Obligation of Acceptor

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  1. The acceptor of a draft is obliged to pay the draft (i) according to its terms at the time it was accepted, even though the acceptance states that the draft is payable "as originally drawn" or equivalent terms; (ii) if the acceptance varies the terms of the draft, according to the terms of the draft as varied; or (iii) if the acceptance is of a draft that is an incomplete instrument, according to its terms when completed, to the extent stated in Code Sections 11-3-115 and 11-3-407. The obligation is owed to a person entitled to enforce the draft or to the drawer or an indorser who paid the draft under Code Section 11-3-414 or 11-3-415.
  2. If the certification of a check or other acceptance of a draft states the amount certified or accepted, the obligation of the acceptor is that amount. If the certification or acceptance does not state an amount, the amount of the instrument is subsequently raised, and the instrument is then negotiated to a holder in due course, the obligation of the acceptor is the amount of the instrument at the time it was taken by the holder in due course.

(Code 1981, §11-3-413, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1306, § 3.)

Cross references.

- Allowance of setoff against original payee in action by holder or transferee of negotiable instrument received under dishonor, § 13-7-7.

Law reviews.

- For article discussing parol evidence in the law of commercial paper, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 53 (1978). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of commercial law from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 11 (1980). For annual survey of commercial law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 85 (1986).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

  • General Consideration
  • Parol Evidence

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 14-602 and former Code Section 11-3-413 are included in the annotations for this section.

Promissory note is unconditional contract of maker to pay payee according to tenor of instrument. Tatum v. Bank of Cumming, 135 Ga. App. 675, 218 S.E.2d 677 (1975); Curtis v. First Nat'l Bank, 158 Ga. App. 379, 280 S.E.2d 404 (1981) (decided under former Code Section11-3-413).

Good faith is presumed until questioned. First Bank & Trust Co. v. Skelton, 154 Ga. App. 423, 268 S.E.2d 691 (1980).

Maker's obligation.

- The sale of a note, although it may provide the seller with sufficient funds to cover the debt, does not discharge the maker's obligation to pay the note according to its terms. First State Bank & Trust Co. v. McIver, 893 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1990) (decided under former Code Section 11-3-413).

Impossibility of performance of contract covenant personal to promissor does not excuse nonperformance. Phillips v. Marcin, 162 Ga. App. 202, 290 S.E.2d 546 (1982) (decided under former Code Section11-3-413).

Debt evidenced by note is not contingent upon continued existence of property. Phillips v. Marcin, 162 Ga. App. 202, 290 S.E.2d 546 (1982) (decided under former Code Section11-3-413).

Necessary allegations.

- In action on check against drawer, petition which fails to allege presentment and notice of dishonor, or facts excusing presentment and notice of dishonor, is subject to general demurrer. Lanier v. Waddell, 83 Ga. App. 423, 64 S.E.2d 79 (1951) (decided under former Code Section11-3-413).

Parol Evidence

Parol evidence generally not admissible to alter unconditional nature of note.

- In absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, unconditional promissory note cannot be changed into conditional obligation by parol evidence. Dolanson Co. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 242 Ga. 681, 251 S.E.2d 274 (1978) (decided under former Code Section11-3-413).

Inadmissible to impose conditions not apparent from face of note.

- A promissory note, being an unconditional promise, is a complete contract as written, and parol evidence may not be used to impose conditions not apparent from face of note. Whiteside v. Douglas County Bank, 145 Ga. App. 775, 245 S.E.2d 2 (1978); Curtis v. First Nat'l Bank, 158 Ga. App. 379, 280 S.E.2d 404 (1981); Phillips v. Marcin, 162 Ga. App. 202, 290 S.E.2d 546 (1982) (decided under former Code Section11-3-413).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks and Financial Institutions, § 956. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, §§ 438 et seq., 492, 557.

C.J.S.

- 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §§ 12 et seq., 39 et seq., 80 et seq., 263.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 3-413.

ALR.

- Words, "credit the drawer," on note, as affecting liability of one who signs before delivery, 56 A.L.R. 232.

Negligence in drawing check which facilitates alteration as to payee as affecting bank's liability in cashing check, 64 A.L.R. 1108.

Duty of holder as regards presentation of check to drawee bank as affected by run on bank or other indications of impending closing of doors, 88 A.L.R. 479.

Right of maker of negotiable paper which is subject to defenses as against payee-pledgor but not as against pledgee (by invoking doctrine of marshaling assets or otherwise) to require the latter to resort first to other collateral, 92 A.L.R. 1085.


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