(a) For purposes of this section, the respective precinct or jurisdiction of a state marshal or judicial marshal shall be wherever such marshal is required to perform duties. Peace officers, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-3, in their respective precincts, shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person for any offense in their jurisdiction, when the person is taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others, provided that no constable elected pursuant to the provisions of section 9-200 shall be considered a peace officer for the purposes of this subsection, unless the town in which such constable holds office provides, by ordinance, that constables shall be considered peace officers for the purposes of this subsection.
(b) Members of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or of any local police department or any chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony.
(c) Members of any local police department or the Office of State Capitol Police and constables and state marshals who are certified under the provisions of sections 7-294a to 7-294e, inclusive, and who perform criminal law enforcement duties, when in immediate pursuit of a person who may be arrested under the provisions of this section, except a person alleged to have violated only a municipal ordinance, are authorized to pursue such person outside of their respective precincts into any part of the state in order to effect the arrest. Such person may then be returned in the custody of such officer to the precinct in which the offense was committed.
(d) Any person arrested pursuant to this section shall be presented with reasonable promptness before proper authority.
(1949 Rev., S. 465; 1953, S. 195d; 1961, P.A. 239; 1971, P.A. 754; P.A. 75-567, S. 69, 80; P.A. 76-111, S. 3; P.A. 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-313, S. 1; 80-394, S. 7, 13; P.A. 81-472, S. 93, 159; P.A. 83-518, S. 2; P.A. 84-302, S. 2; P.A. 89-129, S. 1, 2; P.A. 96-219, S. 10; P.A. 00-99, S. 6, 154; P.A. 01-195, S. 70, 181; P.A. 11-51, S. 134; P.A. 15-83, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act added provision authorizing members of local police departments to pursue suspects beyond their precincts and return suspects, when caught to precinct where offense was committed; 1971 act deleted the word “organized” as qualifier of references to local police departments; P.A. 75-567 substituted detectives in the division of criminal justice for county detectives; P.A. 76-111 replaced detectives with chief inspectors and inspectors of criminal justice division; P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January 1, 1979; Sec. 6-49 transferred to Sec. 54-1f in 1979; P.A. 80-313 divided section into Subsecs. and substituted references to peace officers for detailed listing of persons to which provisions apply, i.e. sheriffs, inspectors, constables, etc.; P.A. 80-394 specified applicability to sheriffs, deputy sheriffs and special deputy sheriffs, adding provision re precinct or jurisdiction of deputies and special deputies; P.A. 81-472 amended Subsec. (a) to delete reference to special deputy sheriffs since such sheriffs are included in definition of peace officers; P.A. 83-518 amended Subsec. (a) providing that constables shall not be considered peace officers for purposes of Subsec. (a) unless town ordinance so provides; P.A. 84-302 permitted certified constables who perform criminal law enforcement duties to pursue offenders outside of their precincts; P.A. 89-129 amended provision in Subsec. (c) authorizing pursuit outside of precinct to include members of the office of state capitol security; P.A. 96-219 amended Subsec. (c) by changing the name of the “Office of State Capitol Security” to the “Office of State Capitol Police”; P.A. 00-99 amended Subsec. (a) by changing reference to deputy or special deputy sheriff to state marshal or judicial marshal and amended Subsec. (c) by deleting reference to sheriffs, deputy sheriffs and special deputy sheriffs and adding reference to state marshals, effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-195 made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality in Subsec. (a), effective July 11, 2001; pursuant to P.A. 11-51, “Department of Public Safety” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection” in Subsec. (b), effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 15-83 amended Subsec. (c) by adding exception re person alleged to have violated only a municipal ordinance and making technical changes.
See Sec. 6-43 re special deputies.
Annotations to former section 6-49:
Facts held insufficient to authorize arrest without warrant. 37 C. 32. Arrest being lawful, officer is presumed to have performed all subsequent duties. 51 C. 432–434. Extends common law rule. 84 C. 167. Owner of goods stolen or any other person may retake them and tender thief to justice. 97 C. 137. Thief resisting capture is guilty of breach of the peace and may be arrested by anyone. Id., 138. Right of police to arrest for offenses in their presence and to seize implements used in law breaking. Id., 545. When officer must act on his own knowledge. Id., 701. Facts held sufficient to authorize arrest without warrant. 101 C. 229. Any arrest without a warrant, except as authorized by statute, is illegal. 115 C. 282. Police officers while off duty or out of uniform are included within the coverage of section. 120 C. 101. Speedy information which justifies arrest is information that person arrested was guilty of crime or at least implicated in it. 131 C. 224. Officer may act on speedy information if he has reasonable ground to accept it as accurate. Id., 231. Fact that defendant not taken before proper magistrate not sufficient to exclude confession. 137 C. 183. Cited. 147 C. 194. Intention of officer in pursuing person admissible as a fact to be weighed with other circumstances. 148 C. 27. An accused is lawfully taken or apprehended in the act if circumstances observed by officer preceding the arrest, viewed in light of common knowledge and his own training and experience, gave him probable cause to believe that a crime was being, or had just been, committed; evidence seized cannot be used to sustain validity of arrest. 149 C. 567. Illegal arrest and detention does not automatically render inadmissible confessions made after the arrest or during the period of detention. 150 C. 169. Officer entitled to exert force where grounds for “reasonable belief” are present. 151 C. 402. Person need not submit to unlawful arrest. 152 C. 296. In determining the validity of an arrest made without a warrant, “reasonable grounds” is to be equated with probable cause. 153 C. 41. Probable cause exists when the arresting officer has reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to believe a felony had been committed by the accused. Id., 42. Arrest made on strength of officer's own observation would be legal only if the circumstances he observed, when taken in connection with those before observed by him when weighed in the light of common knowledge, gave him probable reason or ground to believe that such a crime was being, or was about to be, committed. Id., 69, 70. Accused is lawfully taken or apprehended in the act if the circumstances observed by the arresting officer, viewed in light of common knowledge and his own training and experience, gave him probable cause to believe a crime was being, or had just been, committed; amount of evidence necessary to furnish probable cause for an arrest without a warrant is to be measured by facts of particular case and need not be evidence sufficient to convict; a reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest is not unlawful even though made without a warrant; a lawful entry is necessarily an essential element of a reasonable search of a dwelling. Id., 152. A police officer may make a reasonable search before or after an arrest without a warrant if the circumstances justified the arrest and the search was incidental to the arrest. Id., 154. Where larceny which constituted a misdemeanor was committed in New London and defendants were apprehended in Hartford by Hartford police, held that, since larceny is a continuing crime, defendants, if transportation of the merchandise was with a continuous felonious intent, were committing larceny in Hartford and defendants' claim that arrest or search without a warrant was illegal must fail. Id., 217, 218. Member of an organized local police department is authorized to arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person who officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony and may conduct a search incident thereto without a warrant. 155 C. 385. A legal arrest may be made without a warrant when defendant was apprehended just after his sale of drugs to an informer under police surveillance of the transaction and his person could be searched incidentally to such arrest. Id., 516. Police lieutenant's arrest of defendant on speedy information was clearly justifiable when defendant was sitting armed in his car at night with narcotics on his person. 157 C. 114. Arrest for misdemeanor of breach of the peace on speedy information of others by police was proper; search of car in which defendant was sitting made without warrant was lawful. Id., 222. Arrest of defendant for assault committed in officer's presence was lawful and search of trunk of defendant's car was lawful incident to the arrest. Id., 351. Officer's arresting defendant for disorderly conduct was proper and search incidental thereto of person was legal. Id., 485. Arrest of defendant operating stolen car could be made without warrant on grounds that he was apprehended in act and upon speedy information where arresting officer had been informed by police barracks car was a stolen car. 159 C. 201. Arrest permitted without warrant when person is “taken or apprehended in the act” if preceding arrest, circumstances in light of officers training and experience gave him probable cause for such arrest. 160 C. 140. An informant's tip as to description and location of criminal suspect and his truck having proved true was justifiable basis for arrest under statute. 161 C. 117. Cited. 163 C. 186. Felony provision cited. 171 C. 105. Cited. 174 C. 153; Id., 452; 178 C. 427; 183 C. 386; 220 C. 307.
Cited. 22 CS 6. An arrest by a police officer without a warrant is ground for an action for false imprisonment unless the arrest is authorized by section. Id., 311. Cited. 24 CS 32. Where offenses committed by defendant and with which he is charged occurred within the hour prior to his arrest, officer acted speedily on information he had obtained. 25 CS 108. If search is incident to arrest, no warrant is needed. Id., 216. Discussion of facts which constitute acting on speedy information or on reasonable belief that a felony has been committed or is being committed; no need for issuance of warrant for seizure of articles which are taken incidental to lawful arrest. 26 CS 297. Cited. 28 CS 313. “Speedy information” requirement was in derogation of common law re felonies; additional clause re felonies, added in 1945, is declaratory of common law. 34 CS 531. Modern trend prohibits warrantless entry to home to make an arrest unless there are exigent circumstances. Id., 539.
Arrest made hour after officer saw crime committed satisfied requirement of acting on “speedy information”. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 247. Cited. Id., 467. Arrest without a warrant not unlawful merely because pursuit of defendant by Orange police officer was interrupted when defendant temporarily succeeded in eluding officer. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 42. Arrest made without warrant on “speedy information” of informer who purchased liquor sold by defendant illegally, made within half hour after sale, held lawful. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 125. Cited. Id., 533. Officers would have been justified in arresting defendants for bookmaking when telephone calls and other evidence of their illegal activity occurred in presence of officers who had entered house with search warrant, even if warrant had been illegal. Id., 603. Acting on speedy information defendant was committing crime of lascivious carriage, police officers rightfully entered her apartment building and observed her conduct from fire escape of apartment; police officers investigating a crime on speedy information who enter a building are licensees. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35. Statute provides a less strict standard for arrests without a warrant for felonies provided they are made by members of an organized local police department. Id., 44, 50. Defendant's arrest by police officer who observed him in telephone booth, taking house bets on slips of paper officer could read, was properly made without warrant and reasonable search could be made on such arrest. Id., 51. Member of Derby police department was justified in arrest of defendant without warrant where New Haven police requested his arrest as one involved in felonious larceny in their jurisdiction. Id., 529. Defendant in resisting an unlawful arrest was not guilty of breach of the peace. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 42. Arrest by Trumbull officer of defendant as he drew up to his home in Bridgeport two hours after he had violated hit and run statute in Trumbull was valid as an arrest in immediate pursuit outside Trumbull precinct. Id., 55. Facts held sufficient to authorize arrest without warrant. Id., 228, 235, 236. Cited. Id., 613. Taken or apprehended defined. Id., 618.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 179 C. 46; 180 C. 481; 181 C. 172. As a matter of constitutional law, where entry of dwelling is for purpose of conducting search under a valid search warrant, resident may be arrested under statute where police have probable cause to believe he committed a felony; arrest does not constitute violation of fourth amendment to U.S. Constitution. Id., 187. Cited. 188 C. 432, 442; 200 C. 82; 215 C. 667; 216 C. 172; 225 C. 921; 227 C. 363. Violation of Sec. 14-227a is an “offense” within meaning of this section. 228 C 758. Cited. 229 C. 125; 240 C. 489.
Cited. 15 CA 416; 20 CA 183; 23 CA 123; Id., 487; 27 CA 370; Id., 741; 29 CA 207; 30 CA 108; 31 CA 669; 33 CA 590; 34 CA 189; Id., 201; 46 CA 633. Where prior felony conviction formed basis of a charge under section, violation of section could not be established without presenting proof of such conviction. 64 CA 384. Does not prohibit “Terry” stops by extraterritorial police officers; rather, it prohibits full custodial arrests by extraterritorial police officers. 70 CA 297.
Cited. 38 CS 313.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 191 C. 433; 210 C. 333; 224 C. 494; 227 C. 534; 228 C. 758. Section inapplicable to juveniles re commencement of delinquency proceedings by service of a summons alleging commission of criminal offenses. 297 C. 16.
Cited. 6 CA 124; 11 CA 11; 21 CA 326; 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494; Id., 805; 28 CA 708; 41 CA 779.
“Speedy information of others” does not preclude reliance on supplementary observations made by the officer. 37 CS 755. Officer's entry into apartment was lawful and in full compliance with statute; arrest was made on the speedy information of others; properly conducted search incidental to lawful arrest is not illegal even though made without a warrant. 38 CS 313. Cited. Id., 364; 39 CS 347; 40 CS 512.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 183 C. 386; 189 C. 429; 195 C. 505; 220 C. 307; 236 C. 216; 248 C. 183.
Cited. 6 CA 124; 11 CA 11; 13 CA 69; Id., 214; 14 CA 388; 15 CA 569; 18 CA 184; 20 CA 168; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 667; Id., 521; 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494; 27 CA 128; 31 CA 548; 39 CA 579. Where probable cause for warrantless arrest was established using Aguilar-Spinelli factors, trial court improperly introduced second level of review under “totality of the circumstances” analysis. 47 CA 424. Phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” is synonymous with probable cause. 59 CA 272. Warrantless arrest based on probable cause was authorized under subsection. 74 CA 802. “Reasonable grounds” as used in statute is synonymous with probable cause. 78 CA 659.
Subsec. (c):
Appellate Court, in affirming defendant's conviction for operating motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, rejected defendant's argument that there can only be “immediate pursuit” for purposes of Subsec. when there are findings that arresting officer personally observed illegal conduct and then followed suspect across jurisdictional boundaries. 88 CA 110.
Cited. 37 CS 755.