(1) Most recovery assertions are based on the negligence or wrongful acts or omissions of the person or entity that caused the loss. These actions or omissions must constitute a tort as determined by the law of place of occurrence, except in no-fault jurisdictions where the no-fault law permits recovery. Where the tort is not complete within the jurisdiction where it originally occurred, the law of the original jurisdiction is nevertheless applicable. For example, if a plane crashes in Virginia due to the negligence of a Federal Aviation Administration controller in Maryland, Maryland law determines the extent and nature of the tort. However, as to what law of damages is applicable, Maryland or Virginia depecage (choice of law) theory may apply. For example, if the flight originated in Indiana and the destination was Virginia, the conflict law of both Maryland and Virginia must be applied. See DA Pam 27-162, paragraph 2-35.

(2) Recovery assertions based on the United States being a third-party beneficiary or subrogee are not based on tort, but on the right to recover under local law, for example, the right of a third party to recover workers' compensation benefits is based on local law. However, the right of a third-party beneficiary to recover under an insurance contract may turn on whether an exclusionary clause is valid under the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was made.

(1) Federal law determines when a recovery assertion must be made. Assertions for the value of medical expenses, lost military pay or property loss or damage based on a tort must be made not later than three years from the date of accrual, 28 U.S.C. 2415(b). The date of accrual is usually the date of the occurrence giving rise to the recovery, for example, the date of injury or death for medical expenses and lost military pay or the date of damage or loss for a government property assertion. There are exceptions. For example, the loss of property in rightful possession of another accrues when that person claims ownership or converts the property to his own use.

(2) Recovery assertions based on an implied-in-law contract against a no-fault or personal-injury-protection insured must be brought no later than six years from the date of accrual, 28 U.S.C. 2415(a), United States v. Limbs, 524 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1975). The date of accrual is usually the date of occurrence.

(3) Actions asserted on a third-party beneficiary basis against an insurer or workers compensation fund must comply with the state notice requirement, which varies from one to six years, or the insurer's notice requirement set forth in the policy. United States v. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 979 (1972).

(4) The statute of limitations is tolled or does not start running until the responsible federal official is notified of the existence of a recoverable loss, Jankowitz v. United States, 533 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1976), United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 96 (D. Del. 1986). The responsible federal official can be the area claims office (ACO), the claims processing office (CPO), a command claims service or USARCS, depending on who receives the notice under this regulation. However, because of the responsibility to notify the MTF or TRICARE fiscal intermediary, and by regulation the notice must be expeditious, delayed notification could start the statute of limitations running. Additionally, when an ACO or CPO discovers the existence of an assertion, the statute of limitations will begin to run regardless of when the MTF or the TRICARE intermediary sends a notice. The date of receipt of a notice must be entered into the affirmative claims management program/database (ACMP) and the notice must be date-stamped and initialed.