficient to take contract out of statute of frauds. Alodex Corp. v. Brawner, 134 Ga. App. 630, 215 S.E.2d 527 (1975).
Fully performed oral agreement to transfer property.
- Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a claimant alleging that the claimant owned real property pursuant to an oral contract that the claimant had fully performed, along with paying property taxes, qualified to seek redemption of the property from a tax sale. Tyner v. Edge, 355 Ga. App. 196, 843 S.E.2d 632 (2020).
Part performance shown.
- Because there was some evidence of either full or part performance sufficient to take the oral contract out of the statute of frauds, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(5). Haehn v. Alheit, 212 Ga. App. 252, 441 S.E.2d 529 (1994).
Trial court's grant of summary judgment to an employer and the employer's officer in a breach of contract claim by a former employee was error as the employer and an officer acknowledged that the employee was entitled to an ownership interest in an office building, but it was disputed how much of an interest the employee was entitled to; the terms of the oral agreement regarding the interest were sufficiently definite to be enforced, and the matter was not barred by O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(3) because the employer and the officer offered a certain ownership percentage and a buyback value, which constituted part performance, and an issue remained as to whether their actions were inconsistent with the absence of a contract. Fay v. Custom One Homes, LLC, 276 Ga. App. 188, 622 S.E.2d 870 (2005).
Part performance not applicable.
- In a case in which a bank ceased efforts to foreclose on real estate securing borrowers' and guarantors' notes evidencing obligations to the bank, and sued the borrowers and guarantors on the notes, it was error to apply the "part performance" exception to the statute of frauds, O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(3), in holding that the guarantors were estopped from asserting a statute of frauds defense against the bank because the bank's extension of credit was not partial performance proving the identity of the notes or the debtors thereon. Tampa Inv. Group, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 290 Ga. 724, 723 S.E.2d 674 (2012).
Forbearance to bring action, pursuant to oral agreement, until action is barred constitutes part performance.
- When plaintiff, pursuant to oral settlement agreement, forbore to bring action against defendant's insured and thereby allowed statute of limitations to run, there had been such part performance on the plaintiff's part as would render it fraud upon plaintiff for company to refuse to comply, since plaintiff had thereby suffered detriment by losing plaintiff's right to legally prosecute action. Langford v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 101 Ga. App. 92, 113 S.E.2d 165 (1960).
There has been part performance where status quo cannot be restored or damages adequately compensated.
- Whole performance is necessary to prevent fraud in case where parties have proceeded so far on faith of agreement, that the parties cannot be restored to their status quo nor adequately compensated in damages, by avoiding agreement and leaving the parties to parties' action for damages. Chastain v. Smith, 30 Ga. 96 (1860); Hotel Candler, Inc. v. Candler, 198 Ga. 339, 31 S.E. 693 (1944).
Part performance will not render contract enforceable against county board of education.
- Since a county board of education is a political body, and has no power other than that conferred by statutory authority, no contract made by the board which is illegal and invalid because the contract is not in writing as required by statute is enforceable against board, notwithstanding part performance by opposite party thereto. Dodd v. Board of Educ., 46 Ga. App. 235, 167 S.E. 319 (1933).
Petitioner proceeding under paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A.
§ 13-5-31 must show injury. - When allegations of petition, construed adversely to pleader, are not sufficient to show that petitioner has suffered any injury, part performance will not remove contract from statute of frauds. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 88 Ga. App. 563, 76 S.E.2d 819 (1953).
Jury to determine whether there was part performance when evidence tends to prove such performance. Allen & Bean, Inc. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 153 Ga. App. 617, 266 S.E.2d 295 (1980); Smith v. Cox, 247 Ga. 563, 277 S.E.2d 512 (1981).
Jury should decide when part performance of parol contract.
- When evidence tends to prove part performance of parol contract, the court should permit case to go to jury, and instruct the jury as to legal principles applicable to facts proved. Bryan v. South-Western R.R., 37 Ga. 26 (1867).
Role of jury.
- Since the buyer of the goods had already contracted to sell the goods to another party and the seller incurred costs associated with production, pursuant to an agreement with the buyer, the issue of part performance is a question for the jury. White House, Inc. v. Winkler, 202 Ga. App. 603, 415 S.E.2d 185 (1992).
In an action for damages based on the defendants' repudiation of an oral agreement for a three-party like-kind exchange of real estate combined with a sale of corporate stock, evidence of partial performance was sufficient to create a jury question whether, pursuant to paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31, the oral agreement to transfer an interest in land was enforceable. R.T. Patterson Funeral Home v. Head, 215 Ga. App. 578, 451 S.E.2d 812 (1994).
Existence of contract required.
- In order for lessor to rely upon tenant's part performance of an alleged two-year lease as obviating compliance with the statute of frauds, the lessor must first show the existence of a contract to rent the premises; tenant's mere offer to relet the premises certainly showed no contract to lease the premises. Valiant Steel & Equip., Inc. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 237, 421 S.E.2d 773 (1992).
Insurer's pre-policy letter stating that an insured's umbrella policy would be renewed for three years was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(5), because, due to the three-year term, it could not be performed within one year, and the part performance exception of O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(3) did not apply because the insured's purchase of another policy from the insurer, following the insurer's cancellation at the end of the first year, with a different premium and rate than stated in the letter, was inconsistent with the existence of a contract for a three-year rate guarantee. Werner Enters. v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
2. Sales of Land
Part payment, unaccompanied by possession or valuable improvements, does not validate oral contract to sell land. Kenimer v. Thompson, 128 Ga. App. 253, 196 S.E.2d 363 (1973).
Inadequacy of a property description prevented application of any exceptions to the statute of frauds based on the plaintiff's performance. Rohrig Invs., LP v. Knuckle P'ship, LLLP (In re Rohrig Invs., LP), 584 Bankr. 382 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2018).
Part payment insufficient.
- Even in oral contract of purchase and sale, part payment of purchase money, without more, will not entitle purchaser to specific performance. Neely v. Sheppard, 185 Ga. 771, 196 S.E. 452 (1938).
Part payment and possession may be sufficient.
- While payment of part of purchase money is not alone such part performance as will take case out of statute of frauds, if accompanied by possession it will amount to such part performance as to take contract out of statute. Wimberly v. Bryan, 55 Ga. 198 (1875); Corbin v. Durden, 126 Ga. 429, 55 S.E. 30 (1906); Harris v. Underwood, 208 Ga. 247, 66 S.E.2d 332 (1951); Sikes v. Sims, 212 Ga. 391, 93 S.E.2d 6 (1956).
Receipt of part of purchase money is not such part performance as will take case out of statute; it is only in cases where part payment of purchase money is accompanied by possession that it will amount to part performance as will take contract out of statute. Pierce v. Rush, 210 Ga. 718, 82 S.E.2d 649 (1954); Sellers v. Hall, 153 Ga. App. 189, 265 S.E.2d 81 (1980).
Part payment of purchase money alone, unaccompanied by possession of property, is not such part performance of contract as will render it fraud of party refusing to comply, if court did not compel performance. Powell v. Adderholdt, 230 Ga. 211, 196 S.E.2d 420 (1973).
While payment of a part of the purchase-money is not alone such part performance as will take the case out of the statute of frauds, partial payment of the purchase-money accompanied with possession will amount to such part performance as to take the contract out of the statute and to authorize the specific performance of a parol contract. Smith v. Cox, 247 Ga. 563, 277 S.E.2d 512 (1981).
Partial payment of the purchase price, unaccompanied by possession or valuable improvements, does not meet the test of part performance. Thus, when the owner of a welding shop, after receiving a down payment, sold the owner's supplies, which were not wanted by the prospective purchaser, to third parties, this was not such a partial performance of the oral agreement as would remove the agreement from the statute of frauds. Zappa v. Basden, 188 Ga. App. 472, 373 S.E.2d 246, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 913, 373 S.E.2d 246 (1988).
Evidence of oral agreement to pay a sum representing equitable holding in property was not inadmissible under O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30 as it was specifically exempted by both subsection (2) as an agreement upon which conveyance of the property had been based and by subsection (3) as a conveyance constituting part performance. Kolb v. Holmes, 207 Ga. App. 184, 427 S.E.2d 562 (1993).
Part performance of an otherwise unenforceable contract does not entitle party to specific performance.
- Trial court erred in finding that a lease-purchase agreement was enforceable because, though the agreement satisfied the statute of frauds, the agreement was invalid for failure of consideration in that the lessee/proposed purchaser never paid the rent owed nor any of the property taxes, which not only invalidated the agreement but voided the purchase option under O.C.G.A. § 13-1-8(a). Further, the trial court erred in holding that the lessee/proposed purchaser was entitled to specific performance of the agreement based on repairs made since there was no legal authority to support the trial court's proposition that part performance of an otherwise unenforceable written agreement, as modified by subsequent oral agreements between the parties, transformed the agreement into an enforceable parol contract. Estate of Ryan v. Shuman, 288 Ga. App. 868, 655 S.E.2d 644 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0664, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 482 (Ga. 2008).
Part performance as will allow specific performance of parol contract to sell land.
- Specific performance of executory parol contract for sale of land will be decreed in only two instances. One is where defendant admits contract. The other is where it is so far executed by party seeking relief that if contract be abandoned the party cannot be restored to the party's former position. Full payment alone, accepted by vendor, or partial payment accompanied with possession, or possession alone with valuable improvements, if clearly proved in each case to be done with reference to parol contract, will be sufficient part performance to justify decree. Neely v. Sheppard, 185 Ga. 771, 196 S.E. 452 (1938).
Because a contractor's performance and an owner's acceptance of that performance satisfied the requirements of the statute of frauds, O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31, and the plats and deeds established the requisite description of the properties to be exchanged, the contractor was entitled to specific performance under O.C.G.A. § 23-2-131(a). Masters v. Redwine, 279 Ga. 432, 615 S.E.2d 118 (2005).
Simply bidding at auction insufficient performance.
- When the defendant simply made a bid for the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, which was accepted by the seller, no partial performance of the contract occurred and the transaction, therefore, stayed within the confines of the statute of frauds. James v. Safari Enters., Inc., 244 Ga. App. 813, 537 S.E.2d 103 (2000).
Performance by one in accordance with contract, accepted by other party, removes contract from statute.
- In a dispute over installment contract to purchase land, because evidence sufficiently showed that a buyer partially performed a subsequent oral agreement that was not barred by merger clause contained in the contract, and the seller accepted the benefit of such performance, summary judgment to the seller was erroneous; moreover, given that jury questions as to part performance of the oral agreement remained, order denying the buyer's partial summary judgment motion was upheld. Hernandez v. Carnes, 290 Ga. App. 730, 659 S.E.2d 925 (2008).
Possession, to constitute element of part performance must be actual, definite, exclusive and with vendor's consent.
- When partial payment, accompanied by possession, is relied upon to take parol contract for sale of land out of operation of statute of frauds, possession of vendee must be actual, definite, and exclusive of the vendor, and with express or implied consent of the vendor. Kinderland v. Kirk, 131 Ga. 454, 62 S.E. 582 (1908).
Defendant's possession and improvements pursuant to contract, with plaintiff's approval, constitute part performance.
- When defendant's possession is by virtue of contract of sale, and improvements of property are made with knowledge and approval of plaintiffs and in connection with contract of sale, such possession and improvements are sufficient to remove cause from prohibition of former Code 1933, § 20-401 (see O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30), and to bring it within provisions of paragraph (3) of former Code 1933, § 20-402 (see O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31). Higdon v. Dixon, 203 Ga. 67, 45 S.E.2d 423 (1947).
Substantial performance and expenditures removed application of statute of frauds from contract involving real estate development.
- In a suit brought by a golf course development company against two other members of a limited liability company and a housing authority, the trial court erred by dismissing the golf course development company's oral breach of contract claim for the development of a golf course for a public housing project as, although a writing was required since the alleged contract involved real estate, the golf course development company sufficiently pled substantial performance, expenditures, and reliance to avoid application of the statute of frauds to the claim. Perry Golf Course Dev., LLC v. Hous. Auth., 294 Ga. App. 387, 670 S.E.2d 171 (2008).
Possession with improvements must be shown to arise by virtue of oral contract.
- When a party seeking specific performance of an oral contract to sell realty relies on the principle of possession with improvements, it must be shown that the possession and improvement arose by virtue of and in the faith of the oral contract or promise, so as to take the case out of the statute of frauds and constitute the equivalent of a writing by showing acts unequivocally referring to the alleged contract or promise. Thus, where a party takes possession under an oral contract to rent, and also alleged an oral option to purchase, the possession is under the tenancy and cannot also be shown to be in reliance on the option. Smith v. Cox, 247 Ga. 563, 277 S.E.2d 512 (1981).
Payment, possession, and improvements removes parol agreement from statute of frauds.
- Purchase of land, payment of consideration, taking possession, and making valuable improvement is sufficient to relieve parol agreement for purchase from operation of statute of frauds. Scott v. Newsom, 27 Ga. 125 (1859).
Payment of purchase money unaccompanied by possession and improvements pursuant to contract, not part performance.
- Payment of purchase money, in case of parol contract concerning lands, is not, per se, such performance, or part performance, as will take case out of statute of frauds. But such payment, taken in connection with other acts, as taking of possession and putting improvements on land, will constitute such performance. These other acts, however, must unequivocally refer to, and result from agreement. Black v. Black, 15 Ga. 445 (1854).
What are valuable improvements as will obviate statute of frauds.
- Valuable improvements, as related to specific performance, mean improvements of such character as add permanent value to freehold, and such as would not likely be made by one not claiming right to possession and enjoyment of freehold estate. Improvements of temporary and unsubstantial character will not amount to such part performance as, when accompanied by possession alone, will take contract out of operation of statute of frauds. Neely v. Sheppard, 185 Ga. 771, 196 S.E. 452 (1938).
Creation of parol license to use land did not interfere with existing right of first refusal.
- In a suit brought by a property owner seeking to specifically perform an oral agreement to purchase a strip of real estate, the trial court properly denied the property owner's request for an interlocutory judgment based on a violation of the statute of frauds and because another held a first right of refusal over the sale/purchase of the property. However, the trial court erred by concluding that the property owner had not obtained a parol license to use the strip since the property owner had made expenditures to improve the land and, as to the right of first refusal held by another, the grant of a parol license was not the equivalent to a sale of the property to have in anyway interfered with that right. Meinhardt v. Christianson, 289 Ga. App. 238, 656 S.E.2d 568 (2008).
Part performance not established.
- Sellers were properly granted summary judgment in an action filed by a buyer arising out of an oral land sales contract, given that: (1) no evidence of the buyer's partial performance existed sufficient to remove the contract from the statute of frauds; (2) a wetlands study and interest rate negotiation were not a part of the contract; and (3) a later negotiated contract was an arm's length transaction, the price of which was negotiated at the time, and hence, did not relate to the original contract. Payne v. Warren, 282 Ga. App. 524, 639 S.E.2d 528 (2006).
Oral agreement regarding one-third interst in boat ramp.
- Grant of summary judgment to the defendants was affirmed because an oral agreement conveying an interest in land was unenforceable under the statute of frauds as the plaintiff failed to present any evidence of part performance to remove the oral agreement from the statute of frauds as the plaintiff did not identify any purported improvements or tax payments made, and the appellate court was not going to cull the record to locate information or facts from over 500 pages of ledgers the plaintiff cited. Bodiford v. Waltz, 351 Ga. App. 532, 830 S.E.2d 738 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0025, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 196 (Ga. 2020).
3. Leases
Even if the lessee did not sign the lease, the lease would still be enforceable if the lessee took possession and partially performed under the terms of the lease. Cardin v. Outdoor East, 220 Ga. App. 664, 468 S.E.2d 31 (1996).
Change of possession and payment of rent removes oral lease from statutes of frauds.
- Parol contract establishing relation of landlord and tenant if within statute of frauds, possession thereunder and payment of rent for two months removes contract from operation of statute. Steininger v. Williams, 63 Ga. 475 (1879).
Oral contract for rent, accompanied by change in possession and payment of rent, is not within statute of frauds, but will be enforced as made, as not to do so would be a fraud. Richards v. Plaza Hotel, Inc., 171 Ga. 827, 156 S.E. 809 (1931).
Tenant's vacating property and ceasing payment of rent, combined with landlord's occupation of the property and failure to demand payment of remaining rent due under a written lease, was not sufficient evidence of part performance of an alleged oral agreement modifying the lease. White v. Orton Indus., Inc., 224 Ga. App. 342, 480 S.E.2d 620 (1997).
Tenant's erection of improvements not part performance unless done pursuant to agreement.
- Erection of improvements on rented premises by tenant will not amount to part performance when not made in pursuance of rental agreement that tenant should make the improvements. Moon v. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n, 223 Ga. 696, 157 S.E.2d 461 (1967).
Money expended by tenant preparatory to moving into a mall did not constitute a part performance taking the case out of the statute of frauds. 20/20 Vision Ctr., Inc. v. Hudgens, 256 Ga. 129, 345 S.E.2d 330 (1986).
Payments under unenforceable lease.
- Although a handwritten lease was deemed unenforceable under the statute of frauds due to an indefiniteness of terms, a question as to whether partial performance by the parties removed the lease required a remand to the trial court as payments had been made by the tenant and accepted by the landlord under the lease. Nacoochee Corp. v. Suwanee Inv. Partners, LLC, 275 Ga. App. 444, 620 S.E.2d 641 (2005).
4. Contracts of Employment
Commencing performance under oral agreement O.C.G.A.
§ 13-5-30(5) will not obviate statute of frauds. - Fact that person who has contracted to serve another one year, to commence at future day, enters upon performance of contract does not take case out of statute of frauds. Bentley v. Smith, 3 Ga. App. 242, 59 S.E. 720 (1907); Lewis v. Southern Realty Inv. Corp., 42 Ga. App. 171, 155 S.E. 369 (1930); Alexander-Seewald Co. v. Marett, 53 Ga. 314, 185 S.E. 589 (1936), disapproved on other grounds sub nom. Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 243 Ga. 116, 252 S.E.2d 606 (1979); Norman v. Nash, 102 Ga. App. 508, 116 S.E.2d 624 (1960).
Performance of services under contract not to be performed within a year for part of term is not such part performance as renders it fraud upon party performing for employer to refuse to comply, by discharge of that party before expiration of term. Dameron v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 257, 192 S.E. 446 (1937).
Oral contract for period of five years, whereby plaintiff was employed as insurance agent of defendant to solicit policies of insurance and collect premiums thereon, was not removed from operation of statute of frauds merely because person so employed entered on performance of that person's part of contract for period of three or four months. Dameron v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 257, 192 S.E. 446 (1937).
Mere fact that party to oral agreement entered upon employment and served will not avail as part performance. Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 147 Ga. App. 31, 248 S.E.2d 9 (1978), aff'd, 243 Ga. 116, 252 S.E.2d 606 (1979).
Performance of services under contract for part of term is not such part performance as renders it a fraud upon party performing for employer to refuse to comply, by discharge of that party before expiration of term. Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 243 Ga. 116, 252 S.E.2d 606 (1979); Metzgar v. Reserve Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 404, 254 S.E.2d 517 (1979).
Fact that plaintiff entered upon employment and served would not avail as part performance of oral contract of employment not to be performed within one year from making, nor would the plaintiff's refusal of another offer, coupled with the entry upon employment with defendant's organization, suffice as part performance. Slater v. Jackson, 163 Ga. App. 342, 294 S.E.2d 557 (1982); Ikemiya v. Shibamota Am., Inc., 213 Ga. App. 271, 444 S.E.2d 351 (1994); Goldstein v. Kellwood Co., 933 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
Entry into employment under an oral agreement and the performance of services for a part of the term was insufficient part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds. Gatins v. NCR Corp., 180 Ga. App. 595, 349 S.E.2d 818 (1986).
Leaving one job to begin another has never been held to be sufficient part performance to remove an oral employment contract from the operation of the statute of frauds. Baxley Veneer & Clete Co. v. Maddox, 261 Ga. 309, 404 S.E.2d 554 (1991).
In such case, either party may terminate relationship and servant may recover in quantum meruit.
- In such case, servant may quit at any time and recover value of servant's services in quantum meruit, and master may discharge servant at any time without incurring liability therefor. Norman v. Nash, 102 Ga. App. 508, 116 S.E.2d 624 (1960).
Acts preparatory or preliminary to performance do not constitute part performance.
- Entry on employment, moving, and refusal of another offer, do not amount to sufficient part performance to remove oral contract from statute of frauds but are merely preparatory or preliminary to performance of contract terminable at will of either party, rather than a substantial act essential to an oral contract. These acts do not verify the probable existence of a contract. Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 243 Ga. 116, 252 S.E.2d 606 (1979).
Former employer's claim that a former employee breached an oral nonsolicitation agreement that was part of the employee's promotion was barred by the statute of frauds in O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30; the employee's actions in accepting the promotion and working in the new position did not constitute such part performance as would remove the oral agreement from the statute of frauds pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(2), (3) because mere entry into employment and performance of services for part of the term was not inconsistent with employment terminable at will without a contract, and thus, the part performance was not consistent with the existence of a contract. Outsourcing P'ship, LLC v. Vinson, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2006).
Money expended in preparation for performance not part performance.
- Although funds were expended in order for appellant to incorporate and obtain a beer license, this was preparation for performance, and not part of contract itself, and was not sufficient to remove the case from the statute of frauds. El Diablo, Inc. v. Conway, 247 Ga. 159, 274 S.E.2d 557 (1981).
Acts necessary under oral contract of employment to constitute part performance see Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 243 Ga. 116, 252 S.E.2d 606 (1979).
In order to remove the alleged oral contract from the statute of frauds, the part performance shown must be consistent with the presence of a contract and inconsistent with the lack of a contract. Katz v. Custom Spray Prods., Inc., 168 Ga. App. 451, 309 S.E.2d 663 (1983).
Merely showing up for work on a daily basis did not support plaintiff's contentions regarding the terms of an oral employment contract since plaintiff's activities were not inconsistent with employment terminable at will without an express contract. Morgan v. American Ins. Managers, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 635, 521 S.E.2d 676 (1999); Ford Clinic, Inc. v. Potter, 246 Ga. App. 320, 540 S.E.2d 275 (2000).
Discussion of sufficiency of entering service under oral employment contract as performance.- See Marston v. Downing Co., 73 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1934).
An oral employment contract terminable at will to begin in praesenti is not prohibited by the statute of frauds. Wood v. Dan P. Holl & Co., 169 Ga. App. 839, 315 S.E.2d 51 (1984).
Moving to another city and opening business pursuant to agreement, removed agreement from statute of frauds. Fontaine v. Baxley, Boles & Co., 90 Ga. 416, 17 S.E. 1015 (1892).
Leaving lucrative employment for a higher paying job does not constitute part performance of oral contract subject to statute of frauds such as will take contract out of statute of frauds. Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 243 Ga. 116, 252 S.E.2d 606 (1979).
Giving up job in another state pursuant to oral employment contract as constituting part performance.
- See Alexander-Seewald Co. v. Marett, 53 Ga. App. 314, 185 S.E. 589 (1935), disapproved sub nom. Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc., 243 Ga. 116, 252 S.E.2d 606 (1979).
Alleged oral contract was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, and not within the part performance exception to the statute of frauds, where fire chief stepped down from the chief's position to become a consultant to the city, which did not confer upon the city any uncompensated benefit. Godwin v. City of Bainbridge, 172 Ga. App. 290, 322 S.E.2d 733 (1984).
Trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to the former business partners on the separate entity partners' counterclaim; the claim that the former business partners were liable for breach of an oral compensation agreement, regarding the one separate entity partner's claim for wages for operating the business was barred by the statute of frauds, as it involved a promise to answer for the debt of another, which was required to be in writing pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-5-30(2) and since nothing in the one separate entity partner's conduct was consistent with the lack of an employment agreement, the part performance doctrine could not be invoked as an exception to render the writing requirement unenforceable. Carter v. Parish, 274 Ga. App. 97, 616 S.E.2d 877 (2005).
Noncompete agreement.
- As employee could not produce evidence of an enforceable noncompete agreement which was consideration for a three-year employment agreement, and which was enforced or sought to be enforced by employer so as to constitute "part performance" of the employment agreement, the employee could not avoid summary judgment on that ground. Golden v. National Serv. Indus., 210 Ga. App. 53, 435 S.E.2d 270 (1993).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
- Installation of fixtures as part performance which will take parol lease out of statute of frauds, 10 A.L.R. 1495.
Validity and effect of oral agreement in alternative, one of the alternatives being within the statute of frauds, 13 A.L.R. 271.
Applicability of statute of frauds to joint adventure or partnership to deal in real estate, 18 A.L.R. 484; 95 A.L.R. 1242; 128 A.L.R. 1520.
Discharge of existing debt (or crediting indebtedness) as part payment which will take contract out of statute of frauds, 23 A.L.R. 473.
Name of principal or of authorized agent, in body of instrument, as satisfying statute of frauds where transaction was not conducted by him, 28 A.L.R. 1114.
Statute of frauds: doctrine of part performance as applied to advance of money on oral agreement for mortgage on real estate, 30 A.L.R. 1403.
Character and extent of improvements necessary to constitute part performance, 33 A.L.R. 1489.
Accepting paid employment or remaining in such employment as part performance which will take oral contract to convey or devise real property out of statute of frauds, 40 A.L.R. 223.
Rights of parties under oral agreement to buy land or bid it in at judicial sale for another, 42 A.L.R. 10; 135 A.L.R. 232; 27 A.L.R. 1285.
Promise of landlord or tenant to pay for supplies furnished to tenant or subtenant as within statute of frauds in relation to contracts to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, 59 A.L.R. 179.
Doctrine of part performance as sustaining action at law based on contract within statute of frauds, 59 A.L.R. 1305.
Necessity and sufficiency of statement in writing of consideration or price for sale of goods or choses in action in order to satisfy statute of frauds, 59 A.L.R. 1422.
Oral agreement between joint obligors as to extent of liability inter se, 65 A.L.R. 822.
Failure to comply with statute of frauds as to a part of a contract within the statute as affecting the enforceability of another part not covered by the statute, 71 A.L.R. 479.
Extrinsic writing referred to in written agreement as part thereof for purposes of statute of frauds, 73 A.L.R. 1383.
Relation between doctrines of estoppel and part performance as basis of enforcement of contract not conforming to statute of frauds, 75 A.L.R. 650; 117 A.L.R. 939.
Effect of statute of frauds upon the right to modify by subsequent parol agreement, a written contract required by the statute to be in writing, 80 A.L.R. 539; 118 A.L.R. 1511.
Sufficiency of writing under statutes requiring agreements for the payment of commission, or authorizing or employing a broker for the sale or purchase of real estate for compensation or commission, or a memorandum thereof, to be in writing, 80 A.L.R. 1456.
Statute of frauds as affecting right to reformation of deed or mortgage so as to enlarge or restrict the land or interest covered, 86 A.L.R. 448.
Agreement for sale of buildings or material therein as one for sale of interest in real property within statute of frauds, 91 A.L.R. 1280.
Alterations or improvements by lessor as part performance taking lease out of statute of frauds, 101 A.L.R. 185.
Statute of frauds as applied to agreements of repurchase or repayment on sale of corporate stock or other personal property, 121 A.L.R. 312.
Money or other property in possession of seller, before contract was made, as satisfying condition of part payment which will take oral contract for sale of goods out of statute of frauds, 131 A.L.R. 1252; 170 A.L.R. 245.
Right to recover upon note, check, or other executory obligation representing consideration for a contract which the plaintiff is willing and able to perform, but which because of the statute of frauds would not have been enforceable against him, 132 A.L.R. 1486.
Statute of frauds as applicable to a contract to be responsible for another's funeral expenses, 134 A.L.R. 633.
Part performance predicated upon mortgagor's or judgment debtor's continuance of possession as taking out of the statute of frauds oral contracts between mortgagor and mortgagee subsequent to foreclosure or expiration of period of redemption, or between judgment debtor and execution purchaser subsequent to execution sale, 136 A.L.R. 262.
Retrospective applicability of statute of frauds, 148 A.L.R. 1325.
Oral contract of employment terminable by one, but not both, of the parties within one year as within provision of statute of frauds relating to contracts not to be performed within one year, 161 A.L.R. 290.
Vendor's willingness and ability to perform contract which does not satisfy statute of frauds as precluding purchaser's recovery back of payments made thereon, 169 A.L.R. 187.
Money or other property in possession of seller, before contract was made, as satisfying condition of part payment which will take oral contract for sale of goods out of statute of frauds, 170 A.L.R. 245.
Validity, construction, and application of guaranty of corporate stock, or dividends thereon, by one other than corporation, 170 A.L.R. 1171.
Applicability of statute of frauds to contracts to surrender, rescind, or abandon trusts, 173 A.L.R. 281.
Performance as taking contract not to be performed within a year out of the statute of frauds, 6 A.L.R.2d 1053.
Sale or contract for sale of standing timber as within provisions of statute of frauds respecting sale of contract of sale of real property, 7 A.L.R.2d 517.
What constitutes part performance sufficient to take agreement in consideration of marriage out of statute of frauds, 30 A.L.R.2d 1419.
Statute of frauds: promise by stockholder, officer, or director to pay debt of corporation, 35 A.L.R.2d 906.
Applicability of statute of frauds to promise to pay for medical, dental, or hospital services furnished to another, 64 A.L.R.2d 1071.
Doctrine of part performance with respect to renewal option in lease not complying with statute of frauds, 80 A.L.R.2d 425.
Recovery, on theory of quasi contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution, of money paid in reliance upon unenforceable promise to accept a bill of exchange or draft, 81 A.L.R.2d 587.
Buyer's note as payment within contemplation of statute of frauds, 81 A.L.R.2d 1355.
Statute of frauds: will or instrument in form of will as sufficient memorandum of contract to devise or bequeath, 94 A.L.R.2d 921.
Applicability of statute of frauds to agreement to rescind contract for sale of land, 42 A.L.R.3d 242.
Action by employee in reliance on employment contract which violates statute of frauds as rendering contract enforceable, 54 A.L.R.3d 715.
Promissory estoppel as basis for avoidance of statute of frauds, 56 A.L.R.3d 1037.
Right of owner to recover for work or material expended on his own real property in reliance upon a void or unenforceable contract for its rental or sale, 64 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Application of parol evidence rule in action on contract for architect's services, 69 A.L.R.3d 1353.
Construction and application of UCC § 2-201(3)(c) rendering contract of sale enforceable notwithstanding statute of frauds with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted, 97 A.L.R.3d 908.
Promise by one other than principal to indemnify one agreeing to become surety or guarantor as within statute of frauds, 13 A.L.R.4th 1153.
CHAPTER 6 DAMAGES AND COSTS GENERALLYSec.
- Parties who may bring action on a contract, § 9-2-20.
Remedies for breach of contracts for sales of goods, § 11-2-701 et seq.
Specific performance, § 23-2-130 et seq.
Law reviews.- For article, "Georgia Annotations, Restatement of the Law of Contracts," see 5 Ga. B.J. 15 (1942). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of tort law from June 1, 1977, through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 215 (1978). For annual survey on law of contracts, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 125 (1990).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Breach of one contract does not provide grounds for rescission of separate and distinct contract.
- There is no rule of law which allows breach of one contract to suffice as grounds for rescission of another separate and distinct contract; indeed, the well established rule is to the contrary. CEE Fed. Credit Union v. Chesser, 150 Ga. App. 328, 258 S.E.2d 2 (1979).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
- Measure of damages for breach of contract preventing operation of nonindustrial business in contemplation, but not established or in actual operation, 1 A.L.R. 156; 99 A.L.R. 938.
Liability of one contracting to make repairs for damages from improper performance of the work, 1 A.L.R. 1654; 44 A.L.R. 824.
Measure of damages for defective performance of contract to bore or case well, 5 A.L.R. 240.
Rights of parties to a timber contract upon failure of purchaser to remove the timber within the time fixed or within a reasonable time, 15 A.L.R. 41; 31 A.L.R. 944; 42 A.L.R. 641; 71 A.L.R. 143; 164 A.L.R. 423.
Right to damages because of abandonment or relocation of railway line, station, or sidetrack, 23 A.L.R. 555.
Dismissal of suit as affecting election of remedies as between damages and specific performance, 26 A.L.R. 111.
Liability of labor organization for inducing breach of contract to furnish or accept material, 29 A.L.R. 562.
Rights and remedies of purchaser under seller's agreement to assist him in reselling the goods, 29 A.L.R. 666.
Power of equity to grant damages on enjoining breach of contract by seller of business not to engage in competing business, 31 A.L.R. 1174.
Time as of which damages are to be determined where broker, before expiration of credit period, repudiates contract to purchase stock for customer on partial payment plan, 31 A.L.R. 1179.
Rate of exchange to be taken into account in assessing damages for breach of contract, 33 A.L.R. 1285; 43 A.L.R. 520; 50 A.L.R. 1273; 105 A.L.R. 640.
Anticipatory repudiation of contract for sale of goods by buyer as affecting time as of which damages are to be computed, 34 A.L.R. 114.
Measure of damages for breach of a contract to pay a specific sum in stock, notes, bonds, or other securities, 34 A.L.R. 931.
Right to amount stipulated in contract for breach where it appears there were no actual damages, or there was no proof of such damages, 34 A.L.R. 1336.
Recovery by one who has breached contract for services providing for share in proceeds or profits as compensation, 40 A.L.R. 34.
Measure of damages for buyer's breach of contract to purchase shares of stock, 44 A.L.R. 358.
Measure of recovery by vendee under executory contract for purchase of real property where vendor is unable or refuses to convey, 48 A.L.R. 12; 68 A.L.R. 137; 17 A.L.R.2d 1300.
Stipulation in land contract for payment of specified sum by vendor in case of default as provision for liquidated damages or penalty, 48 A.L.R. 899.
Right to recover as for breach of original building or construction contract where one party, upon refusal of other party to abide by the terms, proceeds under new or changed terms, 61 A.L.R. 212.
Measure of damages for broker's breach of contract with customer as to sales and purchases of stocks on the exchange, 63 A.L.R. 305.
Measure of recovery by building contractor where contract is substantially but not exactly performed, 65 A.L.R. 1297.
Measure of recovery by vendee under executory contract for purchase of real property where a vendor is unable or refuses to convey, 68 A.L.R. 137; 17 A.L.R.2d 1300; 17 A.L.R.2d 1300.
Remedies for breach of decedent's agreement to devise, bequeath, or leave property as compensation for services, 69 A.L.R. 14; 106 A.L.R. 742.
Right of one party to treat repudiation of contract by other as a breach, as affected by former's subsequent demand of, or expression of a willingness to receive, performance, 69 A.L.R. 1303.
Right as against corporation of stockholder who surrenders part of his stock in reliance upon agreement by other stockholders to do the same which they fail to carry out, 74 A.L.R. 1377.
Distinction between uncertainty as to whether substantial damages resulted and uncertainty as to amount, 78 A.L.R. 858.
Time and place with reference to which damages for conversion of chattel are to be determined as against one not a party to the original conversion, 80 A.L.R. 613.
Right to maintain action for damages as for breach of contract upon lease defectively executed, 82 A.L.R. 1318.
Sale by vendor of all or substantial part of property to a third person before time fixed for performance of contract of sale as breach, or ground of rescission by vendee, or as affecting rights to specific performance, 90 A.L.R. 337.
Rule requiring reduction of future payments to present worth as applicable to determination of damages for breach of contract of employment, 90 A.L.R. 1318.
Power of court to reduce or increase verdict without giving party affected the option to submit to a new trial, 95 A.L.R. 1163.
Remedy by mandatory injunction or specific performance for breach of contract to furnish one the requirements of his business, 98 A.L.R. 421.
Measure of damages for breach of contract preventing operation of nonindustrial business in contemplation, but not established or in actual operation, 99 A.L.R. 938.
Right of vendee under executory land contract to treat contract as breached and maintain action for damages upon vendor's declaration prior to time for performance that he will not perform, 102 A.L.R. 1082.
Construction and effect of bond or other agreement to protect mortgagee against prior tax or other liens, or failure to make or complete improvements or repairs, and measure of damages for breach thereof, 103 A.L.R. 1395.
Right of building or construction contractor to recover damages resulting from delay caused by default of contractee, 115 A.L.R. 65.
Presumption and burden of proof regarding mitigation of damages, 134 A.L.R. 242.
Failure of complaint to state cause of action for unliquidated damages as ground for dismissal of action at hearing to determine amount of damages following defendant's default, 163 A.L.R. 496.
Cancelation of lease or contract pursuant to provision in that regard as affecting liability accruing before cancelation, 166 A.L.R. 391.
Vendor's willingness and ability to perform contract which does not satisfy statute of frauds as precluding purchaser's recovery back of payments made thereon, 169 A.L.R. 187.
Buyer's acceptance of part of goods as affecting right to damages for failure to complete delivery, 169 A.L.R. 595.
Specific performance or injunctive relief against breach of contract, other than lease or agreement therefor, or contract for services, terminable by one party but not the other, 8 A.L.R.2d 1208.
Validity and construction of provision for liquidated damages in contract with cooperative marketing association, 12 A.L.R.2d 130.
Right to recover, in action for breach of contract, expenditures incurred in preparation for performance, 17 A.L.R.2d 1300.
Measure of damages for fraudulently procuring services at lowered rate or gratuitously, 24 A.L.R.2d 742.
Measure of damages for buyer's breach of contract to purchase article from dealer or manufacturer's agent, 24 A.L.R.2d 1008.
Measure and items of compensation of contractor under cost-plus contract which is terminated, without breach, before contemplation, 28 A.L.R.2d 867.
Purchaser's use or attempted use of articles known to be defective as affecting damages recoverable for breach of warranty, 33 A.L.R.2d 511.
Conflict of laws as to elements and measure of damages recoverable for breach of contract, 50 A.L.R.2d 227.
Measure and elements of damages recoverable for breach of contract to support person, 50 A.L.R.2d 613.
Measure or basis of attorney's recovery on express contract fixing noncontingent fees, where he is discharged without cause or fault on his part, 54 A.L.R.2d 604.
Employer's damages for breach of employment contract by employee's terminating employment, 61 A.L.R.2d 1008.
Measure and elements of damages for breach of contract to marry, 73 A.L.R.2d 553.
Measure of vendee's recovery in action for damages for vendor's delay in conveying real property, 74 A.L.R.2d 578.
Liability of labor union or its officers or members for wrongful suspension or expulsion of member, 74 A.L.R.2d 783.
Measure of damages, to advertiser, for radio or television station's breach or wrongful termination of contract, 90 A.L.R.2d 1199.
Water well-drilling contracts, 90 A.L.R.2d 1346.
Measure and elements of damages recoverable against union for breach of no-strike provision in collective bargaining agreement, 92 A.L.R.2d 1232.
Liability of garageman to one ordering repair of motor vehicle, for defective work, 92 A.L.R.2d 1408; 1 A.L.R.4th 347; 23 A.L.R.4th 274.
Duty of construction contractor to indemnify contractee held liable for injury to third person, in absence of express contract for indemnity, 97 A.L.R.2d 616.
Contractor's liability for alleged breach of contract for construction of swimming pool, 1 A.L.R.3d 870.
Construction contractor's liability to contractee for defects or insufficiency of work attributable to the latter's plans and specifications, 6 A.L.R.3d 1394.
Venue of damage action for breach of real-estate sales contract, 8 A.L.R.3d 489.
Liability for accident occurring in motor transportation of house or similar structure on public streets or highways, 9 A.L.R.3d 1436.
Awarding damages for delay, in addition to specific performance, of contract for sale of corporate stock, 28 A.L.R.3d 1401.
Seller's liability for fraud in connection with contract for the sale of long-term dancing lessons, 28 A.L.R.3d 1412.
Breach or repudiation of contract as affecting right to enforce arbitration clause therein, 32 A.L.R.3d 377.
Validity and construction of "no damage" clause with respect to delay in building or construction contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187.
Telephone company's right to change subscriber's telephone number, 75 A.L.R.3d 700.
Liability of bank in connection with night depository service, 77 A.L.R.3d 597.
Tax preparer's liability to taxpayer in connection with preparation of tax return, 81 A.L.R.3d 1119.
Liability of lessee who refuses to take possession under executed lease or executory agreement to lease, 85 A.L.R.3d 514.
Limitation to quantum meruit recovery, where attorney employed under contingent fee contract is discharged without cause, 92 A.L.R.3d 690.
Measure and elements of damages in action against physician for breach of contract to achieve particular result or cure, 99 A.L.R.3d 303.
Wrongful cancellation of medical malpractice insurance, 99 A.L.R.3d 469.
Increase in tuition as actionable in suit by student against college or university, 99 A.L.R.3d 885.
Measure and elements of damages in action against garageman based on failure to properly perform repair or service on motor vehicle, 1 A.L.R.4th 347.
Liability of insurer for damages resulting from delay in passing upon an application for life insurance, 1 A.L.R.4th 1202.
Recovery of damages for breach of contract to convey homestead where only one spouse signed contract, 5 A.L.R.4th 1310.
Amount of appropriation as limitation on damages for breach of contract recoverable by one contracting with government agency, 40 A.L.R.4th 998.
Modern status of rule as to whether cost of correction or difference in value of structures is proper measure of damages for breach of construction contract, 41 A.L.R.4th 131.
Damages for breach of contract as affected by income tax considerations, 50 A.L.R.4th 452.
Equipment leasing expense as element of construction contractor's damages, 52 A.L.R.4th 712.
Recoverability of compensatory damages for mental anguish or emotional distress for breach of contract to lend money, 52 A.L.R.4th 826.
Credit card issuer's liability, under state laws, for wrongful billing, cancellation, dishonor or disclosure, 53 A.L.R.4th 231.
Recoverability of compensatory damages for mental anguish or emotional distress for breach of service contract, 54 A.L.R.4th 901.
Recovery of anticipated lost profits of new business: post-1965 cases, 55 A.L.R.4th 507.
Duty and liability of subcontractor to employee of another contractor using equipment or apparatus of former, 55 A.L.R.4th 725.
Bank's liability for breach of implied contract of good faith and fair dealing, 55 A.L.R.4th 1026.