Payable on Demand or at Definite Time

  1. Law
  2. Georgia Code
  3. Commercial Code
  4. Negotiable Instruments
  5. General Provisions and Definitions
  6. Payable on Demand or at Definite Time

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  1. A promise or order is "payable on demand" if it (i) states that it is payable on demand or at sight, or otherwise indicates that it is payable at the will of the holder; or (ii) does not state any time of payment.
  2. A promise or order is "payable at a definite time" if it is payable upon the elapse of a definite period of time after sight or acceptance or at a fixed date or dates or at a time or times readily ascertainable at the time the promise or order is issued, subject to rights of (i) prepayment; (ii) acceleration; (iii) extension at the option of the holder; or (iv) extension to a further definite time at the option of the maker or acceptor or automatically upon or after a specified act or event.
  3. If an instrument payable, at a fixed date, is also payable upon demand made before the fixed date, the instrument is payable on demand until the fixed date and, if demand for payment is not made before that date, becomes payable at a definite time on the fixed date.

(Code 1981, §11-3-108, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1306, § 3.)

Law reviews.

- For note, "Negotiable Promissory Notes Containing Time and Demand Provisions: The Need for Consistent Interpretation," see 19 Ga. L. Rev. 717 (1984).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1882, § 2791, former Code 1933, § 14-207, and former Code Section 11-3-108 are included in the annotations for this section.

Inapplicability to original presentment of documentary drafts.

- It is O.C.G.A. § 11-4-302(b), not this section, which governs as to the "time allowed" the bank for responding to the original presentment of the documentary drafts to it for payment. Accordingly, an otherwise untimely failure on the part of the bank to accept, pay or return the documentary drafts pursuant to their original specification merely as "sight drafts" may be actionable as a failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 11-4-302(b), but could not constitute an intentional "refusal" to comply with a demand for payment or return so as to be actionable as a conversion under O.C.G.A. § 11-3-419. Bank S. v. Roswell Jeep Eagle, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 432, 419 S.E.2d 522 (1992) (decided under former Code Section11-3-108).

No independent demand for payment required.

- Suit may be brought on demand paper without making any independent demand. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980); Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981) (decided under former Code Section11-3-108).

Note payable on demand is due immediately after delivery, without further notice or demand. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980); Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981) (decided under former Code Section11-3-108).

Enforcement of payment anytime within statute of limitations.

- There is no reason why obligor on "immediately" due and payable instrument should be entitled to contest holder's decision to enforce payment anytime within statute of limitation as being in bad faith. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980) (decided under former Code Section11-3-108).

Only "duty" under Uniform Commercial Code on holder of demand instrument is to seek enforcement of instrument which is on its face "immediately" due and payable within applicable statute of limitation. Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981) (decided under former Code Section11-3-108).

When cause of action on demand instrument accrues.

- Cause of action against maker or acceptor accrues in case of demand instrument upon its date or, if no date is stated, on date of issue. Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981) (decided under former Code Section11-3-108).

When county warrants are payable.

- A county warrant, which is a liquidated demand, even though it does not express any date for payment, is as matter of law payable on demand made five days after date on which it is issued, and will ordinarily bear interest from and after demand so made. Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942)(decided under former Code 1933, § 14-207).

When no time specified for payment of bill, it is due upon presentment and acceptance. Bedell v. Scarlett, 75 Ga. 56 (1885)(decided under former Code 1882, § 2791).

Cited in Johnson v. Hodge, 223 Ga. App. 227, 477 S.E.2d 385 (1996); West v. Diduro, 312 Ga. App. 591, 718 S.E.2d 815 (2011).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, §§ 57, 58, 104 et seq., 124.

C.J.S.

- 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §§ 14, 134.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 3-108.

ALR.

- Negotiability of instrument as affected by incompleteness of the attempt to fix due date, 19 A.L.R. 508.

Validity, construction, and application of clause entitling mortgagee to acceleration of balance due in case of conveyance or transfer of mortgaged property, 69 A.L.R.3d 713; 22 A.L.R.4th 1266; 61 A.L.R.4th 1070.

What transfers justify acceleration under "due-on-sale" clause of real estate mortgage, 22 A.L.R.4th 1266.

Validity and enforceability of due-on-sale real-estate mortgage provisions, 61 A.L.R.4th 1070.


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