(a) Preliminary safety analysis report. Each application for a construction permit shall include a preliminary safety analysis report. The minimum information[5] to be included shall consist of the following:
(1) Stationary power reactor applicants for a construction permit who apply on or after January 10, 1997, shall comply with paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section. All other applicants for a construction permit shall comply with paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section.
(i) A description and safety assessment of the site on which the facility is to be located, with appropriate attention to features affecting facility design. Special attention should be directed to the site evaluation factors identified in part 100 of this chapter. The assessment must contain an analysis and evaluation of the major structures, systems and components of the facility which bear significantly on the acceptability of the site under the site evaluation factors identified in part 100 of this chapter, assuming that the facility will be operated at the ultimate power level which is contemplated by the applicant. With respect to operation at the projected initial power level, the applicant is required to submit information prescribed in paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(8) of this section, as well as the information required by this paragraph, in support of the application for a construction permit, or a design approval.
(ii) A description and safety assessment of the site and a safety assessment of the facility. It is expected that reactors will reflect through their design, construction and operation an extremely low probability for accidents that could result in the release of significant quantities of radioactive fission products. The following power reactor design characteristics and proposed operation will be taken into consideration by the Commission:
(A) Intended use of the reactor including the proposed maximum power level and the nature and inventory of contained radioactive materials;
(B) The extent to which generally accepted engineering standards are applied to the design of the reactor;
(C) The extent to which the reactor incorporates unique, unusual or enhanced safety features having a significant bearing on the probability or consequences of accidental release of radioactive materials;
(D) The safety features that are to be engineered into the facility and those barriers that must be breached as a result of an accident before a release of radioactive material to the environment can occur. Special attention must be directed to plant design features intended to mitigate the radiological consequences of accidents. In performing this assessment, an applicant shall assume a fission product release[6] from the core into the containment assuming that the facility is operated at the ultimate power level contemplated. The applicant shall perform an evaluation and analysis of the postulated fission product release, using the expected demonstrable containment leak rate and any fission product cleanup systems intended to mitigate the consequences of the accidents, together with applicable site characteristics, including site meteorology, to evaluate the offsite radiological consequences. Site characteristics must comply with part 100 of this chapter. The evaluation must determine that:
(1) An individual located at any point on the boundary of the exclusion area for any 2 hour period following the onset of the postulated fission product release, would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 25 rem[7] total effective dose equivalent (TEDE).
(2) An individual located at any point on the outer boundary of the low population zone, who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire period of its passage) would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 25 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE);
(E) With respect to operation at the projected initial power level, the applicant is required to submit information prescribed in paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(8) of this section, as well as the information required by paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, in support of the application for a construction permit.
(2) A summary description and discussion of the facility, with special attention to design and operating characteristics, unusual or novel design features, and principal safety considerations.
(3) The preliminary design of the facility including:
(i) The principal design criteria for the facility.[8] Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, establishes minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants similar in design and location to plants for which construction permits have previously been issued by the Commission and provides guidance to applicants for construction permits in establishing principal design criteria for other types of nuclear power units;
(ii) The design bases and the relation of the design bases to the principal design criteria;
(iii) Information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and approximate dimensions, sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases with adequate margin for safety.
(4) A preliminary analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components of the facility with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility and including determination of the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the facility, and the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents. Analysis and evaluation of ECCS cooling performance and the need for high point vents following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents must be performed in accordance with the requirements of § 50.46 and § 50.46a of this part for facilities for which construction permits may be issued after December 28, 1974.
(5) An identification and justification for the selection of those variables, conditions, or other items which are determined as the result of preliminary safety analysis and evaluation to be probable subjects of technical specifications for the facility, with special attention given to those items which may significantly influence the final design: Provided, however, That this requirement is not applicable to an application for a construction permit filed prior to January 16, 1969.
(6) A preliminary plan for the applicant's organization, training of personnel, and conduct of operations.
(7) A description of the quality assurance program to be applied to the design, fabrication, construction, and testing of the structures, systems, and components of the facility. Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” sets forth the requirements for quality assurance programs for nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing plants. The description of the quality assurance program for a nuclear power plant or a fuel reprocessing plant shall include a discussion of how the applicable requirements of appendix B will be satisfied.
(8) An identification of those structures, systems, or components of the facility, if any, which require research and development to confirm the adequacy of their design; and identification and description of the research and development program which will be conducted to resolve any safety questions associated with such structures, systems or components; and a schedule of the research and development program showing that such safety questions will be resolved at or before the latest date stated in the application for completion of construction of the facility.
(9) The technical qualifications of the applicant to engage in the proposed activities in accordance with the regulations in this chapter.
(10) A discussion of the applicant's preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Appendix E sets forth items which shall be included in these plans.
(11) On or after February 5, 1979, applicants who apply for construction permits for nuclear power plants to be built on multiunit sites shall identify potential hazards to the structures, systems and components important to safety of operating nuclear facilities from construction activities. A discussion shall also be included of any managerial and administrative controls that will be used during construction to assure the safety of the operating unit.
(12) On or after January 10, 1997, stationary power reactor applicants who apply for a construction permit, as partial conformance to General Design Criterion 2 of appendix A to this part, shall comply with the earthquake engineering criteria in appendix S to this part.
(13) On or after July 13, 2009, power reactor applicants who apply for a construction permit shall submit the information required by 10 CFR 50.150(b) as a part of their preliminary safety analysis report.
(b) Final safety analysis report. Each application for an operating license shall include a final safety analysis report. The final safety analysis report shall include information that describes the facility, presents the design bases and the limits on its operation, and presents a safety analysis of the structures, systems, and components and of the facility as a whole, and shall include the following:
(1) All current information, such as the results of environmental and meteorological monitoring programs, which has been developed since issuance of the construction permit, relating to site evaluation factors identified in part 100 of this chapter.
(2) A description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility, with emphasis upon performance requirements, the bases, with technical justification therefor, upon which such requirements have been established, and the evaluations required to show that safety functions will be accomplished. The description shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations.
(i) For nuclear reactors, such items as the reactor core, reactor coolant system, instrumentation and control systems, electrical systems, containment system, other engineered safety features, auxiliary and emergency systems, power conversion systems, radioactive waste handling systems, and fuel handling systems shall be discussed insofar as they are pertinent.
(ii) For facilities other than nuclear reactors, such items as the chemical, physical, metallurgical, or nuclear process to be performed, instrumentation and control systems, ventilation and filter systems, electrical systems, auxiliary and emergency systems, and radioactive waste handling systems shall be discussed insofar as they are pertinent.
(3) The kinds and quantities of radioactive materials expected to be produced in the operation and the means for controlling and limiting radioactive effluents and radiation exposures within the limits set forth in part 20 of this chapter.
(4) A final analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components with the objective stated in paragraph (a)(4) of this section and taking into account any pertinent information developed since the submittal of the preliminary safety analysis report. Analysis and evaluation of ECCS cooling performance following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of § 50.46 for facilities for which a license to operate may be issued after December 28, 1974.
(5) A description and evaluation of the results of the applicant's programs, including research and development, if any, to demonstrate that any safety questions identified at the construction permit stage have been resolved.
(6) The following information concerning facility operation:
(i) The applicant's organizational structure, allocations of responsibilities and authorities, and personnel qualifications requirements.
(ii) Managerial and administrative controls to be used to assure safe operation. Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” sets forth the requirements for such controls for nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing plants. The information on the controls to be used for a nuclear power plant or a fuel reprocessing plant shall include a discussion of how the applicable requirements of appendix B will be satisfied.
(iii) Plans for preoperational testing and initial operations.
(iv) Plans for conduct of normal operations, including maintenance, surveillance, and periodic testing of structures, systems, and components.
(v) Plans for coping with emergencies, which shall include the items specified in appendix E.
(vi) Proposed technical specifications prepared in accordance with the requirements of § 50.36.
(vii) On or after February 5, 1979, applicants who apply for operating licenses for nuclear power plants to be operated on multiunit sites shall include an evaluation of the potential hazards to the structures, systems, and components important to safety of operating units resulting from construction activities, as well as a description of the managerial and administrative controls to be used to provide assurance that the limiting conditions for operation are not exceeded as a result of construction activities at the multiunit sites.
(7) The technical qualifications of the applicant to engage in the proposed activities in accordance with the regulations in this chapter.
(8) A description and plans for implementation of an operator requalification program. The operator requalification program must as a minimum, meet the requirements for those programs contained in § 55.59 of part 55 of this chapter.
(9) A description of protection provided against pressurized thermal shock events, including projected values of the reference temperature for reactor vessel beltline materials as defined in § 50.61 (b)(1) and (b)(2).
(10) On or after January 10, 1997, stationary power reactor applicants who apply for an operating license, as partial conformance to General Design Criterion 2 of appendix A to this part, shall comply with the earthquake engineering criteria of appendix S to this part. However, for those operating license applicants and holders whose construction permit was issued before January 10, 1997, the earthquake engineering criteria in Section VI of appendix A to part 100 of this chapter continues to apply.
(11) On or after January 10, 1997, stationary power reactor applicants who apply for an operating license, shall provide a description and safety assessment of the site and of the facility as in § 50.34(a)(1)(ii). However, for either an operating license applicant or holder whose construction permit was issued before January 10, 1997, the reactor site criteria in part 100 of this chapter and the seismic and geologic siting criteria in appendix A to part 100 of this chapter continues to apply.
(12) On or after July 13, 2009, power reactor applicants who apply for an operating license which is subject to 10 CFR 50.150(a) shall submit the information required by 10 CFR 50.150(b) as a part of their final safety analysis report.
(c) Physical security plan.
(1) Each applicant for an operating license for a production or utilization facility that will be subject to §§ 73.50 and 73.60 of this chapter must include a physical security plan.
(2) Each applicant for an operating license for a utilization facility that will be subject to the requirements of § 73.55 of this chapter must include a physical security plan, a training and qualification plan in accordance with the criteria set forth in appendix B to part 73 of this chapter, and a cyber security plan in accordance with the criteria set forth in § 73.54 of this chapter.
(3) The physical security plan must describe how the applicant will meet the requirements of part 73 of this chapter (and part 11 of this chapter, if applicable, including the identification and description of jobs as required by § 11.11(a) of this chapter, at the proposed facility). Security plans must list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR parts 11 and 73, if applicable.
(d) Safeguards contingency plan.
(1) Each application for a license to operate a production or utilization facility that will be subject to §§ 73.50 and 73.60 of this chapter must include a licensee safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the criteria set forth in section I of appendix C to part 73 of this chapter. The “implementation procedures” required per section I of appendix C to part 73 of this chapter do not have to be submitted to the Commission for approval.
(2) Each application for a license to operate a utilization facility that will be subject to § 73.55 of this chapter must include a licensee safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the criteria set forth in section II of appendix C to part 73 of this chapter. The “implementing procedures” required in section II of appendix C to part 73 of this chapter do not have to be submitted to the Commission for approval.
(e) Protection against unauthorized disclosure. Each applicant for an operating license for a production or utilization facility, who prepares a physical security plan, a safeguards contingency plan, a training and qualification plan, or a cyber security plan, shall protect the plans and other related Safeguards Information against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the requirements of § 73.21 of this chapter.
(f) Additional TMI-related requirements. In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, each applicant for a light-water-reactor construction permit or manufacturing license whose application was pending as of February 16, 1982, shall meet the requirements in paragraphs (f)(1) through (3) of this section. This regulation applies to the pending applications by Duke Power Company (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), Houston Lighting & Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), Portland General Electric Company (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), Public Service Company of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), Puget Sound Power & Light Company (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), and Offshore Power Systems (License to Manufacture Floating Nuclear Plants). The number of units that will be specified in the manufacturing license above, if issued, will be that number whose start of manufacture, as defined in the license application, can practically begin within a 10-year period commencing on the date of issuance of the manufacturing license, but in no event will that number be in excess of ten. The manufacturing license will require the plant design to be updated no later than 5 years after its approval. Paragraphs (f)(1)(xii), (2)(ix), and (3)(v) of this section, pertaining to hydrogen control measures, must be met by all applicants covered by this regulation. However, the Commission may decide to impose additional requirements and the issue of whether compliance with these provisions, together with 10 CFR 50.44 and criterion 50 of appendix A to 10 CFR part 50, is sufficient for issuance of that manufacturing license which may be considered in the manufacturing license proceeding. In addition, each applicant for a design certification, design approval, combined license, or manufacturing license under part 52 of this chapter shall demonstrate compliance with the technically relevant portions of the requirements in paragraphs (f)(1) through (3) of this section, except for paragraphs (f)(1)(xii), (f)(2)(ix), and (f)(3)(v).
(1) To satisfy the following requirements, the application shall provide sufficient information to describe the nature of the studies, how they are to be conducted, estimated submittal dates, and a program to ensure that the results of these studies are factored into the final design of the facility. For licensees identified in the introduction to paragraph (f) of this section, all studies must be completed no later than 2 years following the issuance of the construction permit or manufacturing license.[10] For all other applicants, the studies must be submitted as part of the final safety analysis report.
(i) Perform a plant/site specific probabilistic risk assessment, the aim of which is to seek such improvements in the reliability of core and containment heat removal systems as are significant and practical and do not impact excessively on the plant. (II.B.8)
(ii) Perform an evaluation of the proposed auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS), to include (applicable to PWR's only) (II.E.1.1):
(A) A simplified AFWS reliability analysis using event-tree and fault-tree logic techniques.
(B) A design review of AFWS.
(C) An evaluation of AFWS flow design bases and criteria.
(iii) Perform an evaluation of the potential for and impact of reactor coolant pump seal damage following small-break LOCA with loss of offsite power. If damage cannot be precluded, provide an analysis of the limiting small-break loss-of-coolant accident with subsequent reactor coolant pump seal damage. (II.K.2.16 and II.K.3.25)
(iv) Perform an analysis of the probability of a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) caused by a stuck-open power-operated relief valve (PORV). If this probability is a significant contributor to the probability of small-break LOCA's from all causes, provide a description and evaluation of the effect on small-break LOCA probability of an automatic PORV isolation system that would operate when the reactor coolant system pressure falls after the PORV has opened. (Applicable to PWR's only). (II.K.3.2)
(v) Perform an evaluation of the safety effectiveness of providing for separation of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system initiation levels so that the RCIC system initiates at a higher water level than the HPCI system, and of providing that both systems restart on low water level. (For plants with high pressure core spray systems in lieu of high pressure coolant injection systems, substitute the words, “high pressure core spray” for “high pressure coolant injection” and “HPCS” for “HPCI”) (Applicable to BWR's only). (II.K.3.13)
(vi) Perform a study to identify practicable system modifications that would reduce challenges and failures of relief valves, without compromising the performance of the valves or other systems. (Applicable to BWR's only). (II.K.3.16)
(vii) Perform a feasibility and risk assessment study to determine the optimum automatic depressurization system (ADS) design modifications that would eliminate the need for manual activation to ensure adequate core cooling. (Applicable to BWR's only). (II.K.3.18)
(viii) Perform a study of the effect on all core-cooling modes under accident conditions of designing the core spray and low pressure coolant injection systems to ensure that the systems will automatically restart on loss of water level, after having been manually stopped, if an initiation signal is still present. (Applicable to BWR's only). (II.K.3.21)
(ix) Perform a study to determine the need for additional space cooling to ensure reliable long-term operation of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) systems, following a complete loss of offsite power to the plant for at least two (2) hours. (For plants with high pressure core spray systems in lieu of high pressure coolant injection systems, substitute the words, “high pressure core spray” for “high pressure coolant injection” and “HPCS” for “HPCI”) (Applicable to BWR's only). (II.K.3.24)
(x) Perform a study to ensure that the Automatic Depressurization System, valves, accumulators, and associated equipment and instrumentation will be capable of performing their intended functions during and following an accident situation, taking no credit for non-safety related equipment or instrumentation, and accounting for normal expected air (or nitrogen) leakage through valves. (Applicable to BWR's only). (II.K.3.28)
(xi) Provide an evaluation of depressurization methods, other than by full actuation of the automatic depressurization system, that would reduce the possibility of exceeding vessel integrity limits during rapid cooldown. (Applicable to BWR's only) (II.K.3.45)
(xii) Perform an evaluation of alternative hydrogen control systems that would satisfy the requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(ix) of this section. As a minimum include consideration of a hydrogen ignition and post-accident inerting system. The evaluation shall include:
(A) A comparison of costs and benefits of the alternative systems considered.
(B) For the selected system, analyses and test data to verify compliance with the requirements of (f)(2)(ix) of this section.
(C) For the selected system, preliminary design descriptions of equipment, function, and layout.
(2) To satisfy the following requirements, the application shall provide sufficient information to demonstrate that the required actions will be satisfactorily completed by the operating license stage. This information is of the type customarily required to satisfy 10 CFR 50.35(a)(2) or to address unresolved generic safety issues.
(i) Provide simulator capability that correctly models the control room and includes the capability to simulate small-break LOCA's. (Applicable to construction permit applicants only) (I.A.4.2.)
(ii) Establish a program, to begin during construction and follow into operation, for integrating and expanding current efforts to improve plant procedures. The scope of the program shall include emergency procedures, reliability analyses, human factors engineering, crisis management, operator training, and coordination with INPO and other industry efforts. (Applicable to construction permit applicants only) (I.C.9)
(iii) Provide, for Commission review, a control room design that reflects state-of-the-art human factor principles prior to committing to fabrication or revision of fabricated control room panels and layouts. (I.D.1)
(iv) Provide a plant safety parameter display console that will display to operators a minimum set of parameters defining the safety status of the plant, capable of displaying a full range of important plant parameters and data trends on demand, and capable of indicating when process limits are being approached or exceeded. (I.D.2)
(v) Provide for automatic indication of the bypassed and operable status of safety systems. (I.D.3)
(vi) Provide the capability of high point venting of noncondensible gases from the reactor coolant system, and other systems that may be required to maintain adequate core cooling. Systems to achieve this capability shall be capable of being operated from the control room and their operation shall not lead to an unacceptable increase in the probability of loss-of-coolant accident or an unacceptable challenge to containment integrity. (II.B.1)
(vii) Perform radiation and shielding design reviews of spaces around systems that may, as a result of an accident, contain accident source term[11] radioactive materials, and design as necessary to permit adequate access to important areas and to protect safety equipment from the radiation environment. (II.B.2)
(viii) Provide a capability to promptly obtain and analyze samples from the reactor coolant system and containment that may contain accident source term11 radioactive materials without radiation exposures to any individual exceeding 5 rems to the whole body or 50 rems to the extremities. Materials to be analyzed and quantified include certain radionuclides that are indicators of the degree of core damage (e.g., noble gases, radioiodines and cesiums, and nonvolatile isotopes), hydrogen in the containment atmosphere, dissolved gases, chloride, and boron concentrations. (II.B.3)
(ix) Provide a system for hydrogen control that can safely accommodate hydrogen generated by the equivalent of a 100% fuel-clad metal water reaction. Preliminary design information on the tentatively preferred system option of those being evaluated in paragraph (f)(1)(xii) of this section is sufficient at the construction permit stage. The hydrogen control system and associated systems shall provide, with reasonable assurance, that: (II.B.8)
(A) Uniformly distributed hydrogen concentrations in the containment do not exceed 10% during and following an accident that releases an equivalent amount of hydrogen as would be generated from a 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction, or that the post-accident atmosphere will not support hydrogen combustion.
(B) Combustible concentrations of hydrogen will not collect in areas where unintended combustion or detonation could cause loss of containment integrity or loss of appropriate mitigating features.
(C) Equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown of the plant and maintaining containment integrity will perform its safety function during and after being exposed to the environmental conditions attendant with the release of hydrogen generated by the equivalent of a 100% fuel-clad metal water reaction including the environmental conditions created by activation of the hydrogen control system.
(D) If the method chosen for hydrogen control is a post-accident inerting system, inadvertent actuation of the system can be safely accommodated during plant operation.
(x) Provide a test program and associated model development and conduct tests to qualify reactor coolant system relief and safety valves and, for PWR's, PORV block valves, for all fluid conditions expected under operating conditions, transients and accidents. Consideration of anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) conditions shall be included in the test program. Actual testing under ATWS conditions need not be carried out until subsequent phases of the test program are developed. (II.D.1)
(xi) Provide direct indication of relief and safety valve position (open or closed) in the control room. (II.D.3)
(xii) Provide automatic and manual auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system initiation, and provide auxiliary feedwater system flow indication in the control room. (Applicable to PWR's only) (II.E.1.2)
(xiii) Provide pressurizer heater power supply and associated motive and control power interfaces sufficient to establish and maintain natural circulation in hot standby conditions with only onsite power available. (Applicable to PWR's only) (II.E.3.1)
(xiv) Provide containment isolation systems that: (II.E.4.2)
(A) Ensure all non-essential systems are isolated automatically by the containment isolation system,
(B) For each non-essential penetration (except instrument lines) have two isolation barriers in series,
(C) Do not result in reopening of the containment isolation valves on resetting of the isolation signal,
(D) Utilize a containment set point pressure for initiating containment isolation as low as is compatible with normal operation,
(E) Include automatic closing on a high radiation signal for all systems that provide a path to the environs.
(xv) Provide a capability for containment purging/venting designed to minimize the purging time consistent with ALARA principles for occupational exposure. Provide and demonstrate high assurance that the purge system will reliably isolate under accident conditions. (II.E.4.4)
(xvi) Establish a design criterion for the allowable number of actuation cycles of the emergency core cooling system and reactor protection system consistent with the expected occurrence rates of severe overcooling events (considering both anticipated transients and accidents). (Applicable to B&W designs only). (II.E.5.1)
(xvii) Provide instrumentation to measure, record and readout in the control room:
(A) containment pressure,
(B) containment water level,
(C) containment hydrogen concentration,
(D) containment radiation intensity (high level), and
(E) noble gas effluents at all potential, accident release points. Provide for continuous sampling of radioactive iodines and particulates in gaseous effluents from all potential accident release points, and for onsite capability to analyze and measure these samples. (II.F.1)
(xviii) Provide instruments that provide in the control room an unambiguous indication of inadequate core cooling, such as primary coolant saturation meters in PWR's, and a suitable combination of signals from indicators of coolant level in the reactor vessel and in-core thermocouples in PWR's and BWR's. (II.F.2)
(xix) Provide instrumentation adequate for monitoring plant conditions following an accident that includes core damage. (II.F.3)
(xx) Provide power supplies for pressurizer relief valves, block valves, and level indicators such that:
(A) Level indicators are powered from vital buses;
(B) motive and control power connections to the emergency power sources are through devices qualified in accordance with requirements applicable to systems important to safety and
(C) electric power is provided from emergency power sources. (Applicable to PWR's only). (II.G.1)
(xxi) Design auxiliary heat removal systems such that necessary automatic and manual actions can be taken to ensure proper functioning when the main feedwater system is not operable. (Applicable to BWR's only). (II.K.1.22)
(xxii) Perform a failure modes and effects analysis of the integrated control system (ICS) to include consideration of failures and effects of input and output signals to the ICS. (Applicable to B&W-designed plants only). (II.K.2.9)
(xxiii) Provide, as part of the reactor protection system, an anticipatory reactor trip that would be actuated on loss of main feedwater and on turbine trip. (Applicable to B&W-designed plants only). (II.K.2.10)
(xxiv) Provide the capability to record reactor vessel water level in one location on recorders that meet normal post-accident recording requirements. (Applicable to BWR's only). (II.K.3.23)
(xxv) Provide an onsite Technical Support Center, an onsite Operational Support Center, and, for construction permit applications only, a nearsite Emergency Operations Facility. (III.A.1.2).
(xxvi) Provide for leakage control and detection in the design of systems outside containment that contain (or might contain) accident source term11 radioactive materials following an accident. Applicants shall submit a leakage control program, including an initial test program, a schedule for re-testing these systems, and the actions to be taken for minimizing leakage from such systems. The goal is to minimize potential exposures to workers and public, and to provide reasonable assurance that excessive leakage will not prevent the use of systems needed in an emergency. (III.D.1.1)
(xxvii) Provide for monitoring of inplant radiation and airborne radioactivity as appropriate for a broad range of routine and accident conditions. (III.D.3.3)
(xxviii) Evaluate potential pathways for radioactivity and radiation that may lead to control room habitability problems under accident conditions resulting in an accident source term11 release, and make necessary design provisions to preclude such problems. (III.D.3.4)
(3) To satisfy the following requirements, the application shall provide sufficient information to demonstrate that the requirement has been met. This information is of the type customarily required to satisfy paragraph (a)(1) of this section or to address the applicant's technical qualifications and management structure and competence.
(i) Provide administrative procedures for evaluating operating, design and construction experience and for ensuring that applicable important industry experiences will be provided in a timely manner to those designing and constructing the plant. (I.C.5)
(ii) Ensure that the quality assurance (QA) list required by Criterion II, app. B, 10 CFR part 50 includes all structures, systems, and components important to safety. (I.F.1)
(iii) Establish a quality assurance (QA) program based on consideration of:
(A) Ensuring independence of the organization performing checking functions from the organization responsible for performing the functions;
(B) performing quality assurance/quality control functions at construction sites to the maximum feasible extent;
(C) including QA personnel in the documented review of and concurrence in quality related procedures associated with design, construction and installation;
(D) establishing criteria for determining QA programmatic requirements;
(E) establishing qualification requirements for QA and QC personnel;
(F) sizing the QA staff commensurate with its duties and responsibilities;
(G) establishing procedures for maintenance of “as-built” documentation; and
(H) providing a QA role in design and analysis activities. (I.F.2)
(iv) Provide one or more dedicated containment penetrations, equivalent in size to a single 3-foot diameter opening, in order not to preclude future installation of systems to prevent containment failure, such as a filtered vented containment system. (II.B.8)
(v) Provide preliminary design information at a level of detail consistent with that normally required at the construction permit stage of review sufficient to demonstrate that: (II.B.8)
(A)
(1) Containment integrity will be maintained (i.e., for steel containments by meeting the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, subarticle NE-3220, Service Level C Limits, except that evaluation of instability is not required, considering pressure and dead load alone. For concrete containments by meeting the requirements of the ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 2 subarticle CC-3720, Factored Load Category, considering pressure and dead load alone) during an accident that releases hydrogen generated from 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction accompanied by either hydrogen burning or the added pressure from post-accident inerting assuming carbon dioxide is the inerting agent. As a minimum, the specific code requirements set forth above appropriate for each type of containment will be met for a combination of dead load and an internal pressure of 45 psig. Modest deviations from these criteria will be considered by the staff, if good cause is shown by an applicant. Systems necessary to ensure containment integrity shall also be demonstrated to perform their function under these conditions.
(2) Subarticle NE-3220, Division 1, and subarticle CC-3720, Division 2, of section III of the July 1, 1980 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which are referenced in paragraphs (f)(3)(v)(A)(1) and (f)(3)(v)(B)(1) of this section, were approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Office of the Federal Register. A notice of any changes made to the material incorporated by reference will be published in the Federal Register. Copies of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code may be purchased from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, United Engineering Center, 345 East 47th St., New York, NY 10017. It is also available for inspection at the NRC Library, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738.
(B)
(1) Containment structure loadings produced by an inadvertent full actuation of a post-accident inerting hydrogen control system (assuming carbon dioxide), but not including seismic or design basis accident loadings will not produce stresses in steel containments in excess of the limits set forth in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, subarticle NE-3220, Service Level A Limits, except that evaluation of instability is not required (for concrete containments the loadings specified above will not produce strains in the containment liner in excess of the limits set forth in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 2, subarticle CC-3720, Service Load Category,
(2) The containment has the capability to safely withstand pressure tests at 1.10 and 1.15 times (for steel and concrete containments, respectively) the pressure calculated to result from carbon dioxide inerting.
(vi) For plant designs with external hydrogen recombiners, provide redundant dedicated containment penetrations so that, assuming a single failure, the recombiner systems can be connected to the containment atmosphere. (II.E.4.1)
(vii) Provide a description of the management plan for design and construction activities, to include:
(A) The organizational and management structure singularly responsible for direction of design and construction of the proposed plant;
(B) technical resources director by the applicant;
(C) details of the interaction of design and construction within the applicant's organization and the manner by which the applicant will ensure close integration of the architect engineer and the nuclear steam supply vendor;
(D) proposed procedures for handling the transition to operation;
(E) the degree of top level management oversight and technical control to be exercised by the applicant during design and construction, including the preparation and implementation of procedures necessary to guide the effort. (II.J.3.1)
(g) Combustible gas control. All applicants for a reactor construction permit or operating license whose application is submitted after October 16, 2003, shall include the analyses, and the descriptions of the equipment and systems required by § 50.44 as a part of their application.
(h) Conformance with the Standard Review Plan (SRP).
(1)
(i) Applications for light water cooled nuclear power plant operating licenses docketed after May 17, 1982 shall include an evaluation of the facility against the Standard Review Plan (SRP) in effect on May 17, 1982 or the SRP revision in effect six months prior to the docket date of the application, whichever is later.
(ii) Applications for light-water-cooled nuclear power plant construction permits docketed after May 17, 1982, shall include an evaluation of the facility against the SRP in effect on May 17, 1982, or the SRP revision in effect six months before the docket date of the application, whichever is later.
(2) The evaluation required by this section shall include an identification and description of all differences in design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for a facility and those corresponding features, techniques, and measures given in the SRP acceptance criteria. Where such a difference exists, the evaluation shall discuss how the alternative proposed provides an acceptable method of complying with those rules or regulations of Commission, or portions thereof, that underlie the corresponding SRP acceptance criteria.
(3) The SRP was issued to establish criteria that the NRC staff intends to use in evaluating whether an applicant/licensee meets the Commission's regulations. The SRP is not a substitute for the regulations, and compliance is not a requirement. Applicants shall identify differences from the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the Commission's regulations.
(i) Mitigation of beyond-design-basis events. Each application for a power reactor operating license under this part must include the applicant's plans for implementing the requirements of § 50.155, including a schedule for achieving full compliance with these requirements and a description of the equipment upon which the strategies and guidelines required by § 50.155(b)(1) rely, including the planned locations of the equipment and how the equipment meets the requirements of § 50.155(c).
[33 FR 18612, Dec. 17, 1968]