All agents, by an express undertaking to that effect, may render themselves individually liable. Every agent exceeding the scope of his authority shall be individually liable to the person with whom he deals; so, also, for his own tortious act, whether acting by command of his principal or not, he shall be responsible; for the negligence of his underservant, employed by him in behalf of his principal, he shall not be responsible.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 2191; Code 1868, § 2187; Code 1873, § 2213; Code 1882, § 2213; Civil Code 1895, § 3041; Civil Code 1910, § 3613; Code 1933, § 4-409.)
Cross references.- Imputing of negligence of one person to another person generally, § 51-2-1.
Law reviews.- For annual survey of law on business associations, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 41 (2010).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Existence and extent of agency are questions of fact.
- Questions of the existence and extent of an agent's authority are generally for the triers of fact. Allen & Bean, Inc. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 153 Ga. App. 617, 266 S.E.2d 295 (1980).
Summary judgment improper.
- Because the question of authorization could not be decided on summary judgment since a jury question existed as to whether the resolution of the county board of education authorized the county school superintendent to enter into a contract with the plaintiff on the board's behalf, the trial judge erred in entering summary judgment for the superintendent in the superintendent's individual capacity. Knight v. Troup County Bd. of Educ., 144 Ga. App. 634, 242 S.E.2d 263 (1978).
Cited in Johnson v. Varnum, 43 Ga. App. 737, 159 S.E. 908 (1931); Austin-Western Rd. Mach. Co. v. Veal, 115 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1940); Childs v. Hampton, 80 Ga. App. 748, 57 S.E.2d 291 (1950); Whitlock v. PKW Supply Co., 154 Ga. App. 573, 269 S.E.2d 36 (1980).
Agent's Individual Liability
1. Generally
This section states the law of Georgia as to the individual liability of agents in three instances: (1) by "express undertaking; (2) by exceeding the scope of his authority; and (3) for his own tortious acts"; and then the section states when the agent is not liable: "for the negligence of his underservant, employed by him in behalf of his principal, he is not responsible." Pan-American Petro. Co. v. Williams, 174 Ga. 875, 164 S.E. 759, answer conformed to, 45 Ga. App. 490, 165 S.E. 473 (1932).
This section neither changes nor adds to old law.
- This section does not change or add to the old law as to the liability of an agent. Reid v. Humber, 49 Ga. 207 (1873).
2. Upon Contract
Agent may bind agent by express undertaking.
- Even though one employing another to perform services is acting in the capacity of agent and for the sole benefit of the agent's principal, the agent may nevertheless by express undertaking bind oneself personally. Willingham, Wright & Covington v. Glover, 28 Ga. App. 394, 111 S.E. 206 (1922); Davis v. Menefee, 34 Ga. App. 813, 131 S.E. 527 (1926).
A county warden who offered a certain amount to the plaintiff to return a convict rendered the warden individually liable. King v. Lewis, 32 Ga. App. 110, 122 S.E. 633 (1924).
If agent acts within authority, only express agreement binds agent.
- Agent who, acting within the scope of the agent's authority, enters into contractual relations for a principal whom the agent discloses does not bind the agent, in the absence of an express agreement to do so. Echols v. Howard, 17 Ga. App. 49, 86 S.E. 91 (1915).
Agent acting within the scope of the agent's authority is liable only on the agent's own express undertaking. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 138 Ga. App. 582, 227 S.E.2d 77 (1976).
Failure of agent to disclose agency.
- To avoid individual liability, it is the agent's duty to disclose the agent's agency, and failing to do so, even if acting within the agent's authority, the party with whom the agent deals may proceed against the agent. Maslia v. Kilgore, 119 Ga. App. 769, 168 S.E.2d 857 (1969).
If an agent does not disclose to the other party with whom the agent is dealing that the agent is acting on behalf of a principal, the agent is personally liable and responsible. Hodges-Ward Assocs. v. Ecclestone, 156 Ga. App. 59, 273 S.E.2d 872 (1980).
If an agent wishes to avoid personal liability, the duty is on the agent to disclose the agency, and not on the party with whom the agent deals to discover it. Brown-Wright Hotel Supply Corp. v. Bagen, 112 Ga. App. 300, 145 S.E.2d 294 (1965); Hodges-Ward Assocs. v. Ecclestone, 156 Ga. App. 59, 273 S.E.2d 872 (1980).
If agent lacks or exceeds authority, only agent is liable.
- If in point of fact one employing another to perform services has acted without or beyond the authority of an alleged principal, the agent alone becomes personally liable. Willingham, Wright & Covington v. Glover, 28 Ga. App. 394, 111 S.E. 206 (1922); Davis v. Menefee, 34 Ga. App. 813, 131 S.E. 527 (1926).
Agent must pay damages if agent knows of want of authority.
- If one has knowledge of agent's want of authority and, without intending any wrong or by making false representations as to the agent's authority, executes a contract as the agent of another, the agent is personally liable to the person with whom the agent is dealing, and the third party, not learning the facts, has the right to repudiate the contract and hold the assumed agent immediately responsible for damages. Weinstein v. Rothberg, 87 Ga. App. 94, 73 S.E.2d 106 (1952).
Agent's bona fide belief of authority.
- If an assumed agent bona fide believes the agent has authority, but in fact has none, and injury results to a third person who has honestly relied on the correctness of the agent's position as agent in making a contract in behalf of the agent's apparent principal, the agent will be personally liable for such injury. Weinstein v. Rothberg, 87 Ga. App. 94, 73 S.E.2d 106 (1952).
If one has no authority and acts bona fide, still one does a wrong to the other party, and if that wrong produces injury to the latter, owing to one's confidence in the truth of an express or implied assertion of authority by the purported agent, it is perfectly just that one who makes such assertion should be personally responsible for the consequences, rather than that the injury should be borne by the other party who has been misled by it. Weinstein v. Rothberg, 87 Ga. App. 94, 73 S.E.2d 106 (1952).
Breaching implied warranty of authority.
- If an agent executes, without authority from the agent's principal, a bond in the name of the agent's principal as surety, and fails to disclose the agent's lack of authority to the other parties to the instrument, and the other parties have no knowledge of such lack of authority, and no ratification by the principal appears, and the principal is without knowledge of the agent's failure to comply with the specific requirements of a written power of attorney, which furnishes the agent's sole authority to bind the principal, and, on account of the implied representation as to the agent's authority to bind the principal in the manner attempted, a beneficiary in the instrument suffers injury, the injured person may recover damages from the agent individually. Peeples v. Perry, 18 Ga. App. 369, 89 S.E. 461 (1916).
Doctrine of the liability of a purported agent for the breach of an agent's implied warranty of authority proceeds upon a plain principle of justice, for every person so acting for another, by a natural, if not a necessary implication, holds oneself out as having competent authority to do the act, and one thereby draws the other party into a reciprocal engagement. Weinstein v. Rothberg, 87 Ga. App. 94, 73 S.E.2d 106 (1952).
If one assumes, as the agent of a named corporation, to contract with a real estate broker to procure a purchaser for certain corporate realty at a stated price, and the broker, within the time specified, finds a purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to purchase the realty in the terms of the contract and who actually offers to so purchase, the broker may, when the purported agent was without authority to contract for the corporation, maintain an action against the purported agent individually for the breach of the implied warranty of authority. Weinstein v. Rothberg, 87 Ga. App. 94, 73 S.E.2d 106 (1952).
Other party's ignorance of agent's want of authority.
- To give a party a right of action against a professed agent, the party must have been ignorant of the want of authority on the part of the latter and have acted upon the faith of the representations, express or implied, that the professed agent had the authority assumed; hence, if the party complaining is fully cognizant of all the facts touching the agent's authority, the latter will not be liable. Weinstein v. Rothberg, 87 Ga. App. 94, 73 S.E.2d 106 (1952).
Section embodies only general rule of agency.
- Provision of this section that "every agent exceeding the scope of his authority shall be individually liable to the person with whom he deals," embodies only a general rule of agency. Hill v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 427, 183 S.E. 662 (1936).
Section does not authorize action against agent on unauthorized instrument.
- This section creates no authority for an action ex contractu against the agent on the unauthorized instrument itself, save perhaps, for peculiar reasons, in cases of executors, administrators, and guardians. Hill v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 427, 183 S.E. 662 (1936).
Contract not purporting to bind agent personally.
- An action ex contractu on the instrument itself ordinarily will not lie against the agent individually on a contract made by the agent in the name of the principal, unless it contains apt words binding the agent personally. While the instrument is not the contract of the principal, because the principal did not authorize or ratify the acts of the alleged agent, neither is it the contract of the alleged agent, because in seeking to bind the principal the agent used no language binding the agent, and therefore the law cannot create an undertaking which was not made by the parties themselves. Hill v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 427, 183 S.E. 662 (1936).
Language not binding agent of corporation personally.
- If a replevy bond, given in a laborer's lien foreclosure, was signed by a corporate officer with the name of the corporation followed by the word "by" and the officer's own name as secretary, the instrument as thus executed contained no language which as a matter of contract or as a matter of law would bind the corporate officer personally. Hill v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 427, 183 S.E. 662 (1936).
Agent for principal with no legal status.
- One who assumes to act as agent for a nonexistent principal or one having no legal status renders that one individually liable in contracts so made. Don Swann Sales Corp. v. Echols, 160 Ga. App. 539, 287 S.E.2d 577 (1981).
If the evidence supports a finding that the purported corporation is not a valid corporate entity, there is no doubt that the agent is bound by the agent's purchases on an open account. Don Swann Sales Corp. v. Echols, 160 Ga. App. 539, 287 S.E.2d 577 (1981).
Measure of damages against agent acting without authority.
- The damages to be recovered against a purported agent for acting without authority must, in general, be compensation for the loss which the other party has naturally and proximately sustained by reason of the lack of authority. Weinstein v. Rothberg, 87 Ga. App. 94, 73 S.E.2d 106 (1952).
In the case of a contract, the measure of damages to be recovered against a purported agent for acting without authority will usually be compensation for the loss sustained by not obtaining a then binding contract. Weinstein v. Rothberg, 87 Ga. App. 94, 73 S.E.2d 106 (1952).
Measure of damages against a purported agent for acting without authority is what the plaintiff actually lost by losing the particular contract which was to have been made by the alleged principal if the defendant had the authority the defendant professed to have; in other words, what the plaintiff would have gained by the contract which the defendant warranted should be made. Weinstein v. Rothberg, 87 Ga. App. 94, 73 S.E.2d 106 (1952).
Summary judgment improper.
- Summary judgment for an engineer in a concrete company's suit for services and materials provided to a construction project was error because the evidence could have authorized a jury to have found that the engineer obtained the concrete company's agreement to provide services and material to the construction project without disclosing that the concrete company was dealing with the engineer, not directly, but only as an agent of the developer for purposes of O.C.G.A. §§ 10-6-53 and10-6-85; a jury could have found that the concrete company reasonably understood that the engineer was binding itself as well as the developer. Action Concrete, Inc. v. Focal Point Eng'g, Inc., 296 Ga. App. 567, 675 S.E.2d 303 (2009).
3. For Tort
"Misfeasance" and "nonfeasance" defined.
- "Misfeasance" is a positive wrong, and means the improper doing of an act which the agent might lawfully do. It may also involve to some extent the idea of not doing, as if an agent engaged in the performance of an undertaking does not do something which it is the agent's duty to do under the circumstances, or does not take that precaution or does not exercise that care which a due regard to the rights of others requires. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).
"Nonfeasance" on the part of an agent is the total omission or failure of the agent to enter upon the performance of some distinct duty or undertaking which the agent has agreed with the principal to do. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).
"Nonfeasance" is the total omission or failure of the agent to enter upon the performance of some distinct duty or undertaking which the agent has agreed with the principal to do. "Misfeasance" means the improper doing of an act which the agent might lawfully do, or, in other words, the performing of the agent's duty to the principal in such a manner as to infringe upon the rights and privileges of third persons. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).
"Misfeasance" may involve, to some extent, the idea of not doing, as when an agent engaged in the performance of the agent's undertaking does not do something which it is the agent's duty to do under the circumstances, or does not take that precaution or does not exercise that care which a due regard to the rights of others requires; this is not the doing of that which is imposed upon the agent merely by virtue of the agent's relation, but of that which is imposed upon the agent by law as a responsible individual in common with all other members of society, and is the same not doing which constitutes actionable negligence in any relation. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).
Agent is personally responsible for own tortious act. Wadley v. Dooly, 138 Ga. 275, 75 S.E. 153 (1912).
Actions not constituting tort.
- O.C.G.A. § 10-6-85 did not apply in an action against a law firm for wrongfully and intentionally foreclosing on property since the firm was acting for a company that had legal title to the property under a deed to secure debt which was in default, and there was no impropriety in the notice, advertisement, or sale at foreclosure. McCarter v. Bankers Trust Co., 247 Ga. App. 129, 543 S.E.2d 755 (2000).
Agent personally responsible for conversion.
- When A delivered to the defendant, a warehouseman, a certain bale of cotton and received a warehouse receipt, which A transferred in writing to the plaintiff, who has since retained its possession, and subsequently the defendant, without legal authority, delivered the cotton to one B, knowing that the latter did not own it, the alleged conduct of the defendant amounted to a conversion, and B was liable for B's tortious act, though done in the capacity of agent. Trippe v. Bell & Co., 139 Ga. 782, 78 S.E. 126 (1913).
Trover lies against an agent, even though the agent does not purport to act individually, but wholly for another. Godwin v. Mitchell, 60 Ga. App. 713, 4 S.E.2d 678 (1939); Kelley v. Sheehan, 61 Ga. App. 714, 7 S.E.2d 298 (1940); Teper v. Weiss, 115 Ga. App. 621, 155 S.E.2d 730 (1967).
Fact that the defendant held possession of the property in the defendant's representative capacity (as administrator of the estate) would afford the defendant no protection from a trover suit. Godwin v. Mitchell, 60 Ga. App. 713, 4 S.E.2d 678 (1939).
Agent's liability is measured by duty to third persons agent has assumed.
- Agent's liability must be judged, not merely by a breach of the agent's contract to the principal, but by the extent of the duty and responsibility to third persons which the agent assumed coextensively with the contract. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).
Agent's intervention into the relations between the principal and the others by the agent's assumption of the duty to the principal creates a duty to the others to use care either to perform the service or to see that no harm results from the agent's failure to do so. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).
Agent is liable if acts create unreasonable risk of harm to others.
- Agent is subject to liability if, by the agent's acts, the agent creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the interests of others protected against negligent invasion. Crosby v. Calaway, 65 Ga. App. 266, 16 S.E.2d 155 (1941).
Failure to take reasonable care in performing agency.
- When a servant enters upon the performance of a contract with a principal and in so doing fails to take reasonable care in the commission of some act which the servant should do in the performance of the servant's duty under the contract, and thereby a third person is injured, the servant is responsible therefor to the same extent as if the servant had committed the wrong in the servant's own behalf; the servant's liability in such case is not based on the ground of the servant's agency, but on the ground that the servant is a wrongdoer and, as such, is responsible for any injury the servant may cause. Risby v. Sharp-Boylston Co., 62 Ga. App. 101, 7 S.E.2d 917 (1940).
If an agent fails to use reasonable care or diligence in the performance of the agent's duty, the agent will be personally responsible to a third person who is injured by such misfeasance; the agent's liability, in such cases, is not based upon the ground of the agent's agency, but upon the ground that the agent is a wrongdoer. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).
If a landowner gives an agent sole authority to manage property, including renting and repairing, and if it is specifically alleged that the agent agreed to and did in fact assume such authority for the landowner, the agent may be held individually liable for a violation of this duty, not as an agent, but as an independent tort-feasor whose breach of duty owed to a third person is the actionable negligence. Ramey v. Pritchett, 90 Ga. App. 745, 84 S.E.2d 305 (1954).
Agent liable whether wrongful act is misfeasance or nonfeasance.
- If a servant has undertaken for the principal the performance of a duty owed a third person, the servant is personally liable to such third person when the servant's wrongful act in the course of the servant's employment is the direct and proximate cause of injury to the third person, whether the wrongful act is one of misfeasance or nonfeasance. It is not the servant's contract with the principal which exposes the servant to, or protects the servant from, liability to third persons, but the servant's common-law obligation to use that which the servant controls so as not to injure another. Southern Ry. v. Smith, 55 Ga. App. 689, 191 S.E. 181 (1937); Crosby v. Calaway, 65 Ga. App. 266, 16 S.E.2d 155 (1941).
Performance of duty to principal is no defense.
- In an action for damages founded on tort, it is no defense that the injury was caused while the defendant was acting in performance of a duty as agent of a firm of which the plaintiff was a member, if negligence of the defendant amounting to misfeasance produced the injury. Owens v. Nichols, 139 Ga. 475, 77 S.E. 635 (1913).
Officer or agent of corporation is personally liable for torts.
- An officer or agent of a corporation is liable in damages for injuries suffered by third persons because of the officer's or agent's torts, regardless of whether the officer or agent acted on the officer's or agent's own account or on behalf of the corporation, and regardless of whether or not the corporation is also liable. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).
Misfeasance of corporate agent.
- The rule which makes officers or agents of a corporation liable for their torts to third persons who suffer injury thereby refers to misfeasance or positive wrong. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).
Agent is not ordinarily liable for nonfeasance.
- Under former Civil Code 1895 §§ 3029 and 3041, while an agent was personally liable to those injured by the agent's misfeasance, the agent was not ordinarily liable for mere nonfeasance. Kimbrough v. Boswell, 119 Ga. 201, 45 S.E. 977 (1903).
Agent is not ordinarily liable to third persons for nonfeasance; an agent is, however, liable to third persons for misfeasance. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932); Chambers v. Self, 53 Ga. App. 437, 186 S.E. 203 (1936); Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).
Liability when duty to principal required performance.
- Before an agent becomes liable for an act of omission alleged to have constituted negligence with resultant injury, it must appear that such agent had agreed to perform such act for the agent's principal, or had assumed to perform the act. Risby v. Sharp-Boylston Co., 62 Ga. App. 101, 7 S.E.2d 917 (1940).
Agent in complete charge of business is liable for nonperformance.
- Nonperformance by an agent left in complete charge of the business in the absence of the owner entails liability, as do specific acts of negligence. Warnock v. Elliott, 96 Ga. App. 778, 101 S.E.2d 591 (1957).
Liability for failing to keep premises safe.
- Agent who undertakes the sole and complete control and management of the principal's premises is liable to third persons, to whom a duty is owing on the part of the owner, for injuries resulting from the owner's negligence in failing to make or keep the premises in a safe condition. Ramey v. Pritchett, 90 Ga. App. 745, 84 S.E.2d 305 (1954).
Agent with custody of property that may harm others.
- Agent who has the custody of land or chattels and who should realize that there is an undue risk that their condition will cause harm to the person, land, or chattels of others is subject to liability for such harm caused, during the continuance of the agent's custody, by the agent's failure to use care to take such reasonable precautions as the agent is authorized to take. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).
Failure to make repairs.
- After the defendant had by contract assumed the duty of maintaining and repairing a building, which duty in the first instance devolved upon the owner, and actually entered upon such duty by repairing a part of the building, then the defendant's failure to repair another part of the building, resulting in injury to the plaintiff, rendered the defendant liable, not because the defendant had breached the defendant's contract with the defendant's principal, but because, by assuming the total duty of repair and maintenance, the defendant had caused the owner to rely upon the defendant and prevented the job from being done by others, and had therefore breached a duty owing to the public generally and the plaintiff in particular of maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).
Employee canning food products not liable unless employee knows of defective condition.
- Employee aiding in canning food products that are then in a dangerously defective condition is liable to the person injured if such agent knows of that condition; the agent would not be liable unless the agent knew of the defect. Crosby v. Calaway, 65 Ga. App. 266, 16 S.E.2d 155 (1941).
Retail clerk.
- Agent or clerk in a retail store who merely passes out the articles and receives the price for the principal is not liable for defects in the article sold unless the clerk has actual knowledge of the defect, or unless the clerk assumes the responsibility which the law places upon retailers and distributers of food, or unless the clerk owes some particular duty to the purchaser. Crosby v. Calaway, 65 Ga. App. 266, 16 S.E.2d 155 (1941).
4. As to Underservant
Agent is not liable for subagent's negligence.
- When an agent has authority to employ a subagent to do the work of the principal, the agent is not liable for the negligence of the subagent in the performance of the work, if due care has been used in the subagent's selection. Morris v. Warlick, 118 Ga. 421, 45 S.E. 407 (1903); Henderson v. Nolting First Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S.E. 347 (1937).
Failure to use due care in selecting or failing to remove subagent.
- Agent is liable for the negligence of the subagent if due care has not been used in the subagent's selection, and the same principle should be applied to negligence in failing to displace a subagent or an underservant when the agent appears to have had a duty and responsibility as to such matter. Henderson v. Nolting First Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S.E. 347 (1937). But see Pan-American Petro. Corp. v. Williams, 45 Ga. App. 490, 165 S.E. 473 (1932).
Negligence of an underservant in respect to the inspection of bottles and the soft drink was not attributable to an agent of the bottling company in charge of business's operation, who served as the company's executive and administrative head; the only negligence of which such agent could have been guilty under the circumstances would have been an original act of negligence in selecting or retaining an incompetent employee. Schutle v. Pyle, 95 Ga. App. 229, 97 S.E.2d 558 (1957).
Employment by agent should be explicitly alleged.
- If the plaintiff means to charge that an underservant was employed by an agent and that the agent was liable for the torts of the underservant because the agent had not exercised good faith and reasonable care in the selection of a suitable and proper subagent, the allegations of employment should be explicit and not inferential. Pan-American Petro. Co. v. Williams, 174 Ga. 875, 164 S.E. 759, answer conformed to, 45 Ga. App. 490, 165 S.E. 473 (1932).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency, § 273 et seq.
C.J.S.- 2A C.J.S., Agency, §§ 264, 265, 297.
ALR.
- Liability for misconduct or negligence of messenger not directly related to the service, 18 A.L.R. 1416.
Personal liability of servant or agent to third person for injuries caused by the performance or nonperformance of his duties to his employer, 20 A.L.R. 97; 99 A.L.R. 408; 96 A.L.R.2d 208.
Duty of principal to discover and notify third persons of wrongful disposal of property by agent not assuming to act for principal, 35 A.L.R. 325.
Personal liability of agent to third person for injuries or damages due to condition of principal's premises, 49 A.L.R. 521.
Right of defendant in action by undisclosed principal to avail himself of defenses or setoffs that would have been available in an action by the agent in his own right on the contract, 53 A.L.R. 414.
Right of purchaser from agent or dealer in possession of article for purpose of demonstration or solicitation, without actual authority to sell, 57 A.L.R. 393.
Liability of agent for acts or omissions of subagent, 61 A.L.R. 277.
Sole actor doctrine where officer or agent of corporation acting adversely to it is its sole representative in the transaction, 111 A.L.R. 665.
Right to bring separate actions against master and servant, or principal and agent, to recover for negligence of servant or agent, where master's or principal's only responsibility is derivative, 135 A.L.R. 271.
Liability of master or principal for servant's or agent's libel or slander of one other than servant or agent or former servant or agent, 150 A.L.R. 1338.
Agent's disregard of principal's instructions where power coupled with an interest, 162 A.L.R. 1182.
Doctrine of apparent authority as applicable where relationship is that of master and servant, 2 A.L.R.2d 406.
Rights and remedies where broker or agent, employed to purchase personal property, buys it for himself, 20 A.L.R.2d 1140.
Tenant's capacity to sue independent contractor, as third-party beneficiary, for breach of contract between landlord and such contractor for repair or remodeling work, 46 A.L.R.2d 1210.
Salesman's power to pledge employer's or principal's personal property, 49 A.L.R.2d 1271.
Implied or apparent authority of agent to purchase or order goods or merchandise, 55 A.L.R.2d 6.
Liability of vendor's real-estate broker or agent to purchaser or prospect for misrepresenting or concealing offer or acceptance, 55 A.L.R.2d 342.
Broker's liability for damages or losses sustained by vendor of real property to vendee because of broker's misrepresentations, 61 A.L.R.2d 1237.
Liability of auctioneer or clerk to buyer as to title, condition, or quality of property sold, 80 A.L.R.2d 1237.
Status of gasoline and oil distributor or dealer as agent, employee, independent contractor, or independent dealer as regards responsibility for injury to person or damage to property, 83 A.L.R.2d 1282.
Release of (or covenant not to sue) master or principal as affecting liability of servant or agent for tort, or vice versa, 92 A.L.R.2d 533.
Agent's authority to execute warrant of attorney to confess judgment against principal, 92 A.L.R.2d 952.
Personal liability of auctioneer to owner or mortgagee for conversion, 96 A.L.R.2d 208.
Products liability: Right of manufacturer or seller to contribution or indemnity from user of product causing injury or damage to third person, and vice versa, 28 A.L.R.3d 943.
Liability of insurance agent, for exposure of insurer to liability, because of failure to cancel or reduce risk, 35 A.L.R.3d 792.
Liability of insurance agent, for exposure of insurer to liability, because of failure to fully disclose or assess risk or to report issuance of policy, 35 A.L.R.3d 821.
Liability of insurance agent, for exposure of insurer to liability, because of issuance of policy beyond authority or contrary to instructions, 35 A.L.R.3d 907.
Liability for negligence of doorman or similar attendant in parking patron's automobile, 41 A.L.R.3d 1055.
Criminal liability of member or agent of private club or association, or of owner or lessor of its premises, for violation of state or local liquor or gambling laws thereon, 98 A.L.R.3d 694.
Liability of owner or operator of shopping center, or business housed therein, for injury to patron on premises from criminal attack by third party, 31 A.L.R.5th 550.
Liability of insurance agent or broker on ground of inadequacy of liability-insurance coverage procured, 60 A.L.R.5th 165.