(Orig. Code 1863, §§ 2704, 2708, 2711; Code 1868, §§ 2698, 2702, 2705; Code 1873, §§ 2740, 2744, 2747; Code 1882, §§ 2740, 2744, 2747; Civil Code 1895, §§ 3657, 3661, 3664; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4242, 4246, 4249; Code 1933, §§ 20-302, 20-304, 20-306; Ga. L. 1981, p. 876, § 2.)
Law reviews.- For article discussing the anachronistic nature of the Georgia Contracts Code as dramatized by comparing the doctrine of consideration as it is formulated in the Restatements of Contracts and in Code 1933, Title 20 (now this title), and the interpretative approach Georgia courts have taken in dealing with such Code, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1979). (But see amendments by Ga. L. 1981, p. 876.) For article, "Promissory Estoppel and the Georgia Statute of Frauds," see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 204 (1980). For article surveying developments in Georgia contract law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 67 (1981). For article surveying developments in Georgia real property law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 219 (1981). For article, "Considering the Consideration Approach to Classifying Georgia Contracts In Partial Restraint of Trade," see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 18 (2004).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions decided prior to the amendment by Ga. L. 1981, p. 876, which changed the definition of consideration, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Slight consideration is sufficient, and courts of law will not look closely into its adequacy. Wolfe v. Breman, 69 Ga. App. 813, 26 S.E.2d 633 (1943).
On principle it is immaterial whether promisor or promisee initiated negotiations which resulted in promise. Strachan v. Burford, 173 Ga. 821, 162 S.E. 120 (1931).
Language of section negatives idea that both benefit and injury must occur, but expressly provides that either, by itself, will support promise. Supreme Court has uniformly followed plain mandate of law, and held that, in absence of fraud, even slight benefit will be sufficient. Crine & Daniel v. Davis, 68 Ga. 138 (1881); Roberts v. Davis, 72 Ga. 819 (1884); Burruss v. Smith & Turner, 75 Ga. 710 (1885); Sanders & Ables v. Carter, 91 Ga. 450, 17 S.E. 345 (1893); Gilmore v. Hammock, 72 Ga. App. 35, 32 S.E.2d 844 (1945).
Damage or trouble to promisee, as well as benefit to promisor, is sufficient consideration to support promise. Mankin v. Bryant, 206 Ga. 120, 56 S.E.2d 447 (1949); Zachos v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 213 Ga. 619, 100 S.E.2d 418 (1957); Mann Elec. Co. v. Webco S. Corp., 194 Ga. App. 541, 390 S.E.2d 905 (1990).
Any benefit accruing to promisor, or any loss, trouble, or disadvantage to promisee, is sufficient consideration, in eyes of the law, to sustain cause of action upon breach of agreement. Vanguard Properties Dev. Corp. v. Murphy, 136 Ga. App. 519, 221 S.E.2d 691 (1975).
Any benefit accruing to one who makes promise, or any loss, trouble, or disadvantage undergone by person to whom promise is made, is sufficient consideration, in eyes of the law, to sustain an assumpsit. Whitley v. Powell, 47 Ga. App. 105, 169 S.E. 766 (1933); Mankin v. Bryant, 206 Ga. 120, 56 S.E.2d 447 (1949); Zachos v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 213 Ga. 619, 100 S.E.2d 418 (1957).
Any benefit accruing to one who makes promise, or any loss, trouble, or disadvantage undergone by, or charge imposed upon, him to whom it is made, is sufficient consideration. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 248 Ga. 114, 281 S.E.2d 579 (1981).
Consideration need not be benefit accruing to promisor. Porter Fertilizer Co. v. Brewer, 36 Ga. App. 329, 136 S.E. 477 (1927).
Consideration need not be benefit accruing to promisor, but may be benefit accruing to another. Owens v. Service Fire Ins. Co., 90 Ga. App. 553, 83 S.E.2d 249 (1954).
Motive with which a party enters into a contract is no part of contract's consideration. Sellers v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 177 Ga. App. 85, 338 S.E.2d 480 (1985).
Mutual promises.
- When mutual promises are given, each promise is itself consideration for the return promise. Phillips Audio Video Systems Corp. v. Bateman, 160 Ga. App. 12, 285 S.E.2d 747 (1981).
It is not necessary that promisor receive anything, as loss, trouble, or disadvantage undergone by promisee is sufficient consideration. Collins v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 149 Ga. App. 658, 255 S.E.2d 122 (1979).
Contract may be supported by adequate consideration, although promisor never receives any part of it. Fine v. Haas, 120 Ga. App. 524, 171 S.E.2d 372 (1969).
Detriment sustained if relied on as consideration should be alleged and proved.
- Detriment sustained by plaintiff, if relied upon as consideration for contract sued on, should be distinctly alleged in declaration and proved upon trial. Stovall v. Hairston, 55 Ga. 9 (1875).
Agreement to settle existing debt by part payment requires consideration.
- Agreement to settle existing debt by promise to pay part thereof, is void, for want of consideration, unless some benefit accrues from agreement to creditor or detriment to debtor, other than what springs out of original contract. Stovall v. Hairston, 55 Ga. 9 (1875).
Promise to pay preexisting debt of another requires new consideration.
- When one person has sold and delivered goods to another and detriments and benefits which constituted consideration of contract between them have been suffered and received and transaction has thus become fixed as to their reciprocal liabilities, contract by third person, not originally bound, to pay debt thus already pre-existing and incurred by purchaser, is nudum pactum, unless supported by new consideration. Saul v. Southern Seating & Cabinet Co., 6 Ga. App. 843, 65 S.E. 1065 (1909).
Agreement to do what one is already legally bound to do is not sufficient consideration for promise of another. Johnson v. Hinson, 188 Ga. 639, 4 S.E.2d 561 (1939).
Relinquishment of interest in valid indebtedness is valid consideration. Smith v. Davis, 65 Ga. App. 245, 15 S.E.2d 820 (1941).
Settlement of pending cause of action.
- A definite, certain, and unambiguous oral contract of settlement of a pending cause of action is a valid and binding agreement. When the suit is pending, either of the parties to the case is entitled to a final judgment based on the terms of the agreement of settlement so as to render certain the termination of the case. Olson v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 158 Ga. App. 713, 282 S.E.2d 184 (1981).
Contract not bargained for.
- Trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for directed verdict predicated on claims that a contract was enforceable as supported by valid consideration since plaintiff did not provide the contract to the defendant for signature until after all the work performed thereunder had been done. Driggers v. Campbell, 247 Ga. App. 300, 543 S.E.2d 787 (2000).
In the plaintiff's suit on a promissory note, partial summary judgment was granted to the defendant as the note failed for want of consideration because, while the note stated that it was supported by a good and valuable consideration, it then specified that the consideration consisted of the money the plaintiff extended to the defendant for the down payment and repairs; thus, because the note specified a monetary or valuable consideration, the plaintiff could not rely on a good consideration that was founded on natural duty and affection or on a strong moral obligation to provide the plaintiff, the defendant's elderly mother, a residence at the house or repay the plaintiff the money to help the plaintiff buy a house of the plaintiff's own. Lewis v. Ikner, 349 Ga. App. 21, 825 S.E.2d 443 (2019).
In the plaintiff's suit on a promissory note, partial summary judgment was granted to the defendant as the note failed for want of consideration because the plaintiff's purported agreement to rescind the plaintiff's request to be named on the deed did not constitute valuable consideration to support the note as the plaintiff testified that it was merely the plaintiff's supposition that the defendant agreed to sign the note instead of naming the plaintiff on the deed; the note specifically purported to establish that the consideration was the money the plaintiff gave the defendant for the down payment and the repairs; and any consideration for the note was limited to the purported monetary consideration recited in the note. Lewis v. Ikner, 349 Ga. App. 21, 825 S.E.2d 443 (2019).
Forbearance in bringing suit on legal claim is sufficient consideration to support contract. Trust Co. v. Rhodes, 144 Ga. App. 816, 242 S.E.2d 738 (1978).
Forbearance to prosecute legal claim, and compromise of doubtful right, are both sufficient considerations to support a contract. Wolfe v. Breman, 69 Ga. App. 813, 26 S.E.2d 633 (1943).
Forbearance from asserting defenses in litigation as consideration for release from contract.
- Forbearance by party from asserting defenses in related litigation would be, if bargained for by other party, consideration sufficient to support release from contract. Atlanta Nat'l Real Estate Trust v. Tally, 243 Ga. 247, 253 S.E.2d 692 (1979).
Recital of payment of one dollar suffices as consideration, although never actually paid.
- When contract contains recital of payment of one dollar as contract's consideration, contract is valid though sum named was not actually paid. Hickok v. Starka Indus., Inc., 154 Ga. App. 589, 269 S.E.2d 84 (1980).
Subsequent act as consideration for promise unenforceable when made.
- Promise, though unenforceable for lack of consideration when made may become binding and enforceable, if promisee subsequently furnishes consideration contemplated by doing what promisee was expected to do. ABC Sch. Supply, Inc. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 97 Ga. App. 84, 102 S.E.2d 199 (1958).
Cited in Pitts v. Allen, 72 Ga. 69 (1883); Glanton v. Whitaker, 75 Ga. 523 (1885); Sanders & Ables v. Carter, 91 Ga. 450, 17 S.E. 345 (1893); LaGrange Lumber & Supply Co. v. Farmers & Traders Bank, 37 Ga. App. 409, 140 S.E. 766 (1927); Owens v. Glover Grocery Co., 39 Ga. App. 798, 148 S.E. 541 (1929); Benton v. Roberts, 41 Ga. App. 189, 152 S.E. 141 (1930); Strachan v. Burford, 173 Ga. 821, 162 S.E. 120 (1931); Conley v. Kelley, 43 Ga. App. 822, 160 S.E. 532 (1931); McCowen v. McCord, 49 Ga. App. 358, 175 S.E. 593 (1934); Ocean Lake & River Fish Co. v. Dotson, 70 Ga. App. 268, 28 S.E.2d 319 (1943); Thompson v. Hudson, 76 Ga. App. 807, 47 S.E.2d 112 (1948); R.A.C. Realty Co. v. W.O.U.F. Atlanta Realty Corp., 205 Ga. 154, 52 S.E.2d 617 (1949); W.O.U.F. Atlanta Realty Corp. v. R.A.C. Realty Co., 207 Ga. 334, 61 S.E.2d 499 (1950); Flatauer v. Goodman, 84 Ga. App. 881, 67 S.E.2d 794 (1951); Carlisle v. General Fire Serv. Co., 86 Ga. App. 807, 72 S.E.2d 568 (1952); Wilson v. Whitmire, 212 Ga. 287, 92 S.E.2d 20 (1956); Utzman v. Caribbean & S.E. Dev. Corp., 107 Ga. App. 56, 129 S.E.2d 62 (1962); Jefferson Mills, Inc. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1965); Maddox v. Loden, 117 Ga. App. 99, 159 S.E.2d 743 (1968); Frink v. Derst Baking Co., 224 Ga. 642, 163 S.E.2d 712 (1968); Top Quality Homes, Inc. v. Jackson, 231 Ga. 844, 204 S.E.2d 600 (1974); Haire v. Cook, 237 Ga. 639, 229 S.E.2d 436 (1976); Boxwood Corp. v. Berry, 144 Ga. App. 351, 241 S.E.2d 297 (1977); McCrackin v. Clay, 151 Ga. App. 744, 261 S.E.2d 471 (1979); American Century Mtg. Investors v. Bankamerica Realty Investors, 246 Ga. 39, 268 S.E.2d 609 (1980); Hospital Auth. v. Bryant, 157 Ga. App. 330, 277 S.E.2d 322 (1981); Grant v. Bell, 161 Ga. App. 878, 288 S.E.2d 907 (1982); European Bakers, Ltd. v. Holman, 177 Ga. App. 172, 338 S.E.2d 702 (1985); Starr v. Robinson, 181 Ga. App. 9, 351 S.E.2d 238 (1986); Thornton v. Ellis, 184 Ga. App. 884, 363 S.E.2d 584 (1987); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Benton, 257 Ga. 751, 363 S.E.2d 549 (1988); Hawes v. Emory Univ., 188 Ga. App. 803, 374 S.E.2d 328 (1988); Rogers v. deMonteguin, 193 Ga. App. 480, 388 S.E.2d 10 (1989); Avanti Group (U.S.A.), Ltd. v. Robert Half of Atlanta, Inc., 198 Ga. App. 366, 401 S.E.2d 576 (1991); Wimpey v. Bissinger, 198 Ga. App. 784, 403 S.E.2d 78 (1991); Acuff v. Proctor, 267 Ga. 85, 475 S.E.2d 616 (1996); Fisher v. Toombs County Nursing Home, 223 Ga. App. 842, 479 S.E.2d 180 (1996); Drake v. Wallace, 259 Ga. App. 111, 576 S.E.2d 87 (2003).
Application
Taking possession of and improving property in reliance on promise to convey as sufficient consideration.
- When petition alleged that plaintiff, relying upon promise of corporation to convey to the plaintiff certain property, took possession and made valuable improvements thereon, it alleges a benefit to corporation by reason of enhancement in value of corporation's remaining property because of valuable improvements made by plaintiff, and injury to plaintiff, by reason of valuable improvements made by plaintiff in reliance upon promise of conveyance. Mankin v. Bryant, 206 Ga. 120, 56 S.E.2d 447 (1949).
Promise to help or cooperate in work, sufficient consideration for agreement to accept and pay for service. Roberts v. Allen, 31 Ga. App. 660, 122 S.E. 86, cert. denied, 31 Ga. App. 812 (1924).
Agreement that one shall share equally in firm profits supports promise to pay one-third of losses. Tillinghast v. Banks, 14 Ga. 649 (1954).
Release from partnership debts in exchange for release of partnership interest provide requisite consideration.
- When partnership is dissolved and creditor is made party to dissolution agreement, expressly agreeing to release retiring partner from, and to look solely to continuing partner for payment of firm's debt, and retiring partner releases to continuing partner retiring partner's entire interest and equity in firm's assets, undertaking of each party constitutes sufficient consideration to support undertakings of the other. Stanley & Gravitt v. Roberts Bros., 31 Ga. App. 746, 121 S.E. 878 (1924).
Deed in consideration of one dollar, plus past and future support, is valid.
- Deed in consideration of one dollar actually paid, and of past support of grantors by grantees, and an agreement on the part of the grantees for the future support of the grantors, is not a voluntary conveyance, but one based upon a valuable consideration. Dorsey v. Clower, 162 Ga. 299, 133 S.E. 249 (1926).
Change of residence at another's request is valid consideration for promise to pay money. Zachos v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 213 Ga. 619, 100 S.E.2d 418 (1957).
Agreement of defendant to obtain loan for benefit of plaintiff provides consideration for deed. Grice v. Grice, 197 Ga. 686, 30 S.E.2d 183 (1944).
Withdrawal of objections to year's support as consideration for promise to pay deceased husband's debt.
- Note made by widow to creditor of deceased husband's estate, in which she promised to pay creditor's debt, provided estate should fail to do so, consideration for note being withdrawal by creditor of objections filed by creditor to allowance of year's support, is in absence of fraud, a valid contract. Golding v. McCall, 5 Ga. App. 545, 63 S.E. 706 (1909).
When consideration of contract supports agreement to extend time, see Baker v. Davis, 127 Ga. 649, 57 S.E. 62 (1907).
Extension of time for payment of debt supports endorsement of renewal note.
- Extension of time by creditor to principal debtor is sufficient consideration to support endorsement of note renewing original debt. Reed v. Gormley, 57 Ga. App. 821, 196 S.E. 921 (1938).
Option in lease contract supported by general consideration of entire lease.
- When lease contract at specified annual rental, contained option allowing lessee to purchase property during term at such amount as might be offered for it by another, option was supported by general consideration for entire contract, and was not unenforceable on ground that it was merely unilateral. Turman v. Smarr, 145 Ga. 312, 89 S.E. 214 (1916).
Benefit to locality as consideration for guaranty by stockholder residents.
- Benefits to guarantors as stockholders and as residents of town where corporation's plant was to be located is sufficient consideration for guaranty made to induce subscription for stock. Rogers v. Burr, 105 Ga. 432, 31 S.E. 438, 70 Am. St. R. 50 (1898).
Insurer's agreement to issue a policy and determine the insurance premiums was sufficient consideration for a named driver exclusion of coverage in the policy. Middlebrooks v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 222 Ga. App. 785, 476 S.E.2d 82 (1996).
Continuing liability coverage as consideration for exclusion endorsement.
- Adequate consideration is present when both parties intended that the execution of an exclusion endorsement would continue liability coverage. Miley v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 176 Ga. App. 527, 336 S.E.2d 583 (1985).
Helping mother settle estate.
- Defendant son's testimony as to his assistance to his mother in settling estate of his father constituted something of value "convertible into money, or having a value in money," and when considered with evidence of love and affection between mother and son, amounted to good and valuable consideration for mother's forbearance to collect son's indebtedness to estate of which she was sole beneficiary. Bates v. Bates, 163 Ga. App. 268, 293 S.E.2d 515 (1982).
Appellees' agreement to sell and appellant's agreement to buy certain stock of a corporation constituted such mutual promises as afforded consideration one as to the other. Brown v. Reeves, 164 Ga. App. 89, 296 S.E.2d 393 (1982).
Unilateral right to extend contract without additional consideration.
- The unilateral right by one party under a contract to extend the term covered by such contract without payment of additional consideration is unenforceable for lack of consideration. Newport Timber Corp. v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 535, 277 S.E.2d 646 (1981).
Assignment to bank of future periodic proceeds.
- For discussion of status (legal or equitable) of assignment to bank of specific amount from future periodic proceeds and consideration required for such an assignment, see Bank of Cave Spring v. Gold Kist, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 679, 327 S.E.2d 800 (1985).
When employer undertook to have renovation work done in a portion of the plant, and contracted with another to do the floor refinishing, an employee was not a party to the contract but was, at best, an incidental beneficiary. Church v. SMS Enters., 186 Ga. App. 791, 368 S.E.2d 554 (1988).
Arbitration agreement enforceable between employees and employers.
- Employer's "Open Door" policy was an enforceable contract under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 13-3-42. When viewing a facilitator as an advisor rather than a gatekeeper, it was readily apparent that the arbitration agreement contained mutual promises - both the employer and its employees committed to resolving workplace disputes through the Open Door process. Lambert v. Austin Ind., 544 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2008).
Amendment of agreement between firm and clients.
- Award of attorney fees was affirmed because the parties then entered into negotiations, during which the law firm made clear that the firm would discontinue work altogether (as was authorized by the terms of the original agreement) unless the clients agreed to a new compensation arrangement. Both parties agreed and entered into the amendment. Rowe v. Law Offices of Ben C. Brodhead, P.C., 319 Ga. App. 10, 735 S.E.2d 39 (2012).
Reliance on promise to pay.
- When a bank had a recorded lien on insured property which was destroyed by fire, and notified the insurer of the bank's interest, and thereafter the insurer promised to pay to the lienholder any proceeds of the policy of insurance, the bank's reliance on the promise to pay, and the resulting forebearance of legal action, constituted sufficient consideration to support the insurer's promise to pay. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alma Exch. Bank & Trust, 195 Ga. App. 103, 392 S.E.2d 320 (1990).
Trial court erred in concluding that the alleged oral agreement for attorney fees was unenforceable and, therefore, granting defendant summary judgment because some evidence existed that the plaintiff relied on the defendant's promise and continued negotiating the land deal, all the while incurring legal expenses and losing the value of obtaining the return of the escrowed funds and the opportunity to seek another buyer. Cheeley Invs., L.P. v. Zambetti, 332 Ga. App. 115, 770 S.E.2d 350 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1298, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 615 (Ga. 2015).
Separation agreements.
- A separation agreement entered in contemplation of the parties' uncontested divorce was supported by consideration and was enforceable. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 229 Ga. App. 494, 494 S.E.2d 240 (1997).
Past consideration cannot support promise.
- Trial court erred by denying a couple's motion for a directed verdict on a personal assistant's claim against the couple for breach of a 2010 agreement because the agreement relied upon was unenforceable and did not provide consideration for the payment of $450,000 for services already performed; therefore, the 2010 agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law and should not have been submitted for the jury's consideration. Lee v. Choi, 323 Ga. App. 370, 744 S.E.2d 871 (2013).
In the plaintiff's suit on a promissory note, partial summary judgment was granted to the defendant as the note failed for want of consideration because the plaintiff could not rely on any prior or contemporaneous oral agreement that the down payment money was subject to certain conditions as the transfer of the down payment money was memorialized in the gift letter, which stated that the defendant was under no obligation to repay the plaintiff and that the gift was subject to no terms or conditions; there was no consideration for any subsequent agreement for the defendant to repay the plaintiff; and the termite repairs money could not be deemed valuable consideration as it was past consideration. Lewis v. Ikner, 349 Ga. App. 21, 825 S.E.2d 443 (2019).
Promises for Benefit of Third PartyThird-party beneficiary can be a stranger to consideration and still maintain action on contract, so long as a valid consideration supports a promise. Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co., 629 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded on other grounds on rehearing, 698 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1983).
Promise to pay another's debt, supported by relinquishment of lien on collateral for such debt.
- There is sufficient consideration to support agreement to answer for debt of another when creditor is thereby induced by promisor to relinquish valuable lien which creditor had acquired upon property to secure original debt. Bluthenthal & Bickart v. Moore, 106 Ga. 424, 32 S.E. 344 (1899).
When the owner of a Chapter 11 debtor signed a personal guaranty of its debt in return for the withdrawal of an application for the appointment of a trustee, there was consideration for the guaranty because under the circumstances the guaranty represented a well-considered bargain, the owner was a sophisticated businessperson who read the agreement and discussed the agreement with counsel before signing, and it did not matter that the withdrawal of the motion did not directly benefit the owner personally. Abdulla v. Klosinski, F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2012).
Note given by father for relinquishment of disputed claim against son is enforceable.
- While promise by father to assume unenforceable obligation against his minor son is unenforceable, and while promissory note cannot be enforced when the note is executed to pay existing debt of another unless supported by legal consideration, a note voluntarily given by father in liquidation of disputed, and perhaps valid, claim against son, is not without consideration where promisee relinquishes bona fide claim against son, and surrenders evidence thereof. Gibson v. Kyle, 46 Ga. App. 295, 167 S.E. 547 (1932).
Assumption of third person's past-due debt for promise to extend maturity of debt is enforceable.
- Written contract in which plaintiff, in consideration of conditional assumption by defendant of past-due indebtedness of third persons, expressly agreed to extend date of maturity of debt, and thereby incurred detriment was not without valuable consideration to defendant. Rice v. Harris, 52 Ga. App. 42, 182 S.E. 404 (1935).
Release from employment contract supports third party's promise to pay released employee's debt to employer.
- Release of laborer from contract of employment is sufficient consideration to support promise of third person to pay debt of laborer to employer. Johnson v. Cothern, 12 Ga. App. 258, 77 S.E. 207 (1903); Wilson v. McDougald Bros. & Co., 12 Ga. App. 74, 76 S.E. 755 (1912).
Promise to pay for another's car repairs, provided promisor allowed to designate garage, lacks consideration.
- When only consideration alleged for contract for auto repairs was right given to defendant, employer of tort-feasor, to designate garage at which owner was to have car repaired, and if defendant was not otherwise obligated to repair vehicle, mere choice of place where owner would have the car repaired does not appear to be such consideration as would confer any benefit upon defendant, or any injury to plaintiff, thus alleged agreement to have another's car repaired at defendant's expense was unenforceable. Simmons v. Noble, 84 Ga. App. 255, 65 S.E.2d 834 (1951).
Promise of note may maintain action although consideration furnished by third party.
- When in suit on note it appears that there was consideration to defendant endorser, fact that consideration was furnished by one other than promisee does not prevent promisee from maintaining suit on such note. Edgar v. Edgar Casket Co., 125 Ga. App. 389, 187 S.E.2d 925 (1972).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Required waivers by environmental protection division personnel of liability for injuries lack consideration.
- Requiring environmental protection division personnel to sign waivers of liability for injuries to person or property sustained while on premises for purpose of carrying out their duties of inspection constitutes unreasonable restriction on state's police power and any such waiver is not binding on EPD personnel because of lack of valid consideration. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-121.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §§ 85, 95, 96.
C.J.S.- 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 70 et seq.
ALR.- Validity and enforceability of contract in consideration of naming child, 21 A.L.R.2d 1061.
Forbearance as sufficient consideration for guaranty, 78 A.L.R.2d 1414.
Validity of agreement to pay royalties for use of patented articles beyond patent expiration date, 3 A.L.R.3d 770.
Right to follow chattel into hands of purchaser who took in payment of preexisting debt, 11 A.L.R.3d 1028.
Sufficiency of consideration for employee stock-option contract, 57 A.L.R.3d 1241.