(a) As used in this section:
(1) “Law enforcement officer” means: Each officer, employee or other person otherwise paid by or acting as an agent of (A) the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection; (B) the Office of the State Capitol Police; (C) a municipal police department; and (D) the Department of Correction;
(2) “Property” includes, but is not limited to, a companion animal, as defined in section 22-351a; and
(3) “The amount of such damage”, with respect to a companion animal, includes expenses of veterinary care, the fair monetary value of the companion animal, including all training expenses for a guide dog owned by a blind person or an assistance dog owned by a deaf or mobility impaired person and burial expenses for the companion animal.
(b) If any dog does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper, or, if the owner or keeper is a minor, the parent or guardian of such minor, shall be liable for the amount of such damage, except when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog. If a minor, on whose behalf an action under this section is brought, was under seven years of age at the time such damage was done, it shall be presumed that such minor was not committing a trespass or other tort, or teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog, and the burden of proof thereof shall be upon the defendant in such action. In an action under this section against a household member of a law enforcement officer to whom has been assigned a dog owned by a law enforcement agency of the state, any political subdivision of the state or the federal government for damage done by such dog, it shall be presumed that such household member is not a keeper of such dog and the burden of proof shall be upon the plaintiff to establish that such household member was a keeper of such dog and had exclusive control of such dog at the time such damage was sustained.
(1949 Rev., S. 3404; 1953, S. 1842d; 1969, P.A. 439, S. 1; P.A. 13-223, S. 1; P.A. 15-26, S. 1; P.A. 17-12, S. 1; P.A. 18-131, S. 1.)
History: 1969 act added provision re actions brought on behalf of minors; P.A. 13-223 added provision defining “property” and “the amount of such damage” re a companion animal, and made conforming changes; P.A. 15-26 added provision re action brought against household member of law enforcement officer assigned a dog owned by law enforcement agency of the state, political subdivision of the state or federal government; P.A. 17-12 added Subsec. (a) re definitions, designated existing provisions re dog that does damage as Subsec. (b) and amended same by deleting definitions of “property” and “the amount of such damage”; P.A. 18-131 amended Subsec. (a)(3) by redefining “the amount of such damage” to include all training expenses for guide dog or assistance dog, effective June 11, 2018.
Administrator as “owner”. 74 C 85. Necessity of counting on statute. 77 C. 570. That person injured provoked dog as a defense under former statute. 81 C. 321. Action is one in tort. 86 C. 710. Cited. 91 C. 492; 102 C. 480. Statute held constitutional; elements of damage. 105 C. 89. Scope of exception. 106 C. 202. Negligence in operation of automobile not a “tort” within exception; owner of dog held liable where dog jumped in front of automobile causing it to swerve into ditch and overturn. 107 C. 626. Complaint should negative the existence of circumstances which would bring plaintiff within exception. 117 C. 107. Defendant who pleaded an affirmation of exception assumed burden of proof thereof. Id., 103. “Trespass or tort” construed; conduct not within exceptions, although it might be held contributorily negligent, is not a defense under statute. Id., 310. Cited. 119 C. 648. Wife, co-owner, liable with husband who thrust dog toward plaintiff's face. 129 C. 210. “Trespass or tort” means more than mere entry; statute bars recovery where plaintiff is committing or intends to commit an injurious act. 133 C. 509; 140 C. 358. Plaintiff may recover where menacing attitude of dog frightened him and caused him to fall. 138 C. 718. Friendly playing with a dog is not “teasing, tormenting or abusing”. 142 C. 516. Plaintiff must bring himself clearly within provisions because it creates a cause of action that did not exist at common law. Id., 719. Phrase “trespass or other tort” interpreted; that plaintiff was on a public highway did not eliminate the possibility that she was committing a trespass within the meaning of statute. 148 C. 125. Plaintiff restrained dog with a leash from attacking another dog and from leaving the premises of its master, all in accordance with the wishes of its master; held that this did not come within exceptions from liability under statute; history of statute reviewed. Id., 557. Cited. 221 C. 14; 231 C. 920. Doctrine of parental immunity bars action by unemancipated minor against parent alleging strict liability pursuant to statute; doctrine of parental immunity discussed. 234 C. 259. Cited. 235 C. 360; 241 C. 319. Defendant, a church, who imposed some restrictions on where dog could be at certain times of the day but who otherwise bore no responsibility for the care, maintenance or control of the dog not considered a “keeper” of the dog and subject to strict liability under statute. 286 C. 152.
Cited. 7 CA 19; 9 CA 495. Action under section barred by parental immunity doctrine. 34 CA 866. Cited. 42 CA 239. Absent specific language in Sec. 52-557n modifying common law rule of governmental immunity for claims of strict liability, section should not be so construed. 58 CA 702. Because defendant did not exercise dominion and control over the dog in any manner other than by placing a limit on when and where the dog could be let outside, defendant was not a “keeper” of the dog as provided in section. 94 CA 617. In action where plaintiff claimed damages as a result of potential exposure to rabies, strict liability under section does not extend to damage caused by a dog's merely passive, and, thus, innocent or involuntary, behavior. 135 CA 76. Under 2013 revision, exuberant unleashed dog was proximate cause of plaintiff falling and injuring herself, and defendant's claim that dog's actions were innocent are without merit. 187 CA 528.
Owner and keeper of dog liable in the alternative and not jointly. 5 CS 150. Trespass does not include technical or casual trespass. Id., 426; 18 CS 156. Controlled by 3-year tort statute of limitations. 14 CS 428. Assumption of risk has no place in an action brought under section; plaintiff must prove either that her own conduct was not such as would naturally incite the dog to retaliation or that it was, under the circumstances, justified. 22 CS 332. Cited. 25 CS 341. When a cause of action arises in a child for personal injuries under section, an independent cause of action arises in his parent for consequential damages as a result of the injury, but parent's right may be barred by conduct of his own which in whole or in part caused the damage. 26 CS 274. Applicable statute of limitation is Sec. 52-577. Id., 294. Statute of limitation under the dog bite law is 3 years. 29 CS 71. Owners of premises where dog was kept considered “keepers” and held to be liable. 36 CS 156.
Where plaintiff alleged, in her complaint, negligence and scienter on the part of the dog's owners, held that, notwithstanding plaintiff's claim of defendants' statutory liability, the action was one in negligence at common law and not under statute. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 539. History discussed. Id., 541. Petting of dog does not constitute teasing, tormenting or abusing dog. Id., 694.